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Abstract 
 
Displaced by the Syrian civil war and seeking refuge in the cities of Amman and Beirut, Syrian refugee 
women face a multitude of complex legal, security, and cultural structures as they attempt to 
negotiate new lives for themselves. Typically, urban refugee women are overlooked or homogenised 
into wider descriptions of the situation of refugees.  When they are considered as a separate group, 
they are hemmed into narratives of ‘empowerment’ through their changing gender roles or ‘victims’ 
of the wider structures of conflict, flight and refuge. As a result, there is a lack of insight into the 
complexity of these women’s daily, lived experiences, their tactical agency in the face of the powerful 
structures which shape their lives, and in particular their perceptions and engagement with scalar 
issues of protection and security in their host cities. Foregrounding the lived experiences of 
participants through a range of qualitative methods, this thesis explores the relationship between 
identity, security and space in order to examine the realities of life in the city for Syrian refugee 
women.  
This thesis uses a comparative case study approach, and a range of literatures, including critical 
realism, intersectionality, tactical agency and feminist geopolitics, in order to highlight how different 
structures interact with refugee women’s identities to shape differing experiences of (in)security. 
Whilst policies pertaining to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon are not gendered at the state level, 
in the micro day-to-day, the law shapes refugees’ experience in differentiated and gendered ways and 
has gendered consequences. This results in refugee women occupying a landscape of permitted or 
prohibited spaces based on policies and legal documentation, which intersect with structural issues of 
gender and patriarchy. Women negotiate these permitted and prohibited spaces through a range of 
active and passive tactics, using their agency and the interaction of their various identities in 
considered ways in order to enhance their mobility, social positioning and wider security in their host 
cities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Contents 
Abstract __________________________________________________________________ 2 
Acknowledgments and thanks_________________________________________________ 6 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ____________________________________________ 8 
List of terms _______________________________________________________________ 9 
List of Figures & Tables _____________________________________________________ 10 
A note on Language and Arabic terms _________________________________________ 11 
Chapter One: Introduction ___________________________________________________ 12 
A Research Project _____________________________________________________________ 14 
The Syrian Civil War, the Ensuing refugee crisis and UNHCR _____________________________ 18 
A note on Language and Terminology ______________________________________________________ 21 
Outline of Chapters _____________________________________________________________ 22 
Chapter Two: Identity, Structure/Agency and Public/Private Space __________________ 25 
The need for Feminist Research ___________________________________________________ 25 
Gender, Structure and Agency ____________________________________________________ 26 
Critical Realism and Structure and Agency __________________________________________________ 28 
A Critical Realist Approach to Identity & Intersectionality ______________________________________ 30 
Patriarchy, Gender and Society in the Middle East ____________________________________ 37 
Kinship, gender and the state in the Middle East _____________________________________________ 38 
Gender and Agency in the Middle East _____________________________________________________ 41 
Structure and agency and de Certeau’s theory of tactics and strategy ____________________________ 43 
Tactics, Strategies and Space _____________________________________________________________ 44 
Public and Private Space _________________________________________________________ 45 
Gender & Public/Private Space ___________________________________________________________ 47 
Gender and Space in the Middle East ______________________________________________________ 50 
Gender & Space in Amman and Beirut ___________________________________________________ 53 
Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 55 
Chapter Three: Urban Refugees, Gender and (In)security __________________________ 56 
Defining Urban Refugees ________________________________________________________ 57 
(In)security and Urban refugees ___________________________________________________ 59 
Shelter, Livelihoods and Changing Gender Roles _____________________________________________ 59 
Urban Refugees Legal Status and Protection ________________________________________________ 61 
Urban Refugees, Conflict Management and Access to Security and Justice Institutions ______________ 62 
Host Community & Urban Refugee Relationships ____________________________________________ 65 
Syrian Refugee women in urban settings ___________________________________________________ 67 
Theorising urban refugees’ experiences of (in)security _________________________________ 68 
Feminist Geopolitical approaches to (in)security _____________________________________________ 68 
Feminist geolegality ____________________________________________________________________ 73 
Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 76 
Chapter Four: Jordan and Lebanon and their refugee policies ______________________ 78 
Theorising Strong and Weak States in the Arab World _________________________________ 78 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan _________________________________________________ 79 
Jordan, Syria and the Arab Uprisings _______________________________________________________ 81 
Security Framework in Jordan ____________________________________________________________ 82 
4 
 
Urban Planning and Public Space in Amman ________________________________________________ 83 
The Lebanese Republic __________________________________________________________ 85 
Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings __________________________________________________________ 86 
Security Framework in Lebanon __________________________________________________________ 87 
Urban Planning and Public Space in Beirut __________________________________________________ 88 
Summary: state and security structures of Jordan and Lebanon _________________________________ 90 
Jordanian and Lebanese state policies towards Syrian refugees __________________________ 91 
Jordanian State policy regarding Syrian Refugees ____________________________________________ 91 
Rights & Labour opportunities for Self-Settled Syrian Refugees in Jordan _______________________ 93 
Lebanese State policy regarding Syrian refugees _____________________________________________ 94 
Rights & Labour opportunities for Self-Settled Syrian Refugees in Lebanon _____________________ 97 
Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ 97 
Chapter 5: Methodology ____________________________________________________ 99 
Theoretical Framing ____________________________________________________________ 99 
Research Aim and Questions ____________________________________________________________ 101 
Comparison, specificity and generalising __________________________________________________ 102 
Comparing Amman and Beirut __________________________________________________________ 104 
Research Neighbourhoods ______________________________________________________________ 105 
Beirut ____________________________________________________________________________ 106 
Amman ___________________________________________________________________________ 106 
Methods of data collection and analysis ___________________________________________ 108 
Participant Selection __________________________________________________________________ 108 
Focus Group Discussions and Interviews __________________________________________________ 109 
Challenges relating to FGD’s and Interviews ________________________________________________ 110 
Solicited Diaries ______________________________________________________________________ 111 
Participatory Cognitive Mapping _________________________________________________________ 112 
Additional Interviews __________________________________________________________________ 113 
Table 1: List of Interview Participants _____________________________________________________ 114 
Coding and Analysis ___________________________________________________________________ 114 
Access ______________________________________________________________________ 115 
Working with Interpreters ______________________________________________________________ 116 
Non-Government Organisations and Charities ______________________________________________ 117 
Community Contacts __________________________________________________________________ 118 
Ethics & Positionality __________________________________________________________ 119 
Consent _____________________________________________________________________________ 120 
Positionality and Ethical Concerns in the Field ______________________________________________ 120 
Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________ 127 
Chapter Six: Gendered (in)securities of shelter and livelihoods _____________________ 128 
Refugee tactics and decisions on where to seek asylum _______________________________ 130 
Negotiating arrival and refugee status ____________________________________________________ 134 
Lebanon’s refugee policies and kafala __________________________________________________ 134 
Jordanian refugee policies and kafala ___________________________________________________ 137 
Self-Settling in the City: Shelter, Livelihoods and Employment __________________________ 139 
Shelter Conditions in Refugee-receiving neighbourhoods _____________________________________ 141 
Shelter & Housing in Beirut _____________________________________________________________ 143 
Shelter & Housing in Amman ____________________________________________________________ 146 
Livelihoods, work and gender in the city ___________________________________________ 149 
Employment and Livelihoods in Beirut ____________________________________________________ 150 
Employment and Livelihoods in Amman ___________________________________________________ 152 
Refugee women and work: ‘empowerment’, exhaustion and exploitation _________________ 154 
5 
 
Gendered coping mechanisms in host communities __________________________________ 160 
Family abandonment, patriarchy and polygamy ____________________________________________ 162 
Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________ 166 
Chapter Seven: Negotiating public space and the hegemonic gaze _________________ 170 
Daily life, gender and mobility in public space _______________________________________ 171 
Socio-economic status and public spaces __________________________________________________ 172 
Navigating humanitarian aid ____________________________________________________________ 177 
Social Relationships, Belonging and Mobility _______________________________________________ 179 
Verbal and physical harassment in public space _____________________________________________ 187 
Public sexual harassment and sexual propositioning _________________________________________ 191 
Tactics of appearance, behaviour and mobility in public space __________________________ 195 
Dress and Harassment _________________________________________________________________ 195 
Tactics of Feminine Behaviour and Invisibility ______________________________________________ 201 
Chaperoning: The Tactic of Company _____________________________________________________ 202 
Temporality, Kinship and Mobility ________________________________________________ 205 
Temporality & Restriction ______________________________________________________________ 205 
Female relatives, mobility and temporality ______________________________________________ 213 
Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________ 215 
Chapter Eight: (In)security, conflict resolution and mobility in Amman and Beirut _____ 218 
Experiences in Syria shaping fears of public space and security institutions ________________ 219 
Legality, Space and (in)security in Amman and Beirut _________________________________ 221 
Legality, mobility and security in Beirut ___________________________________________________ 221 
Legality, mobility and security in Amman __________________________________________________ 230 
Refugee women, mobility and state security in Amman and Beirut ______________________ 237 
Political parties as alternative conflict management and security provision ________________ 238 
Political parties in Beirut ________________________________________________________ 238 
Political Parties in Amman ______________________________________________________ 245 
Mukhtars, Community Leaders and Religious Institutions as alternative conflict mediation in Beirut 
and Amman __________________________________________________________________ 247 
Gender, Tactics and Conflict Resolution ____________________________________________ 250 
Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________ 256 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion: (in)security and urban refugee women __________________ 259 
Answering the Research Questions _______________________________________________ 260 
Cross-cutting themes __________________________________________________________ 263 
Particularities and Contributions from Research Findings ______________________________ 270 
Bibliography _____________________________________________________________ 275 
APPENDIX _______________________________________________________________ 307 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
Acknowledgments and thanks 
Without the agreement of numerous refugee women to share their stories, this project wouldn’t have 
taken shape. Their openness, trust and willingness to share their experiences and their time, made 
this research possible. My first thanks and acknowledgments belong to them. I hope I do your lives 
and realities justice.  
To my supervisors Stephen Connelly and Paula Meth, and before my project was recalibrated, Berna 
Keskin. Thank you for all your patience and hard work in getting me to this point. I suspect I would 
have bowed out on numerous occasions if I hadn’t received such mammoth and encouraging support 
from you over the past few years. Thank you for reaffirming me and this project during my countless 
panics and for making this such an enjoyable experience.  
To my incredible family and friends who have listened, smiled, hugged, proof-read, babysat, skyped, 
messaged, encouraged and supported me through countless confusing issues and a PhD process that 
felt never ending. I am grateful to have so many wonderful people in my life. Special thanks to my 
lovely parents who have always advocated education, personal faith and personal relationships as 
building blocks for life and who made countless sacrifices for their children to have the best future 
possible.    
Thank you to my lovely friend Deema, whose bright, beautiful and sunny nature, amazing hospitality 
and constant ability to be a deep friend despite all her own responsibilities has been constant in this 
PhD journey. Thank you so much for all your insight and help. I am only sorry that we will never be 
able to enjoy your Syria together.  
Thank you to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Sheffield, my academic home base for 
both my MA and my PhD and to the Issam Fares Institute at AUB, for kindly opening your doors to me 
when I was in Beirut. To the ESRC and White Rose Fellowship, thank you for your generous financial 
support and bursaries. Your maternity policy, in particular, made it possible for me to suspend work, 
experience family life and return to my studies.  
To my fellow students, and the creators and facilitators, of the Newton Project WITS-Sheffield 
exchange. Your advice, openness, support, feedback and authenticity made a huge difference to my 
journey. Thank you for creating some of my favourite PhD memories and for making it so enjoyable 
to work alongside you.  
7 
 
To my two wonderful translators-interpreters-research assistants-cultural ambassadors. In each of 
your context you were a key for me. Thank you for your kindness, hospitality, patience and flexibility. 
For sitting with me on dusty floors in the freezing cold and the sweaty heat. Thank you for 
painstakingly and professionally translating harsh and heart-breaking accounts with respect and 
consideration. Thank you for opening up your homes and cities to me and for making me feel so 
welcome. I feel that I learnt so much from spending time with you both.   
Alongside my translators, this project would have been very challenging without the support and 
assistance of a number of NGOs and community contacts who kindly took an interest in my research 
and assisted in setting up interviews and focus groups. Thank you so much for your time, effort and 
energy in helping this project.  
To my wonderful husband, Howard, who has made all the difference. There are not enough words 
that could express my love and appreciation to you for all your support and encouragement. To my 
daughter Beatrice. Light of my life, nothing has ever made me focus more, or understand more. And 
lastly, to the little one on the way, who has kept me company as I’ve written up over these past 
months, I can’t wait to meet you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms  
 
3RP: Regional refugee and resilience plan  
FGD: Focus group discussion  
GID: General Intelligence Department (Jordan)  
GBV: Gender-based violence  
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq & Syria, also referred to as Daesh  
IAF: Islamic Action Front. The political wing of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood  
ISF: Internal Security Forces (The Lebanese Police)  
LAF: Lebanese Armed Forces (The Lebanese Army) 
MOI: Ministry of Interior 
MOU: Memoranda of Understanding  
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation  
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council  
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation  
PSD: Public Security Directorate (Jordan)  
PSF: Public Security Force (Jordan)  
RTC: Right to the City, a theoretical term introduced by French Philosopher Henri Lefebvre  
SPS: Special Police Force (Jordan)  
SRAD: Syrian Refugees Affairs Directorate (Jordan)  
UN: United Nations 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme  
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNWRA: United Nations Relief and Works agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East 
WFP: World Food Programme  
YPG: Kurdish Peoples Protection Units  
 
 
 
 
9 
 
List of terms 
 
Abaya: Long, shapeless, typically black cloak that covers a woman’s neck to her face in order to 
provide modesty  
Al Dahiye: The suburbs. Neighbourhood area in the south of Beirut with strong Hezbollah presence. 
Also referred to as the Southern Suburbs 
Al Nakba: The catastrophe. Mass movement and expulsion of Palestinians following the 1947-9 
Arab-Israeli war.    
Aman: Secure  
Azeez: Powerful, respected  
Bayt: House 
Gharib: Stranger/Outsider or Foreigner  
Hijab:  Modesty scarf that covers a woman’s head and hair, leaving the face uncovered 
Jabal: Hill  
Kafala: Sponsor  
Hawajez: Security blockade or checkpoint 
Mufawadyn: Authorised, a term commonly employed to describe refugee papers or status  
Mukhtar:  A community level mayor, typically the lowest rung of local governance. Common in Syria 
& Lebanon for signing official documents (e.g birth certificates). There are usually one or two per 
neighbourhood    
Mukhabarat: Intelligence Services, often referred to as the Secret Police  
Nakba: Catastrophe 
Qawiyye: Strength  
Refoulement:  the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to 
be subjected to persecution. 
Shi’a: Branch of Islam  
Sunni: Branch of Islam   
Taghrib: Smuggled  
Wasta:  Influence or Connections  
Za’im: Leader  
 
 
10 
 
List of Figures & Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Syrian Situation Map, November 2017 (UNHCR) 
18
Figure 2: Map of Beirut with research neighbourhoods (Google Maps)
106
Figure 3: Map of Amman with research neighbourhoods 1) Basman - Hashmi Shamali & Mahata 2) Al 
Yarmouk – Ashrafyeh (Google Maps) 107
Figure 4: Map of Syria, indicating some of the main cities and settlements (Google Maps) 
126
Figure 5: Refugee participant's home in Mahata, with cooking and cleaning facilities side by side (Author)
139
Figure 6: Ad hoc electricity wiring in the neighbourhood of Na'ba (Author)
141
Figure 7: Refugee participant's home in Mazra'a made of an assemblage of materials (Author)
144
Figure 8: Overlooking high density accommodation in the neighbourhood of Ashrafyeh (Author)
155
Figure 9: Swings at a local playground in Na'ba (Author)
173
Figure 10: Refugee children play in their home in Ashrafyeh (Author)
180
Figure 11: An interchangeably public and private space that leads to refugee homes in Hashmi Shamali
193
Figure 12: One of the main streets of Na'ba (Author)
208
Figure 13: Barbed wire on the streets of Beirut (Author)
220
Figure 14: Refugee woman on the streets of Na'ba (Author
248
Figure 15: Overlooking high density dwellings in Mazra'a (Author)
255
Table 1: List of Participants 
112
11 
 
A note on Language and Arabic terms  
 
Arabic terms in this thesis have been transliterated based on the International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies (IJMES) guide. Thus, words that have a common English translation (according to the 
Miriam-Webster Dictionary), the names of individuals, political parties and places are not italicised 
(for example ‘hijab’ or ‘Ashrafyeh’). On occasion, terms have been adjusted to more accurately reflect 
dialetic pronunciation.  
For ease of understanding to the non-Arabic speaking reader, Arabic plurals are indicating using a ‘s’.  
Participants in this study expressed themselves using a combination of formal (fush’a) and colloquial 
(ammiyyat) Arabic, in the local dialects of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. These are all considered 
Levantine Arabic dialects and thus share very common similarities. Terms have been translated using 
a combination of Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian speakers of both English and Arabic in order to 
provide a greater depth of understanding.   
All transliterations are my own, checked over with an English-Arabic speaking Syrian translator. 
However, I take full responsibility for any errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Chapter One: Introduction  
 
In early 2016, over a hostel dinner of lentil soup in the Getawi district of Beirut, I chatted with my 
friend Lus, who was working as an NGO volunteer with Syrian and Palestinian refugee families in the 
southern suburbs of Beirut. The conversation had turned from a focus on housing conditions and 
refugees’ rights, to the topic of security and conflict in Beirut. In particular, the recent bombings in the 
Bourj El Barajneh neighbourhood, that had killed 89 people and injured hundreds. The terrorist group, 
Daesh (also known as the ‘Islamic State of the Levant and Iraq’: ISIS) had claimed responsibility and 
threatened further acts. Lus had spent the day working with Syrians who lived in this neighbourhood, 
and reflected on some of the comments a refugee family had made to her when she had asked them 
how safe they felt living in a neighbourhood where something so traumatic and violent had occurred: 
‘They said they weren’t worried about the bombing. But they started talking about the home that they 
were living in. It felt like it was coming down on top of them, the whole neighbourhood feels 
structurally insecure. Can you believe it? I thought they would be worried about ISIS, but they are 
actually just scared that the house is going to fall apart’.    
This conversation, and others, led me to pursue various avenues of thought about what constituted 
safety and security in such settings, about the scale of fear and insecurity and the ways in which this 
was perceived and experienced by those who were marginalised and living in structurally and socio-
economically compromised situations and locations in the city. Whilst Lus and I assumed that wider 
threats of terrorism and the uneasy political networks and militias at work within Beirut would leave 
a refugee family feeling deeply insecure, they deflected these concerns, and instead pointed to the 
materiality of their living conditions in the city and their fears that their homes would collapse on top 
of them. Day to day fears regarding their lives in the city, appeared to dominate thoughts over 
concerns of terrorism and regional power struggles.  
These discussions reflect some of the arguments from feminist geopolitical academics, who argue that 
ideas of (in)security1 need to be considered and examined not only at the scale of the state, but at 
varying scales from the global to the intimate. This enables an understanding of the lived, daily 
experiences of (in)security and the way that this is deeply related and connected to wider structures 
and identities in shaping everyday life.  This thesis brings these concerns together and examines 
refugee women’s experiences of (in)security by considering the ways in which their various 
 
1 Rather than focus on either security or insecurity as categories, this thesis is exploring the range in women’s 
experiences, thus (in)security is used as a term throughout this thesis which allows for an encompassing 
expression of women’s experiences of both security and insecurity simultaneously.  
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intersectional identities interact with legal, political and social structures to create lived experiences 
of (in)security.  
This research was motivated by a desire to deepen understanding and highlight the position of 
marginalised urban refugees displaced by the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, and as of 2020, is 
ongoing. In the spring of 2014, I witnessed Syrian refugee women begging on the streets of Istanbul, 
often with their children, using their Syrian identity documents as a means of attracting attention.  The 
war had entered its third year and felt largely forgotten by Western audiences2. The Turkish/Syrian 
border was hundreds of miles away, but the presence of these women demonstrated that refugees 
were making their way to the city, were living alongside the urban poor and desperately trying to make 
ends meet. The necessity of refugee women to beg on the street made me question the humanitarian 
and legal infrastructures in place and to consider the gendered effects of these, as women were clearly 
being exposed to insecure livelihood and negative coping mechanisms.  
The visibility of these women on the street contrasts with their invisibility in research, academia and 
policy (Hyndman, 2010). Urban refugee research has only started to gather pace in the last couple of 
decades and, as the following chapters will examine, studies on urban refugee women are even less 
common. Initially, urban refugees were shown to be a predominantly young, male and mobile 
population, who sought opportunities of betterment in the city in order to send remittances and 
support back to their families who remained settled in camps or continued to live in home countries. 
However, the urban self-settlement of Syrian refugees has been characterised by a representation of 
different genders, ages and incomes. Women, as well as men, have sought refuge from the ongoing 
war in Syria, in cities not only in the Middle East, but also further afield. In 2016, just under 50% of 
Syrian refugees were women and young girls, predominantly living in urban areas (UNHCR 3RP, 2016). 
Refugee women living in both urban areas and in camps are deeply marginalised. They face specific 
gender-based risks including endemic sexual and physical abuse, discrimination and challenges in 
accessing legal systems, work permits, health centres, schools and exclusion from peace processes 
(Ellerby, 2013; Pittaway, 2011). Refugee women have escaped extremely traumatic experiences, often 
living under a daily threat of death, injury or violence. Many have experienced the death of close 
family members, gender-based violence and the destruction and loss of their homes and belongings. 
Once in exile, many women are alienated from supportive kinship and family relations with many 
experiencing an increase in isolation, boredom and loneliness. Women in these contexts are 
vulnerable, not only in a traditional humanitarian sense of being ‘vulnerable’ to the compromise of 
 
2 By the time I commenced my PhD in Sheffield in September 2015, the plight of Syrian refugees was dominating 
headlines over the world as thousands of refugees had made the journey across the Mediterranean into Europe.    
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their human security concerns and networks, but also a wider vulnerability in regard to their mental 
health and wellbeing which is affected by the interaction of individual relational, spatial and temporal 
factors. This is an important distinction to make. ‘Vulnerability’ in humanitarian and development 
contexts is often understood in through fixed and essentialist traits and categories (Clark, 2007). It has 
been criticised for encouraging refugee communities to ‘perform powerlessness’ in order to be 
categorised and thus receive much needed assistance (Turner, 2019). The understanding of 
vulnerability within this thesis encourages a widening of the term, to include and consider not only an 
individual’s human security vulnerabilities (i.e. vulnerability of shelter, livelihood and so on) but also 
their wider relational, spatial and temporal vulnerability in their host contexts, all of which shape their 
mental wellbeing and has outcomes on their day to day lives. It encourages a holistic and individual 
view of ‘vulnerability’ that affects an individual in the everyday, rather than a fixation on categories 
and tick boxes which attempts to determine which individuals are ‘worthy’ of assistance.   
Using this understanding of vulnerability, and thus acknowledging and highlighting it, does not make 
refugee women a homogenous group of faceless victims, suffering in their day to day life in adverse 
conditions and contexts. Rather, this thesis aims to highlight how refugee women are individuals of 
capacity, capability and agency who tactically (re)negotiate their livelihoods and security in oppressive 
circumstances. Various studies have shown how women’s roles in conditions of flight and asylum are 
transformed, particularly in becoming the head of the family or the family’s sole breadwinner (El-
Masri, 2013). This is not necessarily a source of empowerment for women, as envisioned by 
humanitarian actors, but rather an encumbrance and a disruption to their preferred lives (Bangstad, 
2011; Muhanna, 2013). By examining the ways in which women’s agency operates in such contexts, 
this thesis explores ways of theorising and understanding acts of female agency in conditions of 
marginalisation and oppression in urban contexts of the peripheral world. Thus, it demonstrates a 
sensitivity to the reality of the vulnerability of women’s situations whilst also exploring their agency.   
A Research Project  
This thesis is a structural and socio-spatial analysis of urban (in)security from the perspective of  
refugee women, which seeks to understand how refugee women’s experiences and perceptions of 
(in)security in host cities of the Middle East is shaped by the relationship between categories of 
identity and structures of law, policy and societal norms. It is focused on answering the question: How 
do the social, political and legal contexts of host countries interact with the identities of Syrian refugee 
women to produce multiple scales and forms of (in)security? This question is driven by a set of 
additional, more detailed research questions:  
15 
 
• In what ways do these structures affect Syrian refugee women’s security of shelter and 
livelihoods within their host cities and how do women respond to these?  
• In what ways do these structures shape experiences of public space and urban mobility for 
Syrian refugee women and how do women respond to these?   
• How do Syrian refugee women engage with structures of formal and informal security and 
conflict resolution provision in their host cities? 
• How do Syrian refugee women experience and respond to multiple scales of (in)security, and 
what tactics do they employ in order to negotiate these structures of power?  
Drawing on a feminist critical realist ontology, which considers the world to be both socially 
constructed and real, it foregrounds the voices and experiences of refugee women, whilst exploring 
issues of structural oppression or opportunity as they interact with categories of identity. Several 
academic disciplines, including refugee studies, urban and feminist studies, and a number of different 
thematic bodies of literature, including intersectionality, public/private space, tactical agency, 
feminist geopolitics and geolegality, undergird the thesis. The network of these texts builds a working 
framework which enables an examination and comparison of the negotiations of urban (in)security 
for Syrian refugee women who have self-settled in Amman and Beirut.  
This is a complicated research project, which benefits from ‘borrowing’ from several schools of 
thought in order to theorise from different angles to aid understanding. Several of these theories are 
significantly interlinked with mutually conducive literatures, theories, ideas and constructs. For 
example, issues and theories of gender are examined across a broad spectrum of literature including 
gendered conceptions of space, structural issues of patriarchy, feminist geopolitics and geolegalities 
and gendered experiences of refugee-ness. This literature is examined and presented in a necessary 
linear format across three theoretical framework chapters. However, there are critical and productive 
relationships and connections between these bodies of literature, which are drawn upon to construct 
the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
Through an engagement with intersectionality, women’s differing identities are considered 
instrumental in understanding fluctuating experiences of space and security in such contexts. 
Considering the marginalised position of refugee women in such context, and in order to consider the 
ways in which refugee women exert their personal agency in complex, and often oppressive, 
conditions, de Certeau's (1984) theory of strategies and tactics is employed. This theory considers the 
ways in which individuals made tactical decisions which may go against the expected response, in 
order to protect themselves.  
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By focusing on the position and the knowledge held by urban refugee women, and prioritising their 
voices, this thesis echoes the calls of feminist geopolitics to dislodge notions of security from the 
monolithic and global, to the lived, everyday experiences of those living on the margins of the 
peripheral world (Hyndman, 2010, 2012). In order to understand the lived and individual experiences 
of refugees, it is important to use methods that allow for their perspectives and elevates their 
positions and voices, whilst also ensuring they are protected and not exploited or compromised. This 
research employs a range of qualitative methods that sought to prioritise participants as knowledge 
holders, emphasising the worth of their personal experiences and perspective. This included semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions, solicited diary keeping and cognitive mapping.   
This is a study that is focused on experiences of women. However, women do not exist in a vacuum, 
but are embedded in societal, political and cultural matrixes. Their position is deeply relational to 
those around them regardless of their age, gender or income. This study not only reflects on the 
experiences of women, but also those of men. In the same vein, this study, which is focused on 
experiences of Syrian refugees, also reflects on the relational networks with host communities and 
with other refugees. Thus, while centred on refugee women, (in)security and space, it has wider 
implications and knowledges about host communities, men and power.   
This thesis refers to the primary participants as ‘urban refugee women’. I am conscious of the politics 
of labelling a group in such a manner, particularly alongside theories of intersectionality which 
emphasise the individuality of experience. This term has been used for a number of reasons. Primarily 
this is because participants often defined themselves, and were defined by the wider humanitarian 
network in which they were embedded, as ‘refugee women’. Within the context of Jordan and 
Lebanon, Syrian women presented themselves during interviews and focus groups as refugees, and 
expressed frustration at the lack of care and protection they received despite this labelling. For the 
women in this study this categorisation was an important aspect of drawing attention to their 
situation, and as such I have continued to use this terminology throughout the thesis.  
Secondly, this thesis is focused on experiences of refugee-ness and the urban. The urban can be 
considered as built up areas of high density, which result in heterogenous mixing, new sites and forms 
of interaction, activities and association and thus new practices of social relationships (Sayer, 1984; 
Latham et al, 2009). It is a centre of both conflict and visible claim-making, an opportunity to stake out 
‘new politics’ (Sanyal, 2014). ‘Camp’ and ‘urban’ refugees differ in how they are either visibly and 
geographically demarked from the host community in their settlement (camp) or living and working 
alongside them in the everyday (urban). The urban brings a unique set of challenges to understanding 
refugees and their encounter, settlement and resulting experiences with the urban and urban host 
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communities is of central interest to this thesis. As such, participants are referred to as ‘urban, refugee 
women’ to provide a shorthand framework in order to understand participants as self-identified 
women who have fled from Syria during the civil war and who have consequently self-settled in 
Amman or Beirut for protection and livelihood opportunities.  
This thesis uses a comparison across two Middle Eastern cities in order to deepen understanding of 
how structures and identities shape experiences of insecurity within different contexts. Amman and 
Beirut are the capital cities of Jordan and Lebanon. Between them, they are hosting somewhere in the 
region of 400,000 Syrian refugees displaced from the Syrian civil war (UNHCR Operation Portal, 2020), 
although the numbers are in likelihood much higher than these official records show, due to the 
politicisation of refugee numbers and the complication of accounting for urban refugees. These two 
contexts share some similarities in their demographics and across their political and social histories 
(as explored in Chapter Four). However, they also have widely different political and security 
structures, with Lebanon broadly considered to be a ‘weak state’, with poor and compromised 
governance and sovereignty, while Jordan is considered a ‘strong state’, with centralised and 
authoritarian governance. Although this framing will be critiqued in this thesis, these states do operate 
in distinct ways and are influenced by several geopolitical and regional factors. These factors make 
the case for a compelling comparison in order to understand causal mechanisms of marginalised 
experiences of (in)security amongst refugee women. This thesis draws out thematic similarities and 
differences across these contexts whilst being conscious of the socio-political and cultural differences 
(and indeed, similarities) across these contexts (Chatty, 2007).  
Furthermore, there is need for ‘south-south’ urban comparisons which illuminate the legal and social 
history of refuge in cities of the Global South, which are framed by legacies of post-colonialism and 
Orientalism (Sanyal, 2011). As peripheral, ‘southern’, nations host a disproportionate number of 
refugees and are also the site of rapidly urbanising populations, this is timely research that examines 
the effect of thousands of refugees pouring into developmentally compromised cities. Moreover, with 
most refugees now being ‘self-settled’ or urban rather than ‘camp-based’ (L. Landau, 2014) and with 
much of the existing urban research highlighting male experience, this research contributes to the 
slow-growing, but much needed, research on urban refugee communities, and especially the 
experiences of women in such contexts. Additionally, comparative, qualitative studies on refugee 
experiences are somewhat rare as often refugee scholars are reticent to compare across different 
socio-cultural sites, despite these studies providing valuable insights and contributions to knowledge 
across contexts (Chatty, 2007).  
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This opening section has provided an outline of the research project. The section that follows briefly 
delivers a contextual outline of the Syrian civil war and ensuing refugee crisis, as well as UNHCR 
definitions of a refugee that will be used in this thesis. A final section presents an outline of the 
chapters of this thesis.   
The Syrian Civil War, the Ensuing refugee crisis and UNHCR  
Ash-shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām (The people want to topple the regime)  
Scrawling this graffiti on the side of a school in Daraa in Southern Syria in early 2011, fourteen-year-
old Mouawiya Syasneh unsuspectingly rolled the Syrian civil war into motion. He and a group of friends 
were swiftly arrested for their efforts in modelling the rhetoric of Arab uprisings in Egypt and Libya. 
They were imprisoned, tortured and, after much local protest resulting in the death of four citizens, 
released. Their discharge came too late and the provincial conflict exploded into country wide unrest 
(Al Jazeera, 2017; Diehl, 2012). Successive protests were brutally crushed by government forces. 
President al-Assad attempted to deter attention on the crackdown by insisting that Al Qaeda 
extremists were stirring up war within Syria, rather than his own citizens calling for a change in the 
political regime (Tamimi, 2016). This oppressive environment established fertile ground for 
recruitment of Syrian citizens by a number of anti-government factions with diverse objectives, most 
operating under the umbrella term of the ‘Free Syrian Army’. The civil war also saw the emergence of 
some ultra-conservative and extremist forces such as Jahbat Al Nusra and Daesh. By early 2012 Syria 
was embedded in a confusing and multi-front civil war, with the regime fighting several anti-
government groups with varying aims. Because of Syria’s regional importance and its strong 
relationship with Iran and Russia, the conflict quickly saw involvement from several global players and 
regional powers. As a result, defining and understanding the conflict is challenging, and it has been 
positioned in various ways: competition for regional hegemony, a fight for democracy and reform or 
a sectarian feud between Sunni’s and Shi’as (Hokayem, 2017). Before the crisis, Syria had been viewed 
as a ‘fierce state’, relatively immune to revolution, even in the wake of the Arab Spring protests. This 
is due to President al-Assad’s established power and influence in Syria, achieved through a 
combination of personal popularity, co-optation and repression (Hokayem, 2017, p. 61). However, the 
conflict has continued for over nine years and the Syrian refugee crisis that has emerged from the 
conflict has transformed from a short-term emergency to a protracted and highly political 
development issue. 
In March 2011 the first Syrian refugees fled to Lebanon. By July, refugees were arriving in Turkey and 
Jordan, and by May the next year Syrian refugees were being hosted in camps in Iraq and urban areas 
in Egypt. By December 2012, 500,000 Syrian refugees were being hosted by neighbouring countries. 
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This increased to 1 million by 2013, 2 million by that September and 4.2 million by the end of 2015 
(UNHCR 3RP, 2016). As of 2017, UNHCR put the number of displaced Syrians at 5.3 million. Despite 
the predominance of the ‘European refugee crisis’ across the world’s media, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey host the greatest number of Syrian refugees between them. But the ‘crisis’ in Europe emerges 
in a very different legal, political and institutional framework than the refugee crisis in the countries 
neighbouring Syria. Whilst European nations attempt to bypass their legal obligations enshrined in the 
membership of UNHCR, Lebanon and Jordan technically do not have to abide by these obligations as 
neither signed the 1951/67 UNHCR Refugee Convention. Thus, to a certain degree, they can respond 
to the crisis as they see fit. However, despite being non-signatories, UNHCR still operates in each 
country and supports refugee issues under Memoranda’s of Understanding (MOU’s).  
The role of UNHCR is crucial to note, as it is considered the world leader on refugee issues and its 1951 
classification of ‘what’ a refugee is continues to be the most widely employed definitional starting 
point used by policy makers and researchers. The organisation was created in 1950, mandated with 
assisting millions of Europeans displaced by the Second World War. It is tasked with the international 
protection of refugees and has played a crucial role in the development of law pertaining to refugees 
(Lewis, 2005). The constitution of the agency does not deny the existence of refugees pre-1950. 
However, it is a watershed moment where notions, ideas and labels of ‘the refugee’ become highly 
politicised and embedded in the greater global order. The 145 states that signed the convention 
agreed to a unique ethical obligation and commitment to protect refugees on a human rights basis 
and provided refugees with a means of making protection claims on the international community 
(Hathaway, 2007). By definition, refugees become subject to the laws of the state in which they have 
sought asylum and are guaranteed protection under international refugee law on non-refoulement i.e. 
the deliberate undertaking of a state not to return a refugee to a state where they are likely to face 
persecution, as defined by the Refugee Convention (Ludwig, 2016)3. The definition of a refugee, 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention, is as follows. An individual who:  
‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [sic] of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it’ (UNHCR, 1951).   
 
3 From the 1951 UNHCR Convention on Refugees: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [sic] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (UNHCR, 1951) 
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The geographical limitations of the definition, which were specifically attached to European refugees 
following WWII, were lifted in the 1967 Protocol to ensure global protection for those forced to flee 
their homes. However, very few nations in the Middle East, including Jordan and Lebanon, signed the 
convention or its protocol. As such, when the region is faced with refugee flows the UNHCR has 
operated in these countries on an ad hoc basis, often through gentlemen's agreements and MOU’s 
(Ward, 2014). Thus, Jordan and Lebanon are positioned to respond to incoming Syrian refugees at 
their own discretion. Whilst they have admirably hosted over 2 million Syrian refugees between them 
(alongside thousands of displaced Iraqis and Palestinians), Syrian refugees in these two countries fall 
outside the protection of the UNHCR mandate. This policy context, whereby refugee protection for 
Syrians is ‘ad hoc’ and decided on by the state, is also a basis for this research focusing on the states 
of Jordan and Lebanon. Without the global protection measures of the UNHCR mandate, policies and 
protection measures will be dictated by a range of socio-economic and political factors, as well as the 
strength or fragility of the state itself. This will have repercussions on refugee women’s sense of 
security within their host communities.      
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A note on Language and Terminology  
For the purposes of this study, the ‘Middle East’ broadly refers to the region encompassed by the ex-
Ottoman empire, including the Arabian Peninsula (Egypt, Palestine/Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Iraq) and Turkey (Chatty, 2012). However, due to socio-religious and ethnic relationships with North 
African states, I also, very occasionally, define and refer to literatures based in these regions as ‘Middle 
Eastern’.  
Shorthand terms such as ‘the North’ and ‘the South’, the ‘Metropole’ and the ‘Periphery’ are used 
throughout this thesis. These terms are not purely related to distinct geographical areas, but rather to 
socio-political legacies and economies. In particular, ‘the South’ can be viewed as a ‘dual situation of 
post-coloniality and particular political economy’ (Mabin, 2014, p. 22). In this thesis, the North, or 
Metropole will be used interchangeably to refer to the ‘developed’ North-West states – namely 
Western Europe and the United States. Whilst the South, or ‘the Periphery’ refers to those regions 
often crassly considered to be the ‘developing world’, or post-colonial world: South America, Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. Although this shorthand, and by default dualism, is not ideal, it ensures an 
easier means of navigating concepts and literature throughout the thesis.  
I am conscious that in using these terms I risk bifurcating the world into ‘The Occident’ and ‘The 
Orient’, the terms outlined by Edward Said within his post-colonial critique Orientalism, which initiated 
post-colonial theory and an analysis of Western hegemonic thought (Katz & Smith, 2003). Orientalism 
can be understood as a style of thought, which engages in an epistemological and ontological 
distinction between the Orient and the Occident, and as an institution of domination utilised by the 
West to assert dominance and authority over the Orient, through conceptually dividing East and West 
(McCarthy, 2010, pp. 68-69). ‘Othering’ is employed in order to make a distinction between the Orient 
and the Occident (‘The West’ versus ‘The Rest’). The Orient has been perceived and written about as 
a place of savagery, barbarism, ignorance and exoticism, particularly in colonial times (J. A. Massad, 
2007; Meriwether & Tucker, 2018). Orientalism engages in universalizing and, in some instances, 
dehumanizing individuals by viewing their ‘difference’ as a shared, homogenous, characteristic. This 
results in individuals and communities being reduced to single, totalizing labels and perpetuates 
prejudice and xenophobia. 
The twentieth century has seen numerous scholars from the periphery draw attention to the power-
knowledge nexus and the ways in which this is heavily skewed to those whose work is produced in the 
West. Often this knowledge is presented as being ‘universal, timeless and placeless’, even though it is 
produced in a handful of Global North societies and exported and applied to the World’s ‘peripheries’ 
(Carrington et al., 2016, pp. 1-2). Not only is research produced in the periphery frequently 
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underutilised or dismissed as having little relevance for the Metropole, the subjects of research in the 
Global South are often presented as a homogenised group. Furthermore, the peripheral world is often 
‘mined’ for data for and by the metropole, resulting in a continuation of Western academic dominance 
(Connell, 2014).  
Many fields of social science inquiry relevant to this project have been critiqued for their deferment 
to, and dominance of, northern academic hegemony in shaping core discourses (Chimni, 1998; 
Connell, 2014; Mohanty, 1984; Watson, 2009). I feel highly conscious of these debates as I outline my 
theoretical framework, with particular consideration to the language, expressions and literature I will 
be engaging with throughout this thesis, and indeed my positionality as a white, Western woman 
conducting research with and ‘on’ Syrian refugee women. This work attempts to keep these 
arguments at the forefront and has highlighted the academic material of theorists from the peripheral 
world as much as possible. I have consciously engaged with theoretical and methodological devices, 
such as intersectionality and positionality, in order to avoid slipping into homogenising research 
participants and to reflect on power imbalances within this research project.  
With considered employment, theories from the North can help inform, illuminate and guide research 
and theory in the South and vice versa. A combination of both is necessary in order to engage with 
useful constructs, but also to show gaps in literature. Most importantly, engaging with literature from 
both the ‘East’ and West’ one is able to better enter into argument and to knit positions and literatures 
into coherence instead of polemics (Connell, 2014; Mohanty, 2003).  
Outline of Chapters  
Having outlined the purpose and objectives of this thesis, this last section of the introduction provides 
a synopsis of the following chapters of the thesis. The thesis is broadly divided into two parts. The first 
section (Chapters Two – Five) provide a rationale for the research, combining theoretical and 
contextual material, to build a framework of understanding with which to analyse the empirical work 
which makes up the second section of the thesis (Chapters Six – Nine).   
Chapter Two: explains the feminist critical realist approach that underpins this thesis and explores 
definitions of gender and patriarchy and their relationship with space. In exploring a critical realist 
approach to identity and intersectionality, it demonstrates how this approach allows for a means of 
analysing the personal experiences of marginalised groups as shaped by the relationship between 
wider causal mechanisms and identity. Drawing together literature on gender, agency and space, it 
considers the diverse ways in which Middle Eastern women exert and practice their agency, and 
considers how de Certeau's (1984) theory of ‘strategy and tactics’ provides a means of understanding 
the agentic capacity of refugee women in contexts of patriarchy and oppression. The chapter goes on 
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to explore the relationship between space and gender and the ways in which these concepts are 
socially (re)produced and deeply relational, by considering the associations of the dichotomies of 
public/private space with male/female.     
Chapter Three: This Chapter analyses literature that explores the experiences of urban refugees and 
the ways in which their insecurity has been researched and theorised. Examining literatures that 
consider the security of refugee shelter, livelihoods, legal status and protection, conflict management 
and access to security and justice institutions, as well as research that explores host community and 
refugee relationships. In each of these literatures, where possible, contributions that have focused on 
gendered experiences have been highlighted. Having established the complexity of ‘security’ in such 
contexts, the chapter goes on to present theories of feminist geopolitics, feminist geolegality and 
human security as a means of theorising (in)security as ‘lived experience’. Noting the ways in which 
international relations and geopolitics express security as a concern of the state, rather than an 
everyday concern of the individual, feminist geopolitics and geolegality resituate security with the 
individual, promoting an examination of the scalar and relational experiences of security, from the 
bottom-up, from the intimate to the global.  
Chapter Four: considers the way states of the Middle East are theorised as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ in 
international relations and geopolitical theory and the extent to which this aids understanding of the 
political and security framework in Jordan and Lebanon and their subsequent policies towards Syrian 
refugees. As such, it explores the recent socio-political history of these states and their security service 
infrastructures, as well as providing an outline of their Syrian refugee policies. It also provides a brief 
outline of the cities of Amman and Beirut, the factors that have shaped their development and their 
key public spaces.   
Chapter Five: begins with the theoretical underpinning of the thesis, its critical realist feminist 
epistemological and ontological standpoint and its comparative methodology. It demonstrates how 
the theoretical framing and methodological underpinning shape the decision to undertake qualitative 
research in order to understand and forefront the experiences of urban refugee women. It explains 
the reasoning for focusing on Lebanon and Jordan, and Beirut and Amman as case study cities, and 
presents the four qualitative methods that this study engaged with: interviews, focus group 
discussions, cognitive mapping and solicited diaries. It concludes with a reflection on the specific 
ethical challenges regarding both refugee research and personal positionality in this context.  
Chapter Six: examines how the structures of refugee policies in Lebanon and Jordan affect the 
gendered experiences of refugee self-settlement in the cities of Amman and Beirut. Examining refugee 
arrival, settlement, shelter and access to employment, and specifically considering the ways in which 
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shelter and livelihoods shape experiences of (in)security, it engages with feminist theories of 
geolegality and geopolitics to highlight the gendered realities of urban self-settlement. This chapter 
highlights the ways in which refugee policies interact with patriarchal structures to have gendered 
affects that are felt and experienced by urban refugee women in their day to day lives.     
Chapter Seven: focuses on the ways in which refugee women experience and negotiate public space 
in their host cities. By investigating this through an examination of identity and structural mechanisms, 
this chapter demonstrates how refugee status, gender and ethnicity intersect with structures of 
patriarchy and citizenship to create perceptions and experiences in the urban outdoors. It notes how 
sexual, physical and verbal harassment shape the cityscape as unwelcoming and disrupt women’s 
sense of a ‘right to the city’, building a strong sense of unwelcome and insecurity. It considers a range 
of tactics, including particular behaviours and dress, that women engage in, in order to negotiate the 
city and to enhance their wider sense of safety and protection when in the urban outdoors.  
Chapter Eight: analyses refugee women’s interactions and perceptions of state and non-state security 
services within their host cities. Highlighting the differences in state strength and the (in)formal 
security networks in place in Amman and Beirut, this chapter examines women’s varying attitudes and 
experiences of formal and informal security, and the ways that this affects attitudes towards conflict 
resolution within host communities and a wider sense of security. It examines the extent to which 
women feel able to access and approach a range of (in)formal security services, the ways in which 
women negotiate and resolve conflict within their day to day lives, and the spatial implications of 
these impressions and relationships.  
Chapter Nine: Reviews the thesis, demonstrating how a feminist critical realist approach to 
understanding identity and causal mechanisms allows for insight into refugee women’s experiences 
in Amman and Beirut, and more broadly. Drawing together the findings from the empirical chapters, 
the conclusion answers the research questions posed in the Methodology Chapter and draws out four 
specific themes regarding security, space and tactics of refugee women, finishing with highlighting its 
contribution to knowledge and presenting areas for further research.  
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Chapter Two: Identity, Structure/Agency and Public/Private Space 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between identity (particularly gendered 
identity), agency and space with a focus on these concepts within the context of the Middle East. The 
Middle East is home to a heterogeneous mix of women of different ethnicities who live in varied socio-
political and economic conditions, who ascribe to different religions and beliefs, in contrasting 
geographies (Moghadam, 2003). Women in these contexts are influenced by, and in turn are 
influencers of, both localised and global powered and gendered structures that stretch across time 
and space, such as colonialism and patriarchy, which extend from the micro (intimate body; family) to 
the macro (state; regional and global power structures and institutions). Women’s identities of 
sexuality, race, ethnicity, nationality and class shape their encounters with these structures, which in 
turn shapes their quotidian experiences and negotiations of space (Valentine, 2007).    
This chapter demonstrates the advantage of a feminist and critical realist approach to structure and 
agency, identity and intersectionality. This enables a consideration of categories of difference as both 
real and socially constructed, alongside a critical examination of how women utilise their agency 
within structurally confined conditions. As demonstrated within this chapter, and the empirical 
chapters that follow, this is a vital consideration for refugee women, who are often framed as faceless 
victims who lack capacity and have no control over their lives. This first section closes with an 
examination of de Certeau’s theory of strategies and tactics, which theorises the agency of individuals 
in oppressive situations. The chapter goes on to examine the relationship and (re)production of gender 
and space within the Middle East, addressing popular dichotomies which associate public/private 
space with male/female genders respectively. Using the work of several Middle Eastern scholars, this 
section explores how space is both practical and material, and socially constructed, imbued with 
gendered associations and hierarchies. Rather than a strict dichotomy, there are shifting boundaries 
between public and private spaces and different genders occupy and access these spaces through a 
varied gradedness (Thompson, 2003). The section highlights gendered and spatial experiences of fear 
and women’s resulting tactical decisions concerning dress and behaviour, particularly in public space, 
which continues to reproduce gendered and spatial identities. It finishes with a consideration of 
literature on space and gender in my two case study cities, Amman and Beirut.   
The need for Feminist Research  
In a review of literature on gender, feminist geography and the Middle East Fenster & Hamdan-Saliba 
(2013) discuss the significant gap in literature in regard to these topics. They lament that: 
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‘The public sphere (in the Middle East) remains a space of male hegemony, while women are 
relegated to the sidelines in institutions and centres of economics, political, social and 
scientific knowledge. The social, economic and political hegemony of men has also led to their 
hegemony of knowledge and the production of knowledge’ (p. 539). 
As a result, knowledge is seen to lie in authoritarian discourse, which makes claims to an objective 
truth that is dismissive of individual, lived experiences. Feminist research is focused on unsettling and 
interrogating this positivist notion of an all-encompassing, scientific and objective knowledge of 
reality, and with putting an end to ‘sexism, sexual exploitation, and oppression’ (hooks, 2014, p. 1). 
This became necessary because of the tendency to neglect and misrepresent women’s experiences in 
favour of the ‘master subject’ – typically white, heterosexual, bourgeois men (Scott, 2012). Feminist 
research seeks to highlight the influence of patriarchal and public institutions in shaping the daily lived 
experiences of (particularly) women and minorities. Therefore, it seeks to interrogate 'inequalities of 
power resulting from racism, patriarchy and class exploitation' (Valentine, 2007, p. 11). Thus, feminist 
research is called to address the ‘god trick’ at the centre of white, androcentric, science which 
contends to see ‘everything from nowhere’ (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). This so-called god trick is a useful 
short-hand analogy for addressing claims of universal knowledge and objective ‘normative’ reality.  
As it is inherently interested in power, feminist research is highly political. It is frequently critiqued for 
being 'biased' in its knowledge production by positivist scientists, who argue that this partiality distorts 
opportunities to engage with it (Harding, 2004; Ramazanoglu & Hollland, 2002). However, Harding 
(2004, p. 2) has argued that the political heart of feminist work does not stunt the production of 
knowledge, but rather ‘stimulates and guides it’, opening up new understandings of our social world. 
Indeed, the purpose of feminist knowledge is to achieve ‘theories that accurately represent women’s 
activities’, to give voice to women’s lives and to ‘uncover hidden knowledge contained within women’s 
experiences and bring about women-solidarity and social change’ (Brooks, 2012, pp. 53–54; Harding, 
2004). This call is relevant to this thesis which seeks to foreground the voices and experiences of Syrian 
refugee women and their spatial experiences of (in)security. These women are often homogenised, 
overlooked, ignored or forgotten, and there are often broad assumptions made about their gender 
roles, opportunities and day to day lives. Thus, emerging from a feminist epistemology, this thesis 
determines to ensure their experiences are heard.    
Gender, Structure and Agency 
The categorisation of ‘gender’ is understood as a social elaboration of the biological categorisation of 
sex which is performed and re-produced through everyday praxis (Butler, 1988; Eckert & McConnell-
Ginnet, 2013). There is great interest in the construction and performance of gender because of the 
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vast implications it has had, and continues to have, for both the daily realities and identities of people, 
with regards to the distribution of power and the ordering of society. Patriarchy, the preference of 
men in socially, political and economic contexts, and thus the favoured distribution of power in men’s 
favour, is symptomatic of this. Patriarchy, as a socio-cultural structure, shapes gendered experiences 
and has spatial repercussions in how both women and men perceive their positions within a given 
society. Harding (2008) highlights how notions of gendered behaviour have been influenced by a 
perception of our social world as a set of dualisms, for example ‘rationale mind vs. irrational emotions’ 
and ‘public vs. private’ and the linkage of men and masculinity with the former, and women and 
femininity with the latter term, in each binary. As such, societal ideas of femininity and masculinity 
propagate, extend and are absorbed and reproduced into everyday praxis, thus presented as 
gendered ‘norms’. Whilst these labels have been relatively stable (or enduring) through social 
reproduction, categorisation of ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’ behaviours, traits or roles, are not fixed, but 
are continually reproduced and reformed through social relations over space and time (Deutsch, 
2007).    
Thus, one is not born possessing a gendered ‘female’ or ‘male’ identity, but rather learns the ways in 
which to perform and exhibit culturally and contextually appropriate feminine and masculine traits, 
which are determined by one’s sexual categorisation as female/male. West and Zimmerman (1987, 
2009) emphasise the difference between sex, gender and sexual categorisation. They highlight how 
the relationship between sexual categorisation and gender is:  
‘the relationship between being a recognizable incumbent of a sex category…and being 
accountable to current cultural conceptions of conduct becoming to—or compatible with the 
“essential natures” of—a woman or a man. We conceptualized this as an ongoing situated 
process, a “doing” rather than a “being”’ (West & Zimmerman, 2009, pp. 113–114). 
Pioneering researchers such as Goffman (2004), West & Zimmerman (1987) and Butler (1988) have 
elaborated the ways in which gender is ‘done’ or ‘performed’ and thus socially produced and 
reproduced through behaviours, interactions and dress. Some of the critique that has emerged from 
the conceptualisation of the social construction and the ‘doing’ of gender, is that it obscures individual 
agency. Deutsch (2007), argues that feminist positions on performing gender which focus on 
internalisation and re-enactment, removes accounts of agency from individuals. West & Zimmerman  
(2009) have countered that focusing on the internalised and reproduced norms in historical and 
structural circumstances rather ‘contextualises’ agency (p 118). Thus, by highlighting historical, 
temporal, cultural and societal structures, agency can be understood as shifting, relational and 
28 
 
particular. These positions demonstrate some of the challenges in analysing the social construction of 
gender and its relationships with wider causal structures and individual agency.  
Female agentic capacity is a central concern of this thesis, particularly as it is focused on refugee 
women, who are typically presented as voiceless and lacking agency. Sehlikoglu (2017), notes that is 
politically impossible for feminist scholars to avoid reflecting on agency, as women are required to 
manoeuvre through multiple social and patriarchal structures in their day to day lives. Individual and 
collective concepts and practices of agency are at the heart of all feminist political projects. Feminist 
academics seek to investigate and address structures of oppression that operate within women’s lives, 
whilst acknowledging, celebrating and enhancing their individual agency (Clegg, 2006). Critical realist 
approaches to structure, agency and identity assist in negotiating the epistemic challenges of 
acknowledging structural constraints alongside agentic capacity.  The following sections explore these 
concepts of structure and agency further, leading to a critical realist approach to identity and 
intersectionality.  
Critical Realism and Structure and Agency  
The conceptual issues of structure and agency weave themselves into the major themes of this thesis 
and are fundamental to theorising causation and capacity. This section outlines a critical realist 
approach to structure and agency, in order to sustain a dialectic between these two concepts which 
allows for a deeper exploration of causality and agency. Thus, it provides a methodology for 
understanding refugee women’s behaviour and experiences, with a consideration of both their 
intersectional identities and the pre-existing structures of society that they encounter.   
The debate between structure and agency is one that emerges from theorists exploring their 
ontological position on what society consists of: rational actors (individuals) who make independent 
decisions (i.e. through the use of their agency), or structures (constructed rules and norms) to which 
actors simply ‘react’ (Elder-Vass, 2010; O’Reilly, 2012). Theorists tend to plot an understanding of 
human behaviour across a spectrum of structure and agency, either attributing more ‘power’ to 
individuals’ agentic capacity which shape and reproduce wider societal structures, or conversely 
towards the social structures that shape individuals’ behaviour. Hay (2002) emphasises that the 
structure-agency debate is not so much a ‘problem’ but is in itself a ‘language by which ontological 
difference between contending accounts might be registered…in a systematic and coherent manner’ 
(p. 91). Thus, engaging in ideas and debates of structure and agency enables an analysis of how the 
world works and the extent to which causality shapes experiences.  
For Critical Realists, issues of structure and agency are deeply related to understanding and analysing 
mechanisms of causality that operate within society, in order to understand how and why empirical 
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events occur (Vincent & O’Mahoney, 2018). Critical Realists’ critique both positivist and interpretative 
approaches of the social world, arguing that these result in flat ontologies. For example, an empiricist 
would argue that only what can be observed can be known, e.g. X results in Y. However, this overlooks 
a multitude of unseen forces and mechanisms that are at play in the observed phenomena and is thus 
ontologically flat. Critical Realists argue that causality can best be understood through a stratified 
ontology, a relationship between the real, the actual and the empirical. The ontological relationship 
between these factors provides a compelling account of causation and the power of structures.    
(Jessop, 2005, pp. 41–42). The empirical are observable and measurable events, that which is 
experienced by individuals. The actual are events which result from causal mechanisms, which may or 
may not be experienced by individuals. The real are generative structures or causal mechanisms. 
These are the inherent properties in an object or structure that act as causal factors to produce events 
(Fletcher, 2017; Jessop, 2005; Parr, 2015). Vincent & O’Mahoney (2018) perceive this ontology as a 
‘stratified conception of causation’ which facilitates an understanding of how material and social 
powers operate in different locations and or/at different hierarchal levels and the relationships 
between these (p.9). Fletcher (2017) emphasises that this is achieved through the explanation of social 
events by an examination of causal mechanisms (the real) and the effect that this has on the realms 
of the empirical and the actual.   
Returning more explicitly to structure and agency, critical realism posits that structure and agency are 
not two elements of the same process, but two different phenomena that are deeply related (Carter 
& New, 2004; Danermark et al., 2019). Structures are relatively enduring social mechanisms, made up 
of a set of internally related objects, which may also be part of a greater structure and which possess 
causal mechanisms (Danermark et al., 2019; Fletcher, 2017, p. 186). They pre-exist individuals, are 
independent of individuals and therefore exist without them and existed before them. However, they 
are still dependent on the activities of the actors inhabiting the structure (Singh, 2018, p. 432). Human 
agency, which includes our values, meanings and ideas as well as our capacity, can reproduce or 
transform structures over time, both consciously and unconsciously (Fletcher, 2017, p. 186). 
Therefore, structures, within critical realism, can be understood as ‘both the ever present condition 
and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency’ (Bhaskar, 2010, pp. 71–72). Because of 
the ‘ever present’ condition of structures, individuals are always acting within a world of structural 
constructs and situations that they did not create. Therefore, agents can unintentionally reproduce 
systems and patterns of behaviour through their activities. This is a acutely relevant argument with 
regard to feminist research, as women can unintentionally reproduced patriarchal structures that 
continue to oppress themselves and other women (Kandiyoti, 1988).  
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As explored in more detail below, many women, particularly in the majority world, operate within 
extremely restrictive structures whereby they are forced to make tactical, agentic decisions in order 
to enhance and protect their intimate security, rather than engage in emancipatory efforts to address 
patriarchal oppression (this will be discussed in more detail below, alongside de Certeau’s theory of 
strategy and tactics). This brings to the forefront other aspects of identity, beyond gender, such as 
ethnicity and nationality, that shape quotidian experiences. The following section will outline a 
feminist critical realist approach to identity and intersectionality which emphasises the socially 
constructed and real aspects of identity which shape the daily lives of marginalised women.  
A Critical Realist Approach to Identity & Intersectionality  
Identity, our ‘sense of self’, is crucial to understanding how we understand and see the world, and 
how it perceives and responds to us. Identity is socially constructed and embedded in specific social 
relations. It can be understood as ‘social categories in which an individual claims membership as well 
as the personal meaning associated with these categories’ (Shields, 2008, p. 301). This thesis adopts a 
critical theorist approach to identity and as such understands that we both project ourselves into 
various pre-given cultural identities, as well as internalize their meanings and values (Hall, 1996). 
Therefore, identities are both something we do and something that we are (West & Zimmerman, 
1987). Identities are practised and reproduced, and thus are both fluid, and stable and continuous 
over time and space (Shields, 2008, p. 304). This means that identities have a relational and contextual 
nature: as they draw upon available social categories, identities are linked to a ‘historical time, place 
and situation’ which can mean that the same identity ‘evokes very different associations in different 
places’ (Moya, 2006, p. 99).   
Emerging as a key theorist in critical realist identity theory, Moya (2000, 2006) uses the terminology 
of ascriptive (imposed) and subjective (adopted) identities. She emphasises that these are not 
analytically separate, but rather deeply relational and are thus in a dialectic: ‘people are neither wholly 
determined by the social categories through which we are recognized, nor can we ever be free of 
them’ (2006, p. 99). In this sense, she emphasises both the complexity and inescapability of categories 
of identity.   
Ascribed identities emerge from society and are imposed, or typically understood as, ‘social 
categories’. They are ‘inescapably historical and collective’, for example, categories of race or gender 
(Moya, 2006, p. 97). The power of ascriptive categories is important to recognise as these (typically, 
but not always) exterior identities significantly affect how others perceive and behave towards us. This 
in turn shapes an individual’s perspectives and experience of their lived reality. Subjective identities 
are those that reflect our ‘individual sense of self, our interior existence, our lived experience of being 
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a more-or-less coherent self across time’ (Moya, 2006, p. 98). This includes not only our personal sense 
of self and our personal values, but also the way in which we understand or see ourselves in relation 
to others. These are not purely internal but are ‘inescapably shaped by the experience of social 
recognition’ (ibid, p. 98).  
For example, categorisation as a ‘refugee’ is something that is very much imposed by external others. 
This can be understood as an ascriptive aspect of identity. However, many refugees do not perceive 
themselves as belonging to this categorisation. They consider a ‘refugee’ categorisation to be 
negatively associated with flight, war and dependency (Ludwig, 2016; Suerbaum, 2018), rejecting this 
labelling as it clashes with their subjective identity. The individual’s subjective identity is not only 
formed by their deep sense of values and sense of self, but also continuous encounters with other 
agents and structures which deem them a ‘refugee’ or an ‘outsider’, and the various connotations and 
expectations this holds.  However, despite their internal rejection of this refugee identity and its 
antagonism with an individual’s subjective identity, state’s and agencies (external others) will 
nonetheless recognise and categorise these individuals as ‘refugees’ based on their circumstances and 
indeed, their other ascriptive identities. This indicates the relationship between ascriptive and 
subjective identities. Even when rejecting an ascriptive label, engagement with this categorisation 
shapes part of an individual’s subjective identity, and the inescapability of ascriptive identity requires 
continued engagement and negotiation of this categorisation.  
Understanding identity through relational ascriptive and subjective identities provides a means of 
understanding identity as both socially constructed and real (Gilpin, 2006). As such, it is a tool to 
examine the complex nature of identity, rather than essentialising or deconstructing it. In 
essentialising identity, only ascriptive identities are considered, thus overlooking individuality, 
difference or heterogeneity within categories (ibid). In deconstructing identity altogether, 
postmodern proponents’ risk ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’. In arguing that there can 
be no known reality and categories only serve to subjugate individuals, they overlook important 
realities of how individuals are categorised and in turn disrupted or privileged in accessing particular 
resources (Moya, 2000). Instead, a critical realist approach both acknowledges the complexity and 
difference within a category of identity, whilst also being conscious of its external attributes. As such, 
identity categories are in themselves structures that pre-exist, and are independent of, individuals. 
Therefore, individuals are always shaped by the constraints associated with particular identities (for 
example, women’s various constraints in the labour market because of perceptions that they are 
inherent caregivers or prone to emotion, see: Anthias, 2013). Identities are continually (re)produced, 
and therefore they will also be co-constituted and transformed over time and space.   
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Critical realist approaches to identity demonstrate the importance of social location and categories of 
identity. The relationships between different categories of identity and the experiences that this 
produces, require attention - particularly regarding those who are marginalised or oppressed. 
Categories of identity are imbued with power and have social, economic and political imperatives 
which affects how individuals are perceived (Gilpin, 2006, p. 13). Evaluating critical realism, Mohanty 
(2003) highlights how it provides an important model of understanding for the position of women on 
the margins and adds that this approach is important to the feminist solidarity pedagogy:  
‘Realist theorizations explicitly link a historical materialist understanding of social location to 
the theorization of epistemic privilege and the construction of social identity, thus suggesting 
the complexities of the narratives of marginalized peoples in terms of relationality rather than 
separation’ (Mohanty, 2003, p. 524). 
Examining the relational aspect between categories of identity is therefore a necessary means of 
analysing experiences of oppression and privilege.  No single category can provide an explanation for 
the complexity of an individual’s social experience or social situation (Shields, 2008, p. 304). Feminists 
thus seek to examine and highlight axes of oppression, including race, sexuality and imperialism 
(McDowell, 1999), as examining different categories of identity and the interactions between them is 
crucial to understanding the ways in which different individuals access goods, resources and 
opportunities (Gunnarsson, 2011; Moya, 2000). 
However, this intention has not always been so explicit in their work. Earlier feminists were criticised 
for their privileging of white, western women’s experiences which were universalised to other 
contexts, or positioned as ‘enlightened’. Mohanty (2003, p. 63) argued that studies that examined 
gendered experiences in the ‘third world’ tended to analyse women’s experiences alongside a 
‘monolithic notion of patriarchy or male dominance’, which appears to oppress most, if not all, women 
in these contexts.  
Feminist researchers and practitioners have also, on occasion, been guilty of attempting to enforce 
particular cultural concepts of agentic empowerment in different contexts. This has been notable in 
contexts of the peripheral world, where ‘agency’ and ‘empowerment’ is perceived, enacted, 
embodied and strategized against structural oppressions in different ways to Western, feminist 
discourses and expectations (Mernissi, 1975). For example, there is a tendency amongst Western 
Feminists to perceive agency in purely ‘emancipatory’ ways, overlooking other contextual and cultural 
exercises of agency (Bangstad, 2011). As Sadiqi & Ennaji (2013) argue:  
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‘Agency is commonly defined as either the capacity to create a difference or the freedom to 
act otherwise. However, men and women do not self-elect circumstances; they make their 
own history, not only as they please but according to the norms regulating their culture, 
society, and general historical, economic, and socio-political context’ (2013, p. 1) 
Recognizing the predilection for even well-meaning feminist scholars to ‘other’ women from different 
cultural and racial contexts in their research, one can understand why theories of intersectionality 
have been heralded as one of the most important contributions to feminist scholarship in the past few 
decades (K. Davis, 2008).  
Intersectionality emerges from the critiques of several Black feminists, notably Crenshaw, (1991), Hill-
Collins, (1990) and (hooks, 1984), who highlighted the predominance of white women’s experiences 
in academic theory. This includes the ways in which gender has been foregrounded as a single 
analytical category of identity, to the detriment of other, intersecting categories of oppression, thus 
treating women as a homogenous collective, overlooking key issues of oppression and marginalisation 
(McCall, 2005; Samuels & Ross-Sheriff, 2008):  
‘Gender differences are not the only “fault lines”; they operate within a larger matrix of other 
socially constructed distinctions, such as class, ethnicity, religion, and age, which give them 
their specific dynamics in a given time and place.’ (Moghadam, 2003, p. 25) 
  
Theories of intersectionality instead seek to understand an individual’s lived experiences at the 
crossroads (or axes) where their various identities meet. For Crenshaw, intersectionality begins as an 
examination of race and gender in the lives of real people, which is then built upon with other 
hierarchal systems such as class and ethnicity (Crenshaw, 1989; MacKinnon, 2013). Hill-Collins defines 
intersectionality as the:   
 
‘critical insight that race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability and age operate not 
as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reciprocally constructed phenomena that 
in turn shape complex social inequalities’ (Hill Collins, 2015, p. 2). 
 
It is not a theory of ‘additions’, where each oppression or identity is stacked one on top of the other, 
but a nuanced examination of how each identity can be individually oppressive, or conversely agentic 
or powerful, and the ways in which these identities interact to create individual experiences. As such, 
intersectionality conceptualises the ‘relationships between systems of oppression which construct our 
multiple identities and our social locations in hierarchies of power and privilege’ (Carastathis, 2014). 
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Thus, in order not to neglect ‘difference’ in research, one needs to attend to a participant’s multiple 
identities and experiences of subordination (K. Davis, 2008, p. 68). 
 
There is debate amongst intersectional scholars as to whether it is a method, a heuristic device or a 
theory (Cho et al., 2013). If one employs it as theoretical framework, as it is in this thesis, further to 
these discussions are questions over ‘how’ to study it, that is what methodologies it calls for (K. Davis, 
2008; McCall, 2005). Indeed, intersectionality has received hefty criticism for being ambiguous and 
open-ended, without analytical scope and limited theoretical premises (Davis, 2008). There are also 
several different ‘categorical’ approaches taken to identity (McCall, 2005, see more below). Several 
critical realist scholars have argued that a critical realistic ontological positioning helps address some 
of these critiques.  
 
In her large-scale summary of intersectionality research, McCall (2005) outlines three predominant 
approaches taken by intersectionality scholars in order to understand the relationship between 
categories of identity:  Inter-categorical, Intra-categorical and anti-categorical. Martinez-Dy et al 
(2014) argue that these first two approaches dip into positivist assumptions because they contain 
assumptions that categories such as race and gender are fixed with measurable effects, whereas they 
are slippery, contested and fluid (p. 451). The anti-categorical approach (post-structuralism) attempts 
to deconstruct ideas of fixed identity and categories completely, making analysis deeply challenging 
(Walby et al., 2012, p. 227).  
In response to these challenges within intersectionality, Martinez Dy et al (2014) argue for an 
approach to intersectionality that combines critical realism with positional approaches, building 
predominantly on the work of Anthias (2008, 2012a, 2013). This approach engages in the critical realist 
stance of transfactuality (the concept of structures as enduring, not ephemeral), thus building in 
notions of structures that shape day to day life and interact with identities to create experiences not 
only of oppression, but also of privilege (Martinez Dy et al., 2014; Nash, 2008). Thus, identities are not 
fixed, they are fluid and heterogenous, but are also categorised and shaped by both (seen and unseen) 
structural forces. Martinez Dy et al., (2014) note how transfactuality ‘enables the conceptualization of 
causal mechanisms emerging from the level of society that in some cases are unactualized or 
unrecognized’ yet are still held to function. In this example, they point to how structures of privilege 
or discrimination are perhaps not always obvious but exist despite our awareness of them – thus 
allowing for an ontological understanding of causality in a social world that exists independently of 
our knowledge of it (p. 455 - 457).  
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Anthias has extended the work of intersectionality and broadly reflects a critical realist approach to 
the concept, arguing for an intersectional framing approach (2012a). She expresses concern that 
intersectionality’s focus on identity has resulted in a ‘retreat from issues of structure’ stating that 
there is a tendency to ‘treat it as a possessive attribute of individuals or groups, rather than a process’ 
(Anthias, 2008, p. 7). As a result, she argues, intersectionality overlooks how processes of 
subordination and discrimination take place and urges for a focus on inequality created through the 
state and other institutions.  
In response, Anthias has suggested a theory of translocational positionality. For Anthias, positionality 
is both social position (outcomes) and social positioning (processes) and is therefore the space at the 
intersection of structure and agency (2008, p. 15). When referring to translocation, Anthias refers to 
a ‘social space which is produced within contextual, spatial, temporal and hierarchical relations around 
the ‘intersections’ of social divisions and identities of class, ethnicity and gender (amongst others)’ 
(2008, p. 9). Thus, by focusing on translocationality, Anthias references the complexity of positionality 
for those who are located across different, fractured locations regarding social categories (2008, p. 
15-16).   
Anthias emphasises the multiple locations involved in time and space and the ways in which these are 
connected to the past, present and future. She points to the importance of approaches that use 
transnational dimensions of context and time in order to attend to the realities of identities in differing 
spaces (2012). For example, how an individual is perceived in one space and time (for example, a 
middle-class Syrian woman living in Damascus) in comparison to another (the same woman now living 
in Lebanon as a refugee). By focusing on social location and positionality, Anthias argues that we can 
examine the broader landscape of power which produces social division, as an examination of our 
social location is always embedded with relations of hierarchy (2013, p. 130). Thus, she encourages an 
examination of the broader social locations and processes that are context, meaning, and time-
specific, explicitly located within social hierarchies, and tied to both material and cultural resource 
distribution (Anthias, 2012, p. 14; Martinez Dy et al., 2014, p. 448). Thus, she places a heavy emphasis 
on both social divisions (categories of identity) and structures.   
Furthermore, Anthias emphasises how not all categories of difference occupy equivalent domains of 
power, nor are they salient all the time.  Rather, the importance of a certain category will vary 
depending on the social arena, and the social forces at work at differing times and spaces. Thus, certain 
identities will be foregrounded or more manifest depending on the situation an individual is navigating 
(Anthias, 2013b). Additionally, she highlights the different social locations that individuals hold 
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simultaneously, whereby an individual is both subordinate and dominant depending on the various 
identities at work.  
This consideration of differing positions within time and space, and indeed the complexity of social 
locations as both subordinate and dominant are highly relevant in conceptualising the experiences of 
Syrian refugee women. It allows for a means of understanding the varied positions of power and 
subordination that women hold in relation to both their categories of identity and the context in which 
they find themselves as they cross borders and negotiate uncertain legal status. How they may gain 
or lose power depending on their circumstances and identities and how these work out contextually. 
For example, whilst a typical assumption may be that a refugee women will be disadvantaged and 
oppressed when they cross a border seeking asylum, Ayoub (2017) found that wealthy Syrian refugee 
women in Cairo enjoyed a ‘new emancipation’ in their host city (see more below). In addition, Nasser-
Eddin (2017) demonstrates how intersections of age and gender affects the integration and 
opportunities of Syrian refugee women in the UK, with those that are younger experiencing more 
freedom and power in comparison to older women, when comparing their typical roles and 
opportunities in Syria. Anthias has applied her theories with migrant women in order to conceptualise 
their changing social and economic roles as they move across borders, and indeed their fluctuating 
experiences of power and oppression as they gain and lose status depending on their new 
transnational positionalities. Her emphasis on both categories of difference and the wider social 
hierarchies and structures of power are deeply relevant to this thesis which seeks to understand how 
socially constructed identities interact with wider structures to shape women’s experiences of 
insecurity.  
Whilst there has been some significant work conducted in the field of social location, intersectionality 
and migration (Anthias, 2012; Bastia, 2014; Bürkner, 2012; Silvey, 2004), there has been significantly 
less research on the intersectionality and social location of refugee women, particularly those located 
in the peripheral world. Anthias’s intersectional framing approaches, outlined above, have much to 
offer in understanding and conceptualising refugee women’s experiences of flight, asylum and 
refugee-ness. Refugees are frequently categorised as a homogenous group, with little attention paid 
to their differentiated experiences. Whilst there has been growing stress on the distinct threats that 
women refugees face (J. Freedman, 2015; Hyndman, 2010), there is still little emphasis or research 
conducted on the other categories of difference that shape refugees’ experiences. The Canadian 
journal ‘Refuge’ have recently produced a special issue on ‘Intersectional feminist interventions in the 
Refugee Crisis’ (2018). Noting the much-needed emphasis on intersectionality, the editor’s state that:  
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‘the majority of (forced) migration scholarship continues to approach the subject without 
attending to the simultaneity of experiences and co-implication of positionalities shaped by 
gendered, racialized, class, and sexuality-based power relations’ (Carastathis et al., 2018) 
Ayoub (2017, p. 78) agrees with this position, noting that intersectionality acts as a ‘new approach’ to 
understanding and theorising the experiences of marginalised refugee groups.   
Intersectional approaches have much to offer in understanding the breadth of refugee experience. 
Whilst there is not a plethora of studies, and most are based on refugees now living in the majority 
world, some scholars have used intersectional approaches to highlight how identities of sexuality 
(Karimi, 2019; Lee & Brotman, 2011), disability (Pisani et al., 2016) and religious identity (Eghdamian, 
2017), can shape refugee’s experiences of displacement and have significant impacts on their 
wellbeing and protection. A small number of feminist and development researchers, who have 
conducted work with refugees, have emphasised the worth of employing intersectionality in order to 
understand a refugee’s lived experience and to highlight and address oppressions. In particular, the 
research of Pittaway (2004; 2011) and Pittaway and Bartolomei (2001; 2003) investigated the ways in 
which racism and sexism intersect to compound refugee women’s human rights violations. More 
recently, Ayoub (2017) demonstrated the importance of an intersectional approach in her study of 
Syrian refugee women living in Cairo. Through this approach, she found Syrian women’s experience 
varied across the city of Cairo: Issues of class and education opened up avenues of employment and 
opportunity for wealthier more educated refugees, but poorer women expressed a far more confined 
existence and a very poor quality of life. These studies demonstrate the importance of examining 
different axes of oppression (and advantage) in order to gain a richer and more nuanced 
understanding of refugee experience.  
Patriarchy, Gender and Society in the Middle East 
Although the structures of patriarchy operate globally, it is important to highlight the specificities of 
this social construct throughout the MENA region, as it heavily shapes economic, social, political and 
religious spheres of life. Ideas of a ubiquitous 'Arab patriarchy', 'Arab family' or 'Islam' often dominate 
Western discourse on the Middle East. However, these are socially fluid constructs that change and 
morph in different contexts and circumstances, influenced by individual and collective agency. They 
are not static or constant, particularly in different contexts and should not be treated as thus (Cole, 
1994; Kandiyoti, 1988). With this in mind, there are both challenges to homogenous labels and broad 
continuities across contexts, which allow for a consideration of what life looks like in the region, 
particularly with consideration to family, gender, kinship and the state (Joseph, 2000; Sadiqi & Ennaji, 
2013). This section explores the way the ways in which Middle Eastern women express and act in 
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agentic ways in the socially, culturally and politically structured environments that they negotiate, 
highlighting the role of family and kinship and how these relationships permeate life and influence 
cultural norms from the state to the everyday, and their gendered effects.      
Kinship, gender and the state in the Middle East   
‘The State’ in the Middle East only emerged at the end of the colonial era of the Ottoman Empire, 
which governed the region for 400 years. Following the First World War, the region was divided into 
a number of successor states based on subgroups of Arab society, by Britain and France who ruled 
over them as Mandates under the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Owen, 2013). Thus, much of the geography 
of the modern Middle East has only been established over the past hundred years or so, and has 
suffered from the various legacies of colonialism, nationalism, independence, and entrance into global 
capital markets (Charrad, 2011). Before the creation of these states, the Middle East was primarily 
organised through ‘tribal communities’ who were the major actors in the region in regulating 
economic production and political conflict (Charrad, 2011b, p. 225; Mellon, 2002). Because of the 
longstanding tribal communities that operated in the region, there are deep tribal and kinship links 
that cross the created boundaries of states (J. Massad, 2001). Because of these kinship relationships, 
most modern, Middle Eastern States are based on patrimonial networks, a ‘political entity, bound by 
shared conceptions of patrilineal kinship serving as a basis for solidarity and orientated towards the 
collective defence of itself as a group’ (Charrad, 2011a, p. 53). These networks are built upon sharing 
of strategic resources and expectations of loyalty and obligation. Patrimonial networks influence not 
only the way in which the state operates, but also the wider dynamics of society and family. 
The extended family has been the principal ordering unit for Middle Eastern society for millennia. 
Thus, it holds a privileged position that permeates all aspects of Arab society, from the social to the 
economic, religious and political (Abudi, 2011; Barakat, 1993). Family members are encouraged to co-
operate in order to increase the family's stature and enhance its livelihood and survival and precedes 
the individual and their needs and desires (Joseph, 1999). The family plays an important role in 
socialising children and passing down cultural and religious norms and behaviours and often also 
mediates marriages, jobs and wider societal connections (Abudi, 2011). The importance and centrality 
of family life is reflected in the rich use of kinship terms in everyday language. Joseph notes how this 
idiomatic language (the use of kinship and relational terms such as ‘sister’, ‘son of my brother’) are 
utilized in order to 'bear the rules and morality of kinship', thus reminding individuals of appropriate 
behaviour and mores, and of existing relational hierarchies (Abudi, 2011; Joseph, 1999, p. 12). 
Typically, the father is the head of the family, and holds authority and responsibility. Females are 
encouraged to defer and submit to not only their fathers, but their grandfathers, brothers, male 
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cousins and uncles, which enhances and reproduces male power (Joseph & Slyomovics, 2001). 
Families are typically organised through patrilineal relations and men are favoured in inheritance and 
land ownership (El Sadaawi, 2015). Elder women are also deferred to by younger women. Thus, the 
structure of the family unit has consequences for the construction of both gender and power in the 
region. Therefore, Joseph notes that whilst defining patriarchy in this context it is important to include 
both males and elders into the definition. She defines patriarchy in the Arab world as:   
The privileging and prioritizing of males and elders (including elder women) and the 
mobilization of kinship structures, morality and idioms to legitimate and institutionalize 
gendered and aged domination (Joseph, 1999, p. 12; Joseph, 1996, p. 14).  
The patriarchal structure of society has also placed women in a position of bearing the family honour, 
predominantly through their sexuality and pre-marital virginity, and an expectation on male family 
members to protect women (Charrad, 2011a; Nasser-Eddin, 2017). If a woman’s sexuality is 
compromised, her family’s honour is compromised. On occasion, the loss of this ‘honour’ in itself, is 
believed to only be regained through ‘the blood’ of an honour killing (El Sadaawi, 2015, pp. 54–55). 
These ideas are also prevalent in the notion of women as the bearers of national identity, whereby 
the nation is ‘inscribed’ into their embodiment (J. L. Fluri, 2011; Yuval-Davis, 1997a). As such, women 
are politically, and as a result often socially, connected to ideas of nationhood, family and honour, and 
are framed as requiring masculine protection. 
Even though individuals are embedded in these relational, familiar matrices, these are 'shifting and 
situational' and therefore do not deny an individual of their 'distinctive initiative and agency' (Joseph, 
1996, p. 11). Whilst collectivism is promoted above individualism which is aided through state and 
family laws, families reflect their own unique structures and gender dynamics. Women may go out to 
work and indeed be family breadwinners. Men may assist with housework and childcare (Droeber, 
2005). There is also a strong pattern of migrant work in the Middle East, where homes are often 
headed and run by women, whilst men work abroad and send home remittances. However, across 
Middle Eastern society, there are deep structural norms embedded into the religious and cultural 
framework of both state and society which influence ideas and notions of femininity and masculinity, 
gender roles and power which are continually (re)produced. State law in the region, in particular 
regarding the family, disenfranchises and subordinates women (Charrad, 2011b; Kandiyoti, 2000). 
‘Family law’, or ‘personal status laws’ in the Middle East inscribe gendered norms into policy justifying 
these on the grounds of custom which are in turn reinforced through institutions (Moghadam, 2005). 
These differ in severity and application across the region. These laws often situate women as 
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caregivers and men as breadwinners which creates a pervasive discourse of motherhood with women 
which influences and reproduces family structures (Moghadam, 2005, p. 11). 
Orientalist writings tend to associate the construction of gender and the dominance of patriarchy in 
the Middle East with Islam, or indeed to argue that a woman’s position in the region is dictated purely 
through her religious positioning. This is accentuated through family status laws in the region which 
are often based on and guided by Islamic Shari’a law (Kazemi, 2000). However, the patriarchal 
structure of the family predates the emergence of the religion in the region and is prevalent in other 
religions of the region (El Sadaawi, 2015; Munoz, 2006). Despite this distinction, some academics, such 
as Ahmed (1992) have noted the ways in which patriarchy has been absorbed into Islam in order to 
reproduce societal norms of male dominance and female submission. Thus, whilst Islam may not be 
inherently patriarchal, it has been utilised in some contexts by male elites to promote the 
subordination of women and to produce religiously condoned expectations of gendered behaviour 
and roles.     
Additionally, in defence of the teachings of Islam, scholars such as Badran (2011) have argued that 
Islam improved the position of women in the Middle East, whilst Moghadam has argued that it is 
rather the intersection of other factors, such as tribalism, economic development, class, the state, and 
regional and global contexts that determines women’s social positioning in the Middle East 
(Moghadam, 2003). Moghadam asserts that social class has greater bearing on a woman’s personal 
autonomy and sexual segregation and reminds the reader that women throughout out the world 
suffer from gender asymmetry (p. 6- 8). However, it is important to understand the contextual 
variances of women’s experiences. These debates indicate the necessity of looking further than one 
axis of identity or subordination, in order to understand women’s positioning and experience.   
There is little doubt that over the past few decades, women throughout the Middle East have been 
‘encroaching’ into the public sphere, engendering this space and becoming increasingly visible as 
political actors, leading to democratisation and gendered legal reform, particularly following the Arab 
uprisings (Moghadam & Sadiqi, 2006; Shalaby, 2016). Alongside this, the centrality of the family has 
become increasingly challenged by the state and other social institutions (for example, through the 
state’s provision of jobs and education which was once purely the remit of the family. However, 
despite these societal shifts and changes to traditional relationships, Barakat (2005) emphasises that 
there is still less isolation from the family then from other social and religious institutions. ‘The family’, 
he argues, still dominates the three patterns of Arab living (Bedouin, Rural and Urban) and is 
particularly prevalent amongst tribespeople, peasants and the urban poor. Thus, there is also an 
expectation that these sections of society, will reflect more traditional gendered roles and hierarchal 
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structures (Abudi, 2011). Furthermore, even though there has been a growth in ‘democratization’ of 
familial roles as woman have increasingly gained work outside the home, the family continues to be 
hierarchal in structure, reflecting patriarchal values. Thus, even though women gain opportunities 
they still negotiate gendered expectations around femininity and position (Droeber, 2005) and the 
family continues to be both economically and emotionally important, even to highly educated Middle 
Eastern Women (Moghadam, 2003).      
Gender and Agency in the Middle East  
Noting the shifting and structural influences of family, religion, society and culture that operate within 
the Middle East, issues of agency and capacity arise. Orientalist writing on Middle Eastern women has 
resulted in women, particularly those from Islamic backgrounds, being othered and homogenised into 
faceless, powerless subjects at the mercy of patriarchal structures who did not possess any personal 
capacities (for a critique of this, see: Abu-Lughod, 2002; Margot Badran, 2011; Graham-Brown, 2013; 
Lazreg, 2015; Meriwether & Tucker, 2018).  
Various feminist scholars have corrected this by emphasising Middle Eastern women’s agentive 
capacity through different conceptualisations and contextualisation’s of agency. For example, 
Mahmood (2005) and Badran (2009) have conducted research on how women express agency within 
structures of public piety, through ethical self-making and religious agency, everyday-ness, and joy, 
desire and fun. Charrad (2011) and Singerman (1996) emphasise the ways in which Middle Eastern 
women exert agency in everyday settings, but particularly through societal and family networks. 
Shami's (1996) work on Palestinian communities living in Amman during slum upgrading programmes 
presents ways in which women transcended community and neighbourhood boundaries to advocate 
for their family and community, bringing the power of the ‘domestic sphere to bear on the public’, 
negotiating with government officials to protect family and social relations (p. 22-23). Yadav (2010) 
examines Yemini women’s engagement in Islamic activism and the ways in which they advocate for 
rights within ‘segmented publics’ which have enhanced their capacity to be part of political decision-
making bodies. Various scholars have examined the advocacy and political involvement of Middle 
Eastern women in the Arab Uprisings (whilst also lamenting the lack of much needed gendered 
reforms in the aftermath of protests see: Johansson-Nogués, 2013).  
Additionally, Das (2006) and Sanyal (2014) argue that academics and activists frequently frame agency 
as an ‘escape from the ordinary’, or a ‘grand act of rebellion’ when in reality agency is frequently a 
‘descent into the ordinary’. For refugees in particular, this might mean the ability to practise of 
ordinary activities whilst they are living in a ‘state of exception’ (Sanyal, 2014, p. 570). Thus, for a 
refugee woman, the freedom to simply leave the house and take her children to school may be agentic 
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and empowering. Furthermore, many women operate and exist within shifting structural contexts 
where they do not possess social positions of power and influence (particularly refugee women). As 
such, they utilise their agency in tactical ways in order to enhance their position to the best of their 
capacity.  
These literatures encourage an examination beyond typical Western feminist discourses on ‘how’ 
agency should look and operate, emphasising an analysis of the cultural contextuality in which agency 
is practised, which can enrichen and broaden understanding (Shalaby, 2016). Bangstad (2011) notes 
that feminists often struggle to recognise or conceptualise accounts of feminist agency unless 
recognised as agentic ‘resistance’. As a result, ‘female agency anchored in other understandings of 
freedom than those implied by secular feminism becomes void’ (p.29).  Mahmood’s (2005) research 
on women in Islamic Movements pushes against the positioning that Bangstad describes. In her work, 
Mahmood condemns tacit assumptions that without the structures of the patriarchal family system, 
all Islamic women would ‘throw off their veils’ and conduct their lives in oppositional confrontation to 
cultural and religious norms. Rather, her work shows that women often express support for their 
existing position and role within their society, thus agency is also utilised in support of ongoing cultural 
and societal norms and structures, not only expressing or exercising an opposition to these. Muhanna 
(2013) joins these criticisms, arguing that in context of humanitarianism in the Middle East, both 
Western liberal feminists and humanitarian agencies overemphasise women’s agency as embodied 
resistance to the active structures of patriarchy in their societies. Muhanna calls for researchers to 
locate human agency ‘in situ rather than by drawing upon normative, feminist politics’ (p. 29), 
emphasising that agency is a complex process whereby women negotiate various discourses in a 
conscious manner in order to best respond to their personal desires (p. 32-33). Thus, women may 
react to various structures in a range of agentic responses, including their resistance towards, and 
maintenance of, existing structures.   
Kandiyoti’s (1988) work examines decisions by women in classically patriarchal societies to ‘bargain 
with patriarchy’. She explores women’s engagement with structures that re-emphasise patriarchal 
norms in society. In these incidences, women ‘bargain’ with patriarchy by engaging with the set rules 
and scripts regulating gender relations as these provide certain levels of protection and security (p. 
286). As such, women re-produce patriarchal norms, frequently to the detriment of their own gender, 
in order to protect themselves individually.  Kandiyoti considers the relevance of how older women in 
patriarchal societies can reproduce oppressive structures for younger women, as this benefits their 
own personal power. The only way that elderly women can gain more power and agency, she argues, 
is through manoeuvring and reproducing the existing patriarchal structures. Thus, women may be 
involved in ‘tactical’ decision making in order to enhance their agency (de Certeau, 1984).  
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The literature above has shown the diverse and contextual ways in which women engage their agency 
in forms of resistance against structures, but also how they may not only reproduce, but support and 
maintain existing structures that are perceived, or framed, as ‘oppressive’, by Western writers. These 
accounts demonstrate the complexity of individual agency. However, many women live in contexts 
where they do not ‘start’ in a position of power, or where structures operate in their favour (Cornwall, 
2007). This is particularly the case for refugee women. The next section theorises the way in which 
agency can be understood and analysed in oppressive contexts by introducing de Certeau’s theory of 
strategies and tactics.  
Structure and agency and de Certeau’s theory of tactics and strategy  
As noted above, agency is expressed in individual ways, in response to structures, situations and 
identities. Noting the literature already discussed on patriarchy and intersectionality, and the chapter 
to come on refugee contexts, it is important to note that individuals may disengage from their 
preferred agentic responses, ‘keep the peace’, or indeed make incremental decisions, in order to 
enhance their personal security. Michel de Certeau's (1984) The practice of everyday life, which 
considers the differences between tactics and strategies, is a useful way of understanding agency and 
decision making for those in oppressive or marginalised contexts.  
The distinction between a strategy and tactic is an issue of power. Strategies can be understood as ‘a 
calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with 
will and power...can be isolated’ (de Certeau, 1984, pp. 35–36). Strategies can be considered to have 
a location, a function of place, that is both distinctly defined and possessed and can therefore act as a  
genuine challenge to other power structures (Buchanan, 2012; Frisina, 2010). Kelly & Mitchell (2012, 
p. 278) argue that strategies can be thought of as ‘rationalising logics of power’ that control and shape 
their external environment and manage external threats. They identify peace processes in Belfast, 
which act to control security, democracy and governance, as strategies. In this manner, state security 
frameworks, or even hybrid or alternative security frameworks, can be thought of as strategies (see 
Chapter Three and Four). Strategies can be considered as power practices, and thus have structuring 
influence. In contrast, ‘tactics’ have no location, they are incremental and reactive, ‘off the cuff’ 
decisions within oppressive structures and contexts. Tactics are the moments of opportunity that an 
individual grasps within a terrain that has been imposed on them (de Certeau, 1984; Kelly & Mitchell, 
2012). This differentiating helps to theorise the way in which landscapes of power operate. Employing 
the notion of ‘tactics’ is particularly helpful when considering the position of marginalised groups, and 
the decision making, they engage in. In her research with Yoruba women in Nigeria, Andrea Cornwall 
reminds us that:  
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‘strategic choices (are) dependent on having the power to realise them: power that many 
women in this as in other settings…are not in a position to fully exercise’ (Cornwall, 2007b, p. 
28).  
Frisina (2010) emphasises that individuals using tactics should not be thought of as rational beings 
that plan out their activities. Rather, tactical opportunities and decisions that are spontaneously 
undertaken, are ‘weighed against daily worries and pleasures’ and do not have heavy consequence or 
fall out. She echoes Cornwall’s position stating: ‘only strong social actors, who can count on an 
abundance of resources, can attempt longer-term emancipatory strategies’ (p. 560). Frisina and 
Cornwall both allude to wider structures of control that hinder agentic capacity, particularly the 
capacity of those in marginalised positions. However, both emphasise that individuals in these 
situations do possess agency, but that it is often engaged with in unexpected or incremental ways.  
Tactics, Strategies and Space  
Strategies of power have deeply felt spatial consequences that can particularly affect marginalised 
groups experiences of space and belonging. Noting above how strategies typically have a ‘location’ 
and a function of place, spatiality can be seen as a definitive component of their power. Strategies 
have spatial significance which require tactical negotiation by those that do not possess powerful 
social locations. For example, examining Arab communities living in Tel Aviv and Jaffa, Hamdan-Saliba 
& Fenster (2012) explore how the norms and values of Arab culture act as a strategy of power which 
influences women’s spatial mobility and wider sense of belonging the city. They consider various ways 
in which these women respond to cultural, gendered, national and global strategies of power and note 
‘active’ (such as finding alternative spaces of ownership) and ‘non-active tactics’ (such as reducing 
mobility) that women employ, in order to negotiate various power structures. They explain the ways 
in which engagement in non-active tactics directly affect women’s wider sense of belonging and 
having a place within the city, demonstrating the relationship between agency and a wider sense of 
spatial empowerment and belonging. 
Looking to the specific experiences of refugee women, Freedman (2017) found that Syrian refugee 
women making the journey across Europe, frequently engaged in a range of tactical agentic responses 
to their circumstances. Freedman found that women utilised their framing as ‘vulnerable’ to their 
advantage, using this to advocate for protection and resources and to negotiate border crossings and 
security services. Despite the structural constraints of borders, security services and asylum 
procedures, women expressed clear decisions on how they intended to negotiate their movement 
across various countries in order to enhance their (and their family’s) protection. This agentic and 
tactical use of femininity is also found amongst Palestinian refugee women. Muhanna's (2013) 
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research in Gaza found that in contexts of conflict or insecurity that often women may feel more 
empowered by enhancing their femininity (i.e. their role as a mother or caregiver) or enhancing their 
historic role of subordination in order to achieve desired outcomes (p. 36-37). These studies 
emphasise women’s tactical decision making in deeply structured and oppressive environments, and 
the specific ways in which the use aspects of their identity in order to negotiate challenging situations.    
Exploring the spatial practices of Kurdish women living in Istanbul, Secor (2004) describes citizenship 
as a strategy of power that draws boundaries of inside and outside against ‘the Other’. Using strategies 
and tactics, Secor traces how Kurdish women disrupt ideas of citizenship through everyday practices, 
particularly their spatial mobility of the city whereby they engage in a range of tactics, such as 
anonymity, to negotiate the different neighbourhoods and spaces of the city in which they live. Secor 
notes that different spaces within Istanbul require ‘different performances of ethnic identity and 
citizenship’ (p. 361) which women engage in, in order to enhance their personal mobility.  She 
emphasises that spatial stories, both those that trace tactics of anonymity or strategies of identity 
should be seen as political narratives operating through the streets of the city (p. 363). Therefore, 
examining an individual’s identity, spatial mobility and indeed the tactics they employ, relate directly 
to understanding matrices and structures of societal power.      
These studies emphasise the spatial relationship between strategies and tactics, particularly 
demonstrating the ways in which structural strategies shape experiences of mobility, spatiality and 
belonging amongst marginalised and oppressed identities. As such, they indicate the importance of 
examining quotidian spatial stories, in order to understand how structures and causal mechanisms 
shape everyday experiences in the city. The next section will explore ideas and theorisations of space 
in more detail in order to consider the ways in which it is both ‘real’ and socially constructed. 
Public and Private Space  
Space is a broad and challenging concept to define. It has been understood and theorised in a 
multitude of ways – most typically in its relationship to place (Agnew, 2011). This thesis is concerned 
with the sociology of space, that is the way in which social relations are produced spatially and how 
space (re)produces social behaviours. Therefore, it understands space to be socially constructed, 
produced and re-produced by citizens’ and stakeholders’ claims and uses of space, reflecting power 
asymmetries at work in these settings (Arjmand, 2016; McDowell, 1999). Urban space has a 
multidimensional nature, consisting of different material, social, symbolic, cultural and historic 
aspects (Madanipour, 2011). Space is not only a material location within a city, but also a site that 
reproduces and reflects social relations (Massey, 1994). This thesis engages with these socially 
constructivist understandings, acknowledging the detailed relationship that social relations have in 
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(re)producing space, and particularly gendered relations, but also acknowledging the material and 
physical location of these spaces (in particular, differentiating between inside/outside spaces, see:  
Madanipour, 2003). The section that follows refers to both the dichotomy of material public and 
private spaces (e.g. the physical home, the public square) and the ways in which (predominantly 
gendered) social relations map onto these material spaces to reproduce social constructions that 
create associations of space with particular genders, behaviours and groups.  
Conceptually, space within cities is often reduced to a dichotomy as being either public or private. 
Mitchell (2003, p. 131) defines public space as a ‘material location where social interactions and public 
activities of all members of the public occur’, whilst Ceccato (2016, p. 71) considers it to be a ‘shared 
environment that can be accessed by all individuals, usually at all times’. These definitions emerge 
from Western, normative understandings of public space as rooted in the Greek concept of agora and 
Jurgen Habermas’s theorisation of ‘the public sphere’ (Qian, 2014). The agora was an open, central 
space in Greek cities, where citizens met, moved through, debated and expressed political positions. 
It is a location of ‘intense social interaction’ where different people and institutions make and 
withdraw claims to the space (Madanipour, 2009, p. 237) and a location where political messages can 
be conveyed to society at large (Shantz & Collins, 2009). Whilst noting its important political function, 
Gholamhosseini et al., (2019) also highlight the ways in which public space fulfils important health and 
entertainment function’s for society as places of exercise and socialising. Thus, normative 
understandings of public space include ‘movement’ or physical, material spaces of interaction and also 
notions of political representation and communication. As such, one can recognise its vital importance 
to urban civic life.  
Whereby the public is open and accessible, the private is its opposite: interior and secluded, the 
contrast between an ‘individual’s inner space of consciousness and the outer space of the world’ (Ali 
Madanipour, 2003, p. 201). Furthermore, ‘private space’ is also considered separate from the public 
reach and intrusion of the state, a public institution (Shami, 1996). As such, private spaces are 
perceived to be the site of the family and the domestic. These definitions, which focus on the totality 
of public space welcoming ‘all’, and private space as being beyond the reach of the state, indicate an 
ideal that in reality is rarely, if ever, achieved. 
For example, whilst the agora is conceptualised as the original public space, it has been critiqued for 
its exclusion of women, slaves and minorities (Benhabib, 1993). This influenced early associations of 
public space as ‘masculine’ and private space as feminine, shaping the continued exclusion of women 
and minorities from public spheres and spaces of the city. For example, refugees, migrants, women 
and those with disabilities are frequently excluded from fully accessing public spaces of the city. 
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Furthermore, state law often extends over the so-called boundary of public/private in several laws 
and policies (for example, family status laws, see: Arjmand, 2016). This suggest that whilst 
public/private are dichotomous terms, in reality the spaces that they refer to operate at a variety of 
scales of privacy and publicness that overlap and intersect. This creates a ‘mosaic of spaces’ with 
‘degrees of access’ within cities (Gieseking, 2014).  
Gender & Public/Private Space   
Social construction of social spheres and spaces have been central to feminist analyses of patriarchy 
(Yuval-Davis, 1997b, p. 5). Traditionally, the private sphere is associated with domesticity and 
femininity whilst the public sphere is associated with power, status, mobility and masculinity and this 
has important connotations for how space is perceived and utilised (Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2001). 
Arjmand (2016, p. 1-2) considers the associations of gender with particular public or private spaces, 
to be the ‘foundation of spatial arrangements in the modern city’ as the city embodies the ‘historic 
division of labour by gender within a normative structure’. As such, these societal associations of each 
gender occupying and belonging to either public or private space are reproduced and reflected in the 
structural norms that shape societal and political life and continue to support the ‘dominant regime 
of power’ (ibid). This dichotomy has been critiqued by feminists since the 1970’s, in order to explore 
the subordination of women to the private/domestic sphere (Abraham, 2010). 
The analysis of space as bifurcated into different gendered spheres has been greatly critiqued. 
Working from the position that space itself is socially produced and reproduced, and constitutes social 
relations (Abraham, 2010; Lefebvre, 1991), societies are not strictly divided into public and private 
spaces which each gender strictly occupies. Rather, men and women negotiate, access and occupy 
different spaces in graded terms of mobility which differs over time and space and is contingent on a 
number of other factors, such as culture, class, race and ethnicity (Moghadam, 2003; Thompson, 
2003). For example, a number of studies have examined how private, domesticated spaces are 
locations of gender-based violence for women, and how many women lack protection and power 
within the privacy of their own homes; whilst others have demonstrated that women who feel a sense 
of disempowerment at home may continue to experience this whilst negotiating the wider city, but 
conversely may also experience a sense of belonging and empowerment once out of the confinement 
of their homes (Fenster, 2005). Thus, women have varied experiences of empowerment, fear, 
discomfort and belonging in a range of both material public and private spaces in the city, which are 
greatly shaped by their identities and personal experiences.  As such, the private cannot be treated 
strictly as ‘indoors’, female and safe, and the public as ‘outdoors’, male and dangerous (Ranade, 2007). 
These arguments point to the necessity of examining experiences and negotiations of space through 
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an intersectional lens, which enables for a wider discussion of how identities shape access and 
experiences of different spaces.  
Thinking about issues of identity and of space in graded terms of mobility and seclusion aids in 
developing concepts of exclusion from and/or ‘belonging’ to particular spaces. Fenster’s work (1999, 
2005) which examines gender and Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to the city’ (RTC), highlights how 
‘belonging’ and exclusion in the city is linked to notions of citizenship, identity and fear. Fenster (2005), 
notes how the use of public space and the act of walking in the city streets, adds an ‘everyday’ sense 
of belonging to the city. Through walking practices, individuals have the potential to make sense of 
space, connect and interact with others and overcome feelings of alienation.  Importantly she also 
notes the ways in which using public space creates ‘informal claims’ which enhance the sense of 
particular communities ‘colonising’ a space (p. 222-223). Without falling into the trap of labelling 
public space as static, Fenster highlights how cities have ‘hegemonic communities’, those who hold 
the greatest rights and ‘citizenship’ in a city, and how in turn that community will determine and affect 
others rights, access, and sense of belonging in spaces of the city (Fenster, 2005, p. 245). Thus there 
is a ‘politics to belonging’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011), which particularly affects those of different nationalities 
and ethnicities (Fenster, 2005, p. 225). This can result in a sense of space being ‘forbidden’ or 
‘permitted’ dependent on identity. Fenster identifies two key reasons for women’s inability to fulfil 
their ‘right to the city’:  Fear of public space, and cultural and religious norms associated with gender 
that construct particular places as ‘forbidden’. Here, Fenster identities a particularly important 
mechanism (fear) through which women’s behaviour and experiences of space is shaped.  
Gendered geographies of fear have direct relationship to how spaces are constituted and 
reconstituted as ‘male’ and ‘female’, and the gendering of space has direct relationship with an 
individual’s experience and perception of fear (Koskela, 1997; Whitzman, 2007). Public space is 
continually reproduced as a location of hegemonic masculinity. Thus, when women access and 
negotiate the typically perceived ‘public spaces’ of their cities, they are in effect transgressing the 
boundaries of the socio-spatial order (Ranade, 2007). Women who negotiate public space are deeply 
conscious of both their embodied and located presence. This is constituted through the male gaze 
which imbues a deep sense of self-awareness upon women of being ‘out of place’ and ‘taking up space’ 
(de Koning, 2009). Thus, women have internalised a realisation that they are objectified, and when 
negotiating public space, they are viewed, judged and interpreted through a narrow, located vision 
(Clark, 2017, p. 2). As such, women in public space are continually negotiating the ‘male gaze’ within 
a hegemonically (re)produced masculine space.   
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Women are not only negotiating masculine spaces but are also negotiating a fear of male violence 
within the public sphere. Valentine (1989) and Pain (1997) note that even though women are more at risk 
of domesticated male violence, they fear the violence of strangers (and thus express greater fear in 
public space) because strangers are perceived as ‘unregulated’. Public space is a concentrated area of 
strangers who we believe might pose a threat to us (Koskela, 1997).  
Returning to theories of tactical agency explored above, women are found to self-regulate their 
behaviour and mobility in order to limit their encounters with (particularly male) strangers when in 
public space. This is achieved through gendered performance and tactics of dress, speech and 
behaviour, which are deemed culturally ‘feminine’, unthreatening and modest (see above, and West 
& Zimmerman, 1987, 2009). Women restrict their movements to specific times of day and utilise 
‘chaperones’ in order to navigate space without the interruption of men. In particular, they restrict 
their mobility in the evening where visibility is compromised (See for example de Koning, 2009; 
Koskela, 1999; Ranade, 2007; Sur, 2012). Ranade (2007) considers these tactics to be a means of 
enhancing personal safety, and these behaviours to be both conscious and internalised:  
‘The production of safety through respectability is thus practised by women in their everyday 
movement through public spaces…Sometimes these actions are purposeful and conscious. At 
other times, they are the result of a subconscious self-policing resulting from an 
internalisation of hegemonic notions of femininity which determine what is proper and what 
is not’ (Ranade, 2007, pp. 1523–1524).   
These defensive behaviours reflect the spatial expression of patriarchy (R. H. Pain, 1997; Stanko, 
1995), which in turn perpetuates and re-constitutes the conceptualisation of public/private space as 
masculine/feminine and directly influences gendered identities.  
However, as noted above through Fenster’s (2005) work, gendered identities are not the only category 
that enhances an individual’s exclusion and marginalisation in public space. Public spaces of the city 
have also been analysed as exclusionary, towards ethnic minorities, those who are disabled or have 
special needs, LGBT and homeless people (Springer, 2009). Thus, those that are disenfranchised or 
othered can feel a heightened sense of vulnerability in public space (Day, 1999; Fox et al., 2009; Pain, 
2001). Thus, examining intersectional identities and their interactions with the various structures and 
spaces of a society create deeper, and more individual, understandings of space, gender, agency and 
tactics.  
There are cultural specificities and meanings regarding public and private spaces that enrich varied 
understandings of these terms and the ways in which the boundaries of the public/private overlap 
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and shift. How different genders negotiate space in different contexts can be widely different. From 
the literature examined above, it is clear that using terms such as ‘public’ or ‘private’ can lead to a 
tendency to view space in a dichotomy with gendered associations. However, there is a utility and 
usefulness to these terms, they provide an ‘important language’ to understand and navigate the 
spaces of the city and the ways in which space is socially constructed. Mills (2007) argues that public 
and private space ‘remain important language for studies of the local and global contexts within which 
gender is constructed’. An awareness of the relationship between these terms, and the construction 
of gender, aids examination of how gendered identities experience, challenge, negotiate and 
reproduce urban spaces of the city. In this thesis therefore, these terms are engaged in order to refer 
to the materiality of spaces in the city (e.g. public: streets and squares; private: the home), and whilst 
not essentialsing gender to each of these spaces (i.e. women to private space, men to public space), 
is aware of the tendency to associate specific genders with particular spaces and the role that this 
then has in constructing spaces in particular ways and in reconstructing wider structures of patriarchy 
and gender.  
Gender and Space in the Middle East  
Examining how constructions of gender and space operate in the Middle East provides insight into the 
critiques of gender and space outlined above. Because of several factors, the Middle East is often 
thought of by Western scholars as societally ordered into gendered public and private spaces. This 
includes the strong representation of Islam, the exportation of Western academic concepts of the 
private and public domain, Orientalist academics fixation with women’s ‘prohibited spaces’ and the 
urban planning of Arab cities themselves (Afsaruddin, 1999; Mills, 2007; Sawalha, 2014).  
Cities in the Middle Eastern region were traditionally built on a pedestrian scale which resulted in a 
complex and dense city with mixed usage (Hassan et al., 2016; Kiet, 2011, p. 43). There was an 
emphasis on a division between the private and public sphere in order to protect modesty, as 
particularly in Islamic society, social relations are frequently based on social segregation between the 
sexes (Golkowska, 2017). However, an examination of the Middle Eastern city demonstrates how 
public and private spaces overlap and how boundaries shift continually. The privacy of the individual 
and the family was achieved in part through urban planning, whereby streets, leading off the main 
road, would gradually diminish in size, changing in character from public to semi-public to private. The 
use of dead ends (cul-de-sacs) was common in order to create these quasi private/public spaces of 
domestic life where those in the street could be easily observed (Hassan et al., 2016). Thus, some 
neighbourhood streets are even perceived as ‘private space’ (Mills, 2007; Mortada, 2003, pp. 83–85). 
Thus, although ‘public spaces’ of these cities does include streets, it is probably best associated with 
areas of the city whereby individuals have the greatest amount of social interaction with ‘unknown 
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others’: streets outsides of one’s own neighbourhood, squares, mosques, cemeteries, the public 
garden and some of the city’s social institutions (Ardalan, 1980; Kostof, 1992).  
Traditionally, places of public gathering (the mosque) and the seat of government were ‘symbolically 
placed at the centre of the city’ or at the ‘head of the town’ in order for these places to be both orderly 
and self-supporting (Ardalan, 1980, p. 5). The Mosque has a two-fold, integrated purpose: religious 
and social. It was envisioned as a multi-purpose space, for prayers, congregation, study, rest and 
‘political decision making’ (Mortada, 2003, p. 87). The main, open area of the city was typically outside 
the Mosque, a large urban courtyard or plaza referred to in some Middle Eastern cultures as a Maidan, 
which academics have argued that it was the original ‘public space’, the agora of Islamic society 
(Rabbat, 2012). The Mosque has received similar critique to the agora for its exclusion or side-lining 
of women. Women’s position, access and involvement in the Mosque reflects the societal norm of a 
gendered dichotomy of public/private space. Mosques have been described as ‘hegemonic, male 
dominated and patriarchal’, as men are encouraged to join in congregational prayers, whilst women 
are encouraged to stay within the domestic sphere to pray. When women do use the mosque, 
participation within the building itself is also segregated, with different areas accessed by each gender 
(Mahmood, 2005, p. 2; Mazumdar & Mazumdar 2002, p. 166).   
Whilst acknowledging these societal and religious ‘preferences’ for particular genders in particular 
spaces, Afsaruddin (1999) remarks that historicising the relationship between gender and space across 
the region shows that the private and public spheres in the Middle East have been ‘anything but 
bipolar’, and rather plotted along a continuum (p. 3). For example, returning to an examination of 
gender, space and the mosque, a number of scholars have tracked the rise of the Women’s ‘Mosque 
Movement’ in the Middle East, and the growth of Islamic classes for women, by women, held within 
mosques (e.g. Badran, 2009). These studies have both highlighted women’s agency, as well as their 
engagement and presence in the public sphere.  
Several feminist and Islamic scholars have critiqued understandings of a dichotomy of gendered 
public/private space in the Middle East, tracking the relationship and overlap within these spheres. 
Nelson's (1974) pioneering work examining Bedouin tribes sought to address Orientialist assumptions of 
the public/private 'dichotomy' and its repercussions for examining ideas of power and authority in the 
region. In particular, she argued against the uncritical notion that there are 'dual and separate worlds 
for men and women (in the Arab world) in which the former world is public and the latter world is 
private' (p. 551). Her work has been echoed by other scholars in the region, who encourage an 
examination of space and gender as ‘graded’.   
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For example, Thompson (2003) argues that ideas of public and private spaces are better reframed of 
in ideas of gendered boundaries and 'graded terms' of 'seclusion' and 'mobility'. As her work is in the 
discipline of history, it largely examines gendered boundaries in medieval and colonial times and 
examines how these shifted during state-making processes. Fenster (1999) advocates the thinking of 
space within Middle Eastern contexts in terms of ‘forbidden’ and ‘permitted’ spaces, as opposed to 
the Western dichotomy of public/private. In this theorisation she reflects the Islamic terms of haram 
(forbidden) and halal (permissible) which guide Islamic moral codes of behaviour. She examines the 
shifting boundaries of space in Bedouin culture whereby private spaces of the home are immediately 
perceived as ‘public’ when a stranger enters them. Thus, public space is perceived predominantly as 
a place where strangers are present (and private space the absence of strangers), not necessarily a 
material or fixed location or boundary (Valentine, 1989, p. 386). This blurring of what is considered a 
‘private space’ is seen in Mazumdar & Mazumdar's (2001) work with Islamic communities in India and 
Iran. They explore how during the day, private spaces can extend into the traditionally perceived 
public realm. As men are expected to be at work during the day, the street and the market become a 
space of belonging and safety for women whilst they conduct daily errands, reverting to a masculine 
space in the evening. They argue for viewing spaces as ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ of particular genders, 
at particular times, rather than a strict dichotomy of private/public. These terms of seclusion/mobility; 
inclusive/exclusive and forbidden/permitted, which are all seen across a continuum of access and 
temporality, all aid in conceptualising the different ways in which space and gender interact, and the 
ways in which different structures act to restrict or open spaces to different genders.   
Continuing this argument, there are a number of studies from the region that reflect a shifting and 
fluid boundary between public and private space, and the ways in which different genders access and 
occupy these spaces. Nooraddin (1998) considers the al-fina (in-between spaces) in the design of 
traditional Arabic cities.  He notes how these spaces are interchangeably public and private, which are 
adjusted and negotiated between everyday users of these spaces, and on occasion, conferred by law. 
The work of Mills (2007), in Mahalle neighbourhood space in Istanbul, echoes this idea of 
interchangeably public and private spaces, noting how Mahalle spaces are  perceived by users as a 
shifting space of privacy and publicness, particularly regarding issues of gender. Arjmand's (2016) 
examination of women-only urban parks in Iran further challenges the division of a public/private 
sphere. She discusses how both typically perceived private and public spaces become blurred as the 
legal scrutiny of the Islamic State extends into both public and private spheres to control male-female 
relationships and mobilities (p. 159).  
Differing identity categories, such as those of ethnicity and class, also have a role in differentiated 
access to space. Examining gendered relations in coffee houses and funeral homes in pre and post-
53 
 
war Beirut, Sawalha (2010) highlights identities of class and gender and the freedoms (or restrictions) 
that class brings to negotiating issues of space and gender, demonstrating how wealth and education 
allows some women access to spaces that are perceived as ‘masculine’. Indeed, a number of studies 
have considered the ways in which gender and class interact to shape women’s experiences of space 
in the Middle East region, allowing for greater access or restriction to public space depending on their 
wealth and education (de Koning, 2009; Hasso, 2017). Alizadeh (2007) examines historic and current 
conceptions of gender and public/private spaces in Kurdish cities in the Middle East. His work serves 
as a reminder of the heterogeneity of Arab society, noting the greater public mobility of Kurdish 
women in the region (in comparison to Muslim women), and within Kurdish categories of class. He 
also underscores the ‘soft’ boundary between public and private spaces in Kurdish cities, noting that 
Kurdish women’s socio-political and economic contexts have a direct relationship into their public 
mobility.  
Issues of space and gender are also deeply connected to identities, agentic capacity and tactical 
decisions about how and when to be ‘mobile’ and active in (public) space, how an individual represents 
themselves and how they are perceived (Silvey, 2004, 2006). For example, Deeb's (2006) work with 
‘pious’ Shi’a women in the southern suburbs of Beirut examines how Muslim women establish their 
acceptance in public space through their strong Islamic identity and charitable work. The increase in 
women taking employment roles outside the home, especially in urban areas, has also led to changing 
dynamics of space and gender, where women assume new habits and mix with male colleagues, which 
leads to a growing dialectic between women, public and private spaces, in the region (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 
2013).  
Gender & Space in Amman and Beirut  
The studies above demonstrate that there are generally gendered associations and norms, shaped by 
structural issues such as patriarchy, that result in a tendency for particular genders to occupy 
particular spaces (Newcomb, 2006). However, conceptualising space in strict and dichotomised public 
or private terms that each gender then occupies, is not an accurate reflection of the social and spatial 
dynamics and realities at work. Rather, the way in which the various genders access and negotiate 
space is better perceived through the terms introduced above, through the work of Fenster (1999), 
Mazumdar & Mazumdar (2001b) and Thompson (2003): graded positions of seclusion and mobility, 
forbidden and permitted, or inclusive and exclusive. These terms enable a means of theorising spaces 
as fluid and changing, not bounded and static, and the ways in which various genders access space as 
adjustable and dependent. Thus, layered onto material understandings of space as ‘public’ (outdoors) 
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and private (indoors), these terms provide a means of deeper theorisation of gender and mobility 
within Middle Eastern society.      
Despite the valuable studies and theorising discussed above, overall it is notable, as Fenster & 
Hamdan-Saliba (2013) point out, that there is a gap on literature that focuses on gender, space and 
mobility in the Middle East. They argue that this gap is present because addressing patriarchal 
hegemony, women's bodies in space, equality and freedom are still considered largely taboo in the 
region (p. 539). Of particular relevance to this thesis is the lack of work on intersectionality, on the 
cities of Amman and Beirut, and the experiences and mobility of women refugees in these contexts.  
Turning now to the cities that are the focus of my research, there are several continuities and 
differences in the research that has emerged from Beirut and Amman regarding gender, space and 
mobility. There is a lacuna on gendered experiences of public space in both cities. Amman in particular 
has been overlooked as a research site for decades, and Beirut is frequently examined in light of its 
complex history of civil conflict and sectarian politics. However, there have been a handful of studies 
that provide insight into the experiences of women in each city. The work of Aljafari (2014) in Amman 
and Fawaz et al (2017) in Beirut note the dynamics of migrant receiving neighbourhoods in both cities, 
highlighting how these typically male dominated neighbourhoods result in women feeling unsafe and 
unwelcome in public space. Studies such as Lara Deeb’s (2006; Deeb & Harb, 2013) on the Shi’a 
neighbourhoods in the South of Beirut, and  Kaya’s (2010) research on Ammani women attending the 
University of Yarmouk both demonstrate the ways in which women negotiate the male gaze and how 
they navigate public space and social codes through behaviours and dress. Whilst both Amman and 
Beirut are considered diverse, heterogeneous cities that differ and vary in character from 
neighbourhood to neighbourhood, studies across both cities demonstrate the sexual harassment that 
women encounter in public space, and the ways in which that there are particular spaces and times 
where women are ‘permitted’ to be present (Ababsa, 2017; Fawaz et al., 2012; Kaya, 2010; Sawalha, 
2010). However, it does appear that in Amman this is more greatly shaped by more conservative 
expectations around gender, behaviour and dress, whilst in Beirut it is heavily shaped by gendered 
security provision (Fawaz et al., 2012; Sawalha, 2010). Beirut is broadly considered one of the most 
liberal and cosmopolitan cities in the region (Sawalha, 2010). Despite this, its citizens and their mosaic 
of cultures and ethnicities all have varying expectations about appropriate behaviour, respectability 
and dress. Although not always explicitly discussed, issues of class, education and wealth are also 
emerge in much of this research and indicates how women’s experiences and freedoms might differ 
across these social locations (see for example de Koning, 2009; Sawalha, 2010).   
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Conclusion  
This chapter has examined a breadth of feminist literature that explores the relationship between the 
construction and interplay of identity and space, particularly within the Middle East. It has promoted 
a critical realist feminist approach to identity and intersectionality to provide an underpinning 
methodology for understanding refugee women’s behaviour and experiences, specifically highlighting 
how pre-existing and (re)produced structures will intersect with women’s categories of identity to 
shape particular experiences in the public and private sphere. For example, this chapter explored the 
ways in which patriarchal structures exist within Middle Eastern society and extend into public and 
private realms to shape expectations regarding gendered social dress, behaviour and presence.   
Expressions of agency by Middle Eastern women often do not conform to the expectations of Western 
feminists. In such contexts, there are varied expressions and acts of agency, some which support and 
uphold existing societal structures, those which confront them and those which negotiate with them. 
Michel de Certeau’s theory of strategies and tactics in particular provides a template for considering 
the ways in which women in oppressive circumstances will use their agency to enhance their personal 
protection and safety, whilst not directly addressing structures of oppression. This raises questions 
about the structuring experiences that refugee women may encounter in their host cities and the 
decisions and tactics they may engage in, in order to enhance their personal sense of security. It also 
raises questions about how empowering or disempowering these contexts may be for refugee women 
as their roles shift and change in different environments.    
Social conceptualisations of gender and space are acutely related to each other. Gendered identities 
play out in spatial locations, reproducing and embedding space with gendered meaning, thus 
reproducing cultural and societal norms, resulting in associations of particular genders with particular 
spaces. Within the Middle East there is a societal preference for the segregation of the sexes, which 
has resulted in continued association of women with private space, to ensure their privacy and 
protection. This is not to say that women are ‘forbidden’ from entering public space or that they 
‘transgress’ gendered norms when they are in public space. However, there are expectations on how 
women conduct themselves within these spaces, which are carried in socio-cultural expectations 
around behaviour, dress and interactions. These expectations vary across countries, across issues of 
class, wealth and religion. Thus, Fenster’s perception that social constructions of public and private 
space are better conceived in graded terms of ‘permitted’ or ‘forbidden’ is relevant and useful. Rather 
than seeing space as flat and static, these terms ask questions of space and gender, of who is 
‘permitted’ or ‘forbidden’, in what spaces, when and why. As such, they bring to the fore the necessity 
of asking about individual’s various identities and the ways in which these shape experiences and 
degrees of access to space.  
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Chapter Three: Urban Refugees, Gender and (In)security  
 
In the previous chapter I have provided a theoretical understanding of identity, structure and agency 
and space. This demonstrated how the employment of theories of intersectionality assist in providing 
a holistic view of refugee women and how highlighting causal mechanisms and structures provides 
insight into experiences of spatial marginality and oppression. This chapter shifts attention to urban 
refugees themselves, examining literature and theories that conceptualise urban refugee (in)security 
in the everyday, in order to understand lived experiences at the city scale.  
This chapter begins with a discussion of urban refugees, exploring how this group has been defined 
and perceived by academics, global institutions and host governments. It identifies and outlines 
several overlapping and interacting issues of (in)security that urban refugees experience specifically 
focusing on livelihoods and shelter, legal status, access to security and justice institutions and host 
community relationships. Drawing on these themes, the chapter provides a review of urban refugee 
literature, highlighting, where possible, knowledge of gendered experiences. Noting several gaps in 
the existing urban refugee literature, the first section concludes with a broad analysis of works that 
have explored Syrian refugee women’s experiences in their host cities. 
The second part of the chapter draws together ideas from the sub-disciplines of geopolitics, human 
security and geolegality, in order to theorise urban insecurity regarding refugee communities. The 
usefulness of feminist perspectives of these theories is noted; as they shift attention to lived realities 
of security, rather than state preoccupations of security with a focus on borders and sovereignty.  
Whilst feminist geopolitics and human security emphasise the various scales at which a refugee may 
experience insecurity, geolegality assists in understanding the ways in which boundaries of legality are 
created for refugees and the ways in which this not only builds a sense of unbelonging within particular 
communities, but also shapes particular spaces and places as permitted or forbidden (Fenster, 1999). 
Thus, the state refuge policy frameworks can create landscapes of fear for refugees, opening them up 
to potential vulnerability and exploitation, particularly if these frameworks are not designed to protect 
refugee rights. Feminist geolegality promotes an examination of the ways in which legality has 
gendered spatial outcomes and encourages an examination of how the scale of the intimate and the 
everyday both produce and reproduce laws and policies. Thus, it reflects the feminist framing of this 
thesis which seeks to understand how refugee women experience and negotiate (in)securities in their 
day to day lives in their host cities.  
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Defining Urban Refugees  
At the beginning of the 21st century, refugees were predominantly camp based. However, reflecting 
the increasingly urbanised population of the world, by 2006 the scales had tipped, and refugees were 
predominantly settling in urban areas. Of the approximately 26 million globally displaced refugees, 
current estimates place urban refugees at around 61% of this population (UNHCR, 2009, 2018b). Most 
Syrian refugees are considered ‘urban’ or self-settled: approximately 80% of Syrian refugees in Jordan 
and 71% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, live in urban or peri-urban areas (UNHCR 2018a; UNHCR et al., 
2017).  
Jacobsen (2005, p. 40) defines urban refugees as ‘self-settled refugees – formally recognised or not – 
residing in urban areas’. In contrast to highly monitored and controlled camp populations, urban 
refugees are typically dispersed, unenumerated and unmanaged and thus perceived to stand outside 
a refugee regime (Marfleet 2007, p. 36-40). This is not strictly true of all urban refugees, but broadly 
refers to the norm in these contexts. However, in the Middle East, there is more of a history of urban 
refugees being recognised and assisted through agencies (for example Palestinians based in Lebanese 
and Jordanian cities supported by UNWRA). The residence aspect of urban refugees is what is 
important to note here. Whilst some refugees living in camps may leave its confines during the day to 
engage in work in the surrounding towns and cities, urban refugees are those that live and have their 
livelihoods in built up areas4 and are focused on the particular opportunities that are provided through 
their presence in these areas.   
For decades, the proliferation of urban refugees was what the ‘eye refused to see' (Kibreab, 1996, p. 
131). Very few governments, institutions and humanitarian organisation were actively engaging with 
urban refugee issues. De Vriese (2006) argues that the slow response of governments to address the 
issue of urban refugees stems from a fear of opening ‘Pandora’s box’ – concerns that by providing 
explicit urban assistance to refugees would create an additional ‘pull’ towards the city which is ‘an 
environment that is difficult to control’ (p. 16). Indeed UNHCR (2009, p. 2) admitted that the growing 
costs in caring for urban refugee populations had largely shaped their policy on urban refugees in 
1997. This policy criticised refugees for self-setting in cities, due to the challenges this brought to 
refugee care.   
In contrast to cities, camps provide a visibility which allows for state control over refugee populations. 
Firstly, it allows for refugees to be ‘visible’ to the state itself. Camps provide a spatial segregation 
 
4UNHCR has noted the challenges in the global definition of the ‘urban area’. For their 2009 policy on refugee protection and solutions in 
urban areas, they posit that ‘urban’ is taken to mean ‘a built up area that accommodates large numbers of people living in close proximity 
to each other, and where the majority of people sustain themselves by means of formal and informal employment and the provisions of 
goods and services’ (UNHCR, 2009, p. 2)   
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between refugees and host communities. They allow the state to monitor and control wider refugee 
movements and ensure easier repatriation of refugees once conflict has abated (Fábos & Kibreab, 
2007). Secondly, it allows a state to make its refugee issue ‘visible’ to the wider world.  For example, 
Jordan’s decision to create numerous refugee camps for Syrian refugees, despite its largely urban 
refugee population, has been attributed to a strategic decision to enhance the visible presence of 
Syrian refugees on its territory. This allows for both the raising of funds and raising the profile of the 
crisis  to a global audience (Turner, 2015, p. 387). 
Urban refugees typically engage in anonymising tactics in the cities in which they self-settle. Their 
integration into the wider fabric of the city means that it is challenging for humanitarian organisations 
to access and assist them. Additionally, states struggle to highlight the challenges in providing 
resources to cities, which bear the brunt of incoming refugees (Chatelard & Morris, 2012).   
UNHCR engagement with urban refugee issues in its 1997 Protocol on Urban Refugees was widely 
criticised for its approach. It promoted encampment policies as default and widely demonised and 
problematized urban refugee populations (Marfleet, 2007). The condemnation from researchers and 
the humanitarian community was swift, as the policy reflected common governmental rhetoric that 
quasi-criminalised urban refugees. It’s replacement in 2009 by the UNHCR Policy on Refugee 
Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas is considered a significant improvement. It engages with the 
critical realities of urban refugees’ predicaments, whilst also acknowledging that with increased 
globalisation, the issue of the ‘urban refugee’ will not disappear (UNHCR, 2009; Landau, 2014).  
The 1997 report was also criticised for its broad assumption that urban refugees were predominantly 
young, single men. Rather, women and children make up a significant proportion (sometimes more 
than half) of urban refugees (Obi & Crisp, 2001). Despite this, a majority of urban refugee research has 
continued to reflect the assumption above. Most studies on urban refugees have focused on male 
experiences, or alternatively refer to ‘refugees’ broadly. There are a small number of research studies 
that focus specifically on women refugee’s experiences in urban settings in the global south (see 
below). These emerge from diverse contexts and their findings show how different legal, cultural, 
socio-political and economic factors shape women’s experiences specifically. It is vital to have studies 
that reflect urban refugee women’s experiences, as these are distinctly different to men (Freedman, 
2010, 2015).  
Women are affected differently through war, flight and asylum. Characteristically, they are already in 
socially, economically and politically subordinate positions within their home countries. This is then 
exacerbated through the process of becoming stateless (J. Freedman, 2015; Indra, 1987). Refugee 
women are significantly vulnerable to gender-based violence, rape and assault. This is because of a 
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loss of protection mechanisms or because they are forced into negative coping situations where they 
have to trade sex for resources (Krause, 2015; E. Pittaway, 2011). Additionally, women can be 
pressured into early or forced marriages by their families in these contexts. This is perceived as a 
measure of protection by families, but often leaves refugee women and girls vulnerable, isolated and 
in danger of significant health risks (Swan, 2018).  Refugee women experience a change in their regular 
social and family roles, frequently experiencing an increase or decrease in their personal mobility, 
either due to a need for family income or issues of safety and protection. Thus, women experience 
various forms and levels of vulnerability and opportunity when they become urban refugees, many of 
which can usefully be seen in terms of different kinds of (in)security.   
The following section reviews urban refugee literature which considers how urban refugees 
experience insecurity. This is categorised into shelter and livelihoods, legal status, access to security 
and justice institutions and host community relationships. These are related and overlapping issues. 
For example, Pittaway (2011) deftly demonstrates how issues of shelter, privacy, livelihoods, 
education and access to other resources such as health services are interconnected in regard to the 
security of refugee women:   
‘safe and secure accommodation is critical to the protection of women and girls from sexual 
violence. It is crucial for the maintenance of good health, and important to enable an 
environment in which children and adults can study. Families struggle to maintain normal 
familial relationships if they are not afforded some level of privacy. Women who cannot find 
safe accommodation are more likely to seek work in unsafe places, which can provide some 
basic accommodation, but can result in high risk of rape….’ (p.3) 
However, whilst acknowledging this interrelatedness, for the sake of clarity this literature has been 
discussed in a categorised format. Where possible, gendered studies and experiences have been 
highlighted. Broadly, there is less literature that deals specifically with women’s experiences of being 
urban refugees. However, wider urban refugee literature does assist in providing insight into broad 
experiences of insecurity for refugees in urban settings, which is also relevant to women. This section 
will conclude with an examination of literature on Syrian refugee women’s experiences.  
(In)security and Urban refugees 
Shelter, Livelihoods and Changing Gender Roles  
Refugees seek out urban areas either because of their own urban background, or because of the 
perceived opportunities (educational, employment, cultural) that a city offers. As such, urban refugees 
in the majority world represent a broad demographic of their home country. Some are wealthy elites 
who have managed to use their capital and connections to create new lives in their host cities and live 
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conspicuously, often with an acquired legal status (Marfleet, 2007; Sommers, 1995). However, the 
vast majority are disenfranchised and poor, and live anonymously in the informal areas of the city, 
alongside the urban poor. Here they use the city’s scale and anonymity to both escape the refugee 
‘label’ and to create new lives outside of camps (Malkki, 1995). Many urban refugee’s desire to gain a 
‘foothold in the city’ and their position vis-à-vis the state has parallels with many rural-urban migrants 
who seek better lives in the city (Agadjanian, 1998; Grabska, 2006; Pasquetti, 2015; Sanyal, 2012). 
However, there is an important distinction in that urban refugees face ‘greater challenges than 
indigenous populations in reducing vulnerability’ (O’Loghlen & McWilliams, 2017, p. 22). 
Whilst living in informal areas of the city provides some anonymity, slum and informal housing 
particularly endangers women, as it exposes them to a significant risk of sexual violence. Rosenberg 
(2016) noted how compromised, permeable dwellings where urban refugees lived were targeted by 
locals, broken into and women assaulted and raped. Single women especially struggled with landlords 
and neighbours who demanded sex, who entered their homes without permission and who attempted 
to assault or burgle them. However, there are often few options at their disposal. A UN Women (2019) 
report has highlighted how Syrian refugee female-headed households in Lebanon are more likely than 
male headed households to live in slums and compromised dwellings, often being denied 
opportunities to rent because landlords are suspicious of their circumstances. Women’s relative 
poverty often results in them being spatially confined to an extremely poverty stricken locality of the 
city which exacerbates their insecurity (Agadjanian, 1998).  
Many refugees also seek out informal areas due to its proximity and connections to employment in 
the informal sector, where they can work without overt attention to their lack of status. The reality 
for many refugee women in these contexts is that livelihoods and protection are a trade-off. Refugee 
women that do find work often discover that this exposes them to exploitation, sexual harassment 
and non-payment of wages (Dale Buscher, 2012; De Vriese, 2006). Survival sex is also a common 
means of getting income and sometimes, shelter, for urban refugee women. This has been noted 
anecdotally amongst refugee communities in the Middle East, for example amongst displaced Iraqi 
women living in Amman (Chatelard et al., 2009).        
In urban contexts, refugee women often fund greater success than men in securing work as they find 
opportunities in the domestic sector, restaurants and hotels (Buscher 2009). Additionally, men are 
often at higher risk of detainment, arrest and deportation and thus are likely to encourage women to 
work (UNHCR, 2009). Refugee women (and also children) are frequently perceived as vulnerable by 
host governments and host communities and their presence unthreatening (Kofman, 2019). Thus, 
women gain opportunities to work, or indeed can enjoy a greater mobility over men within their host 
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cities, as their presence can be overlooked by their host communities as benign. As such, many refugee 
women in urban settings find new roles in becoming the family breadwinner (El-Masri, 2013; Wachter 
et al., 2018). While this may lead to avenues of empowerment, the situation is often more complex, 
with women juggling caring and work responsibilities. It can also lead to increased gender-based 
violence (GBV), as men can resort to violence as they struggle to regain their identity and masculinity 
(De Regt, 2010). Most of the literature that does examine the experiences of refugee women highlight 
this multifaceted experience of changing roles, agency and empowerment. Despite the expectation 
that war and conflict will release women from what is perceived as restrictive, kinship ties and 
networks, women are rarely able to translate their new found independence into ‘tangible sociable 
and material gains’ (Agadjanian, 1998, p. 298; Tyler & Schmeidl, 2014). Indeed, Buscher (2009, p. 94-
95) highlights how even well intentional skill-building programmes for displaced women in urban areas 
is typically poorly orientated to both their needs and the needs of local labour markets. Additionally, 
these programmes often overlook women’s ongoing caring responsibilities. Thus, it is challenging for 
refugee women to enhance their economic position within their host communities and they often 
suffer under the burden of being both primary breadwinners and primary caregivers.   
Urban Refugees Legal Status and Protection  
It is still somewhat unclear of the role that documentation and legal status has on the day to day lives 
of urban refugees, and the extent to which this is context specific. Landau (2014, p. 143) argues that 
whilst documentation 'undeniably open(s) up space for refugees and displaced people to pursue 
livelihoods and access services' there is little evidence within the literature that shows that policies 
can affect such outcomes. There are few detailed studies regarding women refugees and the ways in 
which their legal status (or lack thereof) specifically shapes their experiences within their host 
communities. However, Pickering (2011) considers the correlation between compromised refugee 
status and gendered violence in host countries and states:    
‘An inability to gain (authorised) status in a safe environment and the lack of political clout 
that goes with the lack of status make possible forms of sexual and gendered violence that 
overwhelmingly go unchecked’ (p.110- 111).   
Relating to security institutions, a lack of legal papers can make women a target for abuse and violence 
from not only their host community but from state security services (see below). Several studies on 
urban refugees point to the importance of these groups being given legal status and rights to work in 
order to enhance their personal protection within their host community or to enable their ability to 
integrate into, and contribute towards, their host community (Berti, 2015). Many refugees living in 
the majority world are routinely forbidden to leave refugee camps, shaping the places that they can 
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and cannot access, removing protection frameworks from them when they self-settle in the city, a 
‘forbidden’ area. This places them at risk of exploitation, violence and xenophobia whilst living in the 
city (see for example: Campbell, 2006; Sommers, 2001). As explored in the previous section, urban 
refugee’s decision to live in informal areas of the city and to engage in the informal economy is 
typically related to their lack of status. This lack of status and position makes them vulnerable to acts 
of violence perpetrated by the host community, and even humanitarian agencies tasked with 
protecting them. The removal of their normal everyday context, and their dependency on institutions 
and people in powerful positions makes them particularly susceptible to abuse (Buckley-Zistel & 
Krause, 2017). As a result, much of the literature examining urban refugees promotes and investigates 
the need for formal documentation and legal frameworks in order to enhance refugees’ sense of 
security and the wider set of human rights they are eligible for. 
The relationship between legal status and the ways that this enacts about urban refugee (in)security 
is an area for further empirical study. Specifically, insight into how refugees themselves perceive and 
understand their status (or lack thereof) and how these impact on their wider sense of security, 
belonging and opportunities within their host communities. As the literature demonstrates above, 
even if refugees do possess appropriate documentation, they are still targeted for exploitation, and 
therefore understanding their experiences and perceptions of their status allows for an insight into 
the importance of documentation and the extent to which policies and refugee status can provide 
protection. Furthermore, there is little literature that examines the gendered implications of 
compromised status or lack of identification papers. 
Urban Refugees, Conflict Management and Access to Security and Justice Institutions  
  
Security and justice institutions that operate within the state are an important aspect of maintaining 
order within a society. These institutions are charged with providing protection from harm, a means 
to resolve conflict and mechanisms of punishment in order to maintain law and order (Shearing & 
Johnston, 2003).   
At the outset of this section, it is salient to consider what ‘security’ and ‘justice’ might mean in these 
contexts regarding refugees, and ‘who’ is responsible for providing or enhancing this. For example, 
much of the literature above has considered how refugee women are vulnerable to acts of harassment 
and violence because of their refugee status. Typically, it would be expected that formal state 
institutions and procedures (inscribed in law) such as police, prosecution, courts and custodial 
measures, would act as a means of securing an individual’s safety. However, in contexts where, for 
example, individuals do not have full rights or legal status (such as refugees) or are living in post-
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conflict or other unstable environments where state institutions are compromised, many individuals 
seek dispute resolution mechanisms that fall outside of the formal justice system (Wojkowska, 2006, 
p. 5). These alternative providers may be sought in order to avoid the gaze of the state, or indeed, to 
enhance capacity to negotiate with the state (Abel, 1982). This might include informal court and 
policing systems, customary courts, gangs, local mayors or esteemed cultural leaders or political 
parties and militias.  
These avenues are often celebrated as a means of marginalised groups accessing ‘quick, relatively 
inexpensive and culturally relevant remedies’ in regard to disputes (Kerrignan et al., 2009). However, 
there may also be challenges and difficulties with these providers. For example, issues can arise over 
representation, force and validity, creating a patchwork service of uneven provision (Paasche & 
Sidaway, 2010). Alternative security providers, such as gangs, can also be deeply violent and 
problematic (Mutahi, 2011). Wojkowska (2006, p. 6) states that if there are no viable means (that is 
either formal or informal) of resolving societal disputes, or managing conflict, the alternatives are 
either violence or conflict avoidance (which, in itself, can lead to violence).  
Urban refugee women living in the global south suffer from poor education levels. This, combined 
with strategies of anonymity, and typically a lack of shared language, means they struggle to have 
their voices heard in urban settings, where male elites often speak for them and claim to represent 
them (Sommers, 2001). As a result, they can struggle with both formal and informal security and 
justice institutions, especially if these are embedded with patriarchal norms.  Looking beyond 
alternative security provision to justice institutions, observers have voiced concerns that informal 
justice provision often draws on the normative structures of the community in which it operates, 
accentuating existing gender hierarchies, and showing preferences to the norms of the community 
over the rights of the individual (Kerrignan et. al 2009). This is particularly relevant regarding gender, 
as studies have demonstrated that informal justice mechanisms can reflect patriarchal norms and that 
these are not always useful alternatives for women who lack access to appropriate security and justice 
institutions (Manganaro & Poland, 2012; Wojkowska, 2006).  
Within refugee camps, it is not unusual to see informal justice and security frameworks developing 
within the refugee community itself (for example see Pasquetti, 2015; Sullivan & Tobin, 2014). 
However, these mechanisms are also in danger of replicating patriarchal norms of the dominant 
group. Crisp’s work in refugee camps in Kenya found that women especially suffered under informal 
frameworks which were run by male elders. For example, women could be arrested for adultery and 
imprisoned without trial (Crisp, 2000). However, there is little literature on urban (i.e. non-camp) 
refugees’ methods of resolving conflict or accessing security providers in their host communities, 
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particularly if they have uncertain, or illegal status. Most of the literature on refugees in the Global 
South show the ways in which refugees struggle with formal and state providers of security (such as 
army, police or border patrols) as demonstrated further below. Reports that explore urban refugee’s 
experiences with state security providers broadly highlight how they are routinely at risk of arrest by 
police over their refugee status, and therefore cannot rely on these networks for assistance. For 
example, Pavenello (2010) found that urban Somali refugees battled to access services due to their 
tendency to keep a low profile in the city and were regularly harassed and bullied by police and 
security forces. Palmgren, (2014) examining refugees in Bangkok found that as Thailand is not a 
signatory to UNHCR’s 1951 protocol, refugees have a precarious legal position, spending great 
amounts of effort in avoiding authorities and being forced to work in the informal sector, leading to 
greater insecurity and opportunities for exploitation. Self-settled Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are 
vulnerable to violence, corruption and exploitation, some of which is perpetrated by police, because 
of their lack of documentation (O Driscoll, 2017). Even in situations where urban refugees do have 
legal status, they are often still harassed and forced to pay bribes, not only to local police but 
sometimes also to UNHCR staff in order to receive assistance (see: Campbell, 2006; Landau, 2010; 
Morris, 2010; Nyaoro, 2010). Pasquetti's (2013, 2015) work with Palestinian communities living under 
Israeli rule, highlights how mechanisms of law enforcement, including police informants and 
surveillance culture, creates emotional climates of fear, resulting in distrust of both neighbours and 
wider security services.  As such, refugees are unlikely to use these formal sources of security provision 
in order to enhance their personal protection or in order to aid issues of conflict within their 
communities.  
Examining a gendered angle regarding refugees and security institutions, Rosenberg (2016) notes how 
police are often a significant source of insecurity for urban refugee women. Her report highlights how 
police in various contexts put refugee women under pressure to engage in sexual acts when detained 
or imprisoned because of their lack of documentation.  
Focusing on the experiences of Syrian refugees in their host communities, some studies that have 
noted their use of alternative security and justice provisions, due to discomfort in using state security 
services. Riach & James (2016) explored the use of alternative mechanisms (such as Syrian leaders 
within the camps) within Za’atari camp in Jordan, which operated because many refugees felt unable 
to access justice systems, lacked correct documentation and held strong suspicions of police. Whilst 
they agreed on the importance of these groups, their work also highlighted the poor representation 
of women, noting that the one women’s group that did exist had very little authority. Sullivan & Tobin, 
(2014) also focused on Za’atari camp, examining the use of Syrian ‘street mayors’ that were utilised 
to resolve conflicts amongst refugees.  However, they demonstrated how these roles were filled by 
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older men and were prone to corruption. In Lebanon, there have been a few studies that have 
considered refugees’ use of informal mechanisms, such as political parties, in order to resolve conflict. 
For example, Carpi et al. (2016) examined Syrian refugees in three localities in Lebanon and highlighted 
refugees’ preference for informal security providers due to their lack of legal status. Boustani et al. 
(2016) also considered refugee use of the existing ‘hybrid security’ framework in Lebanon as a means 
of accessing protection or resolving conflict in Beirut. However, these studies did not look at gendered 
experiences and perspectives of security provision, and the Jordanian examples are completely camp 
based. One urban based exception is Özaşçılar et al. (2019) who found positive use of police, security 
services and crime reporting amongst Syrian refugees in Istanbul.  
There is a lacuna in the literature on how refugees’ access security and justice provision, especially in 
non-camp environments, and indeed how they might resolve conflict in contexts where they may 
struggle to access these providers. Furthermore, there is little literature that examines how refugee 
status affects not only their impressions of security providers (which has been touched on in academic 
research) but also their interactions with them. Lastly, there is little information on how gender, and 
other identities, might affect these perspectives and interactions with security.  
Host Community & Urban Refugee Relationships  
Host community relationships are an important factor regarding sense of security and protection for 
refugees (Lyytinen, 2017).  Reactions of host communities towards incoming urban refugees is often 
mixed and their responses to urban refugees has a significant effect on refugees’ sense of security and 
belonging. In contrast to camp-based refugees, self-settled refugees have a ‘direct impact on the host 
society’s infrastructure, services and economy…(which) can lead to a lower standard of living for the 
host community’ (Kelberer, 2017, p. 148). As a result, host communities can tend towards negative 
attitudes towards urban refugees. These can manifest in xenophobic attacks on refugee populations 
(Landau, 2010). Further, Fábos & Kibreab (2007) argue that by securitising the issue of refugees (i.e. 
indicating the heightened security risk putatively caused by refugee populations), governments breed 
paranoia and xenophobia amongst their populations towards refugees. Therefore, refugees can find 
themselves in an environment where they can be accused of anything from stealing ‘local jobs’, 
straining resources, people smuggling, increasing criminality to affecting political stability. Jacobsen 
et al. (2014) found Sudanese refugees in Cairo citing ‘mistreatment by the local community’ to be the 
factor that concerned and affected them the most, after concerns over lack of funds. Landau's (2005; 
2010) extensive work with refugees and migrants in South Africa finds that many locals think that 
refugee communities are inherently criminal and a drain on public resources. Xenophobic attacks in 
the country are well documented, and these stereotypes fuel extortion, arbitrary arrest and detention 
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of non-nationals. Dryden-Peterson (2006) found that even in situations of positive refugee 
contributions towards a local community, xenophobia can still be present and can hinder or prevent 
empowering, self-reliant solutions for refugees. The literature examined above indicates that host 
populations incline toward negative perspectives of refugees, justifying their stance through 
arguments that refugees adversely affect local livelihoods and human security concerns. This 
demonstrates a general tendency to view incoming refugee populations in highly negative terms, 
understandably so, in resource-compromised communities.  
Consequently, host communities can have a significant impact on how refugees perceive their 
personal safety and security and their wider sense of belonging. Regarding urban refugee women’s 
experiences of host communities, studies that have examined the lives of internally displaced women 
and girls in contexts of the global south note that living in unfamiliar cities results in heightened 
seclusion, which exacerbates isolation and depression (Agadjanian, 1998). Jops et al. (2016) found that 
Chin refugee women in Delhi felt marginalised and discriminated against by their host community and 
as a result, had formed a strong insular community network that they all relied heavily upon in order 
to get by in their city of asylum.  
Spotlighting communities that are hosting Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, one 
can see the effects of the protracted crisis on livelihoods, natural resources, housing, medical care and 
education facilities (see for example: LCRP, 2015; Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Zetter & Ruaudel, 2014). 
These communities have been widely praised for their support and hospitality towards Syrian 
refugees. However, most reports from humanitarian agencies in the last few years note the shortening 
of patience and growing frustration with the protraction of the crisis and the strain on resources in 
undeveloped areas (Davis & Taylor, 2013; Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016). Frequently, host communities echo 
their governments’ rhetoric and prefer to emphasise the temporary nature of refugees, that they are 
‘guests’ that need to return to Syria at the end of the conflict (Berti, 2015; Guay, 2016). Despite this, 
few reports of xenophobia have emerged, although high levels of verbal harassment regarding stealing 
jobs and resources is noted (UNHCR et al. 2017). Kinship links and some shared language, culture or 
religion alongside a long, regional history of displacement and mutual refugee hosting helps keep 
xenophobia in check (De Vriese, 2006; Dionigi, 2017). For example, Anubha & Seferis's (2014) work in 
Iraqi Kurdistan notes how shared language and religion have led to greater linkages between incoming 
Syrian refugees and Iraqi Kurds. Whilst there may be a building resentment or frustration, many 
individuals pride themselves on their humanitarian responsibility towards Syrians, and many have 
assisted Syrian families without any compensation or prompting (Mackreath, 2014; Thorleifsson, 
2016).  
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Communities hosting Syrians have more recently become recipients of aid and assistance in order to 
address uneven care amongst refugees and host communities in deprived municipalities, and to 
address growing resentment over unbalanced distribution of assistance (UNHCR 3RP, 2016). Some 
research has suggested that relationships with host communities are key to assisting refugees in not 
only settling into their communities but also ensuring they have a network of assistance.  For example, 
Onoma, (2013) found that when African refugees were not intermeshed within a community, they 
were more vulnerable to violence and demonization if state authorities expressed anti-refugee 
rhetoric or enforced anti-refugee legislation. However, if refugees had a high interaction with elites in 
the communities in which they lived, they were more likely to be protected.  Although this might result 
in subjugation toward particular groups, it provides a measure of protection for refugees.     
Syrian Refugee women in urban settings 
The studies highlighted above show some of the complexities of refugee women’s experiences in 
urban settings. Urban settings transform refugee women’s lives in complex ways, occasionally 
benefiting women’s independence, employment opportunities, empowerment and personal security, 
and other times compromising it. The breakdown of family kinship ties and community can place 
women at significant risk  and gendered violence appears as one of the few ‘knowns’ about these 
women’s experiences (Freccero, 2015). Echoing much of the literature above, Syrian refugee women 
are suffering from a range of exploitation, abuse, safety and security concerns. Research has 
highlighted how some Syrian women have engaged in survival sex on order to establish livelihoods. 
Child marriage has also been noted as a survival strategy (Save the Children, 2014). High rates of 
ongoing domestic violence against women have been presented (Al-Shdayfat, 2017). Various reports 
by UNWOMEN (2013, 2014, 2018) have noted the frequency of GBV amongst Syrian refugee 
populations, including verbal and sexual harassment and heightened experience of domestic abuse. 
These reports have also discussed the restricted mobility of Syrian women and their inability to access 
labour opportunities, and, in Lebanon, concerns of accessing police and security services in order to 
resolve issues of personal safety (UN Women, 2018). El-Masri's (2013) found that while some Syrian 
refugee women may be empowered by living in urban areas, gaining new mobility and opportunities, 
others may lose some of the freedom they possessed before, having their mobility restricted for their 
own protection, or gaining mobility to their detriment. On this last point, a study from Lebanon 
indicated that men fearing arrest may use women to collect humanitarian aid, as they perceive women 
at being at a lesser risk of being stopped, detained or deported (Aranki & Kalis, 2014). This literature 
presents a small picture of Syrian refugee women’s experiences and shifting gender roles in exile. 
Whilst emphasising their particular gendered risks and vulnerabilities, it points to difficulties and 
challenges around mobility and issues of harassment and abuse both in the private and public realm.  
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This first section of Chapter Three has defined urban refugees and, examining literature across varied 
refugee contexts, considered the ways in which a range of insecurities are experienced and created 
by structural issues. It has highlighted, where possible, urban refugee women’s experiences to 
demonstrate the ways in which gendered identities affect experiences of (in)security within cities. 
Whilst much of this literature provides insight into the realities of life for urban refugee communities, 
and particularly the ways in which these experiences are gendered, most of this research is under-
theorised. As such, it doesn’t provide a clear conceptual basis for exploring or analysing the issue that 
affect refugee insecurity more systematically. Having established some of the interconnecting and 
relational ways in which refugees experience insecurity, the following section will examine theoretical 
concepts of feminist geopolitics and feminist geolegality. These theories aid in situating security in the 
lived, everyday whilst drawing attention to the ways in which different scales and structures, as well 
as individual capabilities, shape these experiences. This provides a theoretical framework in which to 
consider refugee women’s experiences of insecurity within their host cities.   
Theorising urban refugees’ experiences of (in)security   
Feminist Geopolitical approaches to (in)security  
Studies of security and space have been critiqued for their focus on the concerns of state sovereignty, 
borders, control and global issues, such as terrorism. Many of these studies have emerged from the 
disciplines of international relations and geopolitics and are perceived as ‘normative’ theories of 
security, typically focused on state-centric concerns of security, warfare and the framing of enemies 
(Williams & Massaro, 2013). As such, conceptualisations of security in this context have focused on an 
identity ‘which needs protection from the danger posed by a different external other’ (Sharp, 2007, p. 
383). Refugees, particularly those from the peripheral world that have sought asylum in the 
Metropole, have been the subject of a number of geopolitical examinations, as their mobility, border 
crossings and presence is perceived as an outside ‘threat’ to the stability of nations (Chimni, 1998; 
Hyndman, 2012).   
In a special issue of City and Society, Fawaz & Akar (2012) present a compellingly way of theorising 
(in)security. They emphasise that rather than purely a matter of ‘national self-defence perpetrated in 
the name of a common good’ security is better understood as a landscape of ‘public, communal and 
individual responses to a set of constructed, contested and negotiated threats’. They note the 
performative power of security ‘primarily as the generator of particular forms of spatialities that can 
extend beyond national territories’ (p. 106). They conclude by noting that security is not ‘imposed’ but 
is rather 
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‘continually negotiated, contested, defined, and redefined through the everyday practices of 
social agents who rarely agree on what constitutes a threat, to whom and how’ (p. 107).  
Fawaz and Akar extend ideas of security beyond a focus on monolithic security networks and borders, 
encouraging an examination from the bottom up, through examining individuals’ lived experiences of 
security. By doing so, they highlight that security is not static, structurally imposed or purely 
institutional. Rather, it is fluid, embedded, embodied and material to individuals – security is a 
structure as much as it is a response. Thus (in)securities reproduce space just as space reproduces 
(in)securities.  
Whilst not expressively ‘feminist’ in their approach, Fawaz & Akar pay homage to feminist theorists of 
human security and urban geopolitics. They do this through emphasising an understanding of security 
as lived, by an examination of the banal everyday processes, interactions and mobilities of city 
dwellers and a disorienting of security as a purely top-down, process and structure. Furthermore, they 
stress the spatiality of security and the specificity of the city scale in security. The following section 
builds on this conceptualisation through an examination of feminist geopolitical and human security 
theories of security. It also examines feminist geolegality literature, in order to consider the specific 
role that the structures of law can have in shaping refugee lives.  
Feminist geopolitics seeks to ground geopolitical issues and reconfigure hierarchies of scale. It does 
this by drawing together concerns of power, identity and representation alongside the actualities of 
everyday life of individuals and communities in order to understand realities of security (Smith, 2012; 
Williams & Massaro, 2013, p. 569). Theoretically, it merges geopolitical concerns of security (typically 
focused on concerns of the state) and human security concerns (security concerns of the individual), 
in order to create a different territorial foundation upon which security is based (Hyndman, 2001, p. 
214). Consequently, rather than a pure focus on ‘normative’ security, it emphasises the importance of 
looking at the scale of the body in order to attend to gendered, racialized, classed, sexualised spaces 
of the everyday and recognises the embodied and partial nature of knowledge production (Hyndman, 
2004; Williams & Massaro, 2013). In turn, this focus on the micro scale of the body, daily practice and 
place aids understanding of the production of the macro scales of the nation and the international.  
By focusing enquiry on varying political and geographical scales, feminist political geographers have 
intertwined the personal and the political and explore how private/public spheres and spaces are 
overlapping and mutually constitutive. By drawing this examination across both public and private 
spheres, it focuses attention on the relationships between the spatial, temporal and subjective scales 
and concentrates on the networks of power that shape public/private spaces as (in)secure (J. H. Clark, 
2013, p. 851; Hyndman & Giles, 2011; Lemanski, 2012; Williams & Massaro, 2013, p. 570). As discussed 
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in Chapter Two, binarised divisions of space into private or public, female and male, are limiting. 
Rather, the ways in which different genders access space is better understood in graded terms of 
inclusion and exclusion, or forbidden and permitted (Fenster, 1999; Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2001). 
Feminist geopolitics enrichens perspectives on the varying meanings of different spaces and the ways 
in which these spaces have scalar and political meaning (Sharp, 2007). Thus, feminist geographers 
continually present and analyse the interlinkages and relationship between domestic/private and 
public spaces. For example, they have highlighted the ways in which women use domesticated norms 
to confront wider state activities and how daily spatial negotiations have wider implications and 
relationships with national and global concerns and structures.  
In decentring the state as the primary theoretical object, feminist geopolitics places marginalised 
groups who inordinately experience insecurity, such as refugees and migrants, as the critical unit of 
analysis (Torres, 2018). For a refugee, these concerns of the everyday might include a wide range of 
scalar and interconnected issues of state legality and refugee status. These feature alongside day to 
day worries of shelter, livelihood security and personal protection, which are often shaped by, and 
connected to, their legal status. Thus, in focusing on experiences of refugees, feminist geopolitics 
examines multiple scales of (in)security from the state to the refugee household (Hyndman, 2010, p. 
170). It places theoretical focus on how individuals construct security within the everyday, 
emphasising the deeply political aspect of the intimate and the ways in which this is embedded into 
political life (Cassidy et al., 2018). Categories of identity, such as race and gender, are embedded in 
global, national and local structures and mechanisms and greatly shape experiences of security in the 
lived every day. Thus, attention to intersectional identities and the ways in which these different 
identities are constructed through relationships of power, adds further richness to this examination. 
Hyndman (2004) discusses the importance of utilising axes of difference (intersectionality) in order to 
understand how spatial mobility is influenced. In doing this, she considers the wider relationship, 
particularly for refugees, between mobility, spatiality and geopolitics. For example, refugees require 
mobility to access humanitarian aid points or UNHCR offices in their host cities in order to secure both 
immediate (for example, food security) and longer-term securities (such as asylum through UNHCR 
processes). These spatial mobilities are therefore linked to local and global scales and securities.  
Looking at the experiences of Congolese refugees living in Kamapla, Lyytinen (2015a, 2015b, 2017)  
explores refugee experiences of (in)security, protection, space and the right to the city (RTC). She 
highlights different scales of insecurity that refugees experience, (micro: home and shelter; meso: 
relations with host community; and macro: the wider city) and the ways in which refugees attempt to 
enhance their sense of safety and protection within the city through the claiming of particular spaces 
and locations (2015a). She found that refugees held complex feelings of (in)security whereby ‘security 
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and insecurity were highly related and at times inseparable issues’ (Lyytinen, 2015a). For example, 
whilst Congolese refugees felt a sense of security from living in neighbourhoods where other 
Congolese refugees were present, this could also add to their insecurity as they were unsure of other 
refugee’s identities and whose ‘side’ of the conflict they represented. There was a sense of security in 
being removed from the conflict from which they’ve fled, but also an insecurity in not having full rights 
and freedoms in their city of asylum. She found that the various micro, meso and macro scales of 
space and protection overlapped and influenced refugees’ impressions of security and space, and that 
everyday encounters mattered demonstrably regarding a sense of protection and security (2015a). The 
way in which Lyytinen explores the interrelated and scalar aspects of space and security, and the 
complexity of fluctuating (in)security in the lived every day, are relevant to this thesis. However, her 
work rarely touched on issues of city-present security providers (i.e. everyday policing), nor on the 
role of other structures such as the legal status of refugees (especially as materialised in their 
possession, or not, of ‘papers’) or of gender. Thus, whilst her work is extremely relevant, in its scalar 
examination of refugees, urban space, security and protection there is further conceptual work to be 
done, in particular the consideration of how the wider macro context affects refugee status and ideas 
of security.   
Clark's (2013) research with Kurdish women is particularly helpful as her context closely mirrors my 
own research setting in Amman and Beirut. She examines the role of the development agenda in 
transforming the spatial mobilities of Kurdish migrant women in Istanbul. Her work maps the spaces 
that women access and interact with in order to examine how conditions of security are encountered 
and negotiated. Clark calls for research that provides accounts of the complexities of lived practice, 
which she achieves through a focus on both embodiment and space. Drawing on the work of feminist 
geopolitics and human security, she argues that security is ‘embodied knowledge’ and is best 
understood through an examination of ‘intimate geographies of fear, violence and injustice’ (p. 838). 
With an intimate, bodily focus, institutional security policies and practices (and indeed their failures) 
can be tracked and interrogated. Through an examination of space, Clark unpicks the horizontal scalar 
relationship between private spaces of domesticity and public spaces of the city and the ways these 
interrelate, influence and reproduce each other. Clark’s view of human security as fundamentally 
emergent and spatial, emphasises the need to reframe security as foregrounding spatial and 
temporally different experiences of security (p. 851). Thus, she interprets human security as a 
relational, multi direction and cross-spatial (public/private) network through which various legal and 
state inconsistencies can be examined (p. 837; 851). Through this examination, she also reflects my 
position of public and private spaces as graded and overlapping and a consideration of how this shapes 
marginalised women’s mobility.        
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Examining violence, gender and the war on terror in urban areas of Pakistan, Mustafa et al. (2019) 
highlight the linkages between the daily experiences of violence for marginalised groups living in slum 
conditions, and the ways in which this violence is shaped and linked by global issues of terrorism, and 
regional issues of ethnicity. In this study, urban dwellers are presented as experiencing a continuum 
of violence. This extends from the poor infrastructures of their homes, to their encounters and 
persecution by police and army.  In this way, Mustafa et al. emphasis the different and relational scales 
of violence which affect the lives of marginalised groups and how this are interrelated and relevant. 
Whilst they do focus on issues and effects of scales of ‘violence’, I would argue that this very much 
overlaps, and can also be framed by, concepts of (in)security.    
Looking at the specific ways in which security and geopolitical concerns are inscribed on the intimate 
bodies of female citizens, Smith (2012) examines the geopolitics at work in women in Kashmir, 
whereby reproductive bodies and babies become the focus of familial and religious concerns, which 
tie into wider regional and national issues over nation, ethnicity and statehood. Fluri (2011) examines 
the site of the gendered body in regard to Afghan women and humanitarian workers and the wider 
geopolitical networks represented in each. In this context she highlights the body as a ‘geographic 
space that is a symbolic, material and at times violent agent of geopolitics’ (p. 531).  These studies 
indicate the ways in which the intimate bodies of women represent ideas of nation, thus showing the 
strong interlinkage between global, national, domestic and corporeal scales. Because of the ways in 
which ideas of ‘nation’ are inscribed onto women, their (in)security becomes salient, as they can be 
targeted or excluded because of these associations.   
Feminist geopolitics aids in conceptualising how marginalised and oppressed groups experience and 
construct securities within their day to day lives. By focusing on the overlapping, scalar relationship of 
issues from the macro to the micro, it allows for a focus on the lived realities of individuals that are 
shaped by (and in turn shape) political and social realities and contexts. Thus ‘security’ becomes a 
complex, scalar, relational concern rather than a top down fixation of borders, sovereignty and 
external threats. Through such a framework, refugees can move beyond narratives that place them as 
a destabilising security threat. Rather, feminist geopolitics calls for a grounded, multi-angled 
examination of the ways in which refugees experience various (in)securities, embedded in the 
intimate to the global. By focusing on the everyday, feminist geopolitics demands an examination of 
space and mobility. Lastly, by emphasising the ways in which ‘bodies are not inactive agents’ (Cassidy, 
et al., 2018, p. 140), feminist geopolitical theorising is consistent with a critical realist approach, in 
their emphasis on how different structures interact with individuals capacity to shape and constitute 
experiences of (in)security.   
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Feminist geolegality  
Whilst feminist geopolitical scholarship emphasises the multiple and overlapping macro and micro 
scales of (in)security, a crucial aspect which is underplayed is the significance of the legal: of borders 
and status. Whilst feminist geopolitics explores refugee’s experiences of spatiality, mobility and 
security, feminist geolegality provides an addition avenue of theorising, in considering how macro 
issues of state law shape spatial experiences of the everyday.  Refugees operate and exist within 
global, national and regional structures and institutions. Their legal status, that is, the way in which 
they are labelled and categorised by wider structures, has fundamental repercussions for their lives 
and their experiences of (in)security (Zetter, 2007; Brickell & Cuomo, 2019). Moreover, these 
repercussions are scaled, as laws that pertain to refugees legalise or illegalise their presence at varying 
spatial scales and shapes the spatially-bounded institutions and resources that they can access.  
Legal geography focuses not only on the shaping and boundary creating relationship between the law 
and the individual, but the specific ways in which this is embedded in the spatial. Legal geography, 
also interchangeably referred to as geolegality, is not so much a field, but rather: 
‘braided lines of inquiry that have emerged out of the confluence of various intellectual 
interests… (it is) a stream of scholarship that makes the interconnections between law and 
spatiality, and especially their reciprocal construction into core objects of inquiry (Braverman 
et al., 2014, p. 1).  
From a geolegal perspective, law is always grounded in the spatial, and space is inscribed with legal 
meaning. In these studies, space is foregrounded and serves as an organising principal (ibid, p1 -2). 
Legal Geographers examine the ways in which territories, and those within them, are inscribed by 
legal means and the ways in which legal rule localises people’s rights and obligations in space (Von 
Benda-Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2014). Delaney emphasises that the ‘legal’ is associated 
with statist organisations but includes other expressions of legality, such as customs and norms 
(Delaney, 2015, p. 97). As such, legal geography encompasses a broad range of rules, rights, laws, 
customs and norms that claim societal authority, can engage in consequential ‘punishments’ and is 
also broadly interested in ideas of social justice and the ways in which this is spatialised (Delaney, 
2016). Within this thesis, many of the legal concerns related to refugees are rooted in policies, which 
are informed by law but are typically not inscribed ‘laws’ in themselves. For example, Lebanon has 
chosen not to govern the Syrian refugee crisis within its borders by law, but by ‘government decisions’ 
(Janmyr, 2016). Despite not being ‘law’, government decisions and policies have wide ranging legal, 
and therefore social, impacts and are backed by authoritative powers. Noting Delaney’s broad 
definitions above, legal geography is not only concerned with law that is embedded and authorised 
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by statist organisations but wide and varied forms of legality that permeate and construct day to day 
lives.  
Whilst much geolegal research investigates the ways in which space and law are mutually co-
constitutive, it is the emphasis on social boundary drawing that geo-legality frequently highlights 
which is a helpful concept for this thesis. Delaney (2015, p. 99) emphasises the way in which law ‘draws 
lines, constructs insides and outsides, assigns legal meanings to lines and attaches legal consequences 
to crossing them’. Frequently geo-legalists points to how refugees are prime examples of this in action, 
but thus far there appears to be little work that engages with refugee populations from an explicitly 
geolegal perspective. Refugees are frequently illegalised through the crossing of borders (boundaries) 
in a bid to find safety, or indeed, for leaving the boundaries and confines of refugee camps in order to 
seek livelihoods (for example see: Kiama & Likule, 2013; Pickering 2012). Law shapes the ways in which 
refugees can (or can’t) access medical care, education and labour opportunities and live safely in host 
communities. For example, legal manoeuvring around defining an individual as a refugee allows 
Governments to justify the provision (or removal) of protection frameworks for individuals from 
particular nations (Zetter, 2007). Furthermore, it shapes the spaces that they are welcome in, and 
indeed, can shape host communities’ attitudes towards them (Campbell, 2006). Many refugee 
scholars emphasise the challenge of refugees establishing livelihoods in contexts where they often 
lack legal status or rights to work (Grabska, 2006). This has a direct spatial effect. Refugees in these 
circumstances are compelled to live in socially marginalised areas of the city for their affordability and 
anonymity, which then further enhance their insecurity (Dominguez & Menjivar, 2014). Legislation 
that prevents their access to the labour market, results in refugees working in informal spaces, or 
private domestic spaces, which has particular gendered repercussions of exploitation and insecurity, 
as explored in the first section of this chapter (Buscher and Heller 2010).  Thus, attention is required 
as to how law, legal documentation and other policies relating to refugees in host communities is 
constructed. This can assist in understanding refugees’ restrictions and/or opportunities and 
insecurities and allows for opportunities to explore the spatiality of this relationship. Comparative 
work can be useful here, as analysing how laws operate in different contexts and how this shapes the 
ways refugees are policed, or how laws and policies provide them with particular rights and 
opportunities, will make it clearer how the law shapes social behaviours and networks rights to the 
micro, neighbourhood level.  
Geolegal work on plural forms of law and their reciprocal relationships with space is also relevant. 
Legal pluralism can be understood as a concept which:  
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‘draws attention to the possibility that law of various kinds, with different foundations of 
legitimacy, validity, power and authority, and with different degrees of institutionalisation and 
formalization, can coexist with the same social space, often at different scales (Von Benda-
Beckmann & Von Benda-Beckmann, 2014, p. 34) 
For example, within the same ‘space’ of a community, different scales of law can operate in tandem. 
Religious or customary laws can function (and compete for legitimacy), alongside global human rights 
laws and/or state law regarding issues such as marriage, domestic violence, land and property rights. 
State and religious courts can also operate in conjunction, or overlap, as can various providers of 
security and justice. As addressed earlier, refugee communities can often seek out alternative 
methods of security or justice provision, if they feel unable to access formal services due to the 
scrutiny they bring. As such, geolegality places a spotlight not only on the macro structures of state 
and international law, but also on alternative formal and informal structures and institutions who 
enact laws and policies and are grounded into communities.   
Legal geography has been criticised by feminists for failing to acknowledge categories of difference in 
its analysis, and for its tendency to focus on wider transnational structures. For example, Meth et al.’s 
(2019) research has demonstrated the ways in which different legal structures at work in communities 
have gendered effects. They highlight how security in marginalised communities is shaped by both 
formal and informal mechanisms of law and influenced by gendered biases. This research 
demonstrates the importance of examining the intersectional impacts of geolegality on various 
identities. To address these issues, Brickell & Cuomo (2019) have offered a theory of feminist 
geolegality. This theory is presented as a grouping and overlapping of feminist geopolitics and legal 
geography, which emphasises embodied accounts of the effects of law, as well as methodologies of 
intersectionality (Brickell & Cuomo, 2019, p. 107). As such, feminist legal geography has moved critical 
attention:   
‘from the macro level of political analysis to more complex engagements between private and 
public spheres; to diffuse, multifaceted and relational understandings of power and 
empowerment; to social and cultural citizenship; and to political geographies that fluidly cut 
across gendered constructions of “formal” and “informal” (Statz & Pruitt, 2019, p. 1113).  
Brickell & Cuomo (2019) point to the importance of engaging in feminist epistemology and thus 
employing an approach that demonstrates how power is enacted in everyday encounters. They echo 
calls in feminist geopolitics to ground investigation in lived experiences and to explore the ways in 
which law plays out in intimate life (and indeed how intimate life shapes law). State refugee laws and 
policies are typically worded in gender neutral ways, overlooking gendered differences in how women 
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and men experience refugee-ness (Freedman, 2015). Yet law has gendered and spatial effects. As 
such, feminist geolegality encourages attention to the ways in which law shape gendered experiences, 
particularly the spatial nature of these experiences.   
Feminist geolegality is fairly embryonic, however it does usefully encourage a wider assessment of the 
relationship between scales of law and space, and how these in turn can have gendered affects and 
outcomes. Reflecting on the ways in which refugee’s lives, opportunities and day to day experiences 
of security are widely shaped by law and the gendered vulnerabilities that this facilitates, refugee 
settings would benefit from the analysis of a feminist geolegal approach. This allows for a deeper 
consideration of the ways in which different laws and policies operate at different scales to shape 
spatial experiences of the everyday. Regarding this thesis, a feminist geolegal approach encourages 
an examination of how different scales of law play out in the everyday, spatial experiences of refugee 
women and how different laws and policies create spatial boundaries of the permitted and forbidden 
in host cities (Fenster, 1999).  
Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed refugee literature that explores the experiences of urban refugees living in 
cities of the majority world, and where possible, highlighted the gendered experiences of urban 
refugee women in these contexts. Specifically focusing on issues of shelter and livelihoods, legal status 
and protection, access to security and justice institutions and relationships with host communities, 
the first part of this chapter demonstrated the complex experiences of insecurity that urban refugees 
face and how these are often relational and overlapping. Current literature demonstrates that women 
do experience refugee-ness in differing ways to men. Indeed, these differences in experiences would 
be enriched using intersectional approaches, which rarely seem to be undertaken. Women experience 
a mixed and complex experience of new roles when they become refugees, which lead to varying 
experiences of both security and insecurity. Women are clearly at risk to gender based violence both 
within and outside their dwellings in their host communities. However, they also experience new roles 
and opportunities – some of which are empowering, and others very much the opposite. There are 
notable gaps in the literature and several questions emerge. For example, to what extent do gendered 
(and other) identities shape experiences of (in)security within host communities? As women are 
frequently highlighted as the victims of gender-based violence emerging from intimate partners to 
landlords and police, do they seek out formal methods of protection (such as police) or do they use 
informal avenues that are often critiqued for their patriarchal deference, and what are their 
impressions of these providers?  
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Considering the literature reviewed in this chapter, Fawaz & Akar’s (2012) description of the 
contested, confusing and overlapping scales of (in)security at the city scale point to some of the 
realities that urban refugee communities face. Refugees are often perceived as a threat and a source 
of insecurity (Chimni, 1998) but in themselves negotiate a multitude of insecurities from the micro to 
the macro. Urban refugee literature is predominantly focused on the varying scales and aspects of 
insecurity that refugees experience, and thus feminist theories of geolegality, human security and 
geopolitics are particularly valuable in theorising and conceptualising these experiences. These 
theories ground ideas of law and security in the everyday and focus on how wider structures and 
scales affect the lived experiences of those most marginalised. A feminist geopolitical lens probes 
questions about the scalar and relational aspects of insecurity that refugee women might experience, 
whilst a feminist geolegal approach highlights the ways in which refugee policies and laws shape the 
spaces that refugee women are ‘permitted’ or ‘forbidden’ from accessing and the ways in which law 
draws boundaries that place refugee women in situations of vulnerability and exploitation (Fenster, 
1999).  
The last theoretical chapter will focus more specifically on the Syrian refugee crisis and the approach 
that Lebanon and Jordan have taken towards the incoming refugee populations.   
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Chapter Four: Jordan and Lebanon and their refugee policies 
 
The previous two chapters have explored theoretical concepts of identity, agency, space and security, 
and the relationship between these, alongside literature that explores the experiences of urban 
refugees, in order to build a conceptual framework which underpins the empirical chapters of this 
thesis. This chapter changes direction to focus more specifically on the states, cities and refugee 
populations that are the object of this thesis’s investigation. It introduces each of the case study 
contexts and assesses the state structure and security apparatus at work in each nation. Differences 
in state capacity and operations of security services are important structural elements to consider 
regarding refugee’s quotidian experiences in their host cities. Noting how international relations 
theory has often labelled these states as either strong (Jordan) or weak (Lebanon), this chapter begins 
by exploring the usefulness of this paradigm alongside an examination of state and security structures 
within each country. Alongside this analysis, an exploration of each nation’s capital city is presented. 
These cities are the economic epi-centres of both nations and are shaped by the same ongoing and 
historic socio-political issues which structure these states as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. The second part of the 
Chapter explores Lebanon and Jordan’s policies regarding Syrian refugees from the beginning of the 
crisis in 2011 up until 2017 (when the fieldwork for this thesis was completed). It analyses the ways in 
which each state’s complex history of hosting other refugee populations, social demographics and 
economic reliance on migrant workers shapes decisions towards Syrian refugees accordingly.  
Theorising Strong and Weak States in the Arab World  
International relations and geopolitical theory have frequently framed and analysed states in the 
Middle East as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ (Fawcett, 2017). Analysing the strength of a state is achieved through 
scrutinising a state’s ability to exert their capabilities and resources, penetrate their societies and 
maintain their sovereignty, their borders and their security (Migdal, 1988). State strength is often 
associated with issues of state security – the ability for a state to control its borders and manage 
internal and external threats and to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force (Hazbun, 
2016; Weber, 2004).  
Jordan and Lebanon are typically framed and understood as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states respectively in 
this regard (e.g Atzili, 2010; Salloukh, 1996), although there has been critique of these terms (see 
below). The labelling of each of these states as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ provides an important axis of 
comparison of refugee experiences in each of its capital cities. The extent to which a state can 
‘permeate’ its society has important implications for refugee communities. This includes: how refugee 
policies are developed at state level and then enacted; how states ‘control’ their borders and manage 
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incoming refugee flows; how refugee settlement is managed (camps, cities); how refugees are assisted 
and integrated within a receiving state; how security and justice are provided within these states and 
how refugee communities can access these services; and the ways in which gendered (and other 
identities) are institutionalised in these processes and structures. As such, the strength of the state 
can have a marked effect on the day to day life of a refugee, shaping an individual’s access to labour, 
shelter, protection and security. Comparing Amman and Beirut provides an important means of 
analysing the role of refugee policies created and enacted within a weak/strong state, the politics and 
dynamics of each state, the way that security services operate and the ways in which this affects 
women’s lived experiences of (in)security.   
Analysis of Arab States into categories of strong/weak has been criticised as an orientalising device 
used to ‘other’ Arab States from the Western ‘norm’. Indeed, these labelling strategies are used by 
Western powers to intervene or capitalise, on the so-called fragility of weak states (Fawcett, 2017; 
Fregonese, 2012). In addition, viewing states as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ places undue emphasis on the 
capacity of the state to implement security (Hazbun, 2016). Security in some contexts of the Middle 
East is multifaceted, on occasion hybrid, and experienced by a plethora of stakeholders who have 
varying attitudes and impressions of what ‘security’ may look like and how it is implemented 
(Fregonese, 2012; Hazbun, 2016). Equally, scholars have argued that understanding some states as 
‘strong’ is problematic, as some are better conceptualised as ‘fierce’. This can be understood as a 
state’s focus on ‘survival above all else’, designating institutions within the state to support this aim, 
frequently resulting in a loss of accountability and transparency, thus giving rise to authoritarian 
regimes rather than ‘strong states’ (Heydemann, 2018). As such, the use of these shorthand labels has 
been criticised for overlooking the complexities of how states operate across various scales of fragility, 
weakness, ferocity and strength.  
Conscious of this critique, this next section will consider the governments of Jordan and Lebanon, their 
national histories, social demographics, the dynamics and planning of its capital cities, and an 
exploration of how each state has dealt with the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis within its borders. 
Throughout this, it will weave analysis of how each of these states presents as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. In its 
conclusion, it will draw together an assessment of the strong/weak state paradigm and outline how 
these terms will be used in this thesis.    
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan emerged from colonial and imperialist histories of the Ottoman 
and British empires in the Middle East. The State was created in 1921 as a British protectorate 
following WW1 and the end of the Ottoman Empire, gaining full independence from Britain in 1946. 
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The Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy, ruled since 1921 by the Hashemite family (currently by King 
Abdullah II.) It borders Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian territories. Its population (including 
Palestinian refugees) is approximately 10 million, of which the majority (92%) is Sunni Muslim (Ababsa, 
2013). There is a small Christian population (3%) dispersed throughout the country, a small Shi’a Iraqi 
community in the Amman Governate and a small Druze community in the Azraq region, along with a 
number of other minority groups dotted throughout the country (De Bel-Air, 2013).  
Jordan’s population is frequently framed as consisting of two political-ethnic assemblages: ‘East 
Bankers’ (Trans-Jordanians) and ‘West Bankers’ (Jordanians of Palestinian origin), in reference to the 
opposite banks of the River Jordan (El Muhtaseb, 2013; Ryan, 2010). East Bankers are descended from 
the traditional, nomadic Bedouin tribes of the Trans-Jordan. These tribes were territorialized from the 
1920’s onward, curtailing their physical mobility and building them into the nation State (Massad, 
2001, p. 56-59). Bedouins have strong links to the Hashemite Monarchy, recognising the Kings 
legitimacy to rule based on religious and tribal claims (ibid). As such, citizenship is connected to tribal 
and paternal ties, as the tribes provide the foundation on which the Jordanian government is 
grounded (Al Oudat & Alshboul, 2010). ‘West Bankers’ broadly describes Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin. In 1949, following the end of the Arab-Israeli War, what remained of Palestine (The West Bank 
and East Jerusalem) became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (El Muhtaseb, 2013, p. 1). There 
were huge movements of Palestinians (voluntary and forced) from what was now Israeli territory into 
the West bank in what is referred to as Al Nakba (The Catastrophe). West Bankers encompasses not 
only these Palestinians, but also includes other Palestinian refugees who continued to arrive in the 
country as refugees following subsequent regional conflicts with Israel. With the loss of the territory 
of the West Bank to Israel in 1967, a significant number of Palestinians moved (or again, were forcibly 
moved) to the East Bank. Palestinians have rights to Jordanian citizenship, but there are layers of 
tension between each group of ‘Bankers’ which works across boundaries of class and wealth. 
Palestinians have been excluded from occupations in particular institutions (J. Massad, 2001) and each 
group tends to occupy different areas of the economy: West Bankers in the private sphere and East 
Bankers in the public/governmental sphere (Ababsa et al., 2016; Susser, 2011). Palestinian refugees 
have had a deep effect on the character of Jordan. Palestinians are estimated to consist of at least half 
of the Jordanian population (Ababsa et al., 2016). Many continue to live in refugee camps that were 
set up by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNWRA) during the various refugee crises between 1948 and 1973. There are legacies of tensions 
over Black September in 1970 when Yasar Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which 
operated out of established Palestinian refugee camps and represented a large majority of Jordanian-
Palestinians, attempted to overthrow the Hashemite Monarchy. The legacy of Palestinian refugees 
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(and Iraqi refugees from the Gulf Wars) influences ongoing policies towards Syrian refugees (see more 
below). Tensions have somewhat abated between the two groups of ‘Bankers’ and both broadly 
support the Hashemite Monarchy.   
Ryan (2014) considers external sources of economic aid, mostly from the USA and Saudi Arabia, are the 
bedrock of both the Kingdom's stability and its external security, alongside its internal support from 
East Bankers. Unlike its Gulf neighbours, the country is not resource rich. There are no great reserves 
of oil and it has extremely limited (and compromised) fresh-water resources (Schyns et al., 2015). 
Added to this, it is currently hosting the most refugees in the world (approximately 2.9 million [mostly] 
Iraqi, Syrian, Palestinian, Sudanese and Somali Refugees; Davis et al., 2016). The Kingdom is often 
perceived as a ‘strong’ and stable nation in a region that is particularly politically unstable and indeed 
it views itself ‘as a bastion of moderation, stability (and) political reform’ (Ryan, 2014, p. 152). Many 
of the institutions that make up the modern state were built from the support of Bedouin tribes 
alongside the expansion of the army (which consisted predominantly of Bedouins). However, analysts 
and academics are divided in their opinions, many viewing the nation as ‘soft authoritarian’ 
(Schwedler 2012) with questionable stability, potentially more 'fierce' then it is strong (Martínez, 
2017). Wiktorowicz (2000) argues that the Jordanian State is a disciplinary power that operates 
through heavy monitoring and technologies of control of its population. This control is amplified 
through the State’s prolific filtering into, and influence of, the development of civil society 
organisations. As such, civil society in the country is weak, and the State could best be thus framed as 
‘fierce’ rather than ‘strong’. Even though political parties have existed in Jordan since the 
establishment of the Kingdom, they have 'limited impact on political life in general and in 
parliamentary elections in particular' (Nahar, 2012, p. 121). The strongest alternative social force in 
the country outside of the monarchy is the Islamic political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
its political arm the Islamic Action Front (IAF) (G. E. Robinson, 1998). However, after many years of co-
existence with the state, focusing on charitable work and democratic participation, relationships have 
deteriorated. The Muslim Brotherhood itself has had its offices shutdown on numerous occasions by 
the State and has suffered from internal schisms due to disagreeing political approaches post Arab-
uprisings (Martínez, 2017b; Al Soudi, 2014).   
Jordan, Syria and the Arab Uprisings  
The Arab Uprisings, protests and demands for political and social reform that spread across several 
Middle Eastern countries in 2011, had minimal political impact on Jordan compared to other countries 
in the region. Whilst the uprisings oversaw regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia, and the onset of the 
ongoing civil war in Syria, the Jordanian government was not particularly affected. Leading up to the 
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Arab Uprisings, Jordan enjoyed relative internal stability with the notable exception of demonstrations 
for political reform in 1989. These demonstrations resulted from austerity measures from an IMF 
program and the ensuing protests resulted in some ‘defensive’ democratic reforms by the Hashemite 
Monarchy (Robinson, 1998; Ryan, 2010). This strategy was engaged again following protests in Jordan 
during the Arab Uprisings, with various political and legislative reforms offered which appeared to 
appease the monarchy-supporting Jordanian society (Martínez, 2017; Ryan, 2012, 2014). The 
strongest effect of the Arab Uprisings on Jordan has been felt through the Syrian civil war across its 
border, the influx of over 600,000 Syrian refugees and fears of the potential destabilisation influence 
of this on the country (Barnes-Darcy, 2013).  
Before the civil war, Jordan had cordial relations with Syria, although there had been periods of 
tension (Ryan, 2006). There is a history of Syrian migrant workers from the South of Syria working in 
the North of Jordan, particularly around the Ramtha/Dara’a’ region which allowed for some social 
links to particular regions, although nowhere close to the scale of Syrian migrant work in Lebanon. At 
the onset of the war, Jordan called for the removal of Bashar al-Assad. However, this was amended to 
a call for political reforms, with the expectation that al-Assad’s position of power would continue as 
the civil war drew to a close (al Makahleh, 2017).    
Security Framework in Jordan  
Alongside its centralised political structure, the existing unitary security service infrastructure present 
in Jordan is also why the State is considered ‘strong’. Jordan’s security service is characterised by a top 
down structure where several security forces operate in tandem. Senior positions in the security 
services, including police and army, are predominantly held by ‘East Bankers’ and Palestinian-
Jordanians have largely been excluded from the armed services (Massad, 2001). The Kingdom’s 
security apparatus operates under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) as the Public Security Directorate 
(PSD). It is highly organised with strong organisational and structural links to the military through the 
appointment of high-ranking army personnel which further enhances state strength (Haysom & 
Pavenello, 2012; Massad, 2001; Ryan, 2012; Watkins, 2018). Day to day policing is over-seen by the 
Public Security Force (PSF) whilst counter terrorism and riot control is over seen by the Special Police 
Force (SPF) also known as the Gendarmerie or Daraq (MacIntyre, 2007). The Desert Police Force, 
which has evolved from a camel corps created in the 1920’s by the British to police the desert areas 
of the Transjordan, acts as a separate section of the police force and consists solely of Bedouins that 
police the desert areas of Jordan (Al Oudat & Alshboul, 2010; Hubbard, 2014). An additional section 
of the police department called the 'Wafedin', are responsible for checking work permits of 'foreign 
workers' (MOI, 2018). The General Intelligence Department (GID), the nation's intelligence 
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department, also known as the Mukhabarat (secret police) report directly to the King and bypass the 
MOI structure, and hold a revered and feared status amongst Jordanian citizens and refugees. Within 
the PSD is an additional department that is focused on providing security for Syrian refugee camps 
called the Syrian Refugees Affairs Directorate (SRAD).  
‘Policing’ within the refugee camps was initially organised through Syrian street leaders (Za’im) 
(Sullivan & Tobin, 2014), but gradually community police programs have been developed through 
international partners and the Jordanian police force. These have been relatively successful; however 
they have been challenging to implement for refugees that live outside of camps (Watkins, 2018). It 
has been noted that refugees in urban areas are generally averse to engaging with police services, and 
that Jordan’s tribal systems make ‘community policing’ challenging to implement as policing is often 
based on social capital and mediation (ibid). However, there is little known about refugee experiences 
and impressions of police services or their wider sense of security within their host communities, 
including how urban refugees might resolve conflict or difficulties. For example, between 2015-18, 
UNDP worked alongside security services in various locations in Jordan in order to enhance refugee’s 
access to justice and security mechanisms within the State. The report noted several hinderances for 
refugees in accessing these mechanisms, including refugee women having difficulty in accessing 
justice for GBV and domestic abuse (UNDP, 2015), but did not include proposed solutions or 
alternative avenues that they may consider in regard to dispute resolution.    
Urban Planning and Public Space in Amman  
As discussed in earlier chapters, state policies, social structures and refugee identities are played out 
across real spaces. This section introduces the nature of these spaces within the city of Amman in 
more detail.  
Amman is experiencing an ongoing spatial and a social identity crisis (Aljafari, 2014). It is not a 
traditionally planned Arab city, rivalling Cairo or Damascus. Rather, it is a modern city, suffering from 
intense growth spurts and, in recent decades, a sympathy towards Western-style planning which has 
hindered its potential to be planned appropriately (Hanania, 2014). Whilst the settlement of 
Philadelphia, which became Amman, has a rich and fascinating history, featuring Ammonites, Romans, 
Bedouins and Ottomans, it is only since the late 1870's that the city grew beyond a mere 2-3000 
inhabitants. In particular, it has seen significant growth in the last century, when it was declared the 
capital of the new state of Trans-Jordan in 1921, transforming from a quiet backwater into a potential 
regional powerhouse (Potter et al., 2009). The significant influx of Palestinian refugees during Al 
Nakba had a marked effect on Amman’s architectural appearance, through both effective 
beautification and modernist urban design projects and also high-rise flats and the growth of 
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population densities in poorer areas of the city (Hanania, 2014). Although urban planning regulations 
were in place, nepotism and opportunism meant these were often ignored. This ‘disorganised’ 
development, and penchant for rapid development projects has had a strong legacy on the city, 
resulting in a lack of green and ‘traditional’ public spaces (Hanania, 2014, pp. 466–468).    
Negotiating uneven growth and in need of development, Amman has fallen victim to the region’s 
penchant for privatisation. The city originally extended over seven hills (jabals) and centred around 
the traditional El Balad, the old city centre, also known as 'Downtown'. As the city has grown, the El 
Balad has been neglected by planners and wealthier residents in favour of the new city centre in 
Abdali, in the west of Amman. The Abdali project, launched in 2012, has sought to create a new 
'downtown', attempting to refocus the city's centre with a project that is quite the opposite to its 
traditional centre (Al Rabady & Abu-Khafajah, 2015; Mango, 2014). The project takes priority in 
Amman, producing enclaves of elitism and pseudo public spaces, creating an increasingly divided city. 
This urban division is closely linked to economic and social divisions between the East and West of the 
city (Potter et al., 2009). The West of the city is associated with wealthier and more privileged 
elements of Ammani society, whilst the East of the city (including the neighbourhoods focused on in 
this study), is considered the poorer and ‘informal’ side of the city. It hosts migrant workers, refugees 
and poorer Jordanians and encompasses the Wihdat and Al Hussein Palestinian refugee camps which 
were created in the 1950’s and 60’s and were gradually absorbed by the rapid expansion of the city 
(Ababsa et al., 2016). Housing in this area of the city is typically informal and incrementally undertaken 
by residents. Over the years there have been projects to improve housing conditions and to formalise 
the slum-like conditions that Palestinians were living in (Shami, 1996). However, there is uneven 
development and social schisms in the city, further exacerbated by the arrival of low-income Syrian 
refugees in the past five years, a majority of whom have settled in the East of the city (Al-Tal & Ahmad 
Ghanem, 2019).   
Amman generally lacks accessible, green open spaces and does not have a central, open square or 
plaza. Rather, it has been argued that the primary public space of Amman is Mecca Mall, a pseudo-
public space of consumption located in the West of the city  (Daher, 2008). Spontaneous protests take 
place typically on university campuses, refugee camps or outside King Hussein Mosque in El Balad 
(Schwedler, 2012). However, during the Arab Uprisings, citizens protested for reforms by closing one 
of the main transport networks at the Dakhliya Circle, closer to Parliament, Abdali and the more 
affluent areas of the city (Tobin, 2012). There are developments in place to further develop open 
spaces such as the Al Hussein Sports City park, the major open green park of the city. Many public 
spaces, or pseudo-public spaces (such as malls) are often not accessible to all citizens (Madbouly, 
2009). Restrictions, usually implemented through private security firms and police, are often applied 
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to those that are visibly poor; single, young, working men and marginalised groups, such as refugees 
or migrant workers, who are perceived as ‘trouble-makers’ (Khawaja, 2015; Schwedler, 2012). 
The Lebanese Republic 
Lebanon’s political and social history is complex.  The region was governed by the Ottoman Empire for 
centuries, before the borders of modern-day Lebanon were outlined by the Sykes-Picot agreement 
when it was given to the French as a Mandate following World War I. It eventually gained its 
independence from France in 1943. It borders the states of Israel and Syria, and its population of 
approximately 6 million people (including roughly 1- 1.5 million Syrians and half a million Palestinians) 
is a highly heterogeneous ethnic mix, made more complex by the presence of seventeen different 
religious sects (Zahar, 2005).  The demographic make-up of Lebanon is difficult to ascertain, as this is 
a deeply political issue and the last time a census took place was in 1932 (Maktabi, 1999). However, it 
is predominantly comprised of Maronite Christians (located in and around the Mount Beirut area) 
Sunni Muslims (predominantly located in the North), Shi’a Muslims (predominantly located in the 
South), and a notable population of other minority groups such as Druze and Bedouin (Faour, 2007). 
Lebanon, like Jordan, has a long history of hosting Palestinian refugees. However, Palestinians in 
Lebanon have different rights and opportunities to those in Jordan. Most of the Palestinian population 
in Lebanon are Sunni. They do not have Lebanese citizenship, are barred from specific occupations 
and are not allowed to own property. Over 50% of this population continue to live in refugee camps, 
many of which have been absorbed into the urban fabric of Lebanon’s cities (Haddad & Jamali, 2003; 
Sanyal, 2011). As such, Palestinians are greatly disenfranchised and marginalised within Lebanon.  
On gaining independence in 1943, a power sharing agreement was struck between the two dominant 
groups of the country, the Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Christians. The National Pact of 1943 
provided for a confessional formula of governance, based upon the nation’s demographic makeup, 
whereby government power was balanced between Christians and Muslims in a 6 to 5 ratio (Krayem, 
1997). It dictated that the president should always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni 
Muslim and the speaker of the chamber of deputies, a Shi'a Muslim. This arrangement has resulted in 
the Lebanese government reflecting and reinforcing ‘traditional ethnic identities rather than 
supplanting them with political parties emphasising ideological interests' (Calame & Charlesworth, 
2011, p. 42). This agreement, alongside several other local and regional issues, such as the Cold War, 
Arab-Israeli tensions, the rise of Pan Arabism, Lebanese confessional power allocation, and the influx 
of Palestinian refugees from Israel and Jordan into Lebanon, were the factors behind Lebanon's Civil 
War which lasted from 1975 – 1991.  The 1989 Taif Agreement, which largely put an end to the conflict, 
came about due to the coinciding elements of internal reconciliation and favourable regional and 
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international developments (Krayem, 1997). The agreement oversaw both the reform of confessional 
governance in Lebanon, equalising representation between Maronite Christians, Sunnis and Shi'as and 
marked a general turn towards Syrian influence in the State (Zahar, 2005).     
Syria had a pivotal role in the Lebanese civil conflict, with Syrian occupying forces arriving in Lebanon 
from the early onset of the war (around 1976). Syrian hegemony continued at the conclusion of the 
conflict and Syrian troops occupied Lebanon until the assassination of Rafik Hariri, Lebanon’s Prime 
Minister, in 2005. The controversial assassination, which is attributed to Syrian interference, heralded 
the Cedar Revolution, which saw the withdrawal of Syrian troops and an end to occupation. This 
complex set of events created a new era in Lebanese politics through the creation of the March 8th 
and March 14th alliances: political associations that exist to the present and largely dictate existing 
power relations in Lebanon. The March 8th coalition represent forces that are sympathetic to 
Syrian/Iranian interests, and whose interests generally align with those of Syria, and are dominated 
by predominantly Shi’a parties such as Hezbollah.  The March 14th Alliance consists of more pro-Saudi 
Arabian, anti-Syrian elements, and represents predominantly Sunni political parties such as the Future 
Movement.  
The parties that make up these alliances are far more than 'political parties' but are in reality non-
state governance actors with their own militias, administrations, welfare structures and international 
connections (Stel, 2014). Militias (formed during the civil war and continuing to function) and political 
parties have operated alongside and against the State since the Taif accord, and have resulted in a 
hybrid assemblage of security in Lebanon (Carpi, 2016).  
Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings 
As the Arab Uprisings spread through Lebanon, there were relatively few protests that occurred in 
Lebanese society. Those that did occur were in early 2011, predominantly calling for an end to the 
sectarian political system (Monterescu & Ali, 2016; Stel, 2014). Lebanon has been largely affected by 
the Arab Uprising through the State's close links and complex attitudes towards Syria. Because of the 
positioning of the two political blocs in Lebanon vis-a-vis the Syrian State, the ongoing civil war has 
served to deepen the divisions between the two (Smayra, 2013). Despite both power blocs initially 
insisting on remaining removed from the conflict, their involvement in the region has increased 
(Dionigi, 2016) and the conflict has spilled over into Lebanon on several occasions over the past 9 
years, particularly in the region around Arsal and parts of the Beka’a Valley (Tholens, 2017).  
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Security Framework in Lebanon  
Security provision within Lebanon is best described as ‘plural’, whereby multiple actors exert different 
levels of authority (Boustani et al., 2016). This structure is closely linked to the multiple state and non-
state stakeholders that jostle for power – a situation Tholens (2017) refers to as ‘hybrid security 
governance’ - and is consequently strongly linked to sectarian affiliations. As a result, space and society 
is regulated by both state and non-state security providers, creating a very visible security presence in 
public space, particularly in areas of high tension or of political importance (Carpi, 2016, Fawaz et al., 
2012). The increased public presence of security forces and providers in Beirut have been linked to 
the wave of assassinations and attempted assassinations between 2004 – 2006, the Cedar revolution 
and the withdrawal of Syrian occupying troops (Fawaz et al., 2012; Monroe, 2011, 2016). The Syrian 
civil war has deepened this plural security network in Lebanon, through an exacerbation of ongoing 
political polarisations, resulting in the increased militarisation and securitisation of state and non-state 
actors.  
The principal bodies of state security are the police (Internal Security Forces, ISF) and the army 
(Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF). After Lebanese independence was achieved, these two institutions 
were tasked with working in tandem with each other to maintain both internal security and state 
borders (Saliba, 2012). Thus, they have a close working relationship that continues to this day. The 
primary intelligence body of Lebanon is the General Security Directorate (GSD) which is tasked with 
national security and the monitoring of visas and residencies permits for migrants and refugees and 
all individuals within Lebanon. The LAF falls under the Ministry of Defence, whilst the ISF and GSD fall 
under the Ministry of Interior. Broadly speaking, the LAF is widely respected and seen as a neutral 
body that is less prone to sectarian influence, however it struggles with a chain of command and 
effectiveness (Saliba, 2012).  The ISF is perceived as compromised and corrupt to (particularly Sunni) 
sectarian influence, due to its longstanding financial support from Rafik Hariri and the Future 
Movement (Boustani et al., 2016; Tholens, 2017). As a result, most Lebanese have low opinions and 
trust regarding police (Geha, 2015). The head of the GSD must be a Shi’a Muslim according to the 
Lebanese Constitution and therefore it is associated with Hezbollah. However, these links are not 
‘straightforward’, the organisation is well trained and formalised and there have been recent efforts 
to de-politicise it (Tholens, 2017, p. 878). Because of these sectarian influences, state security bodies 
are looked upon by Lebanese citizens in fluctuating measures of trust and suspicion (Geha, 2015). This 
sectarian influence, coupled with political parties that are deeply embedded into the social fabric of 
the country, is why many Lebanese citizens seek out alternative measures of security or conflict 
resolution. Alongside state security services lie a range of other means of mediating security, including 
neighbourhood committees, Mukhtars (street level mayors), religious organisations, tribal networks 
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and women’s groups (Geha, 2015). The most prominent of these is the range of political parties 
representing various interests. Some parties are more influential than others and thus have greater 
power and capacity to resolve conflict or security issues. For example, Hezbollah is distinguished for 
its multi-level insertion into political and social life from parliamentary positions to local charitable 
work (Deeb & Harb, 2009). Therefore, it is unsurprising to note that Shi’a Lebanese are 30% more 
likely than other ethno-religious groups, to turn to a political party for assistance (Geha, 2015).  
Some critics have argued that this complex sovereignty and security context, alongside reoccurring 
violent and political issues within the country (sometimes as a result of proxy geopolitical tensions and 
conflict), is predominantly why Lebanon is best categorised as a ‘weak state’ (B. F. Salloukh, 2013). In 
contrast, Fregonese (2012) has argued that there are different state and non-state actors within 
Lebanon which create a hybrid political order which forms the basis of its sovereignty. Thus, merely 
examining the ‘state’ results in an overlooking of other ‘sovereign enactments’, particularly those of 
political parties, whose power and position gradually dissolve the boundaries between binaries of 
state/non-state and legitimate/illegitimate (p. 670). Hazbun (2016b) echoes this position, examining 
how different actors balance varying concerns and interpretations of security to create an acting plural 
security network within the State. Despite these positions, Lebanon clearly suffers from a complex 
and sensitive security situation which is exacerbated by clientelism, and where no one institution 
operates a monopoly of power. Whilst acknowledging that a vast security network does operate 
within the country, Lebanon’s porous and compromised borders and indeed the lack of a monopoly 
on security or power, by any institution, is why it is best understood as a ‘weak state’.  
Urban Planning and Public Space in Beirut  
Lebanon’s civil war, occupation by Syria, conflict with Israel and subsequent security arrangements 
have had a marked impact on the population and urban form of Beirut. During the war, the city found 
itself literally divided down the ‘Green Line’ into ‘West Muslim’ and ‘East Christian’, although similarly 
to the conflict, the division of the city was far more complex then this explanation encompasses 
(Calame & Charlesworth, 2011). Thus, the western side of Beirut is predominantly Sunni Muslim, the 
southern suburbs (Al Dahiye) Shi’a, and the north-eastern suburbs, Christian (Yassin, 2012).  
The spatial legacy of the war, in which neighbourhoods were controlled and bounded by different 
confessional groups within Beirut, is still apparent today. Because of the ongoing political tensions and 
the confessional political and social structure of Lebanon, the city is highly securitised by both state 
and non-state actors. This results in ‘frontiers’ between neighbourhoods, which creates spaces of 
uncertainty wherein residents are unsure of power and allegiances operating between 
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neighbourhoods (Akar, 2012). These ‘frontiers’ are highly securitised by the presence of a myriad of 
both security providers (including militia’s) and military paraphernalia (for example military tanks and 
checkpoints). Public space is highly politicised through visual reminders of different political factions, 
with flags, posters and pictures of political slogans, party colours and photos of slain martyrs strung 
over roads or plastered on walls to demark space as inherently ‘belonging’ to a confessional group 
(Monterescu & Ali, 2016). Residents must regularly negotiate checkpoints and various state and non-
state security providers whilst in public space (Fawaz et al., 2012).  This has resulted in public spaces 
that are devoid of citizens, heavily securitised and scrutinised.  
The civil war and notable conflicts with Israel (1982 and 2006) have led to Beirut's city centre being 
rebuilt twice in the last three decades. The most recent rebuild has been highly controversial and 
distinctly privatised. Previous to civil war, Beirut’s city centre was considered a symbol of coexistence 
in a highly heterogeneous state, drawing in Lebanese from all social classes and sectarian communities 
(Hourani, 2015). However, several private real estate companies have divided public opinion with their 
re-imaging of the city centre. These developments have been criticised for playing into the hands of 
the city’s financial elite, creating elite shopping enclaves and an exclusive and commercialised city 
centre (Nagel, 2002; Mango 2014). These efforts are reflective of the Abdali developments in Amman 
which have received similar criticism for pandering to elite interests (see above).  
In Beirut, the promenade Corniche that hugs the road around the coast, is the city’s most well-known 
and loved public space. Throughout the day, and especially in the evening, the Corniche is alive with 
families, dating couples, cyclists, skateboarders and tourists. Except for its long linear format, it is the 
closest equivalent that Beirut has to a central square. Although the city still feels quite ‘green’ in parts 
thanks to boulevards of trees, what few parks do exist are normally repellent with concrete and dog 
faeces and are typically monitored by private or state security services. Horsh Beirut, the city’s major 
central park, was closed to Lebanese citizens for decades, due to its positioning on the edge of three 
warring neighbourhoods during the civil war and its partial destruction during the war with Israel. Now 
open, thanks to the efforts of several NGOs, the park suffers from years of neglect and is only open at 
select times. Because of the history of sectarian conflict, security efforts are always focused on 
ensuring potential neighbourhood conflicts do not escalate and threaten the delicate community 
balance (Boustani, et al., 2016). As a result, neighbourhood amenities for public use, such as the 
stadiums or parks can be so over-securitised, they are hostile to public use. 
Public space for congregating (protesting) is highly limited and controlled by the State. The obvious 
public spaces where citizens could congregate/protest is Nejmeh square, a large public square which 
is also the location of important religious places of worship and the House of Parliament. However, 
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this area was closed to members of the public, following a period of car bombings and culminating in 
the ‘Rubbish Crisis’ Protests in 2015 (BBC, 2015). This area is frequently closed off and barricaded by 
police and security services. Adjacent to the Parliamentary area is Martyrs Square. The square holds 
an important cultural and political role in the city. It is the key place of political protest, hosting 
thousands of citizens demonstrating against Syrian occupation during the Cedar Revolution in 2005, 
and even as recently as 2019, an important site of anti-corruption protests. However, its future 
development is in the hands of private development companies (Massena, 2018).  
As with the provision of security, in some places other actors play a state-like role in urban planning 
and development. The past few decades have also seen the rise of ‘state alternatives’ to city planning 
in the form of the powerful Shi’a political party, Hezbollah, who control the poorer Southern Suburbs 
of Beirut. Despite their impressive efforts to rebuild the Haret Hreik neighbourhood in the Southern 
Suburbs following its abject destruction in 2006, their control of these neighbourhoods has overseen 
their move towards increased religious conservatism. This has included the removal of informal and 
social gathering spaces or shaping them as condoned locations of piety, and indeed has had influence 
on gendered roles within these communities (Deeb & Harb, 2013; Harb, 2010).  
Summary: state and security structures of Jordan and Lebanon  
Lebanon is perceived as a ‘fragile’ state, as the government predominantly serves as a ‘forum for inter-
communal bargaining and power-sharing more that an autonomous apparatus with interventionist 
powers in its own right’ (Pearlman, 2014, p.37). Sectarian-confessional groups jockey and manoeuvre 
for control and real power ‘lies not in shouldering the tasks of the state, but in extorting power from 
it or despite it’ (ibid). In contrast, Jordan is perceived as a strong state because the Hashemite regime 
has successfully established a near monopoly on power and the ability to stifle dissent through 
successful socio-economic policies. These policies have promoted allegiance to the King and promoted 
a level of national integration amongst the different segments of Jordan’s population, including 
Palestinian refugees, buffering the nation from outward influences (Salloukh, 1996, p. 54). The nation 
also benefits from a highly efficient and centralised security service which maintains internal law and 
order and border control.  
However, state capacity is perhaps better understood in graded and fluctuating terms, rather than in 
blanket expressions of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. This allows for a consideration of the shifting geopolitical 
contexts in which these States are situated, and indeed, the changing cultural, and socio-economic 
contexts within them. However, these terms are still useful shorthand’s for understanding how the 
state structure differs in each context, whereby Lebanon is fragmented and compromised (weak), and 
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Jordan is centralised and authoritarian (strong). As such, it provides a conceptual framework of 
understanding the varying state and security frameworks in place.  
These differences prompt a several questions regarding the experiences of refugee women living in 
Amman and Beirut. The most pressing of these: how might differing contexts of state structures (i.e. 
weak vs strong) and security frameworks (i.e. unitary vs plural) affect the experiences of refugee 
communities within their host cities? With this in mind, the following section examines refugee 
policies that Jordan and Lebanon have developed for incoming Syrian refugees from 2011 up until 
2017, when this fieldwork completed, in order to consider the relationship between state strength 
and ongoing refugee policies. In its conclusion, it will draw together ideas of the strong and weak state, 
differing security structures, the ways in which refugee policies have been applied towards Syrian 
refugees and the questions that this raises, regarding Syrian refugee women in their host cities.  
Jordanian and Lebanese state policies towards Syrian refugees  
Policies towards Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are motivated and shaped by a range of 
national and regional issues. Neither Jordan nor Lebanon are signatories of UNHCR’s 1951 Convention 
on Refugees, and UNHCR operates in both contexts under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
signed with each government: Jordan in 1998; Lebanon in 2003. These MOU’s, between each State 
and UNHCR, are the basis under which UNHCR operates, and provides protection for refugees, in each 
country. Palestinian refugees are not covered by the MOU, instead they fall under the care of UNWRA. 
Whilst the Jordanian MOU has been updated and amended in recent years during the Syrian crisis, the 
Lebanese MOU has been widely criticised for its poor protection measures (Kelberer, 2017). This next 
section provides an outline of policies towards Syrian refugees in each context, particularly 
highlighting refugees’ rights to work.    
Jordanian State policy regarding Syrian Refugees  
As of 2017, Jordan was hosting approximately 650,000 Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2017b). The Jordanian 
government has frequently argued that there are 1.26 million Syrian refugees living in its border’s. 
However, this number encompasses Syrians who had been living in Jordan for some time and were 
not registered or receiving assistance from UNHCR (Lenner & Schmelter, 2016). Regardless, not all 
Syrian refugees displaced from the civil war would have registered with UNHCR. Thus, it is difficult to 
put an exact figure on the number of Syrian refugees living in Jordan, and the figures employed by 
different groups are highly political. Nevertheless, it is almost certainly between 600,000 and 1.2 
million, and so very significant with respect to the total population of the country of some 10 million. 
Since 2016, there has been a full closure of the Syrian/Jordanian border in 2016 due to a bombing and 
conflict at the border (and additionally the movement of some Jordanians into Syria to join Daesh). 
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Initially, the Jordanian state had a relatively flexible approach to incoming Syrian refugees, allowing 
for their welcome and self-settlement in towns and cities, whilst maintaining close control over its 
borders and restricting refugees to certain crossings in order to monitor their arrival (Pasha, 2017). 
This altered in 2012, when the conflict escalated and refugee numbers increased exponentially 
(Kelberer, 2017). The response to the spike of incoming refugees was to build camps, in order to both 
control the incoming population and to ‘make visible’ the extent of Jordanian refugee hosting to the 
world and to humanitarian funders (Chatelard, 2009; Kelberer, 2017; Turner, 2015). Five refugee 
camps were built between early 2012 and 2014: Za’atari, Azraq, Cybercity, the Emirati-Jordanian Camp 
(also known as Mrajeeb Al Fhood) and King Abdullah Park (Achilli, 2015)5. The camps are estimated to 
only host approximately 10-20% of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan. Most Syrian refugees have 
eschewed camps in favour of self-settlement in urban areas. When the camps were initially 
constructed, they were relatively porous and there were flexible bail out procedures in place (see 
below). However, since late 2014, there have been greater restrictions, with attempts to confine those 
that are in camps, to the camps (Achilli, 2015).  
Up to January 2015, Jordanian state law allowed for Syrian refugees to leave refugee camps if they 
were sponsored by a Jordanian citizen. This kafala sponsorship requires a Jordanian citizen to take 
responsibility for a Syrian family, vouching for their presence in the country. In this case, the sponsor 
should be an individual that is known or related to the family, over the age of 35, male, married and 
employed in a stable job (Achilli, 2015). In principal, the sponsor is supposed to provide for a refugee’s 
livelihood and shelter needs, in order to ensure the refugee does not enter the labour market 
(Frochlich & Stevens, 2015). However, the bail out and kafala systems were open to significant bribery. 
Many Jordanians agreed to sponsor non-related Syrians in exchange for additional payment (Frochlich 
& Stevens, 2015). Very few kafeel’s took responsibility for the family they had sponsored, and 
frequently charged between 350-600JD’s (£350-600) per family, when the kafala fee should be 15JD 
(£15) per person (IHRC/NRC, 2016). Turner (2015) also found that single men from lower socio-
economic backgrounds have often been confined to camps in order not to flood the Jordanian labour 
market and therefore struggled to gain kafala sponsorship.   
If refugees were unable to leave the camp through bail out, they could pay to be smuggled out of the 
camp (Frochlich & Stevens, 2015). Refugees who left camps without an official kafala were still able 
to apply for an Asylum Seeker Certificate once outside the camp before July 2014 (those that left 
without authorisation after this date have restricted access to government services and humanitarian 
 
5 There are two additional 'camps' in the no man's land between Jordan and Syria: Rukban and Hadalat. These 
camps emerged after Jordan closed its border crossing to incoming Syrian refugees. As these camps are not 
officially on Jordanian State land they are not included here (Pasha, 2017).  
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aid).  Therefore, a family could pay to be smuggled out of the camp and still ensure they had legality 
if they registered with UNHCR for a certificate (IHRC/NRC, 2016).   
The Jordanian State refers to Syrian refugees as 'guests'. It does promotes third country re-settlement 
of refugees and, in theory, adheres to a policy of non-refoulement in line with international refugee 
law (Al Kilani, 2014; ILO, 2015). However, refugees are frequently deported to Syria, typically for 
working without a legal permit. These are predominantly men, but deportations of women also occur. 
There was a spike of deportation and expulsions of Syrian refugees by Jordanian authorities in 2016 
and 2017, alongside some voluntarily returns (HRW, 2017, n/p).  
By 2015, the government changed tack from an ‘emergency response’ to the Jordan Response Plan 
2015 which represented a paradigm shift from humanitarianism to long term developmental response 
(JRP, 2015). Under this, Syrian refugees are eligible to access education and healthcare facilities; 
however, these are under significant strain. The JRP stated that this shift was specifically made to 
assist vulnerable Jordanians alongside the refugee population and thus the JRP has focused on 
creating cohesive plans to support both Jordanians and Syrians in shelter, environment and education 
(ibid).  In the same year, the Jordanian government introduced the Urban Verification Process. This 
was an ID card, issued by the MOI which included the capture of biometric data of refugees and the 
creation of a database (UNHCR, 2015b). This card is essential for those refugees that live outside of 
camps, as it provides them with legality to be in Jordan and to access services such as healthcare and 
education. Its issue included an amnesty for those Syrians that were living outside camps without any 
legal documentation and allows the holder to move freely throughout Jordan (IHRC/NRC, 2016). The 
intention was that from 2015 onward, the Jordanian government would hold information about all 
non-camp refugees. However, challenges in gaining access to the card, particularly for those Syrians 
who did not have Syrian identity documents, or children who did not have birth certificates, has been 
noted. As a result, in 2016 an estimated 150,000 Syrians were still not registered, raising concerns 
regarding gendered vulnerabilities in not having documentation (IHRC/NRC, 2016).  
Rights & Labour opportunities for Self-Settled Syrian Refugees in Jordan   
As of 2015, approximately 99% of Syrians engaged in labour were employed in the informal sector in 
Jordan, which is characterised by low and declining wages, long days and poor working conditions 
(ILO, 2015, p. 7; Stave & Hillesund, 2015). These workers are predominantly men as the ILO found that 
only 7% of Syrian women were engaged in work outside the home (Stave & Hillesund, 2015). If Syrian 
refugees want to engage in formal work, they are required to have a worker’s permit which is based 
on an official contract, employee sponsorship and a permit fee. As most are unable to obtain this, 
work in the informal sector has continued (ILO, 2015).  
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The most significant development in Jordan in the past few years regarding refugees and the right to 
work has been the introduction of the Jordan Compact. The Compact, an agreement between the 
Kingdom of Jordan, several European countries and international donors, was introduced in January 
2016. It sought to introduce work permit initiatives for Syrian refugees in Jordan in return for Jordan’s 
favourable access to European markets (Barbalet et al., 2018).  Whilst it has been praised as a 
breakthrough in refugee labour policy, several research papers have highlighted complexities and 
challenges with implementing these initiatives (Huang et al., 2018). For example, Lenner & Turner 
(2019) highlighted that many Syrians work for businesses that operate without their own legal 
permits. These businesses are often disinterested or unable to acquire these permits, and therefore 
will not ‘regularize’ Syrians workers permits (p. 21); whilst Kelberer (2017) found that, despite the 
permit, Syrian refugees stood to earn more working in the informal rather than formal sector. Both 
sets of research have both indicated that these work permits are often aimed at engaging Syrian 
refugee women into their host workforce, but due to various social and practical obstacles there has 
been little take up. Lenner & Turner's (2019) research also explains that the structural and cultural 
format of the Jordanian formal labour market have made the Compact ineffective. 
Lebanese State policy regarding Syrian refugees  
As of 2016, Lebanon was hosting somewhere in the region of 1.1 – 1.5 million Syrian refugees, which 
has had a significant effect on the political, social and economic fabric of the country. UNHCR stopped 
registering incoming Syrian refugees in March 2015, so accuracy regarding the scale of the crisis in the 
country is difficult to establish (UNHCR et al., 2017). Alongside the estimated 1.1 - 1.5 million Syrian 
refugees, an additional 300,000 - 1.5 million vulnerable Lebanese and 300,000 Palestinians have been 
identified as requiring food, shelter and protection assistance as well as improved access to basic 
public services (LCRP, 2015, p. 3-4). Unease regarding the pressing developmental needs of these 
populations, alongside balancing the needs of incoming Syrian refugees, in resource-compromised 
localities, are at the forefront of Lebanese government concerns.  
The Lebanese government has declared the Syrian refugee crisis not to be governed by law, but by 
governmental decisions (Oxfam, 2015). It has applied ad hoc policies towards incoming Syrian 
refugees, which are largely shaped by security concerns (Jagarnathsingh, 2016; Janmyr, 2016). 
Theoretically, the 2003 MOU protects refugees from deportation and provided some much needed 
protection measures, although the principal of non-refoulement is not mentioned (Frangieh, 2016). 
The LCRP 2015-16 plan details that the 'preferred' durable solution to the refugee crisis is the 
repatriation of refugees back to Syria, while 'abiding by the principle of non-refoulement' (LCRP, 2015, 
p. 3). It also emphasises third country re-settlement for refugees after a period of 12 months (UNHCR, 
2004).  
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The Government of Lebanon implements ‘some provisions of the [UNHCR] Convention on a voluntary 
basis’ and is quick to stress that ‘Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, not a final destination for 
refugees, let alone a country of resettlement’ (LCRP, 2015).  As a result, the State is keen to emphasise 
the 'temporary' nature of hosting Syrian refugees, and they are referred to as 'visitors or 'de facto 
refugees’. Since the beginning of 2015, Lebanon focused on decreasing the number of Syrians within 
its borders, by obstructing their entrance into the country and encouraging return to Syria. Refugees 
have been ‘reclassified’ as economic migrants, eligible to pay for resident coupons, thus making day 
to day life in Lebanon deeply precarious (see below).  
Because of the Lebanese government’s initial refusal to develop a systematic policy towards incoming 
Syrians, UNHCR has predominantly led the response to the crisis (Janmyr, 2017; Lenner & Schmelter, 
2016). At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Lebanon operated a lenient open border policy, which 
was in place up to January 2015. The State refused to provide refugee camps and instead promoted a 
policy of self-settlement (ILO, 2014; Jagarnathsingh, 2016). Syrians who arrived via a legal border 
crossing with identification papers were granted an entry visa or coupon, for a stay of 6 months, free 
of charge. This required annual renewal, at a cost of US$200 per person, for everyone over the age of 
15 (Janmyr, 2016; NRC, 2014). The cost of renewing the permit is simply unaffordable for refugees, 
many who are living below the poverty line, and many who are not receiving any assistance from 
UNHCR. Those Syrians who arrived prior to 2015 and wanted or required assistance from UNHCR, 
were provided with a two year registration certificate from UNHCR. However, they were generally 
subject to the same provision in domestic law that applied to other foreigners and had to apply for 
residency coupons as detailed above (Janmyr, 2016). Some Syrians, out of fear of being conscripted 
or turned away at the border (or who lacked identification papers), entered the country through illegal 
means, usually smuggled through the mountains (NCR, 2014). Those refugees who did not enter 
through an official General Security Office post at the Syrian/Lebanese border could subsequently 
apply for a ‘Petition for Mercy’ to legalise their stay (ibid p. 24).     
Initially UNHCR registered Syrian refugees at reception centres, run by a combination of NGO partners 
and UNICEF. However, as numbers tipped over a million, in early 2015 the Lebanese government 
requested that UNHCR stop registering refugees and only record them (HRW, 2016; UNHCR, 2015a). 
The official reason for this halt in registration of refugees was to create a new mechanism for 
registration. However, this has not occurred, and critics argue suspension of registration was done in 
order to frame all incoming Syrians as migrant workers (Janmyr, 2017, 2018). After 2015, Syrians who 
wanted to enter Lebanon needed to produce valid identity documents and prove their stay fits into 
one of the approved entry categories. Most of these categories, which include tourism, studying and 
a ‘pledge of responsibility’, are open to refugees, but typically require finances and thus show 
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preference to wealthier Syrians (for example, to enter for tourism purposes an individual needs to 
show they have US$1000) (Janmyr, 2016).  
The predominant entry category for a refugee family is having a kafala (Lebanese sponsor). Like in 
Jordan, a kafala is a Lebanese citizen who signs a pledge of responsibility for a migrant worker, 
vouching for them whilst they are in the country. This is problematic because it is challenging to secure 
a sponsor, which has resulted in a black market within Lebanon of providing kafala to Syrian refugees, 
some charging up to US$1000 (Oxfam, 2017). These policies ensured that Syrian refugees were placed 
in highly vulnerable positions and extensively opened them up to exploitation, abuse and limited 
mobility (as explored later in this thesis) (ibid). Whilst currently Lebanon does not have an active 
deportation policy regarding Syrians within its borders who are living without legal status, frequent 
army and security checks ensure a perpetual feeling of insecurity (Janmyr, 2017). Furthermore, some 
Syrians have been stripped of their refugee papers for moving between Syria and Lebanon during the 
time of the Syrian civil war (ibid).  
As Lebanon’s governance system is based on a delicate sectarian balance, as detailed above, 
integration of Syrians into Lebanese society is anathema to Lebanese political society (Betts & Collier, 
2015). The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees are Sunni Muslims, and the protracted nature of 
the conflict has vast implications for the governance of Lebanon as integration of refugees challenges 
the confessional government structure (Culbertson et al., 2016).  
Most observers argue that Lebanon’s refusal to provide camps for Syrian refugees, is due to the 
turbulent history of Palestinian refugee camps in the country, which played an important role in the 
Lebanese civil war (Lenner & Schmelter, 2016). Thus, Lebanese officials are anxious to ensure that 
encampment policies are not repeated. The free movement of Syrians within Lebanon is also essential 
to the Lebanese economy, thus it is economically important not to encamp or restrict the refugee 
population or to actively refoule Syrian refugees (Lewis Turner, 2015). 
Despite the non-encampment policy, many of those refugees without existing labour links or 
connections in the country have ended up living in ‘settlements’ which act as informal refugee camps, 
which have predominantly proliferated in the Beka’a Valley and the North of the country where 
refugees are engaged in agricultural work (Sanyal, 2017). Those that have pre-established links in the 
country through family, or migrant labour, have tended to take advantage of those links first, thus 
heading to those areas for work opportunities (ILO, 2014). The crisis has also affected parts of the 
country more heavily. For example, the North of Lebanon, the Beka’a Valley and Beirut are hosting 
the greatest numbers of Syrian refugees (Fawaz et al., 2014; UNHCR 2015). Urban areas, particularly 
poorer, informal neighbourhoods that are perceived as refugee receiving, have experienced the brunt 
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of incoming refugee populations. Beirut itself struggles from poor infrastructure and planning, 
particularly in areas of informality in the city and in the southern suburbs where Hezbollah controls 
aid and development (Culbertson et al., 2016). Electricity and water shortages of a common aspect of 
day to day life, particularly affecting the most marginalised. The swell in population in Beirut has also 
had a marked effect on housing, with rising rents and many refugees forced to live in cramped and 
unsanitary conditions (Marwa Boustani et al., 2016).    
Rights & Labour opportunities for Self-Settled Syrian Refugees in Lebanon  
Lebanon has a long history of hosting migrant workers from Syria, thus allowing Syrians displaced by 
the civil war to engage in work does buoy the Lebanese economy (Lewis Turner, 2015). However, as 
the crisis has continued the Lebanese economy and its infrastructure are now struggling under such a 
high and quick influx of a vulnerable population. 92% of Syrian refugees employed in Lebanon are 
working in the informal sector (Stave & Hillesund, 2015). Only 6% of Syrian refugee women are 
employed, and most women surveyed had not worked in either Lebanon or Syria before the outbreak 
of the conflict (ILO, 2014).  
The State has deemed informal employment without a kafala ‘illegal’ in order to protect job security 
for the native population. Since 2015, those Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR (and therefore do 
not have a kafala) have been prompted to sign a ‘pledge not to work’, whereby they precisely agree 
not to work whilst living in Lebanon (HRW, 2016; Oxfam, 2017). For many, the signing of this document is simply 
cursory: an utter lack of financial support and high debts mean that many refugees will be forced to 
continue to seek informal work opportunities in order to support themselves and their families. 
Furthermore, many refugees registered with UNHCR have been told by the Lebanese state to find 
themselves a kafala regardless of their status (whether they are registered with the UNHCR or not) 
and have not been able to renew their registration status with UNHCR (HRW, 2016). This has led to a 
confusing landscape for refugees to navigate.  
Conclusion  
As of 2020, the states of Jordan and Lebanon host upward of 2 million Syrian refugees between them. 
This has had significant social, political and economic effects on both States, particularly as the refugee 
crisis has continued for over nine years. This chapter has provided contextual background, highlighting 
state structure and security frameworks, as well as recent political developments regarding the Syrian 
civil war and the Arab Uprisings. In doing so it has provided a framework for understanding each 
State’s ensuing Syrian refugee policy. Whilst Jordan and Lebanon share several similarities (history of 
colonialism, conflict and refugees flows, shared religious and language influences), there are also clear 
distinctions in the governance, sovereignty and security structure operating in each of these nations.  
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States and security institutions are structures which shape daily lives and agentic capacity, particularly 
in regard to refugee communities. The labels of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ are utilised in this context in order 
to provide a shorthand analysis for understanding state structure in Lebanon as fragmented and 
compromised (weak), and state structure in Jordan as centralised and authoritarian (strong). As such, 
it provides a conceptual framework of understanding the varying state and security frameworks in 
place.  
These structural differences provide a relevant framework in which to situate the wider investigation 
of this thesis, that is, an understanding of structural influences upon identities and the ways in which 
these shape quotidian experiences of (in)security. These points will be revisited in the following 
Methodology Chapter which will outline the comparative framework in more detail.   
This chapter draws to a close the first section of this thesis which provided a Theoretical Framework 
supporting the methodological and empirical basis of this thesis. In the Methodological Chapter which 
follows, these chapters will be drawn together to provide a clear theoretical grounding for the 
empirical chapters which make up the second half of the thesis.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology  
 
Preceding this chapter, I have discussed theories and positions on gender, structure and agency, 
(in)security and space. The outset of this Methodology Chapter will draw these bodies of literature 
together to summarise and outline the theoretical framework that underpins the empirical chapters 
that follow. It will then revisit and detail the thesis research questions, which were initially outlined in 
Chapter One, that the empirical chapters will be addressing.    
Having established the theoretical framework and research questions, the chapter will outline the 
details of this research project and how it was conducted. It will continue in three parts. Firstly, an 
examination of the qualitative methods used in this thesis. Secondly, an analysis of how I negotiated 
access to research participants and lastly an examination of the ethical challenges of my research 
project, including positionality, issues of consent and extractive research.     
From the outset, I did not expect this to be an easy or straightforward research project. I was conscious 
that I, a middle-class white woman, would be working with a vulnerable population living in poor 
conditions, in complex environments. Owing to these realities, it was inevitable that several political 
factors influenced the shape of this research, directing its concentration towards particular 
individuals, states and conditions (Gough, 2012). These issues are raised and discussed throughout 
this chapter, but most prominently in this chapter’s section on access and on positionality.  
Theoretical Framing  
This thesis examines the relationship between identity, space and security using a comparative case 
study of Syrian refugee women living in Beirut and Amman.  It is primarily concerned with 
understanding and analysing the ways in which refugee women experience a range of scalar 
(in)securities in their host cities, and how they negotiate these (in)securities in turn. Several bodies of 
literature and theories are required in order to provide a theoretical underpinning to the complexity 
of refugee women’s daily lives in two different host cities.  
This thesis is grounded in feminist theory, particularly using feminist theories of intersectionality, in 
order to foreground the ways in which different identities interact with structures to shape 
experiences of (in)security for marginalised, refugee women. These feminist theories are guided by 
critical realist principles, which argue for an understanding of our social world as both real and socially 
constructed. Thus, it is influenced by both feminist and critical realist ontologies. Feminist research is 
driven and shaped by a two-fold agenda: a political commitment to advance progressive social change 
through research and a methodological commitment to prioritise participants’ voices (Avishai et al., 
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2013, p. 395). I believe this is best achieved through both approaches, as feminism prioritise the voices 
of the marginalized through a reliance on thick empirical data, whilst critical realism provides an 
analysis of causality and therefore a deeper capacity to generalise and talk back to social structures of 
oppression (see Fletcher, 2017, p. 182; also see section below on ‘Comparison’). Critical realism aids 
the theorisation of structure, agency and causation in complex contexts where refugee women 
possess agency but must also negotiate significantly repressive structures. Furthermore, critical realist 
identity theories deepen and enrich understanding of intersectionality through its emphasis on the 
ways in which different ascriptive and subjective identities operate, and shape lived experiences. 
Additionally, it emphasises the relational, yet irreducible features of identity categories which allow 
for an insight into the specific experiences of an individual whilst enabling a wider understanding into 
the experiences of marginalised groups more broadly.  
Identities of gender, race and class (amongst others, including refugee status) are enacted and 
reproduced spatially, and therefore space and identity have an intrinsic relationship. This is most often 
reflected in the common association of genders (male/female) with particular spaces (public/private). 
Whilst there are practical and material ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ spaces, space is also socially constructed, 
and spaces are embedded with social meanings. As such, particular identities are not purely confined 
or restricted to specific material spaces, but rather access such socially meaningful spaces in graded 
terms. This is perhaps best conceptualised in thinking of the boundary where identities and space 
meet and how these interactions create degrees of ‘permitted’ or ‘forbidden’ access for an individual, 
based on the intersection of their various identities (Fenster, 1999; Thompson, 2003). These terms 
enrich understandings of the urban spatial negotiations and experiences of marginalised or oppressed 
groups and directly indicate the relationship between identity, space and security.  
Security is very much a lived concern of the everyday and is shaped by a range of structural forces and 
mechanisms operating at a range of scales. Incorporating feminist geopolitical and human security 
approaches, security in this thesis can be understood as concerns of personal embodied protection, 
alongside security of employment and livelihoods, residence, legal status and mobility. What it means 
to be secure is not static, but contested, confusing and very much shaped by identity. ‘Who’ someone 
is, and how they are identified or categorised will summarily deem them a ‘friend’ or a ‘foe’. 
Furthermore, an individual’s sense of security is deeply shaped by a multitude of scalar concerns which 
are concentrated in the everyday of lived experience. Security is therefore both a concern of identity 
and space.    
Within this thesis, feminist theories of geopolitics and geolegality are used to conceptualise the 
relationship between space and security, and the ways in which security is experienced and lived in 
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the everyday spaces of the city. On the one hand, feminist geopolitics emphasises an examination of 
the perspectives of the marginalised, placing them at the forefront of knowledge and analysing the 
scalar nature of security that operates at different levels, but is felt in the lived every day. On the 
other, feminist geolegality emphasises the ways in which formal and informal laws operate spatially 
in order to create boundaries and borders of permissibility, acceptance and illegality. Thus, geolegality 
aids in a deeper reflection on the spatial terms described above of permitted/forbidden. By engaging 
these concepts, alongside spatial theories of permitted/forbidden and feminist theories of 
intersectionality, it is possible to explore the relationship between space, identity and security in 
complex contexts in order to highlight the experiences of Syrian refugee women in their host cities.   
Given this theoretical approach, this thesis straddles both subjective and objective ontological 
standpoints, acknowledging the social construction of reality but emphasising the real social world 
that exists outside of our understanding or encounter with it (Fletcher, 2017; Parr, 2015). It takes an 
inductive epistemological approach. Thus, it prioritises participants’ accounts and empirical evidence 
to build and develop theory, whilst acknowledging the guidance of some deductive reasoning through 
academic study and literature, as outlined in the preceding chapters, prior to entering the research 
field. It is vital to take the perspectives and accounts or groups and individuals (particularly if they are 
marginalised) as the starting point for understanding social realities, allowing these groups to express, 
reflect and make sense of their realities rather than imposing knowledge, hypothesis and expectations 
statically ‘from above’ (Ormstron et al., 2014). Through an inductive epistemological approach, it is 
understood that research cannot be value free, thus I maintained a reflexive perspective throughout 
my research, critically considering the construction of social realities and particularly reflecting on my 
positionality vis-à-vis participants, which is covered later in this chapter. This reflexivity is underpinned 
itself by a critical realist approach which acknowledges how the real world is socially constructed (Parr, 
2015).   
Research Aim and Questions  
The theoretical framework above aids in conceptualising and analysing the experiences of Syrian 
refugee women living in Amman and Beirut. As explored in the opening chapters, refugee policies in 
Lebanon and Jordan are complex and shaped by both historic and ongoing political and social issues 
regionally and within each country. This thesis is focused on understanding how women’s refugee 
identities encounter these structures spatially, and how this then shapes their perceptions and 
experiences of (in)security within their host cities. As such, the aim of this thesis is to understand the 
relationships between categories of identity and structures of law, policy and societal norms and how 
these shape experiences and perceptions of (in)security in day to day urban life for refugee women.  
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This aim will be realised through the answering of this principal research question:  
How do the social, political and legal contexts of host countries interact with the identities of Syrian 
refugee women to produce multiple scales and forms of (in)security? 
The social, political and legal contexts referenced in the question above refer to the structures of 
state policies and laws concerning refugees, as well their rights to employment etc., concerns of state 
structure and strength (as covered in Chapter Four) and formal and informal governance of security. 
It also includes social relations and cultural norms, particularly patriarchal aspects of Middle Eastern 
society. Identity is understood as multiple categories of identification, ascribed and objectively given 
by social location, and also subjectively experienced.  This principal question is answered by 
addressing several more detailed research questions:  
• In what ways do these structures affect Syrian refugee women’s security of shelter and 
livelihoods within their host cities and how do women respond to these?  
• In what ways do these structures shape experiences of public space and urban mobility for 
Syrian refugee women and how do women respond to these?   
• How do Syrian refugee women engage with structures of formal and informal security and 
conflict resolution provision in their host cities? 
• How do Syrian refugee women experience and respond to multiple scales of (in)security, and 
what tactics do they employ in order to negotiate these structures of power?  
In order to understand the ways in which structures and identities interact to create and shape 
differing scales of (in)security, these questions are posed within two different, but related, city 
contexts of Amman and Beirut, in order to understand how these issues interact to create continuities 
and differences across refugee experience.  
Comparison, specificity and generalising  
This thesis is concerned with examining refugee (in)security across differing contexts in order to allow 
for a richer understanding of categories of identity and the ways in which different identities shape 
experiences through an interaction with wider structural mechanisms. ‘When a researcher’s 
experience is limited to a single place, there is much that is taken for granted and not queried’ (Gough, 
2012). As such, comparing across contexts allows for us not to think of refugee women responding in 
‘set ways’ or thinking of issues of space or security as static and consistent. By drawing comparison 
across contexts, it demonstrates how space is constructed, bounded and perceived differently, and 
how structures operate differently and respond to the agency of individuals. 
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Whilst individual experience is not something that can be generalised, intersectionality has much to 
offer in the way of understanding how power and oppression operate, and how it is produced and 
reproduced, particularly through social institutions, which can offer understanding in different 
contexts (Cooper, 2016, p. 398). Gilpin (2006, p. 12) emphasises that in order to highlight the 
experiences of oppressed groups, researchers are required to look at issues as they apply to those 
groups. This becomes possible using a critical realist approach, whereby identity is understood as both 
socially constructed and real. Critical realist approaches, which focus on causal mechanisms and 
processes, allow for wider insight and thus the possibility of broader generalisation, to similar contexts 
where such structural mechanisms are also at work (Connelly, 2002). As such, the complexity of an 
individual’s identities, as well as their categorisation and social location in particular groups, allow for 
both a specific insight into an individual’s experience, alongside a wider insight into the experience of 
those in particular identity groups (Martinez Dy et al., 2014). This enables a means of wider theorising, 
whilst not reducing identity categories into homogenous essentialising. Using a critical realist 
approach to intersectionality thus allows for an insight into the specific experiences of an individual 
and enables intersectional approaches to achieve their goal of addressing uneven power structures 
and biases, whilst being respectful of unique experience and identity. Case study comparison is used 
in this thesis to draw thematic similarities and differences, not to reject or overlook heterogeneity. It 
is employed in order to provide specific insights into the experiences of Syrian women in these 
contexts, but also to provide comment on the wider experiences of marginalised refugee women in 
contexts where they do not enjoy full safety and protection from their host states.  
Whilst there is much research on urban comparison, comparative research in refugee studies is much 
less common. Urban scholars argue that comparative studies are enriching and offer an opportunity 
to unsettle and destabilise knowledge and theory, to highlight issues that may be overlooked, 
showcase diversity and demonstrate how variables work differently in a range of settings. For 
example, Lancione & McFarlane, (2016) encourage an ‘experimental comparison approach’ which 
encourages the engagement of both the specificity and generalizability of comparative cases, arguing 
that this approach encourages an embracing of the heterogeneity of contexts and situations rather 
than an avoidance, or simplification of complicated urban issues. In this argument  they echo the 
arguments of Robinson (2013, 2016) who advocates a ‘comparative urbanism approach’, which 
doesn’t try and control for differences in contexts. Rather, this approach looks for patterns of 
repetition (the demi-regularities of critical realist theory, see Fletcher, 2017) and interconnectedness 
across cities, which aids in building theory across different urban contexts. Robinson encourages an 
openness to theory building, which is approachable to a ‘revisability of concepts’ and that is respectful 
of divergence and difference across cities (Robinson, 2016, p. 188).  
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Much urban comparative work tends to overlook the lives and experiences of urban inhabitants, 
rather focusing on urban processes, urban form and analysing cities at an abstract level (Gough, 2012). 
However, Gough, (2012) emphasises that the urban is space, place and ways of life, pointing to their 
interconnected nature and the importance of comparing these issues alongside each other in order to 
understand the realities of city life.  As such, comparing the lives of urban residents is a useful starting 
point which can often highlight very different realities of the urban, shaped by processes, forms and 
policies.  
In contrast, refugee scholars typically point to the unique socio-political and cultural contexts in which 
refugee communities are embedded, making them hesitant to compare, particularly when studies use 
qualitative methods (Chatty, 2007; Skran & Daughtry, 2007). Comparative studies are also embedded 
into wider debates as to whether findings are generalizable across further contexts, something which 
is relevant here, particularly as this study also draws on theories of intersectionality.   
In answer to these critiques, Chatty (2007) found that comparison had much to offer. Reviewing her 
research with refugee youth across several different contexts, Chatty found thematic similarities 
emerged amongst refugee communities that would have been missed if studied in a single context. 
Thus, she argued, there is worth in conducting comparative, qualitative research amongst refugee 
communities. Sanyal, (2014) compared refugee settlements in Lebanon and India in a ‘transnational 
comparison’. In her approach, she allowed each site to raise its own set of questions and issues rather 
than using predetermined criteria, emphasising some of the specificities and differences across both 
sites. As such, she drew conclusions on refugee spaces of displacement, politics and citizenship based 
on comparing insights in each context. Comparison has also been used across different contexts to 
explore how damaging or constructive refugee policies affect lived experiences in host communities 
(Valentine et al., 2009). These positions, which indicate the use and insight that comparison offer, 
whilst paying attention to some of the specifics of context and the nuances of refugee experiences, 
are echoed in this study. 
Comparing Amman and Beirut  
Shifting focus to the cities themselves, Amman and Beirut have been chosen as two case cities, as I 
anticipated that refugee experiences of insecurity would differ in different contexts. This expectation 
led from various reports and academic studies on refugee policies and experiences in Lebanon and 
Jordan up to 2015, as well as an understanding of the differing State dynamics, security systems and 
demographics in each country (see Chapter Four). These indicated that differing state structure and 
refugee policies would intersect with the various identities of refugee women thus shaping their lived 
experiences in each city.  
105 
 
Beirut might be perceived as an “extreme” case (Flyvbjerg, 2006) due to its history of urban civil war 
and confessional power-sharing government, and thus difficult to compare to other cities because of 
its unique socio-political history. However, rather than dismissing it as ‘too complicated to compare’, 
the arguments outlined above encourage an engagement with the relevant ways in which a city such 
as Beirut is both similar and different to other cities. For example, both Amman and Beirut are capital 
cities in the Middle East in countries that border Syria. They are both shaped by colonialism and the 
states (and their capital cities) have a long history of hosting Palestinian refugee populations which 
has left a complex socio-political legacy in both nations. Despite (and because of) their joint history of 
hosting large refugee populations, neither state is a signatory of UNHCR’s 1951 or 1967 protocol on 
refugees. However, socially and politically, these two cities are quite different. As explored in detail in 
Chapter Four, Lebanon’s recent history of civil conflict had a deep effect on Beirut, which is evident to 
this day. Its governance relies on a complicated confessional structure and security operates within a 
complex hybrid system of political parties, militias, private security firms and various layers of state 
security institutions. In contrast, Jordan is perceived as a stable, constitutional monarchy with strong 
central governance, and a top-down hierarchal security system which is deeply tied to the state. These 
cities’ shared similarities and contrasting differences invite an analysis of how differing structural 
contexts and identities shape experiences of insecurity in the city, particularly amongst marginalised 
groups. This enables a further analysis of the ways in which identity or structure affects these 
experiences of security.  
There were also very practical considerations which made these two cities an useful source of 
comparative case study (Gough, 2012). For example, I developed contacts in both cities, and I was 
(legally) permitted to conduct research in these locations. At the time that this fieldwork took place, 
it would not have been possible to conduct this research in Turkey or Iraq. I was seeking to work in 
with displaced Syrians in countries that neighboured Syria and where large numbers of Syrian refugees 
had fled. Israel, Iraq and Turkey were quickly ruled out because of several difficulties and challenges 
related to research concerning Syrian refugees in these contexts, or overall issues of access and safety. 
This left Jordan and Lebanon as the primary States of interest for this study. 
Research Neighbourhoods  
Field research was carried out in two visits, first to Beirut from September to November 2016, then to 
Amman from February 2017 – April 2017. These were preceded by a field visit to both cities in early 
2016. Through this initial field visit, data checks with UNHCR and conversations with NGOs and other 
researchers, I chose to focus on two districts in each city which were typically perceived as refugee-
receiving.  
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Beirut 
I chose to focus on two districts of Beirut: Bourj Hammoud and Mazra’a. These neighbourhoods 
differed in significant characteristics, and as such I believed that focusing on Syrian women’s 
experiences in each, would serve to highlight important differences around security, identity and 
space across the city. Their predominant difference emerges around political party presence and 
representation, and religious demography. Thus, by focusing on two districts, a broader insight into 
the structural influence of sectarian politics on refugee women’s experiences emerges.  
The Bourj Hammoud district is within the greater metropolitan area of Beirut. However, it is immersed 
and connected to the heart of the city. The neighbourhood was founded by Orthodox Armenian 
refugees fleeing Turkish oppression at the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, its history is 
deeply connected to refugee issues and its population is predominantly Armenian Christian, although 
it is a mixed neighbourhood that includes migrant workers and refugees from throughout the Middle 
East (Habib et al., 2011). The Armenian Revolutionary Federation is the dominant political party. The 
district is made up of nine ‘quarters’ and includes a particularly deprived quarter called Na’ba; a highly 
heterogeneous, dense, refugee and migrant receiving neighbourhood. In contrast to the rest of the 
district, in Na’ba the Shi’a political party, Hezbollah, is the predominant political party (Fawaz, 2017; 
Nucho, 2016).  
My second district, Mazra’a, is a large district of Beirut that encompassed several poorer, 
heterogenous quarters (or neighbourhoods) including Mala’ab and Tareek El Jdeede. The Palestinian 
refugee camp, Shatila, is within its borders. The Future Movement, a Sunni political party run by Saad 
Hariri had the strongest influence in this area of the city, predominantly representing Sunni Lebanese. 
As such, it provides interesting contrasts to Bourj Hammoud, and the neighbourhood of Na’ba, in its 
political, ethnic and religious leanings.   
In both districts I established vital connections and links with NGOs and community contacts, which 
also shaped my decision to pursue research within their borders. Furthermore, I was not restricted by 
the British Foreign Office ‘red zones’ (i.e. forbidden to UK travellers) in these areas. However, as 
expressed above, I also felt the inherent differences, and the large influx of Syrian refugees in each 
district made Mazra’a and Bourj Hammoud relevant areas to focus on for this project.  
Amman 
In Amman, I also focused on two districts of the city. There was less information about where Syrian 
refugees had settled in Amman; however, during my field visit in early 2016, I was advised that many 
Syrians had settled in the South East area of the city, located near the El Balad. This is the older part 
of the city and is poorer, less developed and far more dense area of the city. It encompasses two 
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Palestinian refugee camps and is home to large migrant and refugee populations (Ababsa, 2013). Thus, 
I sought contacts and connections in this area.   
I worked in three neighbourhoods in the districts of Basman and Al Yarmouk. In Basman, I worked in 
Hashmi Shamali and in Mahata. These neighbourhoods border each other (some don’t make a 
distinction between them) and are high density, low income neighbourhoods which have a long 
history of being home to Palestinian refugee families and migrant workers.  I built connections with 
NGOs and community contacts in both neighbourhoods which facilitated the opportunity to conduct 
research there. Mahata is considered a more close-knit and conservative neighbourhood than Hashmi 
and suffers somewhat more from crime and drug problems.  
In the district of Al Yarmouk, I conducted interviews and focus groups from women who 
predominantly lived in the neighbourhood of Ashrafyeh. This neighbourhood shares similar features 
to Hashmi and Mahata in that it’s a densely populated, poor, refugee receiving neighbourhood and it 
also borders one of the oldest Palestinian refugee camps in the city, Al Wihdat (Al Husseini, 2013).  
My decision to focus on these neighbourhoods was shaped by both my intentional seeking out of 
organisations working in these areas, and in turn, by the agreement of these organisations to aid the 
research project and facilitate access.  
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Methods of data collection and analysis  
Several qualitative methods were used for this study, including focus groups, interviews, solicited 
diaries and cognitive mapping. This next section will briefly examine the format and use of these 
methods, specifically noting some of the challenges that arose. Alongside these more ‘formalised’ 
means of data gathering, I also made field notes and observations of various contexts, encounters and 
experiences whilst conducting fieldwork, which also inform this thesis.  
Participant Selection 
I asked NGOs and community contacts to ensure where possible that participants were living in one 
of the three neighbourhoods that I had outlined in each city. I asked for Syrian, female participants 
who were over the age of eighteen (broadly considered adult) that had fled Syria since the onset of 
the civil war. I encouraged NGO’s to include and invite participants from a range of ages, marital status, 
religious and class groups, including women who were infirm, elderly or disabled. This was in order to 
ensure I had a broad insight into women’s experiences in these particular neighbourhoods. I 
anticipated that participants’ experiences within these neighbourhoods may somewhat differ, 
depending on the interaction of some of these identities and factors. I presumed that most women 
living in these neighbourhoods would be from lower socio-economic backgrounds, however, I wanted 
to make certain where possible that I was getting a broad insight into a range of Syrian women’s 
109 
 
experiences in the urban, informal areas of Beirut and Amman. This detailing was important, as my 
samples included women from impoverished, rural backgrounds and those from comfortably middle-
class backgrounds who had struggled in their host cities and gradually migrated from where they had 
originally settled to more affordable and informal neighbourhoods.  
Focus Group Discussions and Interviews  
Participants were located through NGOs and local community contacts, both of whom were actively 
present and working within my research neighbourhoods. NGOs typically had a centre or drop-in 
service in these neighbourhoods. Refugees were connected to the centre through registration, 
accessing aid or classes. They were invited to participate in interviews and focus groups through a 
centre contact. Typically, these interviews and focus groups were then held on NGO premises and 
organised in advance. Community contacts were individuals such as activists or social, health or 
religious workers who were operating within the neighbourhoods. Some both lived and worked in the 
neighbourhoods and were well known and embedded into the local community. Interviews and focus 
groups organised by these contacts typically took place within participants’ homes. These tended to 
be arranged in advance, but occasionally these contacts would encounter potential participants whilst 
we were in the neighbourhood and would ask them if they would like to be interviewed.   
Interviews with refugee women lasted between twenty minutes to two hours and were always 
conducted in Arabic. They took a semi-structured format from an interview outline which was tweaked 
and developed as interesting and pertinent aspects of women’s experiences emerged (see Appendix 
for interview schedule outline). For example, over time it emerged that many women had perspectives 
and experiences within their homes and private lives that shaped their experiences of belonging and 
isolation, and the relationship between public and private spaces. Thus, as interviews progressed, if 
appropriate, I asked participants questions regarding these topics, that were not touched on in as 
much detail in earlier interviews. As a result, some later interviews have more depth and richness of 
detail then earlier interviews. I believe that this is a natural aspect of interviewing in such a format 
and in such contexts. By remaining flexible and semi-structured in the interview format, participants 
are included in knowledge production as the interviewer remains sensitive and inclusive to their 
perspectives and insights (Skeggs, 1997). I took an ethnographic approach to interviews and focus 
groups, noting silence, gestures and tone, which assisted in forming an understanding of attitudes, 
conditions and experiences beyond shared verbal communication (Boswall & Akash, 2015).  
Most interviews were digitally recorded, whilst I also took observational notes and noted important 
aspects of the interview. If there was any confusion following the interview, I would record a debrief 
with my translator so we could share both of our observations and feedback and clarify any confusions 
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from what had been shared. Focus groups followed a similar format. They were all conducted in Arabic 
and followed a semi-structured format of questioning. All focus groups were recorded and lasted 
between an hour to two and a half hours. Focus groups generally followed a schedule of questions 
(see Appendix) but I often found that I was required to be flexible to accommodate participants’ 
tangents or to explore particular themes that emerged during the focus groups. I wanted to be 
respectful of participants, the concerns that were dominating their lives, and to also allow them space 
to ask me questions. (Typically in focus groups participants would ask questions regarding European 
asylum processes. I assisted with advice where possible.) Some NGO’s were very flexible regarding 
permitted questions and did not ask to see my schedule. On other occasions, NGO’s would look over 
my proposed questions and ask that I did not pose particular questions or pursue specific topics with 
participants (for example, regarding grassroots political party activism). This could be somewhat 
frustrating, as participants could be prevented from sharing relevant information by social workers 
(they would be interrupted if they began discussing a topic considered ‘off-bounds’ by the NGO.) Thus, 
on occasion I was alerted to the fact that certain issues were occurring but that participants were not 
able to discuss these. Again, where this is occurred or is relevant, I have noted it in the empirical 
chapters. On occasion, social workers or NGO workers would be present. Where possible, follow up 
interviews were conducted with NGO workers in order to clarify further details about participants, or 
issues that had arisen in the discussions.  
Challenges relating to FGD’s and Interviews  
Ideally, interviews and focus groups would take place in safe, comfortable and neutral locations 
without distraction or interruption (Longhurst, 2010). This was often not the case. As interviews often 
occurred in women’s homes, they were prone to interruption by children, visitors and other family 
members, who in some cases joined the interview itself.6 Some of these interviews were multi-voice 
from the offset as other women (and occasionally men) were present when we arrived and wanted to 
take part in the interview. Male relatives and older female relatives tended to dominate interviews, 
answering questions that were directed to women. Their presence could make some topics difficult 
to negotiate, for example questions related to sexual harassment (Balcioglu, 2018, reported similar 
experiences). Hence, where possible, I sought to interview women by themselves. However, 
experiences and perspectives of male relatives were also pertinent to note and gave alternative views 
of gendered experiences.  
Focus groups also presented several challenges, often related to the size of the groups. NGOs would 
frequently permit additional women who had arrived at the community centres to join the focus 
 
6 Regarding gaining consent in these cases, where possible, we would momentarily pause the interview, explain the research and emphasise 
that the interview was being recorded and therefore if they spoke or joined the interview, their voice would be recorded.  
111 
 
groups or encouraged women to stay after they had attended a drop-in session. This was very 
challenging to manage as it felt impossible to ask women to leave, and when I asked for assistance 
from the NGOs themselves, they argued that it would lead to tension between women. Preferably, 
focus groups would be conducted with a maximum of 5 women, due to the need to interpret, but in 
these circumstances, there could be up to 12 participants. In these contexts, women could dominate 
others, and some participants could be frustrated by the limited opportunity to speak. This occurred 
on a few occasions in Lebanon, and as a result I had long conversations with NGO workers in Jordan 
about the importance of having smaller, controlled groups to allow women to be able to express 
themselves. Because of some of the challenges with participants talking over each other, when 
listening back to, and transcribing, recordings, where it was difficult to distinguish between different 
participants voice or arguments, I and the translator would consolidate what was being shared, akin 
to Hasso's (2017) approach. 
I chose to introduce two additional methodologies with refugee participants: solicited diary keeping 
(Meth, 2003, 2004) and participatory cognitive mapping (Downs & Stea, 2011). I felt that these 
methods had much to offer: participatory mapping in allowing a deeper spatial engagement with the 
neighbourhood and solicited diaries in encouraging reflective and considered accounts of life within 
the neighbourhood. Both these methods are outlined below along with my reflections of their 
benefits, challenges and limitations. There is very little literature on either of these methods being 
employed in refugee research, and therefore this next section adds to the lacuna of literature and 
research in engaging with these methods in refugee settings.   
Solicited Diaries  
As a qualitative method, diaries are yet to reach the profile and employment of interviews and focus 
groups. Yet, they have much to offer in the way of richness of data and eliciting insight into challenging 
topics from participants which they are less inclined to divulge during interviews7 (Mackenzie et al., 
2007; Meth, 2003; Thomson, 2007). Diaries are considered a personal record of what an identifiable 
individual considers relevant and important. As such, it has great use in understanding an individual’s 
lived experience, from their personal perspective (Alaszewski, 2011). I was enthusiastic about the 
potential of this method as I felt that diary keeping allowed a participant both to share what they feel 
is appropriate in a manageable way, over a scaled time. Thus, it should provide greater emotional 
protection for participants. I also felt this method would allow for a sense of ownership and 
empowerment over what was being shared (Meth, 2003, 2004). As a result, I anticipated a different 
set of data to emerge from the diaries. For example, I assumed participants might reveal issues or 
 
7 Detailed practical and ethical consideration of the use of solicited diaries and cognitive mapping techniques was presented in a draft 
paper at the University of York Conference: Ways of Telling: Methods, Narratives and Solidarities in Migration (May 2017)  
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concerns that had not been raised during interviews and focus groups (e.g. personal difficulties within 
the neighbourhood that they wished to keep private or ‘unpopular’ opinions and viewpoints that can 
be difficult to express face to face, or when peers are listening). Diaries also provide the space and 
time for participants to provide more detail, and to address issues that are pertinent to them.  
The main challenge in both Amman and Beirut was finding participants who were both literate and 
willing to keep a diary. It took some time to locate participants who were willing to engage in this 
aspect of the research. When asked if they wanted to be involved, a couple of participants said they 
couldn’t bear to keep a diary. They expressed that it would be ‘too hard’ reflecting on painful or 
difficult experiences and expressed a desire to live in the moment and to move on. Another participant 
said that she would find diary keeping irritating and frustrating and was too impatient for the task 
(similar to participants in Jacelon & Imperio, 2005). Another participant was very nervous that her 
diary would be used to discredit her in her community and place her in a position of vulnerability 
(Alaszewski, 2011). She was extremely concerned that her written thoughts and feelings might ‘fall 
into the wrong hands’ and as such declined to participate.  
Ten women were asked to keep diaries for 3-4 weeks, providing accounts of their experiences within 
their host cities, including experiences both in and outside their homes. Completed diaries were 
typically brief and short in length, and I did not receive diaries from three participants. Participants 
struggled to keep diaries updated, despite check in phone calls. Despite this, they revealed interesting 
data and insights into refugee experiences which were employed as data in the empirical chapters in 
this thesis.   
Participatory Cognitive Mapping  
Cognitive mapping can be understood as a sketched map of an individual’s internal cognitive thought 
processes concerning their wayfinding around the city. It allows for a participant to externally 
represent their internal thought processes, decisions and mobility concerning their spatial 
environment (Downs & Stea, 2011; Upham & García Pérez, 2015). Mapping activities allow for a better 
understanding of spatial dynamics of a neighbourhood and has potential for empowerment of 
participants as it situates participants as knowledge holders (Vertesi, 2008). It focuses on the micro-
politics and everyday realities of spatial negotiation (Campos-Delgado, 2018) and relates not only to 
how we store and recall information but also how an individual thinks and feels about a geographical 
environment (Jacobsen, 1998). It is an inclusive, visual methodology, where one doesn’t need to be 
literate to participate (Liebermann & Coulson, 2004). I had wanted to use cognitive mapping as a 
means of encouraging women to engage with their neighbourhoods spatially, and to ‘break the ice’ 
and get talking during interviews and focus groups. Thus, it would act as a ‘mediatory practice, a ruse 
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for speaking about difficult journeys and personal stories’ (Awan, 2017, p. 31). However, this method 
was poorly received by participants. I believe there are several reasons for this, including cultural 
differences, concerns over literacy and confusion and concern over the method and its purpose. A 
handful of participants did engage in mapping some of the areas that they used in their 
neighbourhoods; however, they were very reticent to do so, and their efforts were fairly disengaged 
and half hearted.  
I quickly discerned that this method was alienating participants rather than drawing them into 
conversation about issues of security and space. As a result, I quickly phased it out in order to avoid 
adding any discomfort to participants. Having spoken with other researchers that have engaged 
mapping techniques amongst Middle Eastern migrants and refugees, I am aware that there are 
cultural differences in the description and orientation of a spatial environment. Additionally, some 
studies have noted that women can struggle with their personal confidence when taking part in 
cognitive mapping tasks (O’Laughlin & Brubaker, 1998). I feel that this method does have potential, 
however it is probably best employed on a second or third meeting with a participant, when greater 
rapport and relationship is established, rather than being a means of building rapport, or as a means 
to break down barriers and encourage conversation about spatial mobility and security.     
Additional Interviews  
This research is supported by additional interviews with representatives from political parties, police, 
community activists, researchers and Mukhtars. These interviews provided vital insight into how 
different institutions and individuals perceived incoming refugee communities and responded to 
ongoing issues within host communities. Interviews with NGOs operating in Amman and Beirut were 
vital in framing understanding of both contexts and allowed for an insight into how the host 
communities were managing the significant influx of Syrian refugees. Whilst interviews with NGO and 
community contacts were relatively easy and straightforward, gaining access to interviews with 
community figures of authority, for example, police representatives or political party leaders, and 
attempting to organise these, was frequently challenging, time consuming and fruitless.  
In Lebanon, the sheer abundance of political parties and security services operating in Beirut, 
alongside their penetration into everyday life meant that there were more avenues through which to 
attempt to secure these interviews.  Wasta (influence) went a long way in securing access to political 
party interviews, or to individuals who held power. Recording these interviews was rarely permitted.  
These interviews were near impossible to replicate in Jordan. Here, police were only willing to talk at 
length and on record if I had permission from the Ministry of Interior, indicating the strength and 
extent of the State. Political party activism was weak and trying to gain access to interviews with civil 
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society institutions was fruitless. Meetings were often rearranged, or contacts went cold. It was 
difficult to discern whether this was related to my positionality, the questions I was asking, or simply 
the availability of these individuals. Mukhtars are more unusual in Jordan and are traditionally 
attached to families instead of communities (see Chapter Eight). The strength of the state, as well as 
the obvious presence of the Mukhabarat and my lack of attachment to a local academic institution in 
Jordan, made me that little more cautious and nervous about pursuing these interviews in this context 
 
Table 1: List of Interview Participants 
 
Coding and Analysis  
All interviews, focus groups and solicited diaries from refugee participants were typically translated 
during interviews and then transcribed and coded using a combination of NVivo software and manual 
coding. Interviews with police and political parties were rarely, if ever, recorded and therefore I only 
had detailed notes to code following interviews, which was done manually.  Initially, I had only 
intended to use coding software. However, during the write up process I found that it created a sense 
Access to Participants
Resulting Interviews & Focus 
Groups
Resulting Solicited 
Diaries 
Community Contact (Na'ba /Bourj 
Hammoud) 
Interviews with 16 participants 
and 3 focus groups with 15 
participants 
5 solicited diaries from 
interview participants  
Community Contact (Mazra'a/ 
Tareek El Jdeede) Interviews with 6 participants 
NGO 1 (Bourj Hammoud)
3 focus groups with 22 
participants 
NGO 2 (Mazra'a/Tareek El Jdeede) 
2 focus groups with 18 
participants
Access to Participants
Resulting Interviews & Focus 
Groups
Resulting Solicited 
Diaries 
Community Contact 
(Mahata/Hashmi Shamali) Interviews with 9 participants
1 solicited diary from 
interview participant 
NGO 1 (Hashmi Shamali) Interviews with 10 participants
NGO 2 (El Balad/Ashrahfey) 
Interviews with 6 participants 
and 4 focus groups with 20 
participants 
2 solicited siaries from 
2 interview participants 
LEBANON - REFUGEE PARTICIPANTS 
(Fieldwork conducted September - November 2016) 
JORDAN  - REFUGEE PARTICIPANTS 
(Fieldwork conducted: February - April 2017) 
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of detachment from the data and from participants. NVivo was undoubtedly a helpful means of 
ordering data, but I also benefitted from frequently revisiting and rereading full transcripts and 
fieldnotes on interviews and focus groups and adding further coding to these.   
Whilst coding was influenced by the theory that underpins this thesis and did not occur within an 
‘epistemological vacuum’, it was primarily inductive (Braun & Clarke, 2006, pp. 83–84). As codes were 
inductive and emerged from the research material, data from Amman and from Beirut was analysed 
separately and different descriptive codes materialised through analysis (Guest et al., 2014). Coding 
the data, alongside reference to fieldnotes which provided further contextual detail, assisted in 
analysing emerging themes and both implicit and explicit meaning from interviews which assisted in 
making sense of participant’s narratives.   
Codes were initially descriptive: for example, ‘Camp’; ‘Papers’; ‘Smuggling’; ‘Host community 
Interaction’; ‘Violent encounter’. Whist descriptive categories did somewhat differ across the two 
contexts and certain descriptive codes were unique to each context (for example, issues of camp 
settlement in Jordan, but not in Lebanon), I still found that they broadly related to the primary 
thematic issues that emerged across both contexts, although different issues concerning these themes 
became salient. This will have been in part influenced by my interview and focus group format and 
the questions posed to participants. These descriptive codes were developed into broad themes that 
emerged across both contexts predominantly concerning the topics of ‘Identity’, ‘Space’ and 
‘Security’, which form the primary crux of this thesis.  I found that data in both contexts was deeply 
related and interconnected across these themes and often sorted into a number of these categories. 
This reflects some of the challenges in sorting and presenting the empirical data into a linear format.     
Access 
As an outsider to both contexts, I relied heavily on the support of NGOs, community contacts, 
academic institutions and interpreters to gain access to participants. These gatekeepers were clearly 
not ‘static’ or neutral figures (Edwards, 2013; Mandel, 2003; Miller, 2004) and my reliance on them 
was strong and their influence pronounced. As such, they significantly affected my access, relationship 
and consent process with participants. I was mindful of how using particular individuals and 
institutions within communities might ‘legitimise’ roles that these gatekeepers hold (Jacobsen & 
Landau, 2003). In the sections below I discuss how I accounted for these issues whilst carrying out and 
analysing my field research.   
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Working with Interpreters  
In both contexts I worked with local female students, Farah & Akilah8, who acted as my interpreter-
cum-research assistants. Both were in their young twenties, students, residents of the country9, fluent 
in English and Arabic, compassionate and conscious of refugee and gender issues and flexible to 
cancelled appointments and hastily organised last-minute interviews. They had both worked with 
refugees and marginalised groups, were briefed about the project beforehand, given an outline of 
research questions in advance and agreed to a code of conduct. I was conscious that we wouldn’t 
always be working in particularly ‘safe’10 or ‘nice’ environments and that sometimes the content of 
the interviews would be troubling. As such, choosing appropriate trustworthy interpreters who were 
well briefed and resilient was essential to the success of the project (Liamputtong, 2010; Vargas, 
1998).  
My relationships with Akilah and Farah were the cornerstone of my research. These two young women 
were essential in aiding not only my deficiencies in Arabic, but also my negotiation of cultural and 
social contexts that were different to my own. As such they acted as interpreters as well as analysts 
and cultural brokers (Temple & Young, 2004). Therefore, reflecting on these relationships is critical as 
they dictated my understanding of the context, my participants and my access to key contacts in the 
field (Edwards, 1998).  
During interviews and focus groups, I would typically introduce myself and my background in Arabic. 
I would explain that I only spoke a small amount of Arabic and would then introduce my interpreter, 
who would greet participants and take over interpreting as I spoke in English. We would begin by 
outlining the research project followed by chatting through issues of consent and whether participants 
were happy recording the interviews. The translator would interpret as the interview progressed so 
that the interview was more conversational, and I could ask questions related to the content of what 
participants were sharing rather than reel off a set of questions (as suggested by Taylor et al., 2015). 
Occasionally, during focus groups, we would just let the women continue talking if they were in the 
flow of conversation (and then translate the recording of the focus group at a later point).  
 
8 These are pseudonyms. Both interpreters were comfortable with me using their names, but due to the political nature of the work they 
assisted me with, I expressed to them both that I preferred the use of pseudonyms.  
9 Jacobsen & Landau (2003) warn that utilising research assistants from the same country as refugee participants risks ‘transgressing 
political, social and economic fault-lines’ (p. 193). Additionally, I was confused about the legality of ‘employing’ a Syrian refugee as an 
interpreter and endangering their position within their community.  
10 This is not to say that the locations were inherently dangerous, but I was conscious that there would be risks. As these were 
neighbourhoods of lower socio-economic status, and we were clearly outsiders, we could be targeted for petty theft or harassment. I was 
also aware that the participant refugee women would be living in ‘informal’ housing and that this could be structurally unsafe (i.e. with 
exposed electricity wires, unfinished buildings, lack of paving/roads etc.).  
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I am conscious that working with interpreters meant that at best I was receiving an ‘an approximation 
of (participants’) statements (as) words and meanings are often not interchangeable between 
languages’ (Tribe, 2005, p. 570). Both interpreters had an excellent standard of written and spoken 
English. The occasional challenge arose over participants’ use of Syrian colloquialisms and slang, which 
would stump my interpreters. In these incidences, we would ask the participant to provide more detail 
or write down the closet approximation of what was being said. If I had concerns or required additional 
clarification, recordings were checked over with Farah or Akilah, or with a Syrian interpreter based in 
Sheffield.11  When interviews were not recorded, where possible the interpreter in question and 
myself would record a post interview discussion of the content of the interview in order for 
recollection, clarification and agreement on detail.     
I am aware that this was not verbatim translation and that on occasion my interpreters would be 
making assumptions about meanings to the best of their abilities (Temple & Young, 2004, p. 171). 
Whilst verbatim translation would have been necessary if I was conducted discourse analysis, as I 
intended to code and analyse data through thematic analysis, a close interpretation and 
understanding of refugee contributions was sufficient for the needs of this study, in order to draw 
understanding and themes from participants (Braun & Clarke, 2006).     
Non-Government Organisations and Charities 
I was strongly encouraged, by both other researchers and my own University, to work with NGOs 
where possible. This was for several reasons. Urban refugees are a difficult group to access as they 
frequently lack legality to live in the city and therefore try to live anonymously (Sanyal, 2014). 
Additionally, women refugees are even more challenging to access as they often experience restricted 
mobility. There were also protection and security concerns, as well as sample validity, that 
necessitated the importance of working with NGOs where possible. Through their role as gatekeepers, 
NGOs also provide an additional buffer of accountability and protection for refugees from 
unscrupulous (or simply, unthinking) researchers. From an organisational point of view, NGOs and 
community organisations often have the resources and capacity to organise focus groups and 
interviews with ease. More importantly, they know enough of the background of participants to 
ensure they have the mental and emotional robustness to negotiate an interview concerning the 
research topic. It was encouraging to meet with many organisations and see how strongly they 
promoted ideals of informed consent, ethical access and reciprocity.  
 
11 This translator was herself a Syrian refugee from Homs who had been in the UK since 2015, is a native Arabic speaker and speaks fluent 
English.  
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I worked with several NGOs in Jordan and Lebanon, who were essential to the research. NGOs are 
ultimately gatekeepers, and controlled access to participants throughout the fieldwork. This meant 
managing expectations regarding the research remit, time limitations, interview content and 
reciprocity. They provided insight into the humanitarian community and the complex and pressing 
issues facing refugee and host communities. Many staff members spent time with me explaining how 
their organisation functioned, their perspective on ongoing refugee issues within the community and 
introduced me to key figures. Some took time out of busy schedules to help set up focus groups or sit 
in on interviews. That is not to say that negotiating or establishing these relationships were easy or 
straightforward. These relationships took time, effort and energy, and I had to approach well over 
twenty NGOs, both in the UK and in the Middle East before finding organisations to work with.         
Community Contacts 
Working through community contacts was a rich and insightful experience. I was conscious that 
working with such contacts would in likelihood reinforce their position within the community, 
potentially increasing their power and position (Jacobsen and Landau 2003, p. 194). Thus, I spoke with 
or interviewed community contacts in advance to understand more about who they were, the work 
they conducted and their links in the community. I worked with 3 contacts, all women, who were 
working or living (or both) in the communities in which I was researching. I was referred to two of 
them through NGOs who had worked with these women in the past and felt that they would be best 
suited to assisting my research, whilst the other was a contact of a work colleague. All the women 
appeared to be respected and liked by the communities in which they worked. They understood the 
dynamics of the neighbourhoods, could explain the socio-political undercurrents, as well as reflect on 
the changes that the communities had experienced with incoming Syrian refugees.  
There were some difficulties working with the community contacts. They undoubtedly held their own 
biases and were gatekeepers who decided which potential participants I should meet. Some had 
preferential contacts in the communities in which they worked, and a desire for certain voices and 
viewpoints to be heard. They were also frequently present during interviews and could on occasion 
interrupt participants to add an additional layer of explanation, start questioning participants about 
scenarios that were being described during the interview, or provide advice on where to go for help 
and assistance. This both disrupted interviews and enriched them. On occasion, community contacts 
could ask probing questions which opened different avenues of insight. However, their interruptions 
could also disrupt the flow of conversation and confuse the participant about why the interview was 
taking place. I am also conscious that participants may have tempered their contributions, particularly 
any that might be critical of the community contact’s inner circle of contacts, whilst these contacts 
were present.    
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Ethics & Positionality  
Researchers have obligations to ensure that their research is not harmful to participants, and where 
possible, reciprocal in nature. The University ethics procedure provides training, guidance and peer 
review to ensure that researchers do not enter the field unprepared, or with proposed projects that 
would be to the detriment of communities. Before beginning the fieldwork stage of my research, I 
provided an ethics review to my department, which was examined and passed, alongside two risk 
assessments for fieldwork in Lebanon and Jordan. My proposed research was ethically sensitive, 
particularly because of the focus on refugees and the contexts in which I was working. Thus, I was 
required to engage critically with philosophical, ethical and practical concerns related to informed 
consent, extractive research and participant protection.  
Research conducted on and with refugee communities is ‘fraught with ethical issues’ (Mackenzie et 
al., 2007). This includes concerns over refugees’ safety, protection and anonymity, their vulnerability 
to re-traumatisation during prying interviews, and the extent to which they can consent in an informed 
manner when they are in a politically, socially and economically fragile position (Block et al., 2013; 
Kabranian-Melkonian, 2015; Pittaway et al., 2010). Researchers are called to maintain a balance 
between acknowledging refugees’ vulnerability, and their own personal responsibility to ‘do no harm’ 
alongside an awareness and promotion of a refugee’s individual agency and autonomy involving them 
where possible in research projects that directly affect their lives (Hugman et al., 2011). This, I believe 
is achieved through emphasising and examining the power imbalances at play between a researcher 
and NGOs, who hold significant power, opportunity and resources and a refugee, who still has agency, 
but whose social, political and economic capital is significantly depleted.  
Being reflexive of one’s positionality is a key aspect of feminist, qualitative research. By focusing on 
positionality, that is, the intersection of the researcher’s various identities and the interaction of these 
identities within the research environment, a researcher intends to address potential subjective 
biases. A researcher engages in this through reflexivity, which can be understood as a ‘process of 
internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of researcher’s positionality as well as active 
acknowledgement and explicit recognition that this position may affect the research process and 
outcome’ (Berger, 2015, p. 220). Considering and reflecting on positionality is essential for not only 
highlighting potential bias but also for addressing the ways in which identity affects the ethics of the 
field research. Reflexivity requires not only an acknowledgement of the landscape of power, and one’s 
identity and position within it, but also an acknowledgement of gaps in knowledge production 
between researcher and researched (Rose, 1997). Thus, reflexivity was an important aspect of this 
research project, and an activity that I engaged in frequently through fieldnotes and conversations 
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with supervisors and other researchers, both in and outside of the research field. This is discussed in 
more detail over the following sections.   
Consent  
From the offset I knew that it would be challenging to gain written consent from participants. Hugman 
et al., (2011) warn that as refugees are a vulnerable and at-risk population, that many will be 
suspicious of written consent forms that require their name and signature, particularly in contexts 
where they are trying to maintain anonymity. As such, introducing such forms can scare off 
participants before research has commenced. Additionally, there may be difficulties around literacy 
which prevent participants from being able to read and understand the consent form they are signing, 
even if translated into a language they are competent in speaking, which can result in alienation, fear 
and confusion. Recently conducting research with Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turner (2018) detailed 
his struggles in gaining both written and verbal consent from refugee participants who were willing to 
assist his research but deeply nervous of committing a signature to a form, or being recorded.  
Whilst I prepared written consent forms and outlines of the research project, these were not used in 
the field. The concerns raised by Hugman, et al. (2011), and realities outlined by Turner (2018) were 
relevant during my fieldwork. Very few of my participants were literate, and I was advised against 
using such forms by Syrian refugees themselves, and by NGO workers, who felt they would intimidate 
potential participants. Instead, I spoke at length at the beginning of the interview with participants 
about who I was, the research project, and how I would use what they shared with me in my thesis, 
future publications and with NGOs working in their neighbourhoods. My contact details were provided 
(including my phone number in Arabic script) so that participants could contact me. I would ask if I 
could record the interview. If participants agreed, I attempted where possible to record their verbal 
consent, or noted it in my fieldnotes. I took great efforts to emphasise that I would not be using 
anything identifying about the women, and I took no pictures of any of them, or their relatives. 
Women were given the opportunity to ask questions or to withdraw from the interview or focus group 
at any point.    
Positionality and Ethical Concerns in the Field12  
This research presents the perspectives of women from the peripheral world and is thus inherently 
political and requires critical reflection on representation and bias. In order to reflect on relations of 
power in the field, I employed a feminist, reflexive approach in order to consider the knowledge that 
 
12 Reflexive positionality and ethical issues and concerns related to field research have been presented on a number of occasions, including 
the Wits-Sheffield Newton Fellowship Workshop 2016 & 2017 and the University of Sheffield UREC Funded Workshop: Understanding the 
ethics of interdisciplinary research with refugee communities (June, 2018).  
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was produced between myself and participants (Mullings, 1999). Feminist researchers have stressed 
the importance of reflecting on the privilege of the researcher, as I will determine the questions that 
are asked, whose voices to include and how to interpret what is being shared (Parr, 2015; Rose, 1997; 
Skeggs, 1997). I am conscious that my own positionality within the research process will have shaped 
the knowledge production that took place. Participants’ responses were, to a certain extent, shaped 
by their perspective of my positionality within wider, global, structures of class, race and gender, and 
embedded within histories of colonialism. Rose’s (1997) encouragement to examine positionality not 
only in regard to mine and my participants identities, but also regarding gaps and limitations in 
knowledge is pertinent in my context, particularly as I worked alongside interpreters and I was clearly 
an outsider. These reflections are considered in more detail below.  
Most of my participants were Syrian refugee women, from a mixture of age groups, religious creeds, 
classes and standards of education. In contrast, I am a ‘foreign’, white, Christian, well-educated 
woman who clearly has means and opportunity, and a citizenship which allows me to move around 
freely. Although I was born and raised in South Africa, I have spent the past fourteen years in the 
United Kingdom and most people who I meet and interact with consider me to be English. 
I was a notable outsider in my fieldwork contexts. From my general appearance, it was plain that I was 
not local, and whilst I dressed conservatively when working (covered shoulders and legs, baggy 
clothing). I did not cover my head unless asked to (e.g. when entering a mosque), which also led to 
assumptions about my cultural and religious leanings. Many of my participants assumed I was a 
Christian, both because I was Western and because of my more relaxed appearance. This made some 
of the participants very self-conscious of their criticism of Christian churches, who frequently provided 
food parcels in return for church attendance, as they were concerned about ‘insulting me’. If issues of 
religion or Christianity were explicitly discussed, I would identify myself as a Christian but emphasise 
that I was offended on their behalf as I didn’t believe this was an appropriate way to care for refugees 
(and endangers many of them). Despite my best efforts, I only speak basic Arabic, so could greet 
people in the community and have a general chat. Language also clearly played a role in establishing 
my outsider status. However, my efforts went a long way in building rapport. Being able to greet 
others, introduce myself, or do part of the introduction of the interview meant that participants could 
see my efforts with their culture and language. My basic understanding of Arabic, and on occasion, 
some of the participants’ ability to communicate in English (this was rare) aided my capacity to follow 
the thread and content of interviews.  
I am conscious that my position, as a feminist, will have led me to interpret participants’ responses in 
specific ways and that this would have also shaped the questions that I posed in interviews and focus 
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groups (Skeggs, 1997). However, I made efforts wherever possible to continue to ask questions, even 
if they appeared naïve or repetitive, in order to ensure I was gaining an accurate perspective from 
participants. I also made efforts not to ask biased questions, even if I did not necessarily agree with 
participants positions on particular matters, but rather to let participants reveal their reasons or 
decisions for their actions. For example, I did not presume that all women wore the hijab or suppose 
their reasons for doing so if they did. I did not presume that my participants were ‘oppressed’ or 
‘forced’ into wearing the hijab but would rather be wearing it for a multitude of social, cultural, 
religious or protective reasons, all of which I felt were relevant to understanding gendered structures, 
agency and security in such contexts. Almost all participants were asked about this individually, and 
many expressed surprise about this topic. However, their varied responses and reasons provided 
insight into power, gender, dress and protection.  
My power in the research field was in itself intersectional, shaped particularly by my gender in 
accessing women participants. My gender exclusively enabled me to conduct research with women, 
in the privacy of their own homes, something that men (especially foreign ‘outsider’ men) would not 
be permitted to do. I also felt that some of the male interviewees (particularly those in positions of 
power) considered my gender less of a threat and were inclined to assist me.  
On occasion however, when ‘researching up’ with stakeholders with more power or position, I found 
that both access and interview content could be challenging to negotiate. For example, one male 
interviewee in a respected and powerful position in the community, frequently dismissed my 
questions, ended the interview prematurely and kept diverting conversation to ask when my 
translator and I would go out dancing with him and his friends. On other occasions, it was difficult to 
access particular stakeholders or individuals that held power and position within the community. 
Additionally, during some interviews with key stakeholders (such as political parties) it was clear that 
the wider landscape of power, and the individual’s position within it, was determining their ‘careful’ 
responses to my questions.  
Thus, on occasion, the intersection of my nationality, gender and race ensured some doors were 
opened to me. On others, these intersections resulted in participants that were reticent or nervous to 
elaborate on their perspectives or to facilitate wider access to other potential participants (see 
Mullings, 1999). In field notes, I commented on occasions where interviews were uncomfortable and 
challenging, with silences, confusion and evasion. In the empirical chapters that follow, I have 
attempted to make these gaps and challenges clear when I felt that I was receiving a partial or 
distorted perspective of the context specifically due to my positionality.  
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Not only was I an outsider to this context, but I also held power. Although it was often challenging to 
build relationships with NGOs, and I frequently felt powerless and obstructed, from the perspective 
of my participants, I seemed very well connected and informed. I moved around neighbourhoods 
unhindered and clearly had signs of wealth (I frequently had a laptop and recorder on me). My 
relationships with NGOs, and my racial identity, meant that my status could often be misinterpreted. 
Particularly in Lebanon I found that many participants thought I either worked for a humanitarian 
agency or for UNHCR. I assumed this was in part because of my racial identity and language but also 
because of how I was introduced. This meant that I was regularly asked for help, specifically with 
UNHCR. As such, it was clear that this misinterpretation of my status was to a certain extent paving 
the way for interviews, as participants are unlikely to turn down the opportunity to meet with an 
‘official’ as their circumstances were so desperate. I would correct this immediately, but it would leave 
me feeling very guilty and compromised. It was often difficult to extract myself from these associations 
with NGO’s and UNHCR, despite my efforts to situate myself as a researcher and a student. Like Faria 
& Mollett (2016) I found these associations stressful and was concerned that I was inadvertently 
exploiting participants through the confusion of my positionality. Taking their suggestion, I found it 
best to lean into, and reflect upon, these anxieties, acknowledging that despite efforts to the contrary, 
on occasion confusions over identity and position are difficult to remedy.   
For example, the confusion regarding my identity meant that some of the content of interviews and 
focus groups could be skewed. During one focus group a participant frequently interrupted others 
who were talking about issues they had experienced, insisting that as a group they needed to provide 
a consistent narrative about high rents so that ‘when I returned to UNHCR it would be my key finding’. 
We had to stop the focus group, reiterate the research remit and explain my role again, emphasising 
that I wasn’t trying to trick anyone about who I was. It was clear that these misunderstandings about 
identity occurred far more in focus groups then in interviews. I believe this was often because my 
focus groups were organised through NGO offices, where UNHCR officials would visit. My connection 
with NGOs would have also encouraged involvement in the project as these organisations loom large 
in the life of refugees, and participants may have assumed that refusal to be involved may have had 
repercussions on their access to aid (Hugman et al., 2011; Zwi et al., 2006). Because of my positionality, 
women may have felt reticent to trust me, downplayed or over-emphasised experiences, particularly 
owing to my positionality in the wider geopolitical humanitarian framework. Longer time in the field, 
in order to establish further relationship with refugee communities and to follow up on conversations 
and clarify points would have been preferable, but owing to personal circumstances, not possible.   
I primarily interacted with women refugees’ independently of their families, although husbands, 
children and other relatives were present from time to time. Despite this, my contact details provided 
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after each focus group and interview led to numerous pictures, phone calls and messages from the 
women’s husbands, most of whom I had never met or interacted with. These ranged from desperate 
calls and messages for help for their families, to inappropriate late-night phone calls and pictures of 
hearts, declarations of love and the men topless and sprawling on beds or straddling motorbikes. Here, 
my gender morphed me from ‘professional researcher’ into potential sex object, whilst my ethnicity 
further confused my identity as ‘humanitarian’ and potential lifeline for assistance. This experience is 
not uncommon for foreign researchers in the Middle East (or other contexts and has repercussions on 
the issue of consent – see Mackenzie et al., 2007). Indeed, Clark's (2006) survey on American 
researchers in the region noted requests for money, medical assistance and favours, whilst Schwedler 
(2006, p. 427) notes the dynamics of negotiating environments where female Western researchers 
are perceived as ‘promiscuous’. Operating within an existing culture of wasta it is unsurprising that 
many respondents wanted to make the most of the connection I had with them. However, I found this 
deeply uncomfortable. It was distressing turning down people’s request for assistance, especially 
when I knew how vulnerable some of the families were and it was deeply uncomfortable to be 
occasionally propositioned by the husbands of women I had spent all day with. There wasn’t always 
an obvious way to deal with these interactions, however I attempted to be clear, consistent and polite 
as much as possible when communicating with participants and their relations to ensure there was no 
misunderstanding or preference given.  
My interpreters held various identities and positionalities, both in relation to myself, and the research 
participants. Both interpreters had to negotiate different social dynamics regarding their positions and 
identities to both the refugee and host community, and their positionalities in turn affected how we 
were treated or provided access, in particular environments. I was conscious that just as I would leave 
behind research participants, I would also be leaving behind my interpreters, both of whom had 
relationships and responsibilities in their home countries. As such, I felt a strong responsibility 
regarding their position and reputation in their communities and did my upmost to emphasise and 
educate on personal protection and boundaries in the research field.  
Both women were moved by the plight of refugee families and their living conditions, and were stirred 
to donate money, provide favours, drop off clothes and food and connect and signpost refugees to 
humanitarian services. Whilst I had extensively engaged in the University ethics procedure, these 
women did not recognise the remit of a foreign, Western institution dictating what ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour was for them within their own cities. My greatest discomfort with this assistance was that 
it was uneven. My interpreters had personal preferences in assisting specific women and families. I 
was deeply conscious that these women were in turn embedded in wider community networks and 
that these efforts would not go unnoticed. Furthermore, as my interpreters lived and worked in these 
125 
 
cities, I was on occasion concerned that they were opening themselves up to further requests for 
assistance and money, which I myself was experiencing. Whilst I spent a lot of time discussing and 
outlining these issues, both were confident and assured that their approach was far more ethical then 
mine. Raising some of these issues at conferences with other researchers, I was assured that this 
tension between local interpreters and foreign researcher approaches of how to care for participants 
was not uncommon.      
Participants were not paid for their involvement in focus groups and interviews. However, those that 
kept diaries were paid, as they were spending a length of time and effort in the research project. Those 
that helped the research project through introductions to other participants or ‘tours’ of the 
neighbourhood were also paid or tipped. This was done on the guidance of senior NGO staff who 
advised that as an outsider, I would be assisted on the grounds of hospitality, but that I should insist 
on offering payment as it was appropriate to pay people for their time and effort.  Some of the NGOs 
also provided a payment in kind to participants, for example a packed lunch, or a sanitary pack, in 
exchange for taking part in focus groups or interviews. I also gave donations to Community Contacts 
to pay them for their time and assistance. The NGOs I worked with did not ask for payment, but they 
did request that I sent a summary of my findings to them on completion of my research so they could 
use this to inform their work further.  
Whilst I very much agree that research should not be extractive or exploitative, I also found it tricky 
to consider how I could realistically ‘give back’ to the communities in which I was working. It was clear 
they everyone I interviewed needed income, advocates and protection – all of which I was poorly 
placed to provide. Refugee populations are also in constant flux, often moving locations depending on 
their altering circumstances, thus following up with participants is not always realistic. Reflecting on 
his work with refugees in conflict zones, Goodhand (2000, p. 14) notes that: ‘It is vital to keep a sense 
of proportion about the potential for researchers to have positive impacts beyond the immediate 
objectives of the research aims itself.’ Zwi et al. (2006) echo this sentiment, reflecting on the unstable 
conditions in which many migrant and refugee groups find themselves in, and the difficulties of 
disseminating research amongst populations that are constantly in flux.  
Through the consent process, I emphasised that the research would be disseminated to raise 
awareness of the women’s plight and most participants expressed a willingness to be involved for the 
predominant reason that my work would be seen by others and their situation would be highlighted 
further afield. Many of the women thanked me for engaging them in the research and said that they 
had found the experience cathartic or expressed thanks for having someone to talk to frankly about 
their lives. During interviews, women would frequently show me their ID papers to emphasise their 
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official registration as a legitimate refugee, or alternatively asked if I believed their account of their 
situation. When I emphasised that I did, they would explain that many people had dismissed them as 
liars when they shared their stories. An NGO worker emphasised that they heard similar stories 
repeatedly from refugees, resulting in their workers quickly experiencing fatigue and indifference to 
the accounts they were told, leading to dismissive or unsympathetic behaviour. As such, it was clear 
that having an opportunity to share experiences, openly and in their own time in an empathetic 
context, was important for the women that participated (other researchers also find this, see: Hunt, 
2008). 
Faria & Mollett (2016) have reflected on the structural role of ‘whiteness’ and racialised power in the 
field, and how it can elicit different responses from different stakeholders, including awe, disdain, 
trust and suspicion. I identify with some of these responses, as I felt that my racial identity, a clear 
marker of my ‘outsider status’, played into some of the occasions where the research process and my 
positionality within it made me uncomfortable and I felt like an outsider or extractor. 
For example, staff members at a café where we had held a day of focus groups expressed their own 
research fatigue at the stream of European researchers and NGO representatives having meetings in 
the café with various members of the community when ‘nothing changed’. I felt significantly 
discouraged, naïve and fraudulent considering this exchange. This was not my only critique. When 
meeting a well-respected Lebanese academic, I situated within wider colonial frameworks and was 
accused of swanning in to steal research data from the Orient to publish ‘in English’ back in the West 
in order to get promoted, whilst Middle Eastern academics were left out in the cold. These were not 
easy conversations to navigate but served as deep and vital reminders of the power imbalances at 
play, of privilege, positionality and of research responsibility.    
The discussion points in interviews and focus groups are also an area of concern. Women were asked 
questions about incidences of harassment or difficulty in their host communities, as well as 
experiences of insecurity and fear. These are tempered with questions that include positive queries 
about agency and empowerment as well as general queries about day to day activities. Discussions 
around fear heighten anxiety (Moser, 2004), and on occasion I was conscious (particularly in focus 
groups) that some participants shared accounts that were cathartic for them, but shocked or 
frightened others. At these times I was deeply grateful for the presence of support workers and 
counsellors, who had viewed my questions beforehand and provided support, and indeed for the 
largely compassionate nature of other participants towards each other.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the first section of this thesis, which has built a theoretical and methodological 
framework which underpins the thesis and guides the empirical chapters and analysis. The three 
empirical chapters that follow all contribute to answering different, yet related, aspects of the 
predominant research question. Issues of security, space and identity are complex, overlapping and 
linked and feature across all three empirical chapters. Discussing and analysing such concerns in a 
linear, detached structure is challenging. I have chosen to structure the empirical chapters in the 
following way in order to make it accessible and to highlight specific themes that emerged through 
data coding. The first empirical chapter relates to the first research sub-question above and details 
refugees’ arrivals into Lebanon and Jordan, decisions to settle in Amman and Beirut and issues of 
(in)security related to housing and employment influenced by refugee policies and identity. This 
chapter particularly highlights the relationship between the macro structure of refugee policies and 
the effect this has on human security issues of shelter and livelihood. The second empirical chapter 
addresses the second sub-question and explores refugee women’s negotiations of public and private 
spaces within Beirut and Amman, including a deeper analysis of tactical agency within insecure 
environments. This chapter especially demonstrates the role of socio-cultural gendered norms and 
how these interact with refugee identities to shape insecurities of space. The third empirical chapter 
addresses the third research sub-question and compares women’s encounters and access to formal 
and informal security provision in Beirut and Amman, and the various ways in which they resolve 
conflict and difficulties within their host cities. This chapter foregrounds how structures of security 
provision shape gendered experiences of space and security. The fourth sub-question related to 
gendered tactics and agency is covered across all three chapters. Thus, each chapter explores 
numerous aspects of security, space and identity, but specific themes are more prominent in particular 
chapters.  
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Chapter Six: Gendered (in)securities of shelter and livelihoods  
 
This chapter utilises a feminist geopolitical and geolegal lens to compare how legal, policy and spatial 
structures of borders, refugee policies and patriarchy shape the intimate scale of everyday shelter and 
livelihoods of refugee women living in host cities. It tracks and compares refugees’ decisions on where 
to seek asylum, the decision to settle in Amman or Beirut, and the ways in which refugee policies 
shape the material, everyday conditions of livelihoods, shelter and security in host cities. These issues 
have direct implications for the intimate and embodied lives of women, and as such, it examines how 
issues of (in)security are lived in the everyday. In this chapter, ‘security’ is very much based upon the 
human security needs of the individual: security of shelter, financial and economic security and a wider 
pervading concern of personal protection – that is, as security from threat. It is predominantly focused 
on the first research question posed in the Methodology Chapter: In what ways do these structures 
affect Syrian refugee women’s security of shelter and livelihoods within their host cities and how do 
women respond to these?  
And thus, through an examination of everyday ‘micro’ concerns and preoccupations of refugees, it 
contributes to the primary research question: How do the social, political and legal contexts of host 
countries interact with the identities of Syrian refugee women to produce multiple scales and forms of 
(in)security?  
Using feminist geopolitics and feminist geolegality to demonstrate the various scales at which security 
operates and is experienced, as well as the influence of legal structures of policy in shaping lived 
experiences of security, this chapter also considers the role of the strong and weak state in how 
policies and security structures differ and are enacted at the state level but experienced in the 
everyday. It also engages with theories of tactical agency in order to consider the ways in which 
women respond to the structures that shape their lives in their host communities. Thus, this chapter 
contributes to understanding gendered urban refugee livelihoods, host relationships and experiences 
of shelter in host communities and draws distinct linkages between the shaping influences of macro 
structures, such as refugee policies, in the daily, lived (in)securities of life in the city at the intimate 
scale. 
This chapter begins with an examination of refugee decision-making on where to self-settle once 
leaving Syria and traces decisions and differences in self-settlement in Amman and Beirut. Detailing 
the interconnection between participants legal status, their livelihoods and dwellings, it goes onto 
consider how material and financial insecurities intersect to create homes as a site of insecurity. This 
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section also contributes to understandings of public/private space as overlapping and relational, 
issues which are explored in more depth in the next chapter.  
The section that follows considers refugees’ attempts to establish livelihoods, predominantly through 
finding informal work opportunities. It demonstrates how policy landscapes related to refugee status 
and rights to work, create opportunities for refugees to be exploited by opportunistic employers. This 
landscape also allows for gendered exploitation and harassment of women.   
The wider legal framework in place in Jordan and Lebanon is thus demonstrated to shape the spaces, 
places, work opportunities and exploitation of Syrian refugees, which plays out in gendered ways. 
Through a comparative analysis, the final section of the chapter demonstrates some of the gendered 
ways that geopolitical structures affect the intimate lives of refugees, through family breakdown, 
polygamy, and separation (in order to seek asylum in Europe) in both contexts. Thus, it demonstrates 
the gendered repercussions of refugee law on everyday life, and everyday insecurity for urban 
refugees.  
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Refugee tactics and decisions on where to seek asylum   
Most interviews and focus groups conducted during this fieldwork opened with questions related to 
participant’s flight from Syria, their initial arrival and settlement in Jordan and Lebanon, their legal 
status and their adjustment into their host communities. This assisted in providing an outline of the 
factors that had shaped decisions to seek refuge in either Lebanon or Jordan and then to self-settle in 
Amman and Beirut and helped establish relationship with participants (Boswall & Akash, 2015). This 
first section examines the factors that influenced refugees’ decisions to settle in a particular state, city 
or neighbourhood, and some of the considerations that shaped these decisions. It examines the ways 
in which refugee policies in each of these countries, which shape refugees’ rights to enter, seek refuge 
and remain in each state, are experienced by refugees, notably regarding kafala sponsorship, and the 
ways this is enacted spatially. This section considers the ways in which refugee policies shape the 
borders, places and spaces that refugees cross, access and inhabit and the ways in which this is 
gendered.    
Participants in Beirut had chosen Lebanon over other locations to seek asylum predominantly because 
of their economic prospects and pre-existing linkages to the country. Many participants had a male 
family member who had worked in Lebanon previously, and as a result, returned to the country in 
order to make the most of their economic and social networks in order to provide livelihoods for their 
families:  
‘My husband had been here [Beirut] before. He's a [migrant] worker so he’s not settled in one 
area of Lebanon, he would travel depending on the jobs. We got married and I directly came 
here with him. We wouldn't go to Jordan or some other places because my husband has work 
over here’ (Shahar, Na’ba). 
Work opportunities and previous knowledge of Lebanon appeared to have stronger consideration 
then geographical proximity to participants’ locations within Syria. Participants came from a wide 
range of places within Syria, including Kurdish regions in the North East of the country, rural 
countryside and urban centres such as Damascus, Aleppo and Homs (see Appendix). However, even 
though countries such as Turkey were closer, economic potential held greater weight. Zulima 
explained that her husband’s economic links to Beirut had held the greatest influence when deciding 
where to go, even if that meant being apart from extended family:  
‘My husband used to work here [Na'ba] before the war. He would work here for a few months, 
then spend 2 months at home in Syria. Our family is from Aleppo. We don’t have any relatives 
here. My husband's family went to Turkey, but because of my husband’s work and his 
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connections here and the fact that he doesn't know the Turkish language…he decided it would 
be better to bring the family here’ (Zulima, Na’ba).  
As Lebanon’s refugee policy towards Syrian refugees is based upon its immigration laws (see Chapter 
Four), there are no official refugee ‘camps’ for Syrians to be housed. Equally, there are no explicit 
restrictions as to where a refugee may self-settle. Around half of participants had arrived at legitimate 
border crossings, with their Syrian identification papers, received the free six-month entry coupon to 
reside in Lebanon legally and entered the country. Extending this stay ‘legally’, that is, paying for a 
renewal, was very unusual amongst participants as it was unaffordable for marginalised families (see 
below). Other participants, usually those from poorer or more rural backgrounds who did not possess 
legal documentation attesting to their identity, had been smuggled into the country through the 
mountains that border Syria and Lebanon. Typically, these participants had lived awhile in the Syrian 
refugee settlements in the Beka’a Valley, a region of the country that has very strong links with Syria 
(van Vliet & Hourani, 2014). These families would then make their way onward to Beirut when life in 
the Beka’a had become too difficult because of poor livelihood opportunities and shelter conditions. 
Research on Syrian refugees living in Lebanon has highlighted the regional differences in income, 
livelihoods and opportunities for Syrian refugees, emphasising the harsh environmental conditions, 
poor accommodation in tented shelters and fluctuating work opportunities and pay in the Beka’a 
(ibid). Ulima explained that she and her husband had spent two and a half years living in the Beka’a 
Valley after they arrived in Lebanon from the countryside near Aleppo. Their poor financial position, 
compromised shelter and difficulties living in the area, encouraged them to seek better opportunities 
in the city for their family. However, this had not benefitted them:  
‘When we lived in Beka’a we lived in a wooden shed thing, it was very cold…there are no job 
opportunities [there]….we were not comfortable there, but there is not much work here so it 
is not much different’ (Ulima, Na’ba).   
Ulima’s family did not have strong links to Lebanon and struggled to establish themselves both in the 
rural landscape of the Beka’a Valley and in Beirut. They expressed difficulty in understanding the 
dynamics of the neighbourhood and felt highly insecure regarding their position, expressing anxiety 
and fear about political parties, police and the ‘strangers’ they were living amongst. Her family’s lack 
of knowledge of Beirut contrasted with many others whose previous migrant links to Lebanon were a 
predominant reason for their presence in the city.  
In strong contrast, none of the refugees interviewed in Amman had pre-existing labour links in the 
region. There are fewer cross-border migrant links between Syria and Jordan (Turner, 2015), and it is 
likely that those Syrians that did have labour links were probably based in the North of Jordan near 
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Ramtha, where prior to the civil war, workers from Dara’a (in Southern Syrian) travelled across the 
border to work and then return to Syria. Therefore, decisions shaping refugee settlement in Jordan 
covered a variety of factors, including kinship links, proximity and refugee policy and care.  
Turkey was frequently dismissed by participants as a viable option either because of its distant 
borders, or, more importantly, the lack of shared language. Some participants considered Turkey to 
be ‘more difficult to get into’. One participant simply put it down to geography, her family went where 
it was practical, where they could get through. Others explained that they had made efforts to avoid 
Daesh controlled areas and that had resulted in Jordan being their best option for asylum.  
For refugees in Jordan, the intersection of Lebanon’s refugee policies, sectarian politics and conflicts, 
influenced families’ decisions to avoid the country. Many participants had family or friends that lived 
in Lebanon but had heard that conditions were extremely poor. Additionally, many stated that access 
or support from UNHCR was non-existent: 
‘Some of our relatives are in Lebanon…. we heard that the situation [there] was really bad, so 
we decided to come here’ (Rania, Hashmi-Shamali). 
When discussing security and protection, women’s opinions would become more political, referencing 
creed, politics and power as a decision to avoid Lebanon. Many broadly referred to Jordan as ethnically 
and religiously homogenous:  
‘It is [different here] because Lebanon is with the [Syrian] regime, so they treat refugees as a 
threat…It’s terrifying…I didn't even think about going to Lebanon [laughs]…all Syrians that I 
know that are in Lebanon are not comfortable or happy at all. So, I am very happy to be here. 
It’s very comfortable here in Jordan because you only have [Sunni] Muslims and Christians, you 
don't have anything in-between...but in Syria there were lots of ethnic religions, political 
groups, you had the Shi'a, the Alawites…lots of groups. The same thing is in Lebanon. This is 
what makes Syria such a bad place as well as Lebanon, so that is why I am so comfortable and 
happy here, because I doesn't have to worry about [regarding religion and politics]. You are 
either a Muslim or a Christian’ (Nailah, Hashmi Shamali).   
Nailah went onto to discuss the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and what she perceived as a legacy of 
distrust towards Syrians:  
‘What adds to the difficulties in Lebanon is that Lebanese people in general don't like Syrian 
people, because back in the day when [Hafez al-] Assad was in power, he had the Syrian army 
in Lebanon. They were mistreated by the Syrian army, so Lebanese people in general do not 
like Syrian people, even though Syrian people love Lebanese people’ (Nailah, Hashmi Shamali)  
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These two comments show different perspectives of the complex socio-political relationship between 
Lebanon and Syria, and the ways in which participants continually place countries within wider 
geopolitical histories, thus making decisions based on political relationships and histories.  
There were also multiple concerns about the spill-over of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon and fears 
regarding the involvement of Lebanese groups in the conflict. Participants highlighted links between 
the large Shi’a Muslim population in Lebanon, Hezbollah, its wider links to Bashar al-Assad and the 
danger this then posed to Syrians in exile:  
‘There are a lot of Shi’a in Lebanon…. and Hezbollah find the Syrians in Lebanon and give them 
back to Syria. [We know this] because we had Hezbollah [militia] in Homs. In Jordan they are 
more sympathetic [to refugees] than they are in Lebanon’ (Ishtar & Sabeen, Ashrafyeh).   
Sunni participants emphasised that Hezbollah was ‘very bad’ and Lebanon wasn’t safe to live in, 
expressing sympathy for those that were trapped there. The involvement of these groups in the 
conflict dictated a strong desire for most Syrians living in Jordan to avoid Lebanon, and for that matter, 
to avoid politics (see Chapter Eight). These comments are also early indicators of levels of discomfort 
and fear regarding Shi’a and Alawite communities from Sunni participants. Throughout the interviews, 
there would be occasional comments about Shi’a and Alawite, usually in negative and accusatory 
terms. 
These opinions, held by participants in Jordan, were in marked contrast to those in Lebanon. Some 
participants in Lebanon referenced the help and assistance offered to them by Hezbollah operatives, 
particularly when negotiating security checkpoints and arrests, despite a range of Kurdish and Sunni 
backgrounds (this is discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight). A small number of participants had 
initially crossed the border into Lebanon and had briefly stayed with relatives in order to then make 
their way to Jordan (usually by flying). These women highlighted poor living conditions within Lebanon 
and expressed a desire to leave as soon as possible. It was clear that many participants feared ill 
treatment in Lebanon as a refugee and felt that they had greater protection and better treatment in 
Jordan. Even though neither country is a signatory of the UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention, this 
appeared to matter little to the women. It was word of mouth reputation that influenced women’s 
impressions of whether a country was fair. The idea that Jordan was a more compassionate and 
supportive location for refugees, appeared to develop predominantly from shared accounts and from 
wider impressions of homogeneity.  
Here, complex factors influenced decisions to avoid Lebanon and seek asylum in Jordan. The poorly 
executed refugee policy, lack of humanitarian support and political tensions of Lebanon intersected 
with the identities of refugees to influence their decision to seek refuge in Jordan. Participants 
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associated their Syrian ethnicity and refugee status as a source of danger for them in Lebanon and 
feared ill treatment because of Syria’s past and ongoing history with Lebanon. Concerns over potential 
ill-treatment and apprehensions related to sectarian politics and religious plurality resulted in some 
refugees avoiding Lebanon in favour of the perceived socio-political stability of Jordan. This was 
despite pre-existing family networks and connections in Lebanon. 
Negotiating arrival and refugee status  
This section examines the relationships and intersections of refugee policies across each context, using 
feminist geolegality and feminist geopolitics it considers how policies (il)legalise refugees’ presence in 
each state and how they shape the places that refugees settle in. This is a theme that will be returned 
to across this and subsequent chapters. At this juncture, these policies are examined by considering 
women’s arrival and settlement in host cities.  
Lebanon’s refugee policies and kafala  
Roughly half of participants in Lebanon had initially entered the country legally, gaining a (free) entry 
coupon for six months. However, as their time in Lebanon had continued, most participants found it 
financially impossible to renew these permits at a cost of US$200 per person. This was one of the key 
differences between participants in Jordan and Lebanon. Although participants in Jordan did have to 
negotiate camp bail out processes, even if this was done outside of the formal channels, refugees 
were still offered the opportunity to legalise their status. However, refugees in Lebanon were forced 
to continually pay to renew their documentation, which is also linked to their ability to access the 
labour market.  
Almost all participants did not have the correct legal permit to remain in Lebanon. Those that had 
gained papers at the border legally upon arriving into Lebanon stated that their papers had expired 
and that their status in the country was not mufawadyn (authorised). Many participants expressed 
their inability to find a kafala (see Chapter Four) who would sign their papers and vouch for them. The 
State’s insistence on viewing Syrian refugees as ‘guests’ or migrant workers meant that the right to 
work and the right to remain in Lebanon were closely linked. Except for one or two participants, all 
women expressed their frustration at the US$200 annual fee for the worker permit, arguing that the 
permit was not even ‘an official paper’, i.e. not refugee status (FGD 4, Bourj Hammoud). Refugee 
women also expressed that their lack of appropriate legal status meant they were unable to register 
their children for schools and were hindered from engaging with other services.  
The necessity of securing a kafala opened refugees to exploitation. Alyas, a mother of four from Raqaa 
explained how she and her husband had been defrauded out of US$300 by an Egyptian man in their 
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neighbourhood. He had posed as a Lebanese citizen who could act as their kafala in order to legitimise 
their status:  
‘He claimed…he had a Lebanese passport and that he would give us kafala. He would take care 
of our papers to renew our stay here…He wanted $800 in total, but we gave him $300....He 
actually took us to the General Security13, he took my husband there, but it was all a fraud...[we 
found out] he’s done this before, with other people’ (Alyas, Na’ba).   
 
UNHCR appeared to be of little assistance for refugees in Lebanon. All participants had had some 
interaction with the organisation, either being registered or recorded with them. Typically, however, 
participants were confused regarding their status with the organisation and the papers they held. 
UNHCR had been instructed not to register any Syrian refugee that arrived in the country after January 
2015, only to record them. Many participants were waiting on meetings with UNHCR and were then 
contacted to be told this was rescheduled for 18 months to two years’ time. This was a source of 
confusion and distress for participants, who had been anticipating assistance and advice from UNHCR 
regarding their legality, work opportunities, food vouchers, medical care, shelter options and 
importantly, an opportunity for third country re-settlement. Many had been counting down the days 
to their UNHCR meeting, assuming that once they met with the organisation, their position within 
Lebanon would change. I was frequently asked in interviews by participants if I could find out why 
UNHCR had rescheduled their interview and why refugees were not eligible for assistance and help. 
With UNHCR seemingly out of touch for most participants, women stated that the only way to 
establish legitimacy in Lebanon was to pay the US$200 permit fee and find a kafala every twelve 
months. This was a completely unrealistic and unsustainable option for vulnerable families.   
Because of the poor access to the UNHCR, many participants were suspicious of the organisation, and 
suspicious of those that received help. There was significant confusion and poor communication about 
how to access UNHCR, and as such rumours were rife about wasta (personal connections and 
influence), sexual favours, bribery and opportunism.  Stevens (2016) has noted prolific use of wasta 
in the Syrian refugee community in Jordan, whereby connections secured assistance from UNHCR and 
other NGOs to the benefit of particular families and the exclusion of others. Therefore, although it 
was rarely referenced in my interviews in Jordan, it is clear that wasta operates and is widespread 
amongst the refugee-humanitarian relationship in these contexts. Many women were exasperated 
and mistrustful of the UNHCR and other aid agencies, saying that they ‘knew’ the international 
community was providing Lebanon with aid and donations, but that they weren’t receiving any 
 
13 General Security is responsible for borders, immigration papers etc. See Chapter Four.  
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support, that Lebanon was pocketing donations and the state should be held to account. Several 
participants detailed hostile and unpleasant encounters with charities and NGOs, and deep confusion 
over the support that was being offered. Participants would live off community rumours of assistance 
from different NGOs and recounted their efforts to visit their offices, only to be turned away. 
Participants expressed frustration at the little support they received and how ‘rude’ staff were. One 
focus group participant recalled refusing to leave the UNHCR offices when they had declined to assist 
her family. Her refusal escalated into a direct conflict, whereby her feet were kicked from under her 
so that security guards could physically manhandle and drag her from the building.  
Women also viewed assistance provided by UNHCR and other aid agencies as based on class and 
manipulated by gender. Participants talked of other women receiving assistance from UNHCR as 
having ‘gold up to their elbows’. This was a common shorthand expression to explain wealth and 
influence. As many of the women had sold what gold jewellery they did possess to escape Syria, to 
pay bribes, or to simply live in Lebanon, those women that still wore visible gold jewellery were seen 
to have wasta, opportunity and resources at their disposal. Women would verbally compare 
themselves, asking rhetorically why these gold-bangled women, so clearly wealthy and unaffected by 
being a refugee, were outside of UNHCR waiting for assistance. Participants insisted that these were 
the women that received appointments and were offered third country resettlement because of their 
wasta. Some expressed opinions that women were exploiting their sexuality in order to access UNHCR. 
Participants would insist that other Syrian women wore ‘sexy underwear’ to UNHCR for when they 
were searched by security and offered sexual favours to guards in order to get appointments or access. 
It is unclear as to whether these were ‘urban rumours’ that emerged from the frustration of the 
refugee community, or if these were genuine accounts whereby women were being exploited in order 
to gain access to support. However, participants often readily engaged in this narrative, expressing 
their frustration and anger at these women for ‘exploiting themselves’ and therefore ‘jumping the 
queue’ whilst the legal framework and institutions at work had created these conditions whereby 
women felt it necessary to exchange sexual favours for assistance. 
During interviews with NGO workers it became apparent that some refugees, particularly those who 
were middle-class and educated, understood how best to utilise the humanitarian infrastructure in 
place. These women benefitted from being the first to access classes and resources and often went 
from one drop in session to the next, thus excluding others from accessing help. NGO workers 
explained that these women were often bored and looking for a way to spend their day, rather than 
in need. These workers also expressed their own reflections on verbal altercations, stating that 
refugees frequently made derogatory remarks towards them saying they were only employed because 
of the ongoing refugee crisis and that NGO employees ‘worked’ for them. Thus, relationships between 
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both groups were overlain by intersecting power relations, which could often become strained and 
misunderstood under conditions of stress and precarity.    
A few participants who were from more middle-class backgrounds had shunned assistance from 
UNHCR when they had initially arrived in the country as they had the means to support themselves. 
However, as the war had continued, they found they were in increasingly precarious positions:  
‘When we first arrived in the country, my husband didn’t want us to be greedy, so we didn’t go 
to the UN. Now things are different, you need to be very cautious’ (FGD 5, Bourj Hammoud).     
In these cases, participants considered UNHCR to be associated with emergency poverty relief and not 
with legality and status within Lebanon. The length of the Syrian conflict had meant that early 
expectations of returning home after the conflict had been replaced with a concerned understanding 
that Lebanon was ‘home’ for a potentially long period of time. Personal resources had dwindled, and 
their social position had shifted from how they perceived themselves as ‘migrant workers’ or ‘guests’ 
to refugees. This meant that gaining access to UNHCR, and indeed to any possibility of third country 
resettlement, was a strong focus for many participants.       
Jordanian refugee policies and kafala  
Syrian refugees who arrived into Jordan faced a different legal framework. Border crossings were 
closed much earlier to refugees coming over the Syrian/Jordanian border, and unlike Syrians in 
Lebanon, arriving refugees were funnelled towards refugee camps following registration. However, 
the bail out system in place, described in Chapter Four, allowed refugees the flexibility of leaving the 
camps and seeking self-settlement throughout Jordan, whilst still providing them with the legal right 
to be in the country.   
Camps were perceived very poorly by participants and acted as a motivating factor to self-settle in 
urban areas. Women highlighted how camp conditions were utterly unsuitable for their children, 
unsanitary, and open to the elements. Many expressed concerns about their children’s educational 
opportunities. Some participants related their decision to leave for the city directly to their children 
falling sick in the camp and the danger that camp conditions posed to them. In contrast to others, one 
focus group participant expressed a desire to stay because the camp had ‘everything that you need’. 
However, she nevertheless felt compelled to move: 
‘I have daughters with me, and I feared for them. I didn’t have a man with me. So, I took a risk 
and left’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh). 
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The amount of time spent in a camp varied between participants from a few hours to a few months. 
As many had been in Jordan for a prolonged period, they struggled to define which refugee camp they 
had stayed in. Most participants had arrived in 2012-2013 and camps were not organised, or fully 
constructed. This meant that security measures were laxer and there were easier opportunities to 
leave the camp. One Focus Group participant explained that one night the holding camp in which they 
were placed was flooded, and in response security personal simply opened the gates and let them 
leave. Furthermore, prior to 2015, ‘bail out’ from the camps was far more flexible (Achilli, 2015) and 
thus movement between the camps and the city was far more fluid.   
Many participants used kafala/kafeel and taghrib (smuggled) interchangeably throughout interviews. 
It was often unclear how refugees had left the camps and whether this had been through a formal bail 
out procedure or through smuggling or bribery. Women were vague about how they had organised 
leaving the camp. This may have been related to nervousness regarding their perceived illegality if 
they had been smuggled, or simply because they had no direct knowledge because their exit had been 
arranged by others (typically, male relatives). A report by the NRC estimated that 45% of refugees 
living outside of camps in Jordan did not go through the formal bail out process (IHRC/NRC, 2016). 
Therefore, a large proportion of self-settled refugees did not engage with this process. Very few 
participants described pre-existing family or labour connections in Jordan from before the onset of 
the civil war, and therefore it is likely that most of these participants paid for a smuggler. Participants 
reported paying significantly more than the 15JD fee per person for a kafeel. A family of four reported 
paying 150JD (approximately £150) in order to leave the camp, whilst others had paid up to 500JD 
(£500) for a family of ten, and others 100JD (£100) per person.  
These payments usually consumed what meagre savings the refugees possessed. One participant 
explained that she worked in a sweatshop in Amman for three months to pay the kafala fee, whilst 
another family explained that their kafeel extorted them when they arrived in Amman, demanding 
more money whilst threatening to return them to the camp and eventually leaving with most of the 
possessions they owned in order to ‘cover his costs’.  
The legal systems in place when a majority of refugees arrived in Jordan opened refugees to high levels 
of financial exploitation. Despite the predominance of Refugee Asylum Certificates and other formal 
registration processes through UNHCR, which gave refugees a sense of legality and access to support, 
the bail out process in place was harmful to refugees’ security. Since 2015, bail out has been 
significantly tightened, and leaving the camps is a far more complex exercise (Achilli, 2015; IHRC/NRC, 
2016). 
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Other than registering with UNHCR, participants in Jordan appeared to have little to no interaction 
with the organisation. Women made a brief reference to encountering the organisation upon their 
arrival in Jordan and there was some discussion about requesting third country re-settlement through 
UNHCR. However, the organisation seemed largely detached from the lives of urban refugees in 
Amman, and few participants mentioned using it directly for assistance and aid, unlike those in 
Lebanon.  
Self-Settling in the City: Shelter, Livelihoods and Employment   
As established above, the lack of official refugee camps meant that refugees arriving in Lebanon could 
self-settle in locations of their ‘choice’, although this was shaped by previous knowledge of the region, 
kinship links and economic circumstances. This contrasted with refugees arriving in Jordan, who 
typically first needed to negotiate registration at refugee camps and their subsequent bail out before 
settling in urban areas. This section examines the neighbourhoods of the city in which refugees settle, 
and the subsequent relationship to shelter, employment and livelihoods.   
Once arriving in Beirut, most participants headed towards areas of the city known for hosting migrant 
and refugee populations. These areas have long histories of homing refugee populations as they had 
either been Palestinian refugee camps (e.g. Shatila, Sabra), or areas of the city allocated by the state 
to incoming refugee populations (e.g. Bourj Hammoud for Armenian Christian refugees). Currently, 
these neighbourhoods are characterised by a diverse host of nationalities, including Armenians, 
Palestinians, Ethiopians, South Asians, Iraqis and Syrians. Indeed, many of these neighbourhoods are 
described as de facto urban refugee camps by academics, because refugees outnumber other 
community groups and because of the subcultures that have developed within them (Fawaz, 2017). 
These informal areas of the city become important bases for more socio-economically deprived 
groups, in order to make inroads into the opportunities available in the city. Since the onset of the 
Syrian civil war they have become vital hubs of economic opportunity and shelter for incoming, and 
returning, Syrian refugees, particularly those from more socio-economically deprived backgrounds.      
Typically, migrant workers with links to Lebanon had previously lived in these more informal areas of 
the city, which were more heterogeneous and affordable. Additionally, there were opportunities for 
flexible and informal work which allowed them the opportunity of returning home to Syria for a few 
months or weeks at a time. Thus, these neighbourhoods have established reputations as places where 
refugees can self-settle and find work. In these areas, economic opportunities for informal work 
coupled with more affordable housing and shelter:  
 ‘[We are in Sabra] because it is cheaper. That’s the most important thing…because my 
husband wasn’t finding work and we needed to find money’ (FGD 7, Mazra’a).  
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‘We are living in Mar Elias [Palestinian refugee camp] because my husband is working there, 
so we live there because of proximity to his work’ (Sara, Mazra’a).  
Some participants gradually migrated to more affordable areas, pursuing work, or hearing of cheaper 
accommodation through word of mouth. One of the key places mentioned in many refugee’s journey 
to Beirut was Cola Junction, a large traffic junction in the heart of the city from where numerous 
transport links are connected. Refugees would arrive by bus into the centre of the city, settle in ‘Cola’ 
(the area in and around the junction) for a short amount of time, before heading for more affordable 
areas.  
Family networks and kinship links played an important role in providing support and shelter for some 
participants, thus establishing them in Beirut. Participants would join existing family members, who 
were either settled in the city due to their own economic migrant links, or because they had fled Syria 
earlier. Often, this led to sharing a home until the newly arrived family could establish themselves.  
Settling in Amman was mostly described as a strategic, family-based decision because it was ‘the best 
Governorate’. The Amman governorate represents the concentration of the Jordanian economy and 
is thus wealthier and presents better labour opportunities. Participants had headed for the 
neighbourhoods of Ashrafyeh, Hashmi Shamali or Mahata for a number of reasons, but typically 
because extended family, displaced from the Syrian conflict, had already settled in these areas. 
Occasionally, participants also had distant relatives linked to these areas. These neighbourhoods, in 
the more traditional, South-Eastern side of the city, have histories of being ‘refugee receiving’ and are 
commonly known to be more affordable and have greater access to informal work opportunities. 
Those refugees who did not have kinship or economic links to Amman explained that their kafala had 
simply dropped them off in these neighbourhoods upon arrival into Amman, probably because of their 
reputation for being affordable and because of the large presence of migrant workers and refugees.  
When I asked Yesenia why her family had chosen Amman over Irbid or Mafraq, the major settlements 
in the North closer to the border and to the camps, she explained that her husband’s family were 
already living in the neighbourhood and therefore it made sense to head to Amman over staying in 
one of the Northern cities. Despite a number of studies in the Irbid and Mafraq Governorates which 
have highlighted tensions between the overwhelmed host community and Syrian refugees (REACH, 
2014), no participants expressed over-crowding or hostility in the Northern Governorate as a reason 
for their migration towards Amman, which I had anticipated being a factor in their decision making.  
Most families made their way from the north of the country either by bus or in a private vehicle 
(usually arranged by kafala or smuggler). One family described how they arrived with a large influx of 
Syrian refugees, getting off the buses in Mahata, where there is a large intra-country bus station. The 
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family lived on the streets for several days, alongside other refugee families until a Palestinian family 
showed them a dwelling in Mahata which had been described as ‘a dump’. They were told if they could 
make it into a home, they were welcome to rent it. Another participant described being left in 
Ashrafyeh by the camp smuggler and becoming ‘trapped’ in the area because other areas of the city 
were so unaffordable, she could never move. Participants explained that when their kafala dropped 
them off in a neighbourhood of Amman, they assumed they would be based in the area for a short 
time before establishing themselves in the city. One participant ruefully commented that ‘a temporary 
home became a permanent home’ over time and it became difficult to move to other parts of the city 
(FGD 4, Ashrafyeh). This was the case particularly for female-headed households. These women 
tended to struggle significantly with a lack of financial resources, practical assistance and social 
networks, and expressed high levels of social isolation, which is explored further in Chapter Eight. 
Thus, opportunities to move away from refugee receiving neighbourhoods were lower for these 
women.  
Shelter Conditions in Refugee-receiving neighbourhoods 
I observed that living standards and housing conditions in the informal, refugee-receiving 
neighbourhoods of Amman and Beirut were poor. This was confirmed by the participants. All 
participants in Beirut and Amman rented their homes from local landlords. Numerous interviews took 
place in participants’ homes, where I could personally witness housing conditions and participants 
regularly described their deficient housing environment. There were exceptions. Occasionally, I would 
interview a participant at home and discover a clean and organised interior, sometimes even a sofa. 
However, most of the participants that we visited lived in sub-standard, overly crowded 
accommodation with compromised hygiene and privacy.  
 
The neighbourhoods in which participants were living were typical refugee and migrant receiving 
localities of the city and featured highly informal housing standards. Although affordable housing is 
easier to acquire in these neighbourhoods, the dwelling conditions in these areas are exceedingly poor 
and, in some areas, akin to slum like conditions. This is due to years of informal construction either 
due to strict building regulations for ‘non-citizens14’ (Fawaz, 2017; Sanyal, 2011, 2014), or a complete 
lack of building regulation (Ababsa & Daher, 2011). They are also highly politicised spaces (particularly 
in Beirut) with higher petty crime rates and anti-social behaviour such as drug dealing, which can be 
challenging to negotiate physically and socially.  
 
14 This refers to the restrictions placed upon Palestinians who resided in refugee camps. In order to prevent their long -term presence, 
successive Lebanese governments have implemented laws that prevent their rights to ‘construct’ on the land that they live on. As such, 
Palestinians in camps have constructed in ad-hoc ways and means resulting in informal planning practices (See Sanyal, 2011; Pasquetti, 
2015).   
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In both Amman and Beirut, following local building trends, homes in these neighbourhoods tend to 
be stacked apartments, made of concrete. These buildings are created with flat roofs so that 
homeowners can extend their home vertically when have the financial means. This design also allows 
for a family unit’s consolidation under ‘one’ roof. These homes are constructed out of a base of 
concrete, which allow the house to remain cool during the heat of the Middle Eastern Summer, but 
which can be bitterly cold in the winter. They are rarely heated, save for those who can afford a 
portable gas heater (and the required gas). Most dwellings consisted of a small bathroom, a kitchen 
and one or two rooms in which sometimes up to 15 family members lived with no interior doors, no 
beds and no running water.  
 
 
 
Several participants explained that their dwellings had been completely abandoned and uninhabited 
prior to them moving in. They were in extremely poor condition, covered in mould, damp and dirt and 
families explained how they paid high rent for this substandard accommodation. They then 
painstakingly cleaned out the rooms, slowly procured mattresses (to sit and sleep on) and other 
necessities, usually from NGOs, rubbish dumps or sympathetic neighbours, in order to live. Some 
families used ad hoc spaces (e.g. under stairwells) within apartment blocks that were converted into 
dwellings when refugee families arrived in the neighbourhoods.  
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These are high density neighbourhoods, with individuals living in close proximity to each other. 
Participants expressed tensions and discomfort within their homes, particularly over noise, anti-social 
and intrusive behaviours. Husnieya spoke of how her neighbours would shout abuse at her family and 
throw rubbish onto the balcony of their apartment. Countless women said they were yelled at through 
walls to ‘keep the baby quiet!’. Dwellings often had a permeable quality that left participants fearful 
of the possibility of burglary and forced entry. Several participants in both contexts experienced 
attempts by opportunistic burglar forcing entry into their homes. Furthermore, refugees often shared 
these spaces with other families, which had gendered repercussions for personal privacy. For example, 
women discussed the challenges of trying to maintain dignity and privacy when negotiating private 
spaces with other (sometimes unrelated) men within wider cultural-religious norms of modesty and 
sex segregation.  
 
Discussions of shelter often intersected with ideas of stability, security and home.  In Arabic, the word 
bayt is used to described one’s house, or home, but also has connotations of belonging and safety 
linked to one’s community, or even a larger city (Abdelmonem, 2012). Thus, some women made 
distinctions between their dwellings in Amman or Beirut and their wider sense of home and belonging 
in Syria. Fenster (2005) has also explored the linkages between the private spaces of home and public 
spaces of the city and a wider sense of belonging and rights. Both these themes emerged in women’s 
reflections of their homes in Amman and Beirut.   
Shelter & Housing in Beirut  
In Beirut, rents varied significantly from participant to participant. Some reported paying US$300 a 
month for a two roomed dwelling, whilst others were charged US$500 for a similar property. Rents 
were inconsistent and according to participants, subject to frequent increase by landlords anxious to 
make a profit. Discussions of rents dominated frustrated conversations with women who highlighted 
their exploitation:  
 
‘My rent is US$400 [a month], because I am Syrian. It used to be US$200, but because I’m 
Syrian they increased the prices…We have tensions and psychological problems [from the war]. 
We come here and the Lebanese people just want to strangle us with rent and high prices’ 
(FGD 4, Bourj Hammoud).   
The vulnerability of Syrian refugee families to high rents in their host communities has been widely 
documented by NGOs and other researchers (Carrion, 2015; Guay, 2016; REACH, 2014), and has led 
to a deterioration of relationships between host communities and Syrian refugees, as locals are 
frequently dislodged from their dwellings in favour of Syrian families. Participants highlighted how 
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Lebanese landlords were taking advantage of the situation, rapidly increasing rents and forcing them 
to pay double the prices of Lebanese residents. Many women expressed high levels of stress and 
insecurity over the thought that they might be evicted at any moment, particularly as they often did 
not have money to pay for rent. Thus, tensions developed between both refugees and hosts through 
the emerging housing crisis in the city. Resources and services in such high-density neighbourhoods 
were also an area of tension. Women shared incidences of conflict over irregular water supply in their 
neighbourhoods, explaining how apartment blocks would have one water source but that as 
‘outsiders’ they would be frequently denied its use:  
 
‘Our neighbour in the building, cut the electricity wires of the water motor, and said: “You Syrians 
will pump water when we are finished, and if we don’t finish, then it’s forbidden [for you to get 
water]”’ (Najat, diary excerpt, Na’ba).  
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Conditions in many of the dwellings led to stress and concern amongst participants, particularly as 
most felt the homes were structurally unsafe. In Mazra’a, many of the participants were living in the 
Palestinian refugee camps Shatila and Sabra, which are notorious for their poor design because of the 
building restrictions levied on these neighbourhoods (Sanyal, 2011). Some spoke of how the area 
wasn’t safe or ‘clean’, and how children had died from being electrocuted on exposed wires. There 
were open drains, sewers and a proliferation of rats: 
 
'The roof and the plumbing are disgusting; we can smell the sewage. There are rats and huge 
spiders. My daughter’s asthma is exacerbated...I'm always alert, I can't sleep at night' (FGD 8, 
Mazra’a).  
 
In the previous year, Lebanon suffered from a chronic rubbish crisis in which piles of refuse polluted 
the streets as a result of strike action (BBC, 2015), This would have exacerbated experiences in poorer 
neighbourhoods, where overcrowding and existing compromised facilities would have generated 
highly unpleasant living conditions. During this fieldwork, there were occasional issues with services, 
and rubbish would quickly pile up on the sides of the road throughout the city, leading to diminished 
living standards and compromised sanitation.   
 
Rent arrears and debt were frequently referenced in interviews. Whilst some women described 
patient and generous landlords who had forgiven months of overdue rent, others talked of immediate 
pressure to pay the rent, fear of eviction and the insecurity this created:   
 ‘When we lived in Syria, we lived well actually. But now we are in a lot of debt. Our back is broken, 
we can't pay the rent, and we can't pay our expenses’ (Husniya, Na’ba).  
 
‘(The landlord’s) a good guy. We haven't paid our rent for three months. But we are in debt to 
other people too. Our friends, we would borrow money from them in order to meet our 
expenses….and we have debt from the grocery store that we would buy things from...In total we 
are in debt about two thousand dollars right now’ (Alyas, Na’ba).  
 
Despite her positive discussion of her landlord being understanding, Alyas also explained that her 
landlord commented that if they found the rents too high, they could leave as a ‘thousand (others) 
would take your place’. This comment indicates the hugely unequal balance of power in host 
communities and the poor bargaining position of refugees in the face of spiralling costs. There was 
also a sense of being watched and observed by landlords and property owners that lived within the 
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community, particularly when it came to money and expenditure. One participant described her 
distress at trying to buy food other than vegetables for her children only to encounter the owner of 
the property that she rented:  
 
‘At some point I would have money to buy my children grilled chicken….and then the [owner] 
would say: ‘Ah, so you have money, you are Syrians with money.’ And I would say: ‘No, I don't. 
I bought it instead of buying coffee and things.’ And she would say: “I don't care, money comes 
first”. She is very materialistic. And she wants to increase the rent every single time, we are 
not able to live appropriately’ (Wajida, Na’ba).  
 
This was a significant source of distress and frustration for Wajida, who was a single mother and lived 
in a one room, windowless dwelling with her three sons. Her observation was that she was not able 
to ‘live appropriately’ in her current circumstances. She felt undignified and desperate because, whilst 
trying to feed her children, she also had to justify that she was poor to her landlady. Other women 
highlighted how they disliked taking their children to the shops as they would cry and beg for food 
and treats that the women couldn’t afford. Whilst this might be regular child-like behaviour, the lack 
of ability to be able to provide for children was a source of distress and embarrassment for the women 
and a constant reminder of their poverty and position. Women expressed a sense of being under a 
hegemonic gaze within the neighbourhood, by those who had more power and position and judged 
their behaviours and decisions accordingly. This led to an oppressive, stifling and uncomfortable 
environment where women felt unable to live ‘appropriately’ and fuelled a wider sense of 
unbelonging and precariousness in their host cities.    
Shelter & Housing in Amman  
Dwelling conditions in Amman were similarly poor to those in Beirut. Hashmi Shamali and Ashrafyeh 
have significantly high population densities, with approximately 20,000 people per square kilometre 
(Ababsa, 2013). These neighbourhoods also border Palestinian refugee camps which have equally high 
densities and significant incidence of socio-economic deprivation (Tiltnes & Zhang, 2013). Many 
participants reported extensive damp and mould, flooding from the street, leaking roofs which 
participants likened to being rained on, and suffocating living conditions where extended families lived 
in crowded conditions. Many homes did not have front doors or glass in their windows. Families used 
blankets over doorways to help keep the elements out and described how winter was particularly 
harsh, with low temperatures and occasional snow, as there was no heating, and gas bottles and 
heaters were expensive. From the perspective of NGOs, this is not considered ‘substandard’ urban 
accommodation. For example, about 20% of urban refugees in Jordan are sheltered in garages, 
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chicken houses and tented settlements (Achilli, 2015). As such, those that are living in a two-room 
dwelling would be considered exceptionally fortunate, despite the accommodation’s questionable 
infrastructure and health-compromising conditions (Verme et al., 2015). However, despite the so-
called privilege of living in one of these dwellings, women still experience high levels of precarity and 
insecurity. Mouna described her family’s horror when part of their roof collapsed and explained that 
her landlord had never repaired it. So, they had to negotiate around exposed metal rods, wiring and 
concrete in their home. Rabiah associated the poor condition of her family’s home to a wider sense of 
insecurity in Amman:   
‘The condition of the house doesn’t make us feel settled, because it’s always falling apart’ 
(Rabiah, Hashmi Shamali).   
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Zarifa honestly admitted that some of the challenges in Amman were related to how she had lived life 
previously:  
‘I miss home. It was so fresh and clean. It’s been hard to adjust, even till now I have not 
adjusted’ (Zarifa, Hashmi Shamali).    
The conditions of dwellings coupled with refugees’ wider sense of not belonging, made their situation 
within Jordan feel unstable and temporary. Keila commented that whilst she felt safe in Jordan 
regarding protection from war, she felt unsettled in a place that was not her home:  
''When it comes to my [dwelling], I don't feel like it’s my own...Bayti [my house] is somewhere 
where I feel safe, so it’s [shelter] it’s not home' (Keila, Hashmi Shamali).    
Keila’s comments were echoed in other interviews where participants distinguished between having 
a roof over their heads and a wider sense of bayt [home]. They emphasised that to have a sense of 
home, you needed a sense of belonging, and that many felt that they did not ‘belong’ in their host 
communities. Brun & Fábos (2015) consider the process of ‘making home’ for refugee communities in 
flux, noting that it is often a process through which ‘people try to gain control over their lives’. In such 
conditions, many women expressed an inability to feel in control because of the precarious nature of 
their dwellings, their undetermined status within their host communities and their pervading sense of 
insecurity.  
Rents also varied, and there was concern expressed about rent payments and their unaffordability. 
However, there were far fewer accounts from participants in Jordan of feeling taken advantage of by 
their host communities. A report by Errighi & Griesse (2016) noted that whilst there was an 
acceleration in housing costs in Jordan at the onset of the Syrian crisis around 2013, this was short 
lived and since 2015 there has been less than a 1.5% increase overall. Participants paid anything from 
100 JD (£100) to 250 JD (£250) per month excluding utilities. If participants were married, 
accommodation was almost always organised through their husband, and they would frequently 
allude to how they found out about possible accommodation through word of mouth and local 
connections, or simply by being approached, or approaching others, in the street.  
Whilst women in Beirut would almost immediately highlight issues regarding outstanding rent, debts 
and rent increases for refugees, participants in Amman would discuss rents but appeared, for the most 
part, to feel that landlords were fair, despite their difficulties in keeping up with payments because of 
their status. Indeed, many participants, particularly those living in Mahata, described friendships and 
support from their landlords who often lived side by side with them in the neighbourhood:  
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‘My neighbour is my landlord and she is very understanding. She is Palestinian. I would feel 
safe with her, I would even give her the key to my house [to watch my kids] (Derifa, Mahata). 
‘The landlord is very good. Our neighbours got evicted…but our landlord said we could stay as 
long as we want, its ok. I got everything [in my home] from the landlord. When we got here, 
we had absolutely nothing, but he got us food and blankets and pillows’ (Fariha, Mahata).  
Whilst these positive and supporting accounts were not reflective of all women’s experiences, they 
do reflect varying experiences and responses by the host community towards incoming refugees. 
Contrasting experiences may well be because of the differing housing contexts between Beirut and 
Amman. The precarity and pricing of housing in Beirut may have led to an additional layer of tension 
between host communities and refugees which didn’t appear to be as present in Amman.  
An examination of issues of shelter and ‘home’ clearly show a range of insecurities experienced by 
refugee women in both contexts. Refugee policies inhibit access to the labour market, particularly for 
marginalised groups that cannot afford permits (see further below). This shapes the places and spaces 
that refugees inhabit, pushing them towards poorer, marginalised areas of the city with poorly 
planned infrastructure and housing stock. This builds a sense of compromised security and an unstable 
urban environment in which refugees are constantly re-negotiating. It also indicates the various scales 
at which (in)security operates. The macro scale of policy and a fixation on state security shapes the 
spaces and places that refugees can inhabit. In turn, women, particularly those in Beirut, see issues of 
rent and poor housing conditions to be geopolitical issues. Women insisted that the UNHCR and the 
Lebanese government should organise standardised rents and appropriate agreements between 
refugees and Lebanese landlords to limit exploitation.  
Livelihoods, work and gender in the city 
Whilst the first section of this chapter has provided insight into refugees’ decisions to self-settle in 
Amman and Beirut, the neighbourhoods in which they live and the particular challenges of negotiating 
their status with regard to shelter and work, this next section engages in a gendered examination of 
livelihoods, work and vulnerability in the city and the ways in which this differs, and is consistent, 
across Amman and Beirut.    
Refugees struggled to construct livelihoods in Jordan and Lebanon. As highlighted in Chapter Four, 
and examined briefly above, there were initially no established rights allowing refugees to engage in 
wage earning employment (Errighi & Griesse, 2016). However, this was slowly changing during the 
course of this field work as a result of the Jordan Compact (Barbalet et al., 2018). Precarious financial 
positions and dwindling to non-existent support from humanitarian agencies means that almost all 
refugees are required to work to support their families and to pay high living costs in their host cities.  
150 
 
Several research studies have highlighted the effect that conflict, flight and asylum have on changing 
gender roles, with regards to economic opportunities and family breadwinners. Whilst some studies 
have highlighted the positive opportunities that this has presented to women, who may have been 
negotiating patriarchal and traditional societies that allowed for little female engagement in the 
working world, they are often tempered with negative gendered effects (El-Masri, 2013; McIlwaine, 
2013). For example, as gender roles change, some women can find themselves increasingly vulnerable 
to domestic violence as male family members struggle to adjust to their new situation and position 
(Wachter et al., 2018) 
Employment and Livelihoods in Beirut  
Day to day life in Beirut was described as financially precarious by every participant. Many expressed 
fears and concerns related to rent, debt, eviction and poverty. In 2016, UNHCR’s Vulnerability 
assessment of Syrians living in Lebanon found that over 71% of households were below the Lebanese 
poverty line of US$3 a day and the average Syrian household in Lebanon was in debt US$1,135 (UNHCR 
et al., 2016). As such, finding employment was imperative for refugee families.   
As explored above, many participants had male relatives who either had jobs or existing labour links 
to Beirut. This meant that some men had regular work provided through a kafeel who sponsored their 
right to work in Lebanon, which in turn gave the family a stronger sense of security, an element of 
belonging in the city and a regular income. However, sponsorship was no guarantee of long-term 
stability and could be revoked at any point by the sponsor. 
Sara, a Kurdish participant from Qamishli in Northern Syria, near the Turkish border, explained that 
her family had been in Lebanon since the onset of the Syrian conflict as her husband had a job with a 
steel shop and therefore had a kafeel to sign his permit. However, within the last year, the owner of 
the steel shop had declined to act as his sponsor and consequently his papers and legal status in 
Lebanon were on the verge of expiring. Sara was beside herself with worry as they were about to lose 
their right to remain in Lebanon and she felt the only way to reapply was for her husband to return to 
the Syrian-Lebanese border. This presented numerous risks and concerns, particularly that he would 
be unwillingly recruited into the conflict.   
Most men (including those that had worked in Beirut previously) were not successful in securing 
themselves a kafeel, and were taking irregular, informal work in jobs such as construction or security, 
wherever and whenever it was available. Thus, their income was highly erratic, often seasonal and 
vulnerable to competition from other refugees and migrant workers. As a result, constructing stable, 
consistent livelihoods in the city was challenging.  
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The state had deemed this informal employment without a kafeel ‘illegal’ in order to protect job 
security for the native population, and have since 2015 promoted the ‘pledge not to work’, requiring 
Syrians to sign a form whereby they agree not to work whilst living in Lebanon (Janmyr, 2016). 
However, the signing of this document for many is simply cursory: an utter lack of financial support 
and high debts mean that many refugees will be forced to engage in illegal work in order to support 
themselves and their families. 
Women reflected on the difficulty of their families securing work, linking this with their lack of 
appropriate documentation and described experiences of being exploited or cheated out of pay:  
‘We work in a place for a week or two, not getting paid by people we are working for.  My son 
has changed 3 jobs so far. They are searching for jobs right now. [Potential employers] are 
always asking about legal papers, or say: ‘You are Syrian, you can't work’ (FGD 5, Bourj 
Hammoud).    
NGO workers and community contacts said that Lebanese workers were frequently overlooked, or 
even let go, in favour of employing a Syrian refugee which had led to a growth in tensions within 
refugee hosting communities. This was supported by refugees’ own accounts of informal work in the 
city. They would express frustration and exhaustion at the hours they were expected to work, but 
countered these issues with an awareness that they (particularly men) were prioritised over Lebanese 
workers as they were less expensive to employ:   
‘I want to be fair to both Syrian and Lebanese perspectives. A businessman would fire a 
Lebanese person, to (afford) two Syrians. Syrian workers are in extreme need and they would 
work from morning until night and face the humiliation [to survive]…a Syrian works for half of 
the normal pay check and we would work double the shift. [The employer] would delay the 
payment and then give you only half of it. People are degrading us’ (FGD 6, Bourj Hammoud).     
Vulnerability to exploitation was common to both those that had a kafeel and those that were working 
‘illegally’ in the informal sector. Thus, both participants with and without a sponsor talked of a 12 -14 
hour working day for poor wages. Women reported employees taking advantage of those working 
without legal papers, threatening them with violence or the LSF in order to circumvent paying their 
earnings. On occasion, when there was conflict over wages and work, refugees talked of how they 
were dismissively told to go ‘get your people’. This referred to a kinship network, who would support 
and advocate on behalf of the individual. As employers knowingly employ refugees without legal 
papers and are more than aware of their illegal status and vulnerability, this comment was used to 
remind refugees of their inferior position in their host society, and their lack of recourse because of 
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their illegality. Refugees were extremely reticent to engage in conflict or aggression within the 
community and, on these occasions, described how they simply let the matter go and looked for other 
employment (explored further in Chapter Eight).  
Employment and Livelihoods in Amman  
Refugee status, access to UNHCR and financial support were very different for Syrian refugees in 
Jordan compared to those in Lebanon. As such, the livelihoods of urban refugees in Amman were less 
immediately precarious, and the severe debt that blighted almost all refugees in Beirut was less 
prominent.   
In Jordan, refugees are eligible for 10JD per person, per week, in Food Vouchers from the World Food 
Project (WFP). For families that are deemed highly vulnerable (for example, elderly individuals who 
cannot work, single mothers with children), the Red Crescent provides additional aid. This was 
referred to as the ‘Iris Scan’, a new programme introduced by the WFP to pay for groceries using an 
iris scan, which was used by many participants as a descriptor of their vulnerability or need (by stating 
whether or not they received ‘the Iris Scan’) (WFP, 2016).  
Although these vouchers rarely manage to cover the costs of food, and many participants explained 
that they had to be used at specific stores, it allowed families to stave off their immediate vulnerability. 
One participant explained that she bought bulk powdered milk with her vouchers which she then sold 
to local women for a small profit which kept the family financially afloat. Others sold on their food 
vouchers to allow them greater freedom with where to buy goods. 
Amongst participants in Jordan, there were far fewer reports of debt. This is most likely because of 
more stable rents and because of some of the more accessible humanitarian aid available to Syrian 
refugees in Jordan (through WFP vouchers). Many family units had at least one working member. For 
men, this work tended to be inconsistent and informal, such as painting or construction, similar to 
occupations on offer to Syrians in Lebanon. One or two participants explained that their husbands did 
have work permits, which had been arranged by employers, as employers themselves were also at 
risk of consequences (such as fines) if found employing a Syrian without a permit (Alhajahmad & 
Lockhard, 2017). However, in common with most participants in Beirut, it was rare for men to possess 
a work permit, as informal roles were not permanent. Many women shared stories of husbands or 
sons that had been caught and cautioned for working after being caught by Wafedin. Others had male 
family members who had been returned to Syria, or to one of the refugee camps after being caught 
in employment without a permit. A focus group participant described her husband’s experience:  
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‘He did have a work permit, but then the [employer] refused to [renew] it. When he got caught 
[working], they took him to Azraq camp, and then they drove him out to the border, near to 
Daraa [southern Syria] and left him there’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh).   
This left families with a strong sense of insecurity, frustration and bewilderment at the position that 
this left them in:  
‘If my son didn't work, and he wasn't able to provide a living for me, who would? I don't get 
the iris scan. He tried to get a work permit, but he wasn't able too. Why, why do they do this? 
It doesn't make sense; we just want to work. We are not bad; we are not stealing. We just 
want to work’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh).   
There were a few (usually teenage sons) who had managed to acquire jobs working in cafés or 
restaurants, distributing pamphlets or occasionally working in sweatshops. As they were under 18, 
they were not eligible to apply for a work permit and therefore worked without any option of legality.  
Participants also expressed a strong sense of exploitation relating to employment and wages. Akin to 
women in Lebanon, Jordanian participants shared stories of long working hours and poor earnings:  
'Even when we want to work, either women or men, they try to take advantage of us because 
we are Syrians. My husband works in a restaurant, he gets paid less than everyone else 
because he is Syrian’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh).  
‘[My husband] works a lot of jobs here and he gets scammed. He doesn’t get paid, or he gets 
paid very little’ (Samya, Hashmi-Shamali).  
These expressions of frustration and concern point to the underlying challenges of existing Jordanian 
labour policies towards Syrian refugees. Whilst many of these laws were being amended and greater 
opportunities for work were in principle being introduced during this field research, due to the Jordan 
Compact (Barbalet et al, 2018) the existing laws made it very challenging for Syrian refugees to live in 
dignity, to provide for themselves, or to be functioning and contributing members to their host 
society. Those that engaged in work risked arrest, deportation, abuse or mistreatment, but felt that 
they had no alternatives.  
These expressions of frustration and concern point to the underlying challenges of the Jordanian 
labour policies towards Syrian refugees during this field work. Whilst changes were underfoot through 
the Jordan Compact, most participants were unaware and suspicious of these new work opportunities 
(As noted in Chapter Four, it is not obvious that the Compact has actually made very much difference 
to the livelihoods and opportunities for Syrian refugees). Instead, they viewed policy and legal 
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structures as creating an impossible environment for them. They felt unable to live in dignity, provide 
for themselves or to be functioning and contributing members to their host society and risked arrest 
and deportation by engaging in work. This led to a significant sense of insecurity and vulnerability.  
Refugee women and work: ‘empowerment’, exhaustion and exploitation  
Typically, husbands or male family members would seek work in Amman or Beirut, as discussed earlier 
in the chapter. However, some Syrian men had fought and been injured in the civil war or been hurt 
in bombing raids or conflict in their neighbourhoods. As such, they were not able to work because of 
their physical (or mental) ailments. Additionally, some were older or had pre-existing health conditions 
that prevented them from engaging in the typically very physical, informal work that was available to 
Syrian refugees. In these situations, the household would either rely on another male family member 
to work and bring in income (for example a brother-in-law, or teenage son). If this wasn’t possible, 
women and children would work where opportunities presented themselves.  
Lokot (2018) has spoken of the importance of not engaging in the stereotyping of Syrian refugees and 
gender norms, finding that many of her female research participants had worked and supported their 
families before their flight to Jordan, whilst El-Masri (2013) has tracked the increase in women taking 
on family breadwinner roles in Syrian families in the Beka’a Valley. However, these findings contrasted 
with the women who participated in this study. Experiences of work and education alongside early 
marriages often worked in tandem: women explained that once they were married, they were 
discouraged from continuing their work or their education, usually at the request of their husbands. 
‘Generally, in [Syria], the men work, and the women stay at home. So, I didn’t work, my 
husband worked. [I got] married when I was 16 and in 9th grade.  My husband didn't want me 
to finish my education, so I stopped…I don’t know if I wanted to get married. I just wanted to 
finish my education and play in the neighbourhood…. I don’t want the same situation for my 
children’ (Badra, Hashmi-Shamali).  
When I spoke with Yara and Mona about their family life in Syria and how they were coping in Amman, 
they said they had stopped their education in Syria around ‘Grade Six’ and that neither of them had 
ever worked: 
‘[In Syria] we had eight or nine brothers [who worked and provided for the family]. We had 
everything. We didn’t need to work. We never asked anyone for help. But here, we have to ask 
people for help’ (Yara & Mona, Mahata).    
Their brothers were living in Amman with them but were struggling to gain steady employment and 
did not have kafala sponsorship. A small proportion of participants were poor, working class rural 
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Bedouin women who had worked in rural agriculture before the conflict. However, most other 
participants, both those that could be understood as working class, and lower- to mid- middle class, 
had held traditional roles as a mother, caregiver and keeper of the house and had specific expectations 
placed on them about their social role and responsibly. This general lack of further education and paid 
work experience led many women, especially those settled in Jordan, to feel at a disadvantage when 
it came to securing work opportunities. Many felt that only low-skilled labour was open to them, and 
that Jordanian women had more skills and education than them: 
‘I can’t read and write….my family didn’t allow me to continue my education because I’m a 
girl. So, I can only [be a cleaner] here because I don’t have any other skills’ (Rabiah, Hashmi-
Shamali).   
Only a very small number of the women that I interviewed in both Beirut and Amman were working, 
and only one was working in what might be described as a Syrian, family business (a small tailor shop 
run by both her and her husband). Employment was more typical amongst female headed families, 
where women were divorced or widowed, or their husbands had left to go to a third country to seek 
asylum. The work available was usually in tailor shops doing sewing, domestic work such as cleaning, 
selling small cooked goods or very occasionally working in the beauty industry. Because of the highly 
irregular and informal status of these work opportunities, the women were not engaged in the kafala 
system and did not seek a sponsor, or indeed feel it necessary for their work to be ‘legitimate’. Women 
also didn’t consider this to be genuine employment because it was engaged in the private, domestic 
sphere. Participants said that they weren’t engaged in ‘work work’ differentiating between the labour 
opportunities for men and women, even if both were engaged in the informal sector. Many considered 
their engagement with work to be safer than men’s, in the legal sense, as they tended to work within 
the privacy of homes or businesses, and therefore the need to have appropriate documentation was 
significantly less. They also expressed concern (more in Beirut then in Amman) that men would be 
stopped on their way to and from work by police, whereas many of them felt less scrutinised by 
security services whilst in public (which is explored further in Chapters Seven & Eight).  
Syrian women’s experiences of employment largely reflected the experiences of Syrian men. Women 
expressed the pointlessness of engaging in employment as one could work for ‘twelve-hour shifts for 
very low pay’, or on occasion not be paid at all (FGD 8, Mazra’a). Working in such informal conditions 
opened women up to exploitation and fraud. Two sisters that had attempted to get cleaning jobs 
talked about how they had been defrauded:    
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‘Me, my brother and sister cleaned two houses for a guy, and he didn't pay us, not a single 
penny, nothing. Even though he knows how hard our living conditions are, he still scammed 
us and took our money’ (FGD 2, Ashrafyeh). 
Women also expressed negotiating racial and class discrimination regarding their background as 
Syrian refugees. Fadila talked about her daughter finding work in a tailor shop, mending shirts to 
support her family:  
‘The guy responsible for the [shop] made her work 14 hours a day. But he wouldn’t teach her 
how to sew. He said to her: “You are a Syrian, you can’t learn anything”…I am very, very 
insulted for her’ (Fadila, Na’ba).       
 
There was a general unease with work opportunities that required women to work with unknown 
male employers who could potentially harass or proposition them. This was particularly the case if 
women were working informally, or behind closed doors in private homes doing domestic cleaning. 
Some participants explained that when they looked for work employers turned them down, informing 
them that they wanted ‘younger women’. Women expressed distaste at being propositioned by 
potential employers and felt they would be compromising their intimate safety by taking on work:  
‘Whenever I go out to find work, the employer will tell me: “Come and go out with me, then I 
will employ you”.  Now, I don’t feel good about going out to look for work’ (FGD 8, Mazra’a).  
‘Some men will ask you to come clean their house [for money]. Then they will lock [you] in the 
house and try to take advantage’ (FGD 7, Mazra’a). 
‘I clean the houses of people I don’t know. That is what scares me…not the [lack of a] work 
permit. I don’t know the people, so I feel insecure when I am cleaning their homes’ (Rabiah, 
Hashmi-Shamali).  
In Beirut, a frequent obstacle that women encountered in their search for work was their appearance. 
As explored in Chapter Four, Beirut is a cosmopolitan and heterogeneous city where Western (casual, 
tight-fitting), traditional (modest dress, hair covered with a hijab), and conservative (very modest 
dress, hair and face covered with a niqab) dress are very much the norm and reflects different religious 
and ethnic backgrounds. This mixture of dress styles is not unlike Damascus and other regions of Syria 
(Enab Baladi, 2017). Despite these varied clothing styles, several women explained that they were 
required to remove their hijab and show uncovered hair if they worked in a shop. This was raised not 
only by women living near traditionally Christian areas of the city, but those that also sought work in 
and around Mazra’a:  
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 ‘When I wanted to find work, I was told to remove the hijab’ (FGD 7, Mazra’a).  
‘My daughters have been looking for a job. But I would come home and find them crying 
because people wouldn’t employ them because they are veiled’ (FGD 1, Na’ba).  
‘We tried to find jobs in the area, but they want women without the hijab. It’s difficult to get 
a job with the hijab. Maybe (it’s an excuse) they don’t want to give us a job’ (FGD 3, Na’ba).  
Women stated that they would not consider removing the hijab in order to secure work, and therefore 
they felt unable to find themselves employment as it required them to compromise themselves in a 
very visible way. This compromise was one that required negotiating socially and individually. Women 
would need to compromise their personal decision to wear the hijab, but also wider societal norms 
(particularly that of the wider Syrian diaspora in their neighbourhoods) of Muslim women covering 
their hair. This issue, of removing one’s hijab, was never raised in Amman by participants, in all 
likelihood because of the majority Sunni community and the typically more conservative dress code.  
Working away from the family home, due to the need for income, raised another dimension of 
insecurity for women, relating to their fears regarding the wellbeing and safety of their family and 
children. Thus, a sense of feeling insecure outside the home and being in the workplace was further 
complicated by caregiving responsibilities and concerns. Women discussed their deep sense of fear 
and insecurity related to their children and their safety whilst they were separated. Some explained 
that they had had to give up employment or had been let go, after they had attempted to take children 
into work with them. Takiya, a mother of six had found daily work sewing at a local tailor but expressed 
discomfort throughout the interview about being anywhere other than home. Before the conflict she 
had never left her village, and her husband had not been in Lebanon before. Working outside the 
home was a strange and intimidating experience for her and, whilst appreciative for the work, she did 
not appear to enjoy it. Reflecting on her job and leaving the neighbourhood she expressed a further 
concern for the wellbeing of her daughters:  
‘I would feel uneasy if I left the girls here alone and went somewhere…my heart would be with 
them’ (Takiya, Na’ba).  
Studies have noted some of the challenges that refugee and immigrant women face in their new 
settings as they struggle with a multitude of old and new responsibilities, from the necessity of taking 
a job to support the family, whilst balancing caregiving needs of the home (Spitzer et al., 2003). 
Amongst Syrian refugee women, these stressors and responsibilities interact with wider worries and 
insecurities in the environment in which they lived and worked, to create a sense of insecurity, 
instability and stress within women’s lives. Thus, in such contexts where identities and structures 
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interact to create oppressive conditions and a sense of insecurity, working opportunities are not 
necessarily the source of ‘empowerment’ that many Western feminists might think (Bangstad, 2011; 
Cornwall, 2007b).   
 
Women’s perspectives on their jobs and contribution to the household varied. Warrda’s husband was 
injured in the conflict in Syria and she worked as the family breadwinner. When I asked about her 
feelings regarding these new pressures, and whether she felt empowered in her new mobility, being 
out of the house and having the role as a ‘breadwinner’ she commented:  
‘I [feel] that I have to summon the power to do [work] because I have three kids, but I don’t 
feel that I am empowered…that I have a choice, I don’t have a choice in this. I have to keep 
up….and me working means I neglect my children; I neglect my house. When I come home, I 
am completely exhausted’ (Warrda, FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).    
Her comments are reflective of other women who found themselves in new roles in their host 
communities as financial providers for their families. Here, she describes a sense of being trapped and 
the capacity to ‘have a choice’ about whether to work or to care for her family is removed from her. 
Rabiah’s husband had left to try and get asylum in Finland (unsuccessfully), which resulted in her and 
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her three children living with her husband’s family. Because of the restrictions around work permits, 
she was the only person in the household who worked, engaging in domestic labour that was hidden 
from the public scrutiny of the Wafedin. Reflecting on her experience as the family breadwinner, she 
noted:  
‘I am not comfortable [working as a cleaner] at all. It’s very hard…I feel suffocated by it’ 
(Rabiah, Hashmi-Shamali). 
She explained that she had had a very sheltered existence, both as a child, and as a married woman 
and seemed very embarrassed about her work as a cleaner. She was from a very conservative, middle-
class urban family in Syria, and this change in social status as the new head of the household, and her 
husband’s journey to Europe, had left her feeling overwhelmed (although she did express in later 
interviews that she felt a greater sense of ‘freedom’ in Jordan - see Chapter Seven).  Raya, a focus 
group participant, was a divorced woman whose husband had also lived in Jordan and had provided 
some support for the family. Eight months previous he had been deported and Raya found that she 
was solely responsible for supporting her children. She worked by cooking for other families but found 
that the work was inconsistent. Reflecting on her position as her family's sole support and whether 
she had a sense of empowerment she said:  
‘I am stronger now, and I should be strong because my kids depend on me. [This situation is] 
not by choice, but this is my reality now’ (Raya, FGD1, Ashrafyeh).    
There were also contrasting opinions amongst women in Beirut. For example, during a difficult focus 
group where women expressed high levels of alienation and challenges in accessing employment, one 
participant quietly and confidently asserted that, since she had been in Lebanon, she had felt a great 
sense of empowerment through the way she supported her family through her work:  
‘I work as a teacher…I care for children under five. With all due respect to Lebanese people, 
my brother-in-law is Lebanese, the house [where I stay] is his, and he makes me pay rent. I am 
more than a man  than him, because I count on myself. This year, thank God I have found work 
providing for my mother, my daughter and my younger brother. Being the man of the 
house….it has empowered me’ (FGD 7, Mazra’a).  
This participant contrasted her new responsibilities and capacities against that of her brother-in-law, 
who in her eyes had failed in his masculinity by requiring her family to pay rent to him.  By relying on 
her own skills and acting as her family’s provider, she had gained a strong sense of empowerment. 
Her reflective account provides an interesting contrast to other women’s experiences of employment 
and empowerment in the city. 
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In summary, then, for some women, the flight from Syria had resulted in new social positions for them 
where they emerged as family breadwinners, or at least, contributors to the family income (Anthias, 
2013b). Whilst typically Western academics may perceive this an avenue of empowerment (Bangstad, 
2011; Mernissi, 1975), these women express a complex sense of both empowerment and 
disempowerment through the demands of balancing primary care for their families and acting as a 
breadwinner. Whilst they had gained a sense of empowerment through being a provider and 
responding to the demands placed on their families, they also felt that this compromised their ability 
to care for their families, enhancing a sense of guilt. Here there is a sense that there is no choice, and 
empowerment is often framed as exhaustion. Whilst women use their agency and their gender to 
engage in low key (often secluded) work, they are at risk and feel that working opportunities increase 
the risk of sexual propositioning or general exploitation.      
Gendered coping mechanisms in host communities  
Tight financial burdens, stress over legal status, overcrowding and living with extended family in 
compromised dwellings led to family disintegration and breakdown amongst Syrian families in 
Lebanon and Jordan. Women in both contexts shared experiences of stress and frustration in their 
new living situations, which had often led to an increase of tensions, and in some cases domestic 
violence. High density neighbourhoods, with little public space and little privacy, as well as homes that 
frequently suffered from permeability and poor structure, resulted in families feeling vulnerable and 
strained. As families were forced into much smaller dwellings than they had lived in previously, aspects 
of privacy and social space were removed, upsetting family dynamics and gender norms (see (El-Masri, 
2013; Meth et al., 2019).  
In Beirut, Husniya, a Kurdish woman who described herself as enjoying a ‘comfortable life’ before the 
crisis, talked of how a ‘boundary had been crossed’ between her and her husband as they had been 
‘sharing insults against each other’. She spoke of how issues over rent and expenses had led to an 
increase in arguments. Her description of a boundary being crossed evokes the idea of a relationship 
altered through the stress of flight and the burden of asylum. Husniya expressed how she was 
desperate to get away from the conflict within her house and to escape, but also described a 
nervousness about the wider neighbourhood and a lack of places to retreat to. As a result, she had 
taken to sitting in the downstairs apartment of her Lebanese neighbour, where we interviewed her.  
Fadila, an elderly woman living in Na’ba, found her husband growing abusive and insulting as their 
circumstances created a heavy strain on the family. She explained how her daughters were married 
with children and how their husbands had abandoned them because of the ‘stress’ of living in 
Lebanon. Her daughters had returned to live with their parents, who were now hosting 10 family 
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members in their home. They had received some assistance from UNHCR for a time, but this had been 
cut off for months. The burden of insecurity was heavy on the family and Fadila found herself at the 
mercy of her husband’s temper:    
My husband is being insulting sometimes [to me], because he is tense and sometimes, he 
lashes out, sometimes he is physically abusive’ (Fadila, Na’ba). 
Fadila’s account of her daughter’s abandonment under the strain of flight and asylum was similar to 
participants in Jordan, a number of whom explained that their husbands had actually returned to Syria 
because they couldn’t bear life in Jordan. However, the women had refused to follow, frequently out 
of concern for family and for safety reasons. Leesha, a Syrian mother of seven from Dara’a whose 
husband had previously worked in Kuwait, detailed the deterioration of her marriage under the harsh 
realities of asylum:  
‘When we got to Amman [my husband] wasn't able to handle living here… He was under so 
much pressure, he was really short tempered…it caused a lot of problems…He started beating 
me and the kids…He said: ‘I don't care if I die, I'm just going to go back to Syria.’ I refused and 
that's when we separated’ (Leesha, Hashmi-Shamali).   
This reflects El-Masri et al.’s (2013) assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, noting the increase in 
negative expressions of masculinity under the challenging conditions of being a refugee, leading to a 
rise in abuse within the home and an increase in gender-based violence. In these accounts, it is clear 
that the stressful circumstances of being a refugee, alongside living in cramped and compromised 
housing conditions interact to create an environment of tension, stress and frustration which can 
result in such gender-based violence. The lack of rights and opportunities for refugees in their host 
communities exacerbate already poor living conditions for these families and heighten women and 
children’s vulnerability to abuse and neglect.  
Whilst some men had felt compelled to return to Syria rather than continuing life in exile, others had 
attempted to make the trip to Europe after finding it difficult to gain work, or feeling that their lack of 
status left them vulnerable to abuse and arrest:  
‘[My husband] is trying to find work, trying to be smuggled to other areas… to go somewhere 
where he could save us. When he was here there was a risk for men, it wasn’t a good situation’ 
(FGD 7, Mazra’a). 
Some participants were displeased at their husbands’ attempts to travel to Europe. Rabiah, whose 
situation was discussed above, was scathing of her husband’s efforts to get asylum in Finland. She 
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perceived this to be an impatient and poorly thought out choice born out of his personal frustration 
rather than their family’s needs. He had been denied asylum in Finland and was unable to return to 
Jordan, leaving her and her children vulnerable and unsure of their future.     
Onward movement to third countries was highly gendered, dependant on age and often income. 
Many participants in Lebanon, viewed those that ‘travelled’ onto Europe and who had managed to 
leave Lebanon, as being wealthy and having opportunity, in contrast to their situation. There were 
generally far more cases in Jordan of women describing attempts to make the journey to Europe. 
Participants described some successful attempts by family members (all male, and usually in their 
twenties or thirties) to seek asylum further afield. The expectation would be that these men would 
apply for asylum and then have their families relocated to join them. However, men were not always 
successful in achieving refugee status, and family reunification was not always granted. In these cases, 
participants would frequently ask questions during interviews and focus groups about reunification 
and asylum procedures in Europe and why they weren’t eligible to join their extended family. Women 
were often left behind in the first country of asylum in the hope that their male relatives would be 
successful in their efforts to relocate the entire family. However, if this was unsuccessful it left women, 
children, and dependent elderly relatives in precarious financial situations.     
Older, single women whose sons had gone ahead were particularly vulnerable. Because of their age 
they were frequently unable to work in any way. Additionally, they were often not able to join their 
older sons who had travelled to Europe through family reunification policies, as most European 
national and asylum reunification policies typically relate only to the nuclear family unit and not the 
extended family (see: Council of Europe, 2017):  
‘[I am divorced and my sons went to Germany] they tried to get me out [of Jordan] but they 
were unable to, so I’ve been left alone with the smaller children…We can't work, we can't live 
here, I am trapped because I am unable to leave…I will never see my sons again’ (FGD 4, 
Ashrafyeh).  
 In these cases, they could only hope that their male relatives were successful in gaining employment 
in Europe and sending remittances to the family so they could survive.  
Family abandonment, patriarchy and polygamy  
In these precarious contexts, wives could find themselves discarded, further exacerbating their 
vulnerability. Despite Qur’anic instruction that a man should only marry additional women if he can 
provide equally for all the women and their subsequent children, some men appeared to be using 
flight and asylum as an opportunity to take a second wife without divorcing or providing for their first 
(or subsequent) wives. Noodah explained that after enduring her husband’s tension and domestic 
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abuse, his mother helped him find a ‘new Syrian wife’, twenty years his junior, living in Za’atari camp. 
He subsequently married her, abandoned his family and moved back to Syria, leaving Noodah and her 
children financially vulnerable and insecure:  
‘He just went off and got married like some teenager or something. I hope that God gives me 
strength to raise [my children]. On top of being a refugee and a stranger [in this country], and 
then that idiot leaves us’ (Noodah, Ashrafyeh).   
During a focus group discussion in Mazra’a, a participant explained that her husband had abandoned 
her and her two children in favour of taking on a second wife. She was distressed in the focus group 
whilst describing his decision and frequently commented that he had only done this ‘for the money’ 
as the woman in question was wealthy. She felt that in such an ongoing financially precarious context 
that Syrian men only ‘wanted someone with money’. She lamented that she had nothing financially 
to offer and insisted that the financial vulnerability of Syrian families living in Lebanon was leading to 
family breakdowns.   
Men who had more than one wife, and more than one family, found that their financial vulnerability 
as refugees left them unable to support two families. I interviewed Yaminah in her tiny dwelling in 
Na’ba with six of her eleven children present during the interview, as she explained how her husband 
had cut them off in favour of only supporting his first wife:  
‘So he was acknowledging our spending and paying for us [in the first nine months we were 
here], but then the other [wife] didn't accept the situation so he stop paying for us….he is 
married to someone else and has three children’ (Yaminah, Na’ba).  
This placed Yaminah in a very vulnerable position. She lived in some of the worst conditions I 
encountered during the fieldwork. Her children were filthy and had collected vegetables from the 
rubbish heap to eat. Her young sons were working in a café and selling packs of tissue paper on the 
street so the family could survive.  
Research has shown how polygamous relationships typically result in one wife and family being shown 
preferential treatment (Al-Krenawi et al., 2001). In accounts shared by my participants, both first and 
second wives described neglectful and challenging situations arising out of their marital arrangements. 
Therefore, if in typical polygamous relationships, one family tends to be favoured over the others, in 
this context where resources and community are highly compromised through the stressors of flight 
and asylum, some families can be completely economically and socially neglected (or discarded). Thus, 
polygamous arrangements, acceptable within such socio-cultural contexts, interact with refugee 
policies to endanger the livelihoods and security of women in such environments.   
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Women also discussed how legal documentation and wider structures of refugee policies and identity 
papers were used strategically by Syrian men to restrict and control women’s legality and mobility in 
their host countries. These were used as a means of exerting power over women’s lives and 
experiences. This coupled with the deterioration of structural influences of kinship ties and 
relationships, which women argued had often provided a wider degree of protection for them (for 
example, many argued that living in Syria, their husbands would have been greatly demeaned for 
taking on a second wife by the first wife’s wider kinship network). This resulted in a change in social 
positioning for women within their family network and indeed had wider repercussions on their 
societal positioning.  
Sawsan talked of her mother, who was trapped in Za’atari refugee camp with her two younger siblings, 
because her husband (Sawsan’s father) would not allow her to have access to the family book15 which 
would allow her to formalise her papers through UNHCR. Sawsan explained that her father had sold 
significant assets in Syria and was very wealthy but was only concerned with his second family with 
whom he lived with in Amman. Sawsan commented on his wealth and how he had supported his 
second wife and young daughter who wore ‘gold up to their elbows’ but had abused and cut off his 
first family. Here, Sawsan’s father had used the Jordanian law and its policies related to Syrian refugee 
status and documentation to confine his wife’s wider mobility and legality to the Za’atari refugee camp 
(FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).   
Her account was echoed in Kalima’s experiences in Amman. Kalima was a divorcee who had owned 
her own house in Syria. Upon marrying for a second time, she found that her new husband was 
inclined to abusive behaviour, on occasion refused to work, and encouraged her to ‘get rid’ of her 
children from her first marriage who lived with them in her house. She explained that she defended 
and protected her children from her new husband, but that the dynamic had shifted when they arrived 
in Jordan. Her husband had Jordanian identification documents through his father, and the 
relationship altered in his favour:  
'In Syria, [we] lived in my house and I had power. When we came here, it was time for revenge. 
He doesn’t let me talk to anyone or go to anyone’s houses. He beats me and kicks me out the 
house all the time in the night with my children. The law is with my husband more than it is 
 
15 The Family Book is a Syrian government-issued document a couple receives when they register their marriage; the names of children 
born to the marriage are added to the document when they are registered. This is used as a form of identification, in particular to prove 
marriage and family links (IHRC, NCR, 2015) 
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with me, because he is Jordanian basically. Even though we are married, I can't get the ID, I 
don't have the money. It costs 250JD (£250)’ (Kalima, Ashrafyeh).  
Ghada and her husband had settled in Beirut together after escaping from Syria. Within a couple of 
years, her husband had become engaged to a second woman, which he had organised by returning to 
Syria. He wanted to bring her to Lebanon, and Ghada described feeling physically sick at the news. 
Despite her significant displeasure, she emphasised that the war, and their subsequent life as 
refugees, had compromised her previous economic and social status. She had held greater power in 
the relationship previously as she was older and wealthier than her husband and had benefitted from 
a strong kinship network. However, she was now disconnected from her wider community, and 
powerless to stop the union. Observing their poverty, lack of privacy and her contempt for her 
husband and his treatment of her, I commented that I was surprised that her husband thought that 
this was appropriate time to take on such a commitment. She responded:  
‘There won’t be any strain, because Syrian women have very minimal needs, or very minimal 
demands, so if [the other wife] comes here, there would be no extra expenses....it would just 
be the same, the same as [just] me...But I will make it clear that I am the first wife’ (Ghada, 
Na’ba).  
In this statement, Ghada expresses her intention to emphasise her position of seniority as the ‘first 
wife’, thus tactically ‘bargaining with patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti, 1988) in order not to lose more power or 
status within her marital relationship. However, as explored above, this did not always relate to a 
preferential position and within such a polygamous arrangement she was still vulnerable to neglect or 
abandonment.  
There is no denying that family breakdown, divorce and second (third, or fourth) marriages occurred 
in Syria before the war. However, the pressures of being refugees increased the likelihood of family 
breakdown, and some men were inclined to use their patriarchal position, alongside wider structures 
of legal policy (and disintegrating kinship structures) to discard or exploit their families and 
dependants. Kalima’s account highlights how patriarchal structures can interact with structures of 
state law to oppress refugee women. In these accounts the changing social positions of refugee 
women become pronounced (Anthias, 2008). Whereas once they may have been in ‘powerful’ 
positions within their family (such as Ghada or Khalima) their new physical location in a country of 
asylum resulted in a new social positioning of marginality, shaped by the structures of patriarchy and 
refugee policies.  
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Some participants described arranging marriages for their daughters for their own protection and 
future security. Hanan, a middle-class woman from Homs, talked to us of the imminent arranged 
marriage between her daughter and her daughter’s cousin who lived in Saudi Arabia. They had never 
met, and indeed Hanan doubted she would ever be able to see her daughter again as they did not 
have the option of leaving Jordan and returning, because of their refugee status. She was deeply 
uncomfortable about the situation but felt this was the best step to take for her daughter’s future. 
Other participants talked of how they had married off their older teenage daughters to ‘good men’ in 
Syria for their protection, before making the journey to Lebanon or Jordan with their younger family 
members. Studies focused on the Syrian conflict have noted how girls are married off early in order to 
give them a sense of security, whilst men in host communities take advantage of vulnerable and 
financially compromised families, offering to marry women, and frequently children, in order to 
‘assist’ the family (Dionigi, 2016; El-Masri, 2013; IHRC/NRC, 2016; Kivilcim, 2016; UN Women, 2013). 
These accounts add to research that has indicated the continued vulnerability of women in times of 
conflict to forced, or child, marriage as a negative coping strategy, emphasising that some of this can 
occur before refugees make the journey from their home countries through the marrying off of 
daughters to suitors for protection.  
Conclusion 
Through the examples presented in this chapter we can see how the existing state law and policy 
regarding Syrian refugees’ status and right to work shapes and mediates elements of everyday 
violence and exploitation of refugees (Brickell & Cuomo, 2019, p. 13), and shapes the livelihoods and 
spaces of shelter they can access. As such, these policies create a broad framework of insecurities that 
refugees negotiate in their day-to-day lives. This is a theme that will be further explored in the 
following two empirical chapters within the context of other forms of insecurity.  
To summarise: a number of scalar, political and practical issues shape refugee decisions as to where 
to seek asylum. Global and regional politics play into the material conditions of geography and 
borders. Refugees’ choices are shaped by socio-political concerns, economic opportunities, family 
networks and the material practicalities of where they can access. However, whilst structural forces 
are at work, there are still tactical decisions possible within these constraints. For example, self-settled 
participants in Jordan made it clear that they intentionally sought to avoid the complicated political 
systems within Lebanon in order to enhance the safety of their families, whilst many Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon sought the potential employment links and opportunities present in that country.  
 In both contexts, refugee policies have a marked effect on refugee families’ precariousness and socio-
economic vulnerability, which in turn increases the vulnerabilities of human security for refugees. The 
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insistence that refugees in Lebanon are ‘not refugees’ but are framed and labelled rather as Syrian 
migrant ‘guests’ has resulted in the continuation of damaging policies that insist on refugees paying 
for unaffordable work permits in order to legitimise their presence in Lebanon. Thus refugees, 
particularly those from poorer socio-economic backgrounds, attempt to establish livelihoods for their 
families whilst their status and right to be in Lebanon remains ‘unauthorised’. This creates spaces of 
legitimised exploitation and abuse of refugees by individuals who are aware that they are living in 
precarious situations in their host neighbourhoods and have few opportunities for recourse.     
The bail out system in place in Jordanian refugee camps, although now greatly restricted, led to direct 
exploitation of refugees desperate to escape the camp and enhance security for their families. Policies 
in Jordan were more systematic and clearer, and refugees were given means of support through food 
vouchers. As a result, refugees expressed a far greater sense of human security and there were 
significantly fewer accounts of spiralling and unmanageable debt. 
However, labour laws and the kafala system pertaining to Syrian refugees in both host countries push 
refugees, mainly those from poorer socio-economic positions, to work in the informal sector for poor 
pay and under poor work conditions. This severely inhibits opportunities to improve their situations. 
Despite generating additional income for the household through working in the informal sector, 
refugees continued to express their feeling of being highly vulnerable and under extreme stress due 
to their circumstances. This was because they could be caught and deported, while they were also 
being exploited and defrauded by employers.  
Whilst policies pertaining to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon is not gendered at the state level, 
at the micro level, examining the daily, lived experiences of refugees, the law shapes refugees 
experience in gendered ways, and has gendered consequences. Poor urban infrastructures and shelter 
in densely populated refugee receiving neighbourhoods coupled with refugee policies that placed 
severe stress upon families. This creates spaces of vulnerability, and violence, for women. At home 
they can be exposed to an increase in domestic violence. In potential places of employment, they are 
subject to sexual harassment or demands to compromise their appearance. Thus, women experience 
insecurity at several levels: the intimate scale of their bodies, to the materiality of their homes, to 
their inability to obtain work and to their uncertain status as refugees and outsiders.  
The wider patriarchal structures at work in Syria affect women in particular ways in contexts of asylum. 
Having suffered from poor educational prospects, and having been removed from school early, some 
women feel that they lack the necessary skills to gain jobs in order to support their families in their 
host communities and expressed a reliance on men to bring in much needed income.    
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Patriarchy couples with polygamous relationships and refugee policies to create further oppression, 
whereby women and children can be discarded or controlled in particular ways. Clearly, polygamous 
relationships can be challenging (and socio-economically compromising) enough for women when a 
family is embedded in its indigenous community. However, when they are displaced, and their social 
and cultural ties have been greatly reduced, or even eliminated, the structural effects of these 
relationships are felt at their strongest. Refugee policies clearly have gendered implications. Men (who 
are physically able) are far more likely to seek opportunities for asylum in third countries and leave 
their immediate and extended family behind. Whilst this places men in highly precarious contexts of 
ongoing mobility and flight, it traps women and children into particular circumstances in their host 
countries. For female-headed households, asylum in cities often results in them ‘being stuck’ in 
specific neighbourhoods due to their economic precarity and an inability to ‘move on’. Here, the daily, 
lived and gendered implications of refugee law are felt.   
These accounts demonstrate how geopolitical scales affect the intimate and embodied lives of refugee 
women. Patriarchy intersects with geopolitical structures of refugee legal policy to create frameworks 
of oppression that have deep repercussions on the lives of refugee women. That is not to deny women 
their agency and capacity - as women throughout the chapter have clearly demonstrated tactical ways 
of negotiating within such structural conditions – but to emphasise the oppressiveness and difficulty 
of the contexts in which refugees find themselves. Legal structures prevent refugees, particularly 
those that are socio-economically marginalised, from pursuing appropriate livelihoods and work. As 
such, family breakdown, affairs, domestic violence and abandonment increasingly begin to feature as 
families are deeply affected by the stress of life in exile. This is exacerbated by hostile policies that 
allow for little leeway. These policies also shape refugee decisions to seek asylum in Europe in order 
to secure better conditions for themselves, joining the wider global movement of people and their 
efforts to enter ‘fortress Europe’.    
Women’s identities intersect with structural conditions which result in women navigating new social 
positions as the family breadwinner. However, despite the expectations of some commentators, these 
new positions are not necessarily empowering or emancipatory. Women’s expressions of agency, 
capacities and empowerment in this study also very much reflect Muhanna's (2013) research with 
Palestinian refugee women. Women do take on new roles in their host communities, but these come 
at a price. Women experience exhaustion and on occasion, embarrassment, working outside of the 
home. Here they show the complex pay-offs of ‘empowerment’. Whilst they may feel proud of the 
ways in which they care and provide for their families, they also clearly sense that they have failed to 
care and provide enough for the emotional, caring and upkeep needs of the family and their own 
home. Additionally, intersectional axes of oppression meet together to further disadvantage women. 
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Their Syrian identity, gender and socio-economic standing coupled with their lack of status create a 
‘black hole’ of lack of protection and vulnerability. Women’s attempts to gain employment are often 
coupled with demands for personal compromise – to remove hijabs, or to spend time alone with male 
employers.  
Whilst this chapter has emphasised the role of deeply oppressive structures in shaping daily life for 
Syrian women, it is important to highlight the ways in which women respond to these heavily 
structured and oppressive environments and contexts in nuanced and tactical ways. For example, the 
safety and protection of children was paramount to all participants. It dominated concerns and 
decisions and shaped behaviours and tactical choices. Most women choose the safety and protection 
of their children over their husband’s desire to return to Syria, even if this resulted in divorce and 
separation, explaining that whilst living in exile is terrifying, returning to live in a warzone would be 
far worse and would compromise their children’s safety and opportunities. Women in Jordan 
specifically dictated this as a reason for leaving camps for the perceived safety and stability of the city 
that this would bring their children. Others recognised that their husbands were unable to work, and 
looked for avenues of employment, even though these were often exploitative and disrupted family 
dynamics and norms. However, it was also clear that for many women, work should not compromise 
their position and dignity, and thus working with unknown men or working without a hijab was 
considered anathema. Women exert decision making, agency and capacity in such conditions, 
attempting to make the most of their situation and prioritising the safety and protection of their 
families wherever possible.  
The following chapter will build on the findings from this chapter by focusing on the specificity of the 
ways in which women experience and negotiate public space in Amman and Beirut.  It will develop 
some of the themes that emerged from this chapter, particularly the spatial repercussions and 
practices of intersecting refugee identities within wider cultural norms and structures and refugee 
policies, the ways in which host community relationships and attitudes shape behaviours and the 
patterns of tactical response that emerge from participants in response to these contexts.      
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Chapter Seven: Negotiating public space and the hegemonic gaze  
 
‘The structures of gender, race and class play into determining whose bodies belong where, how 
different social groups subjectively experience various environment…and what sort of exclusionary 
and disciplinary techniques are applied to specific bodies’ (Silvey, 2006, p. 70).  
The above quotation from Silvey underpins the theoretical framing for this chapter, which addresses 
the intersection of refugee women’s identities in the context of their negotiation and experience of 
public space in their host cities. Silvey’s emphasis on the intersectionality of identities and the ways in 
which this has spatial repercussions, both real and perceived, is characteristic of refugee women’s 
urban experiences. These experiences and perceptions of public spaces shape women’s usage, 
engagement and (re)production of space. The chapter is primarily concerned with the research 
question: In what ways do (social, legal and political) structures shape experiences of public space and 
urban mobility for Syrian refugee women and how do women respond to these? Through its 
examination of intersectional identities, mobility and public space, it contributes to the principal 
research question through a consideration of insecurity both at the scale of the city, and of the home.  
As explored in Chapter Two, ‘public space’ is both a material location (the outdoors) as well as 
reference to urban spaces of publicness, such as city squares, streets and parks, all of which are 
imbued with social meaning. Thus, this chapter considers refugee women’s experiences and wider 
public negotiations of their host neighbourhoods, but also some of their more specific attitudes 
towards accessing so-called ‘public spaces’ of their host cities. Through these accounts, different 
spaces of the city emerged as ‘forbidden’ or ‘permitted’ to women, depending on the interaction of a 
number of different structures and issues, and in some spaces, these are more explicit than others 
(Fenster, 1999).  
This chapter builds on the examination in Chapter Six of refugee status, living conditions and 
livelihoods of women refugees. It does this by exploring how various motivating and deterring 
structures at different scales interact with refugee women’s identities to shape their experiences of 
public space, in both host neighbourhoods and the wider city.  By focusing on spatial experiences of 
the ‘everyday’, refugee women’s impressions and negotiations of their cities become clear (Lyytinen, 
2015b). Whilst the chapter is primarily focused on public spaces, private spaces of home are 
intrinsically linked and relational to public spaces and a wider sense of both security and belonging for 
refugees (Brun & Fabos, 2015; Fenster, 2005). Thus, women’s reflections and comparisons regarding 
both these spaces are explored in order to provide insight into how various structures and identities 
work across different scales to shape women’s spatial experiences.  
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In order to understand the decisions that women make within environments that are often 
oppressively structured, particularly as they impact on women’s intersectional identities, theories of 
tactical agency (De Certeau, 1984) and patriarchal bargaining (Kandiyoti, 1988) are used to provide 
insight into women’s agency, and in particular their varied active and non-active responses to 
structural mechanisms (Fenster, 1999). The chapter emphasises both the uniformity and variation in 
women’s experiences in public space in Amman and Beirut, demonstrating the ways in which an 
intersectional approach provides rich insight into the spatial realities and responses of women 
operating within structural constraints.  
Several intersecting structural and identity issues shape women’s experiences and perspectives of 
space as (varying degrees of) permitted or forbidden, such as age, sexuality, class, finances, and 
refugee status. These are deeply interconnected and relational but cannot be discussed in such a 
format here. As such, they are presented in a linear and thematic format as much as possible within 
this chapter. Where the intersections are particularly significant, such as when they compound 
exclusion, these will be analysed in more specific detail.   
This chapter begins with a discussion of refugee women’s weak socio-economic position and the ways 
in which this marginalisation narrows women’s capacity for mobility within their host cities. It will then 
consider women’s social relationships and networks within host and refugee communities and the 
importance this has for refugee women’s mobility and sense of belonging to the city. Additionally, it 
will examine gendered experiences of verbal and sexual harassment and the ways in which these 
experiences ‘other’ refugee women in public space and disrupt their sense of security and their right 
to the city. Lastly, it will examine the tactics that women engage in, in order to negotiate public space, 
alongside discussions of gender, mobility and temporality, and the role that patriarchy has in shaping 
women’s relationship with public space.  
Daily life, gender and mobility in public space  
Refugee women typically balanced a multitude of daily demands and expectations that required public 
mobility.  Day to day lives were punctuated by ‘mundane’ and regular activities such as taking children 
to school, visiting the market for supplies or visiting social contacts and relations if they had any in the 
city. As explored in Chapter Six, some women were employed in their local neighbourhoods, although 
work was often difficult to obtain. As detailed in the Methodology Chapter, women were asked if they 
would engage in cognitive mapping techniques in order to map their experiences of their 
communities. The few women that did participate drew brief maps of only three of four places that 
they regularly frequented within their neighbourhoods. These were commonly their homes, a place 
of sociability (typically a place where extended family or friends lived), the school where they took 
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their children and a local market. What emerged from these contributions was an impression of 
limited movement, to a small number of places within their immediate neighbourhood.  
The following section examines daily activities of refugee women, in order to gain insight into their 
perspectives of the urban outdoors in their host cities. It considers the experiences, attitudes and 
emotions of women as they negotiate spaces outside of their homes as they pay social visits, travel to 
NGOs for aid or attempt to spend leisure time with their families. Women’s perspectives are shaped 
not only by aspects of identity interacting with structures of refugee policy, legality and social and 
cultural norms, but also past and ongoing experiences, such as those cultivated by the civil war.  As 
such, women’s mobility in the urban outdoors is shaped and influenced by a myriad of interconnecting 
and often relational issues and structures. Some of these are briefly raised in this opening section to 
acknowledge their influence (such as sexual harassment), and then addressed in more detail later in 
the chapter.  
Socio-economic status and public spaces    
Living in socio-economically deprived, high density areas meant that opportunities to enjoy green, 
outdoor leisure space were few and far between for refugee women and indeed for other members 
of these urban communities. Occasionally, women in Beirut and Amman talked of how the urban form 
and high densities of their host neighbourhoods reminded them of communities back in Syria 
(particularly those participants who originated from Aleppo) and thus felt a sense of the familiar whilst 
walking the streets of these neighbourhoods. However, most participants were caustic about the lack 
of public space and greenery in their host cities and the high cost that one had to pay to access leisure 
opportunities and activities. Women who had lived in high-density neighbourhoods in Syria showed a 
wider knowledge of their cities which allowed them to access and enjoy spaces of leisure.   
It was rare for women to have open spaces or parks within proximity that were perceived as public 
spaces of leisure. When I asked about public features within the neighbourhood, such as parks or 
playgrounds, they were often identified by women as being ‘too far’, ugly or unsafe to use (Deerifa, 
Mahata). Several participants living in Amman reflected on the beauty and ‘the green’ of Syria, and 
the availability of parks and accessible sociable spaces where they felt welcomed:  
‘In Syria I used to go out a lot. Wherever we go in Syria there are lots of parks, and lots of 
places to go and it’s very nice, you can just walk here. There is nothing interesting here for me 
to visit…[Here] I don’t go out much…I don’t have any leisure activities’ (Yeseniah, Hashmi-
Shamali).    
Ababsa (2017) has reflected on the lack of safe and useable public spaces for women in Amman, 
noting: ‘There are no gardens, there are no benches, there is a low level of tolerance’ (n/p). This was 
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indicative of how women described their impressions and experiences of their immediate 
neighbourhoods; Amman was perceived as a dusty, dry and ugly city by participants with a dearth of 
public spaces where families could visit.  
In Beirut, women rarely expressed enjoying leisure time in the city or accessing parks or open spaces. 
No participant talked of visiting the promenade on the Corniche and as most parks are highly 
securitised spaces of surveillance, even local citizens expressed rarely using them. In Mazra’a, the 
Beirut Municipal sports stadium is open during the day for runners and walkers. However, the outside 
is heavily securitised. Military tanks guard the entrance and there is prolific barbed wire. Whilst locals 
do use the space to exercise or on occasion for prayer, no participant described using it or perceiving 
it as a public space of leisure16. My personal observation of the space was that it was significantly 
underutilised (Al Masri, 2016). Women in Na’ba spoke of occasionally using a local community garden 
that had been developed by a community activist and NGOs, and taking children to a small local 
playground. However, the playground was often locked by a chain link fence due to ongoing 
vandalism. These examples point to the lack of public spaces within such neighbourhoods and the 
challenges that refugees have in accessing them in these contexts (Linn, 2020).  
Economic precarity shaped women’s mobility and access to public spaces of leisure within their wider 
host cities. Women emphasised their inability to generate income and their ongoing lack of financial 
security in the city as limiting their mobility and capacity to seek out spaces of enjoyment or leisure:   
‘We only have enough money to pay for our basic needs, we don’t ever have any leisure 
activities or anything’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).   
‘Generally, I don’t leave [my neighbourhood] …you would have to pay 10JD (£10) if you wanted 
to go out’ (Fariha, Mahata).  
Participants contrasted the frequent time they spent outdoors enjoying the leisure activities on offer 
in Syria with their friends and family, in comparison to their status as refugees and their resulting 
experiences of the unaffordability of Amman and Beirut. In Amman, several women highlighted the 
cultural sites of the Roman Amphitheatre and the Citadel and their desire to visit them. The East of 
the City suffers from serious congestion and high-density housing and these cultural sites are highly 
visible in this area. However, for refugees the entry prices (either 2JD [£2] or 3JD [£3] respectively per 
person) meant they were unable to consider entering or visiting the sites. King Hussein Sports City, 
 
16 The Stadium itself has a fascinating history as the host of the Nejmah Football Club, and the location of both sporting and political 
rivalries. Much of its intense securitization emerges from its footballing and political legacy, particularly between Shi’a and Sunni factions 
(Al Masrari, 2016).    
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the main park and sports hub, located in the North of Amman, was considered too much of a distance 
and the cost of travelling in a bus to the area was a significant barrier:  
‘[We] want to go to the Roman Theatre, but we can't afford it... it has been 6 years since we 
have been to any park or anything like that…In Syria anyone can just go [to the beach or park]. 
But here you need a car and money for expenses’ (Minar, Hashmi Shamali).   
For some participants, the lack of public, accessible leisure space intersected with their lack of status 
and poor financial capacities, and this exacerbated their already poor mental health:  
‘It’s very tiring to be here. We don’t have any freedom. Or leisure activities. We can’t afford to 
do anything fun or go on a road trip…I feel like my heart died…I just want to get out of the 
house’ (Basmaa, Ashrafyeh). 
Lack of finances also hindered the capacity of Syrian women in Beirut to engage with the wider city. 
As presented in Chapter Six, women had chosen to settle in neighbourhoods for their perceived 
affordability as other parts of the city were seen as expensive and inaccessible. This was not only 
regarding rent and amenities, but also because of their shops and markets. Husniya, who had lived in 
Na’ba for four years since 2012 explained that she had never left the confines of the neighbourhood:  
 
‘even for walks or just to go around…I heard that a lot of areas like Bourj Hammoud and 
Doura’a and others are more expensive then here’ (Husniya, Na’ba).  
 
Her anticipation and worry of other areas being unaffordable resulted in her confining herself spatially 
to her immediate neighbourhood. Even though she explained that she would just be ‘walking around’, 
she still perceived movement beyond her immediate neighbourhood to have financial repercussions. 
Others echoed these remarks, emphasising both the unaffordability of neighbourhoods beyond the 
one in which they had settled, and the expense of using different facilities and shops.  
 
‘I would like to go out and about in Beirut and Lebanon, but there is no money. I would like to 
do that, but I can’t’ (Wajida, Na’ba). 
 
‘I don’t go out of the house at all…I don’t have money to shop’ (FGD 8, Mazra’a).  
 
Lack of finances and lack of sociable spaces in which to enjoy leisure activities, frequently layered upon 
aspects of identity and issues of agency within public space which contributed to feelings of insecurity. 
When discussing parks, or places for children to play, issues of identity and conflict frequently 
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emerged. Women highlighted experiences of taking their children to parks where fights erupted 
between Syrian and Lebanese children which quickly deteriorated into racial slurs and the involvement 
of adults. This created fear and discomfort for women who expressed a desire to keep conflict to a 
minimum and not to create a ‘fuss’ within the community (see below) in order to increase their wider 
sense of security within the neighbourhood. Furthermore, as explored in Chapter Six, women also felt 
a keen sense of worry and concern related to the welfare of their children in such contexts where their 
human security was continually compromised. Thus, a motivating factor in not using these spaces was 
the desire to protect family from insults and bullying and to prevent antagonistic encounters from 
escalating at a neighbourhood scale, thus maintaining the family’s wider sense of security.   
  
Finances also interacted with other issues of identity to restrict mobility. When I asked Wajida if it was 
the financial restrictions that prevented her from pursuing leisure activities outdoors, or spending 
prolonged, social time in the community, she emphasised her status as a divorced woman:  
 
‘I’m divorced, so I would feel scared for myself. From bad guys. I would feel scared for my kids. 
[That] and financial issues’ (Wajida, Na’ba).  
  
Thus, the practicalities of limited finance were exacerbated by her sense of insecurity in the 
neighbourhood because of her marital status which left her with a sense of vulnerability. Discussion 
and accounts of sexual harassment peppered women’s narratives in both Beirut and Amman, as 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter. In this statement, Wajida refers to the ways in which 
different structural issues, layer upon her identity as a divorced, Syrian, refugee woman to hinder her 
wider mobility in the city.  
 
Ulima discussed how she had little free time and she would only ever leave her home to go to visit her 
parents who lived nearby. When I asked what prevented her from engaging in other activities, such as 
going to a park or making social visits to others in the community, her husband interjected and 
explained:  
 
‘Financial difficulties…but there is a bit of insecurity…we don’t know the area well…[and] we 
don’t really know the people around here’ (Saad, Na-ba).     
 
Financial restrictions also meant that women could not ‘escape’ uncomfortable predicaments that 
they found themselves in. In her diary, Nasim noted how she and another female relative found 
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themselves abandoned in a part of Beirut which they were completely unfamiliar with, after a 
disagreement over a taxi fare. As they didn’t have any money left, they were forced to walk home 
whilst guessing the way. Their account was not dissimilar to others who expressed conflicts and 
disagreement with taxi drivers over routes, drop offs, fares and behaviour within the taxicab itself (as 
explored further below). Experiences like this had a negative effect on women, building a wider 
nervousness about spaces outside of the home, and made women concerned about leaving their 
known neighbourhood. Negative experiences often built a pervading sense of fear of the urban 
outdoors, thus shaping places outside of the home as an emotional landscape of insecurity for women 
who felt conscious of their various identities and the way in which this left them vulnerable (see 
Koskela, 1999; Pain, 1997; Valentine, 1989).  
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As examined in Chapter Six, before the civil war, migrant worker patterns between Syria and Lebanon 
were highly gendered. Very few women had lived with their husbands if they had worked abroad and 
only a handful of participants described short visits to Beirut in the past. Some participants from rural 
areas explained that they had never left their village before the civil war and had little knowledge of 
wider Syria. For several participants, limited experience of wayfinding due to geographical restriction, 
poor education and patriarchal norms, intersected together to create the city as a confusing and 
unknown entity. Women expressed that they simply did not ‘know’ the city in which they had found 
themselves. Many lacked awareness and understanding outside of their neighbourhoods, and worried 
about getting lost, particularly if they were illiterate:   
 
‘If I go out of the area, I wouldn’t know the places and I would get lost’ (Yaminah, Na’ba).  
 
‘I don’t go out of Naba unless someone gives me directions, because I am illiterate. An illiterate 
person is like a blind person’ (Ghada, Na’ba). 
 
Although families did have mobile phones, these tended to be in the possession of the male head of 
the family. Women rarely had access to their own phones, which deprived them of a sense of a 
‘lifeline’ and a means of contacting family and others when confronting a difficult predicament. Thus, 
this digital divide compounded other factors shaping women’s spatial lack of confidence (Wall et al., 
2017).   
 
Navigating humanitarian aid   
Due to their significantly limited financial options and the demands on their time, many women would 
only actively leave their homes for a purpose. Here, the NGO and humanitarian network played a 
significant role in drawing women out of their homes by offering aid and assistance. This was typical 
of both Amman and Beirut. Women would travel across the city if they heard a rumour about a charity 
giving out assistance or coupons, in the hope they would be eligible for aid. Some participants 
described these activities as their only wider engagement and movement beyond their immediate 
neighbourhood:   
 
‘I’ve never been out of this area. Both of us [she and her sister] haven’t, never. Just to get 
coupons’ (Fahira & Qamar, Mahatta).   
 
‘I don’t leave the area…well I do leave it, but only if I hear a charity is giving out food or 
178 
 
something’ (Leesha, Ashrafyeh).  
Women were also incentivised to attend focus groups and sessions at NGOs, by the offer of sanitation 
packs, food and other essential items. Indeed, this would have also featured in the focus groups for 
this research project, which were held at NGO premises, as women were typically gifted a sanitation 
pack after participating. Some of the participants expressed delight in partaking in the research study 
as it provided them with an opportunity ‘to do something’, to wash, dress and leave the house:  
‘It’s not a problem [to partake in focus groups] it’s nice for us, it’s a trip. We need someone to 
talk to, we need an outing’ (FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).  
 
In Jordan, women did not tend to express resentment at these activities, but viewed them as 
necessary, or even as an opportunity to get out the house. One participant even remarked that diverse 
NGO visits had resulted in her knowing the city ‘better than a local’. These neutral, and on occasion, 
appreciative expressions regarding aid and a wider mobility may have emerged because of my 
positionality, which was frequently viewed as a ‘humanitarian worker’. Participants may have felt they 
could not honestly express how they felt at having to navigate the humanitarian infrastructure if I was 
associated with it (Pascucci, 2017).  
 
However, participants in Beirut were far more caustic about the humanitarian and aid networks and 
their required negotiation of these institutions. As detailed in Chapter Six, Syrian refugee women in 
Beirut held negative opinions regarding both UNHCR and any other Syrian refugees who had managed 
to access assistance through them. Due to their precarious status, both legally and socio-economically, 
participants discussed visits to see different agencies and charities, both in their neighbourhood and 
the wider city, to secure support for their families. However, these visits were a significant source of 
resentment. Often valuable funds were used to travel to NGOs only for women to be treated rudely 
or discover there was no assistance available. Women considered these experiences negatively and 
talked of exhaustion and confusion related to this.  
This section demonstrates refugee women’s difficulties in accessing public spaces of the city and 
women’s wider challenges in acquainting themselves with, and negotiating, their unfamiliar host 
cities. Women express a desire to be part of the city, to be able to use leisure facilities or to shop, but 
feel unable to do so due to the interaction of a number of factors. This includes their financial 
precarity, which is shaped by wider refugee policies which limit access to work and income (see 
Chapter Six); and concerns related to their gender and ethnicity in being a ‘target’ for harassment. 
Impressions of and access to the city varies across different socio-economic and education levels. 
Those with greater disposable income feel able to use taxis or have a greater confidence in being able 
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to negotiate the city through the reading of signs and road names. The inability to ‘enjoy’ the city or 
to vary day to day life through visiting or exploring different neighbourhoods, parks or sites, had a 
marked effect on women’s mental health and the perception of the city in which they lived. Many 
areas of the city become inaccessible for refugee women, which led to an expressed listlessness and 
indifference to their host city.  
Social Relationships, Belonging and Mobility  
This section explores ideas of belonging, spatiality and social ties, by emphasising gendered networks 
and relationships in refugees’ host communities, highlighting the relationship between seclusion and 
mobility with respect to social relationships and a sense of belonging. Whilst urban refugees are 
coping with social, legal and economic exclusion, they can unintentionally further exclude themselves 
from their host society through their coping techniques, such as relying on refugee organisations or 
family and kinship networks (Grabska 2006). This can lead to strained host relationships and thus a 
compromised sense of security. Intra-social links amongst refugee communities enhancing refugees’ 
sense of protection and social capital (Calhoun, 2010) and wider social capital with both host and 
refugee communities, can lead to employment opportunities, housing and advice and a wider sense 
of integration (Palmgren, 2014). However, these relationships are often difficult to foster. Steven’s 
(2016) has explored the languishing network of social ties amongst Syrians in exile. He especially 
highlighted the financial and emotional strains of being a refugee, alongside a failure of NGOs to foster 
pre-existing networks. This section builds on his contributions with an emphasis on gendered 
networks, mobilities and space in urban areas. 
Social visits form an integral part of the social life of women in the Middle East. Women are typically 
engaged in daily visits to friends, relatives and neighbours and build strong inter and intra family social 
networks through these visits (Singerman, 1996). Participants shared varied experiences in their 
reflections on family, neighbours and general sociability and connected-ness in their host 
communities. For some participants, relationships and social calls to neighbours were an important 
part of feeling that they belonged or had support in the wider community, whilst others expressed 
difficulty in building networks and experienced a sense of isolation from both Syrian refugee 
communities and their host society.  
In both Beirut and Amman, refugee women’s forming of new relationships was determined by gender 
and proximity. This appeared to have greater weight than shared ethnicity or heritage. Participants 
described friendships and social bonds with Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, Palestinian, Kurdish or 
Armenian women, most of whom were their direct neighbours. This lessened the time that women 
spent on the street travelling, and this proximity allowed for friendships and connections to build 
180 
 
slowly and naturally over time:   
 ‘[Building relationships] is just a matter of distance…because of the distance I have gotten 
more close to my neighbours, so I go to them more then I go to visit my Syrian 
neighbours’ (Mouna, Hashmi Shamali).  
Thus, some participants had successfully managed to build relationships within their host 
communities which had enhanced their social lives, their mobility within and outside of the apartment 
buildings and sense of security and belonging. Basmaa, an expressive participant who lived in 
Ashrafyeh, went further. Rather than merely discussing a handful of friendships with women in 
proximity she countered:  
‘I don't only feel that I belong to the community, I feel like I have become the community. 
When I first got here, I was afraid of everything…. but I quickly managed to mingle and be a 
part of the society’ (Basmaa, Ashrafyeh).   
However, her account was unique. Others felt disconnected and alienated from the host community 
and didn’t consider themselves to be deeply entrenched within it.  For example, reflecting on her life 
in Aleppo, Zulima said she felt a ‘marked difference’ in how her daily life had transformed especially 
since the family had just celebrated Eid. In Aleppo, she had: ‘a very different social life’, where she 
would spend time with friends and family. Since living in Beirut, she rarely left the house, as she had 
no family living in Lebanon and therefore no one to visit, although she had slowly started to build 
connections with her two neighbours. She had been living in Na’ba, for over a year and was taken 
aback when I asked about where she spent her leisure time and if she was building relationships in 
her host neighbourhood, saying in response:    
 
 ‘This is a strange country. I can’t spend time at a stranger’s house’.  
 
Many participants acknowledged the high proportion of Syrians living in their neighbourhoods but 
insisted that this had no influence in creating a greater sense of feeling connected, safe or belonging 
to the community. Rather, it was only family connections that appeared to count in feeling secure and 
to aid a wider sense of comfort and belonging. In Beirut, only one participant and her husband 
expressed feeling as though they belonged to a ‘Syrian community’. Zada and her husband recounted 
experiences of conflict and difficulties in the neighbourhood and concluded that they were reticent to 
socialise and build relationships with local Lebanese.  
  
Speaking with Karam and his wife, Takiya, he explained that they frequently saw Syrians around the 
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neighbourhood but didn’t know them and wouldn’t approach them unless they had known them 
previously. He explained that ‘Syria is a big place’ and intimated that, just because they lived amongst 
other Syrian refugees wouldn’t necessarily mean they would approach them to ask advice about the 
neighbourhood or work. Alyas echoed these sentiments, stating that she thought her neighbourhood 
consisted of ‘75% Syrians’, but that this made no difference to how she felt or to the connections she 
had built.  
 
Even if women were restricted in their outdoor activities, visiting family was considered an important 
and essential aspect of daily life. Maintaining these networks was imperative, and reliance on them 
was strong. However, these also served to further isolate refugees from their host communities 
(Grabska, 2006). Strong family networks lessened incentives to connect with neighbours or to 
accustom themselves to their neighbourhoods and the wider city. The sense of family ties and 
community provided an aspect of belonging and safety, and to a certain extent addressed issues of 
isolation. Some participants explained that they ‘didn’t need’ to get to know neighbours because they 
had family, and that they wouldn’t reach out to them if they needed help or assistance but would 
rather rely on their family network:  
 
‘I try to keep limited relationships with other people…I struggle to find common points with 
them…and also, I don’t have to go to them for help…my husband’s entire family live next to 
us. So, we have family support. I don’t really need to [make contact with neighbours]’ (Rania, 
Hashmi Shamali).  
 
‘I’ve got lots of relatives here, so I don’t need to talk to the neighbours’ (Keila, Mahata).   
 
These excerpts intimate a conscious decision to remain apart from the wider community in which 
refugee families are living and to avoid building stronger social networks. This decision to remain 
inward-looking and disengaged from wider community is reflective of research that has shown the 
tendency for refugees to maintain anonymity in their host community, out of fear of arrest and 
deportation (Jacobsen & Nichols, 2011; Stevens, 2016). For some participants, it was clear that 
decisions to remain apart from others were in order to minimise potential points of friction, which 
could create conflict within host communities. In situations of conflict, as examined in further detail 
in Chapter Eight, refugees frequently expressed that they felt that there was a consistent, underlying 
power imbalance weighted towards the host community. Therefore, decisions to remain distant from 
others were clearly a mechanism of protection. Furthermore, women explained how gossip and 
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backstabbing in the community affected their ability to integrate with their neighbours. Ishtar 
discussed how she would avoid engaging in gossip and conversation within the wider community and 
would be pressed on this by other women:  
 
‘I say to them: “I didn’t come here for trouble. I’m here to live.” I don’t take sides with 
anyone…Whenever you have been in war, nothing else will really matter. [Petty neighbourly 
issues] are not real problems [they are not] worth it’ (Ishtar, Ashrafyeh). 
 
Her experience of a ‘gossipy’ community that attempted to drum up drama and conflict in order to 
pass the time was echoed in Wajida’s experiences in Beirut. She talked of her conscious decision to 
avoid close relationships as she felt that other women in the community criticised each other:  
 
‘I know people [in the community] …but I don’t deal with them…there is a lot of gossip amongst 
the neighbours. I try to avoid it by not talking with anyone…I pulled myself away [from 
relationships]’ (Wajida, Na’ba). 
 
Wajida, like others in the community, found that her marital status could result in gossip and isolation. 
She was a divorcee but explained that she frequently described herself as a ‘widow’ because of the 
stigma surrounding her divorced status and the repercussions she experienced (for example, public 
ridicule directed towards her sons). Shayma, a single mother living in Amman whose husband had 
abandoned her when she was in Syria, found it impossible to create a support network:   
‘[Other women] worry about their husbands…they alienate me because I am single and I don’t 
have a husband…Arabs are like that’ (Shayma, Ashrafyeh).  
She found that she frequently had ‘no one to talk to’, whilst shouldering the significant care burden 
of both her children and elderly parents. These comments provide some insight into a reticence, and 
on occasion, an inability to engage with both host communities and the wider Syrian community in 
exile. These accounts echo findings from Cornwall’s (2007) research with Yoruba women in Nigeria. 
She found that in contrast to feminist academic expectations of networked and supportive women in 
socio-economically deprived conditions, women were often wary about engaging with each other.  
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Additionally, urban refugees can exclude themselves from their host populations in order to gain 
specific rights – notably those of citizenship, return to their home country or resettlement in a third 
country (Sanyal, 2012, p. 638). Whilst refugee women did not express a desire to gain citizenship in 
their host countries, many referenced a desire to be resettled or to return home. As such, these 
matters may also be at play when refugee women keep themselves apart from their host 
communities, particularly as Syrian refugees will be deeply aware of Palestinian political history, which 
is heavily imbued with a ‘right to return’. Furthermore, the governments  of Lebanon and Jordan17 are 
also preoccupied with ensuring that Syrian refugees are not integrated into their states in the long 
term, so this sense of not belonging, of temporariness, in the everyday, is also shaped by wider 
structural mechanisms (as explored in Chapter Six) to ensure refugees don’t gain a sense of being 
settled.  
 
17 In the case of Jordan, since 2016 there has been a slight shift to a greater acceptance of the potentiality of a longer-term Syrian 
population living in Jordan. However, women would still have been shaped by their experiences within the country.  
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Despite some women expressing satisfaction, safety and a preference to be in the seclusion of home, 
spatial confinement also appeared to have a highly detrimental effect on women’s mental health. 
Participants had already been subject to traumatic experiences both within and during their flight 
from Syria. Several participants had come close to death themselves, been threatened with or 
experienced sexual violence, lost close family members, were injured or had lost children in utero. The 
civil war resulted in many participants being forced to remain indoors for fear of sniper attacks or 
bombings. Some participants had lived in Homs or Aleppo under severe bombardment, in Daesh 
controlled areas under the organization’s declared caliphate.  Others lived in more rural areas where 
they had not necessarily had direct confrontation with the conflict but had witnessed bombing from 
afar and encountered numerous blockades and security checks. Some participants had been internally 
displaced within Syria, camped in the desert on the border with Jordan, or had being smuggled into 
Lebanon. Additionally, women were often separated from family and kinship links that had played a 
strong role in their sense of community, identity and safety. These experiences had a clear mental toll. 
Women frequently discussed their heightened preoccupation with fears and concerns related to 
family members living back in Syria, or those that had attempted to make the journey to Europe, and 
the recollection of traumatic memories from the war.   
Confinement to home, or to their immediate neighbourhood, for a prolonged period during the war 
had a strong effect on women’s perspectives of life outside the home. The urban outdoors was heavily 
associated with fear and death. Participants, particularly those living in Amman, spoke of how this fear 
had permeated their day to day reality to such an extent that they found it difficult to unsettle even 
when they were conscious that they had found safety in their host communities. Women compared 
their sense of stability and aman (security) within their host communities to the ‘insecurity’ of Syria. 
Thus, even though many were uncomfortable in their host settings and described a range of 
insecurities, in comparison to their experiences in Syria, their new settings were an improvement. 
Nailah, whose family escaped Homs in 2012, during the Homs Offensive, reflected on her personally-
imposed restrictions in Amman:  
‘When I first got here, I was terrified. Because of the situation in Syria we couldn't leave the 
house. It was absolutely terrifying… you would actually die. So, I kind of took that fear with me 
when I came here. I stayed an entire year in the house. I didn't feel safe to go out’ (Nailah, 
Hashmi Shamali).  
Mahira and her family were living in the region of Deir ez-Zour, a site of numerous clashes between 
the Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army and Daesh. Brown’s (2018) analysis of women’s status under 
185 
 
Daesh rule shows an intensely patriarchal fixation on controlling women’s presence and appearance 
in public space and ensuring that women’s existence is predominantly cloistered. Experiences of 
Daesh had notably shaped Mahira’s perceptions of space and safety and left her reticent to leave the 
perceived protection of her home:   
‘[In Beirut ] I don’t go out…even with my husband I don’t go…. Because [our area in Syria] was 
controlled by Daesh, as women we wouldn’t go out’ (Mahira, Mazra’a).  
Keila also commented on how her public mobility changed during the conflict and continued to 
influence her mobility in her host city:  
‘In Syria, before the war, I would visit [my family] by myself [in rural Homs]...But during the 
war, I wouldn’t. So now it’s a changed habit’ (Keila, Hashmi Shamali).  
This wider sense of fear and seclusion related to their experiences during the civil war was 
supplemented with negative encounters within their host communities, confinement to their homes 
because of fear and discomfort, lack of financial opportunities or by their extended family’s wishes 
(see more below). For many women, this resulted in isolated and disconnected lives. Participants 
talked of how they were gharib (strangers or outsiders) to the community, but also to themselves:  
 ‘I don't go anywhere; I don't deal with anyone…I have a really strange life. I am a stranger 
everywhere. In my house, in my community, because I don’t go out. I don’t do anything; I just 
stay in the house. I don’t meet people...I am just surviving, living day by day’ (Badra, Hashmi 
Shamali). 
‘[Day to day life] does feel weird…it’s like being in a prison. A big prison’ (Takiya, Na’ba).   
 
Diary entries from participants in Jordan were particularly articulate in expressing some of this 
isolation and depression:  
 
Days passing by, every day like the one before it, nothing new. Loneliness, living in this place 
as strangers, we’re still strangers, we try to cope with this new society, hard living conditions, 
how are we to provide for our families, the rent to our house, how do we live in dignity without 
being hurt by anyone else? Or without being disrespected? (Hanan, Diary excerpt, Amman).    
 
Even for those participants that had made efforts to connect themselves to the social fabric of their 
host community, there was a sense that they were outsiders. Despite living in the country for years, 
women felt that they didn’t belong and were not fully accepted. Thus, they were cautious in how they 
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behaved or expressed themselves:   
 
‘My neighbourhood is very nice, and my neighbours are very nice. But I still feel that I can’t 
express my opinion…because I feel like a gharib [stranger] and I don’t have a right to say 
anything. They view us as strangers’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).  
  
This perspective of being gharib, an outsider, foreigner or stranger, was often used by participants to 
describe their emotions within their host communities and their difficulties in feeling that they 
belonged or had rights and highlighted their societal isolation, boredom and depression. This last 
comment from the focus group in Amman demonstrate that these feelings are expressed not only 
amongst women who lived highly secluded lives, but also amongst those that had made efforts to 
build relationships. These expressions of living in a prison and being a stranger even in one’s home 
show the ways in which private dwelling spaces are not necessary a space of comfort, or security for 
women. Indeed, many women talked of how compromised living spaces had enhanced feelings of 
suffocation and isolation. Thus, for many women these spaces are not considered to be bayt (i.e. 
home), with its associations of comfort and belonging.  
Additionally, it was also clear that regardless of the length of time they had been living in their host 
communities, there was still a strong yearning amongst participants to return to Syria, not unlike the 
sentiments shared by many displaced refugee communities (Brun & Fabos, 2015). Some discussed 
returning regardless of whether peace had been achieved and many talked at length about their 
concerns about family and their desire to be reunited with them despite concerns of safety. This desire 
to be home, with extended family, in places of familiarity, couples with refugee status that deems 
refugee’s ‘guests’ and makes little attempt to integrate or support them with a longer-term view:  
‘I’m adapting…. kind of. I do feel comfortable here, but at the same time not fully comfortable, 
because comfort is in bayti [my home], in Syria. So, let’s say I am [managing] until I can move 
back’ (Shahar, Na’ba).  
Women’s social relationships and networks in their host cities (and their wider mobility concerning 
this) are determined by a network of interconnected structural issues and personal experiences which 
interact with participants identities. Networks of family relationships predominantly lead to a stronger 
sense of belonging and stability within host cities. However, these networks also shaped decisions 
regarding wider social networks and integration and tend to play into decisions to remain aloof from 
wider society. Women that didn’t have such networks, either from an inability (for example, 
determined by their marital status intersecting with societal stigma around divorce or singleness) or 
187 
 
an unwillingness (often determined by experiences of fear) to build relationships, expressed a much 
higher sense of dislocation and unbelonging within their host cities. The lack of daily ‘encounterability’ 
on the street (Hodgson, 2012), of people to visit and connect with, a reason to leave the seclusion of 
home, led to a strong sense of isolation and a lack of knowledge of the city. For many women this then 
reproduced feelings of fear and insecurity when in public space. In these accounts, continued 
seclusion, because of fear or a sense of unbelonging in society, shaped women’s daily lives in negative 
ways.  
Verbal and physical harassment in public space  
Women experienced high levels of verbal, physical and sexual harassment in their host cities whilst 
negotiating public space, which deeply eroded their sense of security, safety and belonging in host 
communities. Examples featured in every focus group and interview. A significant majority of the 
participants referenced negative and derogatory comments about their Syrian ethnicity and status as 
refugees (Lyytinen, 2015a). These persistent comments wore away women’s sense of security and 
often their sense of having a ‘right’ to be present in public space and the wider city. The following 
section presents experiences and reflections of harassment in public space in Amman and Beirut, 
highlighting the ways in which different categories of identity are perceived or foregrounded by 
others.  
Derogatory and insulting comments related to one or more of a woman’s identity categories, was 
considered typical by most participants. Participants in Lebanon shared countless experiences of 
verbal harassment in public space directly related to their ethnicity and refugee status:  
‘Some people are good [but] some people… would be insulting on the street, they would say 
something's like: “You Syrian people you came here and since [then] you ruined my life”’ 
(Shahar, Na’ba).    
Some of these comments were xenophobic and politicised in nature, related to complaints that Syrians 
were ‘invading’ and taking over the country. Participants described having their accents mocked and 
being discouraged from speaking in their mother tongue:   
‘Every time we walk on the street [people in the community] keep saying: ‘We can’t get rid of 
you now, you control the country’ (Nayat, Lebanon).  
 ‘Whenever I speak Kurdi in public, people say to me: You can’t speak that [here]. Are you trying 
to create another Kurdistan over here?’ (FGD 8, Mazra’a).  
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Whilst several participants, such as Shahar above, emphasised that ‘not everyone’ in the community 
treated them in this way, there was clearly a high frequency of these remarks. Even regular irritations, 
such as nudging someone on a pavement or not crossing a road quickly enough was often met with a 
sharp comment about women’s Syrian heritage.  These constant negative and harassing comments 
about women’s status and presence in Lebanon led to a sense of uneasiness and discomfort in public 
space:  
‘I don’t feel comfortable on the street. I’m a stranger in this country, it’s not my country and 
other people [locals] would look at me as someone who is weird or strange. And sometimes 
they would verbalise these things saying: “Syrians are burdens, why are you here? You’re a 
burden”’ (Emani, Na’ba). 
Participants in Amman also discussed received comments about their ethnicity and refugee-ness 
whilst in public space, many of which were derogatory and focused on ‘othering’ them. However, 
these comments did appear to be less relentless than what women described in Beirut:    
‘If you are walking down the street and someone notices that you are Syrian, you get hell from 
them. We keep hearing: ‘Oh, you are Syrian, you took our country, you destroyed our country’ 
(FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).    
‘When we go out, we hear people cursing us because we are Syrians. I had to change my 
residence and the place that I live just not to hear anything bad about being Syrian, it got out 
of control’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).  
Occasionally, women would emphasise that these experiences hadn’t occurred in ‘their’ immediate 
neighbourhood, but rather in areas of higher density, where there was greater anonymity (for 
example, in a market). This constant emphasis on one’s refugee status and ethnicity all added to a 
sense of unbelonging in the host community, which fuelled a wider sense of insecurity whilst in public 
space. 
Visiting charities for assistance throughout the city was a gendered activity, predominantly 
undertaken by women.  Syrian women were frequently publicly chastised for begging on the streets 
or soliciting charities, even if this was not the activity they were engaged in. Yara and her sister Mona 
recalled their irritation at being shouted at by their neighbour when they left their overcrowded 
apartment, saying:  
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‘“These Syrian women are just going around everywhere, begging for money and going to 
charities”’ (Yara & Mona, Mahata).  
Whilst they emphasised that they never felt fearful, and their neighbour was simply ‘rude’, the 
constant reminder of being watched when leaving home, observed on the street and being judged for 
one’s nationality was unpleasant and exhausting for women.  
During my second focus group in Na’ba, the women that had gathered bonded immediately when I 
explained that the research study was examining their experiences of public space, security and safety. 
They instantly started talking about how they were yelled at aggressively on the way to the café that 
morning:  
‘When there is a group of Syrian women walking together locals think we are going out 
begging.’ (FGD 2, Na’ba)  
These verbal jibes related to women ‘begging’ and visiting NGOs also demonstrates why women feel 
frustrated and acerbic about negotiating the city looking for humanitarian assistance as explored 
above. Women are mocked and taunted about their status as refugees, and their reasons for being 
present in the urban outdoors. These comments continually disrupt and intrude upon women’s 
negotiations of public space.  
Verbal harassment could take on a heavily gendered tone. Alongside accusations of begging when out 
in public, some women found they were publicly criticised for being visibly pregnant or having ‘too 
many children’, indirectly being accused of wasting scarce resources and depleting the Lebanese 
economy:  
‘[I was on the street] holding my son, and a [Lebanese woman] said to me: “You are Syrian, 
and you are giving birth here? Are you serious?” It’s a bit of an insult to us…I wanted to say 
something to her, but I didn’t’ (Yaminah, Na’ba).  
‘People on the street would [say]: “So, you’re here, giving birth to children and then throwing 
them on the street”… I was pregnant and [when I arrived in Beirut] I went to register with [an 
NGO] and the woman there told me: “You're here and now you're pregnant just so you can get 
extra help from the UN?”…I said to her: “Why are you saying this, are you paying from your 
own pocket?” And she said: “From my pocket, or not from my pocket, why are you [Syrians] 
always having children?”’ (Shula, Na’ba).  
Participants emphasised that it was local women who shamed them for being pregnant or having too 
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many children and who would make derogatory and snide comments about their Syrian ethnicity. 
Shula insisted that because she was alone, other women had the nerve to make comments about her 
pregnancy and thus she had a stronger sense of safety in public space if her husband was with her.  
My community contact in Na’ba stressed that she had observed the harassment of Syrian women by 
Lebanese women, saying they would make Syrian women feel ‘uncomfortable’ whilst navigating the 
urban outdoors. For her, this was unpleasant but not unexpected. She had witnessed Lebanese 
women harassed by Syrian men and implied that some of the antagonism between Syrian and 
Lebanese women was emerging from both women’s wider experiences of harassment (from either 
Syrian or Lebanese men) and the strains of living together in a congested and poor neighbourhood, 
saying:   
‘Life for the Lebanese is very difficult here as well…they received little assistance previously’ 
(Community Contact, Na’ba).   
As such, the community contact was not surprised to see a deterioration in relationships between the 
two groups of women. Syrians were also perceived as receiving generous assistance from NGOs whilst 
Lebanese were required to ‘make do’ in deprived conditions. When discussing ongoing relations 
between Syrians and the wider community, NGO and community contacts explained that alongside 
tensions relating to work, housing and resources, there were rumours circulating that Syrian women 
were ‘stealing’ Lebanese men from their wives. The perception was that Syrian women were using 
this as a tactic to provide for their families. Marriage to a Lebanese man would give them protection 
and legality (these rumours were occasionally referenced in focus groups, see also: Dionigi, 2016). As 
such, Syrian women could be viewed as predatory and desperate by their host community. This may 
go some way in why they were subject to derisive and racist comments about draining the country’s 
resources or ‘destroying’ people’s lives.  
The multitude of comments relating to women’s nationality and status eroded their impressions of 
safety in public space, and wider sense of belonging to the community. Women expressed a cultural 
insecurity in their inability to be able to speak with a Syrian accent, or to meet together, without facing 
derisive comments about ‘taking over’ or going ‘begging’ (Lemanski, 2012). Women’s pregnancies 
intersect with wider issues and structures that create points of tension. Ongoing or recurrent 
pregnancies tap into broader fears regarding demographics, power and state security (Smith, 2012). 
This is especially relevant in states such as Jordan where there are long standing internal conflicts over 
the demographic balance of the Palestinian refugee population with the ‘Jordanians’, and in Lebanon 
where governance is based on religious and ethnic demographics. A burgeoning population also raises 
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fears over scarce resources and rising prices, particularly amongst socio-economically marginalised 
communities. As such, pregnant women are publicly scorned by their host community, accused of 
depleting resources and not caring for their children. Hence, in examining refugee women’s accounts, 
wider host community fears, which appear to be linked and (re)produced through state concerns of 
security related to demographics, becomes conspicuous. Whilst women’s accounts of verbal 
harassment were clearly gendered, and deeply intertwined with their identities of being a woman, a 
mother and a refugee, this verbal harassment was primarily attuned to the foregrounding of their 
Syrian and refugee identity. Participants typically framed these as an everyday, ‘irritant’ or 
unpleasantness that eroded a sense of belonging. What created a greater sense of unease and 
insecurity were degrading sexual propositions and comments linked to women’s ethnicity and status, 
which by their sexual nature, were far more focused on women’s gendered identities and created a 
stronger sense of fear and insecurity.   
Public sexual harassment and sexual propositioning  
The intersection of women’s refugee status and their gender made them susceptible to comments 
and insults about their sexuality and their bodies whilst in public space in their host communities and 
in the wider city.  Participants were not unaccustomed to occasional sexual remarks from strangers in 
public when living in Syria. However, these were often perceived as less offensive in nature and far 
less common. Women highlighted that in their host cities, sexual comments differed to what they 
heard in Syria. In their host cities they were often characterised or remarked upon as being 
‘prostitutes’ and being willing to exchange sexual favours for much needed resources. Their identity 
as refugees, and their position within society, led to impressions that men felt able to approach and 
proposition them.  
When comparing experiences in Amman and Beirut, there were far more gratuitous and frequent 
experiences of sexual harassment amongst participants in Beirut.  However, in both contexts, 
participants lamented the high incidence of sexual harassment and the cultural shame that this 
brought on them:  
‘As women…we are prone to being harassed by landlords, taxi drivers and grocers, especially 
if we don’t have a husband in our lives…..Many people in our area are subject to this 
harassment but if they would speak up they would shame themselves in society… because we 
are Arab….No one is being shy about asking [for sexual favours], young men, older men, would 
ask…. Some men are following us until we reach our building’ (FGD 7, Mazra’a).  
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‘My daughters are beautiful, and men would look at them disgracefully. Making it sound as if 
they were prostitutes. It has upset them a lot. My daughters avoid going out. They think it is 
better to be under the bombing in Syria’ (FGD 3, Na’ba).  
‘I hear a lot of [catcalling]…they know I’m Syrian….in Syria there is a particular neighbourhood 
for these kinds of hooligans. But here you find them everywhere…they have no shame’ 
(Yesenia, Hashmi Shamali).  
‘There is a lot of problems with catcalling here. It is worse if you are alone’ (Alma, Mahatta).  
In Na’ba, Yaminah described how she had been searching a local rubbish dump for food for her 
children when a local man stopped and propositioned her:  
‘”Aunty, why are you taking garbage from the dump? Sleep with me twice and I’ll give you 
$100”’ (Yaminah, Na’ba).   
She was shaken by the experience, but this was tempered by the almost immediate response of a local 
Lebanese man who had witnessed this harassment and yelled at the man to leave. Even though she 
had been protected and assisted on this occasion, as she was a divorced mother on little income, she 
felt extremely vulnerable, even at home. She needed to work, but was concerned for her daughters 
safety because two men had attempted to force their way into her home while she was out. These 
experiences had a strong effect on her opinion of the city and her neighbourhood. Her financial 
vulnerability had left her highly, and visibly, vulnerable to others in the community, who attempted 
to take advantage of her circumstances. Here, the intersection of her gender, marital and refugee 
status had a marked effect on her experiences of space.  
Participants in Beirut also emphasised a sense of vulnerability in closed and confined pseudo-public 
spaces such as shops or taxis, where they might be alone with men. Shula related a story where she 
was travelling in a taxi after a visit to an NGO for assistance.  
‘The taxi driver started asking [questions] ….and then he said: “Ah, you are Syrian? Would you 
pleasure me…For an exchange?” I was very taken aback by it. I put a ringtone on my phone 
and said: “My husband is calling”, and then I pointed at a stranger on the street: “That's my 
husband, he's waiting for me,”….it was terrifying for me so I don’t go into a cab alone any 
other time’ (Shula, Na’ba).  
When travelling alone in the city, women felt vulnerable to the advances of men they didn’t know, 
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many of whom appeared to take advantage of the rumours that circulated about Syrian women and 
survival sex. Taxis frequently featured as locations where women were inappropriately propositioned, 
or even assaulted:  
‘Now I don’t feel safe going into cabs at all. Whenever I go in a cab to another area, the 
moment [the taxi driver] finds out that I am Syrian, they would think I am cheap and they 
would start flirting with me’ (Shahar, Na’ba).  
Other participant discussed experiences in clothing and food stores where the shop owner or other 
customers had behaved inappropriately:   
‘I went into the supermarket and someone tried to touch me, and I told them: “Get away”, and 
the owner interfered and said: “Who do you think you are? Who are you to say you are being 
harassed?”’ (Nasim, Diary excerpt, Lebanon).  
Nasim’s experience, whereby she was chastised and embarrassed for trying to defend herself, 
contrasts with Yaminah’s earlier account above, where her harasser was chased off and admonished 
for his behaviour. These accounts demonstrate the uneven experiences of security and society within 
host communities. Whilst some women might experience protection and assistance within their host 
community, others are undermined and ridiculed.   
These incidents occurred in quasi-public spaces, whereby participants were either travelling through 
public space in a semi-private vehicle, or in a semi-private space, such as a shop, which permits 
members of the public to interact. These spaces often allowed for the creation of close, or private, 
encounters in situations where it was difficult for women to move away or signal for help. Nasim’s 
account in the shop where she was accused of being hysterical in response to being touched is also 
indicative of the challenges that some women face when trying to draw attention to their 
predicament.  
These experiences of sexual and verbal harassment increased perceptions of public space as 
‘masculine’ and indeed, as a place belonging to those with rights and citizenship, from which refugee 
women were alienated by through verbal and sexual violence. In both Amman and Beirut, women 
discussed their discomfort at navigating spaces dominated by men. Several participants noted that 
men occupied, or ‘loitered’ around public spaces which made them feel intimidated or restricted as 
to where they could go. A focus group participant in Amman noted that when running simple errands 
in Amman she frequently encountered groups of men:   
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‘In front of the mosque, in front of the pharmacy, in front of the supermarket. It makes me 
really uncomfortable’ (FGD 2, Ashrafyeh)  
She linked this to other women’s experiences of catcalling and sexual comments, adding that this, and 
the constant public presence of men, made her feel uncomfortable when outside her house. Parks 
and open spaces in these neighbourhoods also had a sense of being masculine spaces, where men 
might ‘hang out’ in groups. This lead to impressions that the space was unsafe for women who were 
alone, or that they were not able to remain in the vicinity of these men without their ‘honour’ being 
compromised. For example, when I asked women in the neighbourhood of Mahata if they used their 
local park, they were adamant that it was not a safe space and that they wouldn’t go there. My 
community contact in Mahata also emphasised its lack of safety and noted that as a lone woman, I 
shouldn’t visit it as it was frequently populated by groups of bored, migrant men, who tended to 
gather there if they had been unsuccessful in securing informal work opportunities for the day. 
Although no one specified any negative encounters or incidents in the park, it was perceived as a 
‘masculine space’ which women felt discouraged from using.  
Women in both Lebanon and Jordan noted the tendency of local men to gather around single-sex girls’ 
schools, which made them concerned for women’s and girls’ safety and morality. For example, Sama 
spoke of her difficulties in completing her schooling because of the presence of men around the 
school:   
 ‘My mother didn’t want me to finish school because there were lots of men there. They would 
[hang] around the entrance. I would hear lots of [catcalling].  They would try and break into 
the school and hide in the bathrooms’ (Sama, Ashrafyeh).   
As such, women were influenced in how they used public spaces, in part through a wider, learnt, 
concern of what was deemed ‘proper’ or appropriate behaviour for their gender, which was shaped 
by the structures of societal norms. This influenced not only public spaces or leisure areas but also 
spaces of opportunity and education. However, women also expressed a preoccupation and worry 
about the threat of sexual violence which was largely shaped by their identities as Syrian refugee 
women. Thus, their nervousness in public space was affected by wider structures of societal and 
cultural norms, as well as the intersection of their identities. In societies shaped by patriarchal norms, 
whereby relationships between men and women are sensitive and segregated, the intense male gaze 
upon the female form acts as an ‘active polluting and defiling agent that physically impacts the female 
body…(able) to impute a bad reputation and suggest a lack of respectability’ (de Koning, 2009, p. 546). 
In such contexts, women are expected to be on the move to a destination, to have a clear purpose to 
their activities outdoors or else risk the invitation of sexualised contact. De Koning notes how even 
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low-level sexual harassment is a reminder of a ‘constantly observable male gaze’ (p. 546-7). This is a 
challenging set of circumstances for a refugee woman to negotiate. Sexualised remarks, harassment, 
unwanted contact and low-level stalking (curb crawling etc.) related to both women’s gender and 
nationality act as oppressive, verbal and material reminders of their position. These comments meet 
at the intersection of women’s gendered and racial identities. Power is deeply inscribed through 
sexualised comments, particularly those related to the request of sexual favours because of women’s 
refugee and marginalised socio-economic status. Furthermore, these comments act as reminders of 
refugee women’s visibility in public space. If women seek to be discreet, in order to negotiate public 
space and security services in their host cities when they lack legal papers, these interactions only 
serve to widen fears that they are highly visible.  
Tactics of appearance, behaviour and mobility in public space   
Public dress and behaviour are theorised as methods of gender performance, a way in which sexuality 
is displayed, reflecting and reinforcing wider structural social and cultural gender norms (Goffman, 
2004). For Syrian refugee women, this ‘performance’ was a conscious and often tactical choice and 
predominantly one of public blending, of looking ‘in place’ in order to enhance their personal security 
(Fluri, 2011). Women expressed a desire to remain invisible and blend in socially, thus maintaining 
anonymity in the city as a refugee, engaging in ‘acceptable’ feminine norms of decorum in public space 
and to be above reproach. Sur, (2012b p. 218) notes how women feel a ‘responsibility to protect their 
modesty’ by engaging in a ‘code of conduct’ as held by masculinist culture. Women self-police their 
dress and behaviour to ensure they are not blamed for ‘not adhering to the safety guidelines’ if they 
are victimised. Syrian refugee women were influenced by the structural influences of a patriarchal 
society, which created challenges for their intimate security related to both their gender and refugee 
status. In such contexts, where refugee women inhabit a marginalised position, deeply shaped by 
patriarchal societal norms and structures of refugee policy, women respond tactically, that is adopting 
and adapting to the structures around them in order to enhance their sense of security (de Certeau, 
1984).  
Dress and Harassment  
In the Middle East, veiling, and dress, are particular socio-spatial practices that are embedded into 
wider relations of power and enacted in the urban (Secor, 2002, p. 7). Regarding the practise of veiling 
in the region, theorists have noted the ways in which the hijab and niqab act as ‘mobile security’ and 
visual respectability for women, legitimising women’s presence in the urban outdoors (Fluri, 2011; 
Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2001). This section examines the ways in which outer dress and appearance 
intersect with refugee women’s identities and wider socio-cultural norms to shape experiences of 
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(in)security whilst in public space. These have a wide spectrum of outcomes for different women and 
shape their wider impressions of public space and the ways in which they are permitted to be present 
in their host cities.  
 
Beirut participants displayed varied appearances depending on their religious identity and social class. 
In focus group discussions and interviews, women from a Christian background (typically Orthodox 
Armenian) were dressed casually in jeans or trousers and tops, wore make up and did not cover their 
hair. Some participants had visible jewellery which was also an indicator of class, position and religious 
orientation (many wore a symbol of a gold cross on a necklace). Studies have noted that there is less 
of a culture of veiling, and indeed a greater personal mobility and independence of Kurdish women in 
comparison to Arab women (Bengio, 2016). However, all Kurdish women that I interviewed insisted 
that they had veiled themselves when living in Syria and that they had continued to wear the veil 
outside of the seclusion of home in Beirut. Muslim participants dressed conservatively in black abayas 
or jilbabs with a hijab. Muslim participants from rural backgrounds wore very relaxed hijabs, loosely 
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thrown over hair and draped across shoulders. These acted as a signifier of the women’s rural 
background, as well as their class.   
Despite this range of appearances, dress appeared to have little effect in dissuading harassment. 
Rather, refugee women’s dress and appearance in public space spotlighted their differences from their 
host community and emphasised their status as outsiders. This was particularly the case for Muslim 
women who engaged in more conservative dress. Beirut is a cosmopolitan city that brands itself as 
the ‘Paris of the Middle East’. As such, traditional Muslim dress of hijabs and jilbabs are juxtaposed 
with relaxed Western clothing. Uncovered hair is not unusual, particularly in the predominantly 
Christian neighbourhoods of the city (such as Bourj Hamoud).  
Refugee women in Beirut reported that more conservative dress seemed to promote lewd comments 
and sexual harassment on the street. Women who wore the abaya reported men following them in 
the street, hissing and propositioning them: 
‘[Wearing the abaya] seems to make it [harassment] worse. They think we are naked 
underneath it’ (FGD 2, Na’ba).  
‘A guy began catcalling me, because I was veiled and wearing the abaya, and he started 
speaking not nice words, saying: “Go with me, on a small trip”. He thought I was a whore [that] 
I don’t have values’ (Amira , Diary excerpt, Lebanon).  
Deeb & Harb (2013) have emphasised that even though wearing the hijab is a common clothing 
practise in the city  (to the extent that it is no longer seen as ‘piety’ but rather a normal reflection of 
Islam), it is received negatively in some areas of Beirut. Thus, there is a politics to women’s clothing 
and appearance and how they wear the veil. This reflects on perceived public morality, but also their 
religious affiliation which is deeply tied to ethnic politics in the city.  Whilst it does seem apparent that 
sexuality does play into an aspect of conservative dress and sexual harassment (see Mernissi, 1975), 
the abaya also appeared to act as a visual indicator that women were Syrian, which in turn introduced 
additional elements of identity and politics to the interaction. Women also received mocking 
comments about being supporters of Daesh because of the organisation’s insistence on highly 
conservative public dress:   
‘When we walk past people on the street, they laugh at us and call us “ISIS”’ (Iman, Diary 
Excerpt, Lebanon).  
Thus, women who wore the abaya felt that it enhanced their visibility as a ‘Syrian refugee’ and this in 
turn was the motivator behind how men behaved towards them in public. A report by Enab Baladi 
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(2017) notes a change in gendered dress codes in Syrian since the onset of the civil war, including the 
increased use of more conservative dress (such as abayas) in rebel-held areas of the country, whilst 
contrasting this with a tendency towards more liberal dress in regime-held areas. The politics of 
gendered dress, therefore, does appear to be caught up in the wider politics of the Syrian conflict, 
which may in turn have an impact on host impressions of Syrian women and their political and religious 
affiliations in their host cities. This may explain barbed comments directed at Syrian women, 
suggesting they were affiliated with Daesh, despite conservative Muslim women in Beirut also wearing 
the black abaya. 
Whilst women in Beirut insisted that they had not changed their appearance or clothing from how 
they dressed in Syria, several women in Amman explained their tactic of changing their appearance in 
order to either enhance their personal security, or in order to ‘fit in’ visually with the fabric of Amman. 
Some participants in Jordan had worn the niqab when they were living in Syria, but this had changed 
during the war and the practice continued whilst in Amman. The reasons for this were rooted in 
experiences of scrutiny and violence at checkpoints whilst in Syria:  
‘[I was at a] roadblock [in Syria], and [regime-forces] took off my hijab and veil violently, and 
since then I’ve had some sort of complex that I don’t want to put it on anymore. Even though 
my husband wants me to put it on again, I don’t feel comfortable….at that roadblock they were 
very violent with me…I stopped wearing [the niqab] because it was dangerous to my life’ 
(Rabiah, Hashmi Shamali). 
‘I used to veil my face and cover my eyes…but when I came here I took off the [niqab]…Before 
the war it was ok to wear the [face] veil, but [during] it was not ok….it was not allowed. I would 
hear racial stuff about it’ (Nailah, Hashmi Shamali).   
These were highlighted as racially and politically charged experiences for the women. They identified 
men at roadblocks as (regime-supporting) Alawites (Alawite women do not wear veils) who had 
insisted on the women, who were Sunni Muslim, being ‘uncovered’ in order to be identified. Women 
felt that the niqab had become an outward signifier of their Sunni identity and potentially a signifier 
of opposition to the regime. Thus, they had taken to wearing a simplified hijab during the civil war and 
continued this trend in Jordan in order to ‘fit in’ visually and thus achieve an inconspicuousness within 
their host society (Enab Baladi, 2017; Fluri, 2011). This helped to foster a sense of security in public 
space through ‘appropriate’ attire that helped them to discreetly merge into the public.   
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Despite efforts to blend into public life in Amman, and to maintain anonymity, Syrian women in Jordan 
were frequently identified as such because of the fashion of their hijab. For example, Yeseniah 
discussed the frequent catcalling that she heard and explained:  
‘They know that I am Syrian, I hear it [their comments]. Because there is a stereotype here for 
Syrians, how they dress, how they walk...’ 
When I asked Yeseniah to describe this further, she emphasised it was how she looked during the 
interview, which to my untrained eye simply appeared to be a neatly fitted hijab and jilbab in muted 
colours, not unlike what many women in Jordan would wear whilst out in public. However, what 
indicated that Yeseniah was Syrian was the way in which she had fastened her hijab. Farah, my 
translator, emphasised that: ‘Jordanians don’t wear their hijabs this way’. Later, walking through the 
neighbourhood of Hashmi, Farah explained that she could immediately identify Syrian women from 
their appearance as we passed them on the street. Frequently Syrian women would wear their hijab 
low on the forehead and tucked across the chin. This allowed the wearer to pull up the lower part of 
the hijab over their nose, so only the eyes were showing (in a similar manner to a niqab), in order to 
provide more modesty if required. Jordanian women didn’t wear their hijabs in the same fashion. 
Most of the participants also wore an abaya, or a jilbab, whilst a handful continued to wear the niqab. 
Neutral, subdued colours were favoured, navy, dark brown and black. As such, their appearance was 
perceived as being very modest when out in public space.  
In contrast to the women above, many of whom had decided to remove the niqab in order to enhance 
their sense of security, Jasura had taken to wearing a hijab upon arriving in Jordan, something that 
she had not done previously in Syria. She was a married woman, living in Hashmi Shamali with a large 
network of family living close by. Her female relatives adopted a range of approaches towards head 
coverings, some using a hijab and others not, and she emphasised their personal agency in making 
this choice themselves. However, her reasons for wearing it in Jordan were because:  
 'it's safer and more decent' (Jasura, Hashmi Shamali).    
She emphasised that Hashmi wasn't a more conservative neighbourhood, but simply that she felt by 
wearing a hijab she was more discrete and less noticeable whilst outside of the home. She explained 
that some of her relatives had continued to go out unveiled but she was not comfortable with this any 
longer. Thus, she very much saw wearing the hijab and dressing conservatively as a personal choice 
driven by women's agency, but nonetheless shaped by social and political processes in place in the 
neighbourhood. For example, Jasura’s reasoning that she had chosen to wear the hijab as it was 'safer' 
and 'more decent' indicates that she believes that women who navigate public space without a hijab 
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would be taking a risk, and might entice inappropriate behaviour that would compromise their 
personal safety. As such, she (re)produced the expected religious and cultural norms and codes of 
conduct of women in public space through an internalising of feminine responsibility to behave and 
dress in particular ways (Ranade, 2007). However, this was also influenced by a desire to protect her 
intimate security in a community where she had fewer rights and lower status.   
Her experience was in sharp contrast to Aleaha, a middle-class, university-educated, Syrian mother of 
one. Whilst Aleaha was a practising Muslim, she had chosen not to wear the hijab in Syria or Jordan. 
This had become the source of great friction for her in Mahata, where she lived with her husband and 
their son. She would wear a loose scarf slung over her hair and shoulders, alongside more relaxed 
‘Western’ clothing, such as jeans, and frequently wore make up. She emphasised that in Syria she was 
seen as ‘fashionable’ but that in Mahata her appearance was greatly despised. She quickly found 
herself publicly criticised and prejudiced against, for not dressing ‘appropriately’ in the community. As 
a result, she had begun to confine herself more and more to her home, not from a sense that she was 
physically unsafe, but because the litany of remarks she received from the community endangered 
her mental health. She refused to change her appearance by conforming to the conservative 
expectations of the neighbourhood. This refusal to tactically respond to gendered and cultural norms, 
by dressing more conservatively, had a direct effect on Aleaha’s social isolation and a very detrimental 
impact on her mental health. She wept openly throughout the two-hour interview in her home and 
explained that she simply spent most of the day sleeping or crying.  Her use of dis-active tactics, to 
stay at home rather than negotiate verbal abuse or change her appearance, had resulted in strong 
impressions that she did not belong, and was not welcome, in the community (Hamdan-Saliba & 
Fenster, 2012). The community’s response to Aleaha, and her reaction in turn, demonstrates how 
gendered and patriarchal structures, which shape women’s expected norms of dress and behaviour, 
are reproduced through the societal exclusion of women who push against these norms, thus 
reproducing space in gendered ways.  
Women’s differing perspectives demonstrate the complex ways in which women are ‘permitted’ to 
inhabit public space based upon conforming to certain behavioural norms, and the intersectionality 
of their identities, which result in a spectrum of experiences. Whilst women in Beirut wear modest 
and conservative attire which is typically framed as a device which enables women to negotiate public 
space safely (de Koning, 2009; A. J. Secor, 2002) in actuality it highlights women’s status as outsiders 
and refugees, making them vulnerable to lewd harassment and propositioning. In Jordan, some 
women engage very reflectively and consciously in the practice of their appearance. They 
demonstrate a knowledge and awareness of the gendered, political and social norms of the 
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environment that they are negotiating, using their tactical agency to enhance their personal sense of 
security through using clothing styles to ‘fit in unobtrusively’ or ‘be modest’. These approaches reflect 
how women tactically respond to wider structures in order to access public space and to enhance their 
sense of security when in it. Those that disengage from this tactical approach or ignore wider 
structural influences (such as Aleaha) experience extremely negative experiences consequences which 
limit their sense of being welcome or being allowed in public space and lead to isolation and mental 
difficulties.  
Tactics of Feminine Behaviour and Invisibility 
Alongside descriptions of day to day clothing, many participants would go on to offer how they were 
‘dignified’ and ‘appropriate’ whilst out of the house. These decided norms about what was dignified 
had clear associations with traditional norms of femininity and invisibility: looking down and avoiding 
eye contact, staying close to walls, not talking in the street, avoiding drawing attention to oneself, 
being neat of appearance and, as discussed above, for the majority of participants who were Muslim, 
wearing the hijab and being modestly dressed.  
This featured particularly in interviews with Syrian women in Beirut. Wajida, was very conscious of her 
status as a single mother and divorced woman, and was determined that she would conduct herself 
in such a way as to not invite attention from men:  
‘On the street in Lebanon no one has tried to harass me, or get in my way, or cat-calling or 
anything. Because I am very strict. I am very proper, orderly, I follow the rules. No one can 
get their way with me, with respect to men’ (Wajida, Na’ba).  
 
In this comment, Wajida refers to following ‘the rules’ that she is expected to conform to. She 
frequently emphasised through her interview that she was a respectable woman who was not 
vulnerable to inappropriate relationships with men simply because she was divorced. She was very 
nervous of the stigma of her divorced status and had previously had difficulties with her family who 
had pushed her to get remarried for reasons of respectability (not protection). She had resisted these 
efforts and was determined to project herself as pious and upstanding. Her emphasis on being ‘strict, 
determined and orderly’ demonstrates how Wajida was highly conscious of her public spatial 
presence. Wajida verbalised that she should not be a target because of how she conducts herself, and 
therefore if she was to be approached, it would be because she had allowed her disciplined outer 
appearance to ‘slip’. Thus, she has regulated and policed her public behaviour, by adhering to the 
masculine ‘code of conduct’ (Sur, 2012) and feels that she has been rewarded by being treated 
respectfully and not catcalled or propositioned. Her perspective indicates the ways in which she has 
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internalised and reproduced patriarchal and gendered expectations of how women, such as herself, 
are expected to behave in public space (S. Joseph, 1996).  
Alongside the influence of cultural and social norms shaping women’s behaviour, other participants 
emphasised their wider fears and insecurities with respect to public space and its impact upon their 
behaviour when leaving the house:   
‘We would walk close to the wall, so we don’t do anything [wrong]…we have had similar 
experiences, we don’t want to make a fuss [or draw attention]’ (FGD 3, Na’ba).    
 ‘[Of course, there are a lot of problems for me as a woman]. So, I keep quiet, I don’t speak, I 
stay home [intentionally], I shut up [intentionally]…because there is danger. There is danger 
outside the house’ (Husniya, Na’ba).   
Whilst tactics of accepted feminine appearance and behaviour in public space were used on the one 
hand to retain a sense of social respectability (Ilahi, 2009), on the other, women felt that appearance 
and behaviour had direct potential to compromise their security outside of the home.  Often I would 
ask women to be more specific: ‘What did they fear outside the house? What was dangerous?’ But 
many had difficulty in articulating this further, only emphasising that the urban environment was a 
dangerous place to be for a refugee woman.  This alludes to Valentine's (1989) and Koskela's (1999) 
arguments that often ‘fear’ for women is less of a one-off terrifying encounter and more of a pervading 
sense of alertness in public space. However, over the course of interviews and focus groups more 
specific accounts of harassment or encounters with security personnel emerged which had clearly 
shaped impressions of the host city as a dangerous place. As such, women attempted to create a 
visage of non-threatening, compliant femininity which allowed for their presence to be overlooked or 
seen as benign, discouraging the attention of men, enhancing their respectability and thus heightening 
their sense of personal security. As covered later in the chapter, women also felt it necessary to limit 
their mobility, particularly in the evenings, in order to comply to societal gendered norms, whilst also 
ensuring their personal protection and avoiding potential conflicts or harassments from others in the 
community.  
Chaperoning: The Tactic of Company  
Alongside a focus on how they should look and conduct themselves whilst in public space, women also 
used several other tactics to give them a sense of protection and propriety when in public space. Being 
accompanied whilst conducting errands, or visiting family, was a common means of enhancing a 
personal sense of security.  Many women described relying on family networks, neighbours and 
relatives to navigate public space. Whilst women didn’t always associate being accompanied as a 
necessary component of being outdoors (some women simply had company to pass time), most 
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expressed a preference for company as it broadly increased their sense of security. For example, Alma 
and Rima emphasised that they would often leave their homes in Syria by themselves, but felt it was 
unwise to do so in Amman:  
‘We don’t go out by ourselves here. My sister was out in Hashmi and her purse was stolen. In 
Syria we would go out by ourselves…but there is fear here’ (Alma & Rima, Mahata).   
Mouna described an experience in her local neighbourhood where she was followed on the way to 
the grocery store by a man in his vehicle. She said the experience had left her ‘terrified’ and she would 
now only leave the house if she was accompanied by her twelve-year-old son:  
‘Every time I want to get out of the house or do something, I take my son with me. I was 
absolutely terrified that [this man] was stalking me and following me everywhere I went’ 
(Mouna, Hashmi Shamali). 
Some of the women actively used their children as a barrier to unwanted attention. In Beirut, Shahar 
explained how she would always take her daughter with her, so ‘people would play with my daughter 
and forgot about me’. She went on to explain that having her daughter with her was akin to creating 
a boundary for people, for them ‘not to be inappropriate’ towards her. Other women felt that being 
accompanied by female children was unhelpful and opened them up to more difficulties. Instead, they 
focused on having the company of ‘anyone’ that was a male - a young son, husband, brother or father 
- whilst out in public space. Following Shula’s encounter with a taxi driver who propositioned her for 
sex after he discovered she was Syrian, she explained that if she had to be out the house, she would 
always take a male with her, particularly in a taxi, ‘even if he was a young boy’.  
Participants also referred to their previous ‘norm’ in Syria. This revealed a complexity of gendered 
attitudes to public space and the chaperoning of women outside of the privacy of home. Some 
participants noted that in Syria they would always be accompanied in public space for reasons of 
propriety, whilst others emphasised that they enjoyed personal independence. This was inconsistent 
and varied across both cities and across different women’s religious and social categories:   
 ‘I don’t like to go out alone. I don’t like to be out without a man. [It would be fine in Syria] but 
not here, it’s not safe’ (Fariha, Mahatta).  
 ‘I’ve been veiled since I was 12 years old. We lived in Aleppo with my in-laws, my mother in 
law would be taking care of everything. We wouldn't be allowed to go to go out, to get 
stuff…unrelated to the war and everything. So [my mother in law] would take care of getting 
groceries and other [things]’ (Mahira, Mazra’a).   
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There are cultural and religious norms about gender, space and security that operate and (re)produce 
over various scales and these accounts provide insights into individual gendered spatial mobilities and 
the ways in which these are shaped by kinship, culture and identity. In Syria, some women were 
chaperoned when out in public space in order to maintain a sense of public gendered propriety, whilst 
others enjoyed personal independence. However, as refugees, these norms no longer applied as 
kinship and societal ties were fragmented. Without close family members, women were required to 
navigate the urban outdoors alone. Some women found greater spatial freedom in their host cities, 
whilst others felt compelled to use a chaperone which they hadn’t done previously or they confined 
themselves to home. Within these reflections, women’s complex opinions regarding their changing 
mobility emerged. Whilst some felt that being a refugee had afforded them a greater freedom in 
public, others expressed a general apathy towards these changes as they came at too high a cost.  
Rabiah spoke of how she was confined to her home in Syria by the wishes of her family, whilst growing 
up and then by her husband, once married. She had lived a secluded life and had little knowledge of 
her home country. Living in Amman, she found herself emancipated from these controls and 
restrictions on her mobility and enjoyed her sense of freedom even though this came with 
compromises:   
‘My parents were really strict; they took me out of school and got me married early. I used to wear the 
[niqab] and I didn’t even know where my street ended…and then I had to come here! [Laughs]. Here I 
feel like I’m alive, I can do whatever I want’ (Rabiah, Hashmi Shamali).    
Badra felt she had more freedom as she was now ‘allowed’ to run errands alone, after the civil war 
had fragmented her kinship ties resulting in her and her husband living apart from his family. However, 
she expressed a yearning to return to her previous life, considering her enhanced spatial freedom and 
mobility a poor alternative to the social networks and sense of belonging she had enjoyed previously:   
 
‘There is more freedom here than in Syria…because [in Syria] the men did everything…Mostly 
I left the house to shop for clothes, and I had to leave with [a woman] older than me. [Here] I 
don’t have any [restrictions] going out on my own… [But] I preferred the way I lived in Syria 
even though I didn’t get to go out…because here I feel very isolated’ (Badra, Hashmi-Shamali).   
 
These accounts both reinforce and rebut feminist accounts of the empowering and shifting gender 
roles in asylum. As explored in Chapters Two and Three, women often experience a change in their 
gender role in conflict, flight and asylum, but these are not always a positive or empowering (El Masri, 
2013). Many women resent these perceived public ‘freedoms’ preferring the seclusion, dignity and 
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position of their previous lives even if these may appear to be stifling or traditional to Western 
audiences (Mahmood, 2005; Muhanna, 2013). These accounts indicate the complexity of women’s 
experiences and feeling, with women both appreciating and disliking the changes in their mobility, an 
understanding of which is enhanced through an intersectional approach to their lives and experiences.  
Temporality, Kinship and Mobility  
Male and female kinship relations frequently shaped and structured participant’s interactions, 
attitudes and mobilities within public space in their host cities. These verbal or internalised 
‘instructions’ emerged from a combination of factors, including the interaction of a woman’s identity, 
traditional societal norms and fear of the unknown ‘public’. Thus, restriction of women’s mobility did 
not emerge purely from a desire to limit women based upon patriarchal norms. Rather, this issue 
interacted with other structural mechanisms of security and refugee policy, and thus a wider desire 
to protect women in complex and dangerous environments (Cornwall, 2007a). This next section delves 
into gendered and societal norms of mobility and seclusion, kinship relationships and notions of 
fear/safety of public space to better understand women’s navigation of the urban outdoors. By 
specifically highlighting the subject of temporality and mobility, wider relationships between gender, 
kin and mobility become clear, and differences between Amman and Beirut are emphasised.   
Temporality & Restriction  
Discussions with participants which centred on temporality, unveiled varied and complex impressions 
of space, gender and security, and the ways in which different issues and structures shaped spaces of 
the city as forbidden or permitted at particular times, or to particular genders (Fenster, 1999). These 
discussions amplified distinctions of safety and belonging between Amman and Beirut, and further 
emphasised the ways in which women’s mobility was shaped by both male and older female relations 
(Kandiyoti, 1988; Lokot, 2018).  
Most participants in Beirut emphasised an early evening cut-off of around 7-8pm after which they 
viewed mobility in the urban outdoors to be ‘unwise’. This was usually when visibility began to be 
compromised due to fading light, and when there was greater activity in the streets due to the close 
of the working day and general night-time sociability. Many identified the evening as a time when 
tensions were more prominent between refugees and the host community and where conflicts might 
escalate. Women were averse to being outside of the home alone at this time and would scoff ‘never’ 
or ‘no way’ in response to being asked if they spent time in public space in the evening. Several  
participants emphasised the that the presence of male relatives dictated the extent of their mobility 
in the evening:   
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‘[If I go out] I would definitely hear men who would flirt with me or harass me on the street…I 
feel safe when my husband is here. When he comes [back] at night, we go out together’ 
(Shahar, Na’ba).  
To be out in the evening in Beirut was particularly risky, as some areas had taken to creating curfews 
for Syrian refugees living in their neighbourhoods. These curfews were introduced by several different 
community authorities (for example, municipalities, municipal police, political parties) for diverse 
reasons; usually if fighting in Syria spilt over the border into Lebanon, or from a wider societal 
argument that Syrians ‘needed to be protected’ (Dionigi, 2016). A report by HRW (2014) noted that these 
curfews were in likelihood illegal and had no standing in the law, but that municipal police and 
vigilante groups enforced them. Speaking with political parties in Na’ba and Mazra’a, both insisted 
that there were no curfews in place in Beirut and walking around the neighbourhoods I never saw any 
signs18. However, other research has indicated their presence (Dionigi, 2016; HRW, 2014) and NGO 
representatives emphasised that there were curfews in place in the city. When I raised the issue of 
curfews in interviews, most participants said they were generally aware of curfews, and restrictions 
on Syrians’ movements in the evenings, although many argued that these weren’t operating directly 
in their neighbourhoods. However, some participants in Mazra’a noted the occurrence of intermittent 
curfews implemented for security concerns, stating that in those cases, Syrians would communicate 
amongst themselves and avoid leaving their homes. Khalila noted that one of the reasons her family 
had avoided settling in the Southern Suburbs was over the additional control of movement of Syrians, 
particularly at night:  
‘Syrians are not allowed out in the evening [in Al Dayiha] so we would feel better here. We 
choose this area so we would be safe [from curfews]’ (Khalila, Mazra’a).  
In Bourj Hammoud, participants mentioned that there was a curfew that was communicated with a 
‘clear slogan’ on a large sign, saying that Syrians were not allowed out in the evenings after 8pm (Bourj 
Hammoud, FGD 6).  
Syrian women felt heavily restricted to the indoors in the evening, reasoning that going out after dark 
would be unsafe. Curfews, which ultimately forbade their presence on the street in the evening, made 
public space even more unwelcoming. Not only do refugees who live in Beirut already suffer from 
marginalised status and disordered legality, but these curfews emphasise and create spaces of legal 
exceptionalism, that whilst perhaps aren’t ‘formal’ or state sanctioned, still operate and create 
boundaries of permitted and forbidden behaviour and presence (Brickell & Cuomo, 2019; Fenster, 
 
18 However, I did witness banners relating to a Syrian refugee curfew when travelling outside of Beirut. 
207 
 
1999; Pickering, 2011). Because of the fragmented structure of the state and security services, political 
parties and vigilante groups felt able to implement curfews, criminalising Syrians who transgressed 
public space at night, in order to ‘protect’ the wider community. This results in an uneven 
implementation of these practices which are possible because of the lack of a strong state. In turn, 
refugees restrict their mobility and their presence in public space, particularly in the evening, to avoid 
arrest and keep possible encounters (with informal security providers, for example) to a minimum. 
Thus, many public spaces of the city are regulated and reproduced to reflect the privileges of some of 
the host community, and reinforce the differentiated power and control of public space by different 
individuals and stakeholders (Silvey, 2006, p. 70).     
Regarding public mobility in the evening, responses from participants in Amman varied greatly. There 
were no curfews in place, and although security personnel do run checks on neighbourhoods, there is 
not the same heightened presence of security. Some women voiced the same attitudes of participants 
from Beirut: insisting that they felt unsafe and would avoid being outdoors after 7-8pm in the evening 
or would utilise company in the evenings in order to feel more secure:  
‘I never go out at night. I am generally afraid. I don’t go out after 7pm, but lots of other 
Syrian women do. I don’t have that [courage]’ (Mouna, Hashmi Shamali). 
A number of participants stated that they would never restrict their personal agency regardless of the 
time of day (Koskela, 1997), emphasising that they had few limitations on their mobility in Syria, and 
that they considered living in Amman to be similar:   
‘I used to go out whenever I want in Syria, and I go out whenever I want here…Even at 
night’ (FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).   
‘I go out alone. Anytime, I don’t care. I feel safe here…I don’t feel afraid to do anything. [Before] 
the war, it was the same as here, I would go out and do whatever I want’ (Leesha, Ashrafyeh).  
These attitudes contrasted with women’s experiences in Beirut whereby participants were particularly 
reticent to leave home in the evening and would certainly only contemplate doing so with a 
companion.  
Whilst concerns related to temporality and wider security and refugee status were more explicit in 
Beirut and explored in further detail in Chapter Eight, women in Amman did share accounts which 
indicate wider cultural and societal norms and expectations about women’s presence in public space 
in the evening. Women in Amman expressed annoyance and frustration with a sense of being 
‘monitored’ by the wider community in public space. Noodah, a single mother who was recently 
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separated, explained that she had generally felt confident in public space in Jordan. As such, she had 
found odd jobs to support her family and she felt safe to run errands by herself and confident to leave 
the house ‘anytime’. One evening her son injured himself and she had to carry him to the local hospital 
at 1:30am. The next day, women from the community approached her elderly mother to ask why she 
had been out on the street in the middle of the night. She expressed a strong sense of isolation from 
the community because of her status as a single mother, and was frustrated that other women’s 
response was not to help her and her son, but rather to express concerns about her transgressing the 
‘rules’ about public space by being outside late at night alone, and to question her moral character. 
This sense of being observed and judged was also expressed by Aleaha. She explained that her 
neighbours ‘talked’ because she would be out of her home in the evening visiting her sister and wore 
visible makeup. Men in the neighbourhood had begun to tease her husband and asked if she was out 
in the evening ‘to get you money’, intimating that women were only out in the evening if they were 
morally compromised and working as prostitutes. Ababsa (2017), has noted that in Amman it is 
‘socially unacceptable’ for a woman to walk alone after sunset, except in some of the more commercial 
parts of the city. She adds: ‘Disregarding these unwritten rules will often expose women to suggestive 
remarks and (unwanted attention)’ (n/p). Whilst Aleaha and Noodah were similarly exasperated and 
dismissive of wider societal concerns, these accounts indicate the ways in which space is socially 
(re)produced as masculine, and how space shapes expectations around ‘appropriate’ gendered 
mobilities, particularly at night.   
It was not only the wider community who affected women’s perception of public mobility at night, 
but also extended family. Women particularly highlighted how their husbands expressed concerns or 
expectations regarding their mobility. For example, participants expressed how they might like to 
partake in particular activities outdoors, or simply escape the confines of the home for a break but 
were prevented from doing so because of their husbands’ wishes. Ulima’s husband was present 
throughout her interview, and he provided his perspective:  
‘When I first came here, a lot of [Lebanese ‘bad guys’] in the neighbourhood started insulting 
me. It’s affected us. I wouldn’t go out beyond [6pm] …there are a lot of people that would just 
harass and hit us’ (Saad, Na’ba).  
As such, Saad felt that both he and Ulima were at risk of being targeted because of their Syrian 
nationality and their lack of power and knowledge of the neighbourhood. This had shaped their 
decisions not to leave the house in the evening as they felt they would be an easy target for 
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harassment. In this account gender was less relevant, and nationality and refugee status 
predominantly shaped the temporal relationship with public space.  
Hearing the perspective of Syrian men, what emerged was often a significant concern with security 
and lack of status (explored in more detail in Chapter Eight).  Thus, cultural norms of gender, and 
notions of protecting women’s honour, interacted with a wider landscape of insecurity which resulted 
in many men insisting on restrictive mobility for their wives. Many men spend most of the day outside 
the relative seclusion of the home negotiating opportunities for work (or if younger and the family 
was able to send them, at school). Like women’s experience in the urban outdoors, men experienced 
harassment, violence, fraud and arrest. The frequent difficulty or nervousness in approaching, or 
having access to, authoritative security providers exacerbated these incidents. When women reflected 
on their sons and husband’s experiences in public space in their host community, there were often 
accounts of assault and muggings, whereas this rarely, if ever, featured for women participants. As 
such, men’s understanding and knowledge of their position in their host society is arguably framed in 
a more violent and precarious lens than their female relatives and may indeed be wholly more 
negative. Whilst women’s gender held embodiments of ‘honour’ and ‘morality’ which clearly shaped 
men’s attempts to limit their time in public space, these decisions were also clearly influenced by male 
experiences of violence and othering in their host community.  Thus, some of the ensuing restriction 
in public space emerges from a wider concern over refugee status and security within host 
communities. Despite this, women still found agentic ways of responding to wider male concerns 
about security and public space to ensure they still had independence.  
Some participants were pragmatic and resigned to an acceptance that they couldn’t be outdoors or 
go to specific places at certain times, without the presence of their husband or a male relative. This 
was combined with financial restrictions and fear of the host community whilst exposed in public 
space. Thus, these restrictions ‘made sense’ to participants, and were perceived as sensible, even 
though they were restrictive.  
Other participants were frustrated by this limitation on their mobility and agency and voiced their 
desire to do certain activities and were therefore irritated at the restrictions placed on them. Many 
explained that the means of circumventing these potential restrictions were achieved through 
withholding incidents of conflict or harassment, maintaining silence or, on occasion, defying their 
husband’s or family’s preferences. Participants intentionally kept negative encounters or harassment 
to themselves in order to protect their ongoing mobility. Thus, experiences of catcalling or general 
harassment hadn’t prevented women from continuing to navigate public space. However, they did 
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express fear that other’s (particularly husband’s) reactions and responses might affect their mobility. 
Badra discussed visiting her family in the Jordanian Northern Governorate, explaining that she rarely 
left her relatives’ house because the comments directed towards her in public were so derogatory and 
crass:  
 ‘[I hear] the really dirty words, in Arabic we say from the belt down’.  
When I asked her if she had ever shared these experiences with her husband, she was adamant:  
‘No way. Because then [he would] deny me leaving the house’.  
Badra’s husband often limited her mobility despite her wider confidence in the city and her insistence 
that their local neighbourhood posed no threat. Later, she talked about the difficulty of leaving the 
house in the evening despite her personal wishes and insisted:  
‘This is not about me, that I don’t feel safe. It’s about my husband and what he wants…he 
doesn't let me go out’ (Badra, Hashmi Shamali). 
Yeseniah talked about the relentless catcalling she experienced in public space in Amman. Despite her 
exhaustion and irritation, she was adamant that she would not share these experiences with her 
husband:  
‘No, he would tell me: “Never go out again!” ...I wouldn’t tell my husband’ (Yeseniah, Hashmi 
Shamali).  
Shula (who had been propositioned for sex by a taxi driver) equally insisted that whilst she shared the 
encounter with her sister-in-law, she wouldn’t ever share it with her husband. When we asked her to 
explain this further, she looked directly at Akilah (my interpreter) and said: ‘You know what he would 
do’. When I tactfully redirected the question to ask about his response, she responded simply: ‘he 
wouldn’t let me go out anymore’. Her frank response to Akilah indicates her assumption that Middle 
Eastern men have a ‘set’ response to the harassment of women, which alludes particularly to concepts 
of shame/honour, gender and restriction. Shula had already described how her husband had 
emphasised that the neighbourhood was unsafe and how she had to be ‘cautious’ with everyone. She 
discussed other occasions when she had been desperate to simply go for a walk outside but had been 
prevented from doing this by her husband. This led to a growing resentment and she suspected her 
mobility would be further curtailed if she shared experiences of sexual harassment. Her husband’s 
instruction to her to be ‘cautious’ in public space demonstrates how women can routinely be seen to 
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carry the blame for sexual propositioning and comments, by being present in public space (de Koning, 
2009, p. 548; Sur, 2012). It is of little surprise that women tactically kept negative experiences to 
themselves or only shared them with other women who would be sympathetic. By sharing these 
experiences with male relatives, women made themselves vulnerable to questions about their 
conduct in public space and would expect larger restrictions on what little mobility they possessed, 
resulting in their access to public space at times being ‘forbidden’.  
 
By contrast, the husbands and male relatives of some participants encouraged them to leave the 
seclusion of home. This echoes the findings of Cornwall (2007, p. 161), who notes that feminist 
analyses of marriage are often 'blinkered' to other dimensions of gender relations that feature within 
these relationships. She argues masculinity in patriarchal contexts is often theorised as 'oppressive'. 
However, in her work, she found numerous partnerships of care, co-operation and mutual 
dependency, which also emerged in this study. A focus group participant noted that her husband had 
actively encouraged her to leave the seclusion of their home during the day and to engage in activities 
outside the home. However, she felt that she was unable to do this by herself insisting: ‘I don’t like to 
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go out’ (FGD 3, Na’ba). Her focus group was dominated by women who expressed a strong sense of 
fear in the urban outdoors, who would only leave the house in groups of two or three, never spending 
more than ‘an hour’ outside the home. It was clear that she associated public space with a lack of 
safety and emphasised that even though nothing had expressly occurred, she held a fear of the 
unknown. Her husband had identified her seclusion and encouraged her to get to know the 
neighbourhood. However, she continued to spatially confine herself as much as possible. Mahira, a 
participant living in Mazra’a, shared a similar experience, saying that her husband encouraged her to 
leave the house, make relationships and get around the community, but that she was too fearful. 
Others also expressed how they had shared upsetting encounters of harassment with their husbands 
in order to gain emotional support and did not fear that there would be wider repercussions to their 
mobility.  
In these accounts, women demonstrate the access and mobility they have in public space, but how 
this can also be curbed and restricted by wider fears and concerns of family relations. These accounts 
show how women’s urban imaginations are imbued with a lack of safety, perceiving public space in 
the city as insecure and dangerous, reflecting Lyytinen's (2015b, 2015a) work with urban refugees in 
Kampala. They also reflect heterogeneity in relationships. Whilst some men feel compelled to control 
women’s movements in urban outdoors, others actively encourage their movement and 
independence outside of the family dwelling for their own health and wellbeing. Furthermore, 
restrictions on women’s mobility may not necessary emerge from patriarchal expectations of women 
being unwelcomed in public space, but from a genuine fear of women’s compromised legal status and 
their possible encounter with state security institutions or others that could confront their legality. In 
Amman and Beirut, there were clearly examples of positive and balanced personal relationships where 
restrictions and controls had emerged from concerns of protection or security, or indeed, where 
women were encouraged by partners and family to engage in their new communities for their own 
health and wellbeing. As such, different aspects and issues of personal security are constantly being 
balanced against each other. For example, women’s mental wellbeing to be independent and mobile 
versus the wider insecurity of refugee status and protection.  
Women also show a range of tactical responses when their mobility is threatened, including 
withholding negative incidences or ignoring their husband’s perceived preferences. These indicate 
some of the ways in which women utilise tactical agency in order to live out their preferences and to 
maintain their mobility. 
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Female relatives, mobility and temporality     
Older women and female relatives also had a role in shaping impressions of public space and in directly 
limiting younger female relations’ time spent in the urban outdoors. Kandiyoti (1988) notes how in 
classically patriarchal societies women engage in patriarchal bargaining to offset subordination to men 
by controlling younger women (p. 279). Therefore, they reflect and reinforce men’s expectations 
about how younger women should behave outside of the seclusion of the home, and men and older 
women become ‘cultural guards’ dictating behaviours in particular spaces (Fenster, 2005; Sur, 2012). 
These older women often shaped expectations regarding the ways in which spaces of the city were 
permitted or forbidden to other, younger women (Fenster, 1999), dependent on factors such as their 
age and marital status.   
Expressions of power, and power imbalances, between different age groups, were occasionally 
articulated during interviews and focus groups. These expressions were typically coupled with an 
expectation that younger women would be targeted in public space, and thus required protection. In 
this study, older female participants very much viewed themselves as ‘sexually neutral’ and sexually 
unthreatening, whilst younger women were presented as ‘targets’ for male attention. Therefore, they 
possessed greater freedom to ‘transgress’ the gendered temporal and spatial limitations of public 
space placed on women through cultural and social norms. Thus, women experience different 
gradings of access and mobility within public space, dependent on the intersection of their identities.  
Fathima reflected on her family’s overall immobility outside of the confines of their home stating that 
they were nervous and fearful over the potential for conflict outside and therefore tended to stay 
indoors as much as possible. However, when it came to her younger daughter, Fathima’s fears became 
related to the sexual threat posed to her in the urban outdoors because she was young and a target:   
‘We wouldn’t go out because of a fear about what might happen….and also because my 
daughter is a young woman (she is 16) and there are men about’ (Fathima, Mazra’a).  
Later in the interview she commented that she and her sister Deema would accompany her daughter 
if she needed to be out in the city, in order to ensure she was not vulnerable to the advances of men. 
In Ashrafyeh, I interviewed Sama, a young married woman, alongside her confident mother-in-law, 
Basmaa, whom she lived with. Throughout the interview it was clear Sama had very little voice in the 
home, and her daily activities were greatly shaped by her mother-in-law. It also became clear that her 
mobility was restricted by the matriarch. Talking about some of their daily activities, Basmaa stated:  
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‘We don’t let Sama go out after 7, because she is young…because I am old, I can go out by 
myself, so it’s ok…but because [Sama] is younger, men would target her’ (Basmaa, Ashrafhey).   
When I asked Sama what she did during the day and if she had ever considered looking for work, she 
explained that she would only undertake this if she was accompanied by her mother-in-law. Basmaa 
frequently interrupted and spoke for her even when I addressed her directly, not in a dissimilar fashion 
to interviews that took place when husbands were present. It was a highly unbalanced and hierarchical 
relationship, and frequently Basmaa was openly dismissive and derogatory towards Sama. This is not 
to say that Sama was devoid of her own tactical ways and means of responding to these behaviours, 
which was often reflected of other interviews where there were hierarchal or gendered relationships 
at play.  For example, a common tactic was to completely disengaged from the conversation taking 
place, utilising silence and sullen displeasure to communicate attitudes towards the dominating party 
(Yeoh & Huang, 1998).  
The age dynamic was also interesting to observe during focus groups of women from different ages 
and backgrounds. Despite arguing that younger women shouldn’t be out the house in the evening for 
their protection, catcalling and sexual propositioning were dismissed as innocuous by older 
participants. Frequently when discussions of sexual harassment arose, focus groups would divide on 
the grounds of age. Younger and middle-aged women would talk of how such incidents left them 
feeling highly insecure and unsafe in public space whilst older women dismissed their distress (and 
disgust) saying these remarks and experiences were ‘harmless’. Many older women did not consider 
experiences of verbal sexual harassment to be something that should undermine younger women’s 
sense of security. Rather, there was an element of expectation that women who found these 
experiences unnerving and unpleasant needing to take this behaviour ‘in their stride’. Stanko (1995) 
notes that there is a tendency to frame sexual comments as ‘ordinary’ in the context of public space, 
and therefore to dismiss the association of fear with these experiences. However, in this context, 
where women were economically, legally and socially vulnerable and endured daily comments about 
their ethnicity, to be propositioned and objectified whilst navigating public space built strong 
emotional landscapes of fear and unbelonging. Indeed, studies have demonstrated that societally 
subordinated status has a marked effect on an individual’s perception of safety in public space (Pain, 
2000). These focus groups demonstrated a complex and diverse landscape of impressions of gender, 
space and sexual harassment which were influenced by a myriad of factors. Fears of sexual violence 
or harassment were far more common amongst younger women, who then expressed a greater 
discomfort in public space. They often felt that these spaces were not available to them at certain 
times, or only if they conformed to certain behaviours (for example, being chaperoned). Conversely, 
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older women, particularly those in Amman, expressed a broader freedom and a nonchalance towards 
sexual harassment or the potentiality of sexual violence. In these accounts, older women appeared to 
have tactically ‘bargained’ with patriarchy (Kandiyoti, 1988), enjoying their wider mobility and power 
afforded in their older age, encouraging younger women to stay indoors or to not take harassment 
seriously.   
These accounts show a diverse range of attitudes and concern with spatiality, temporality and 
security. Alongside wider concerns of personal safety and insecure status, there are patriarchal 
relationships, structures and societal norms at play. Some husbands and older female relatives extend 
expectations and influence over women’s temporal mobility, thus socially reproducing public space to 
reflect wider social norms prevalent in the region, arguing that certain spaces are not ‘permitted’ to 
younger women, particularly at specific times of the day. These expectations do not necessarily 
emerge from an expectation that public space ‘belongs’ to men, although there is an aspect of this. 
Amongst societal and cultural expectations regarding gendered behaviour, there are other structural 
issues which intersect with identities and personalities to influence impressions of public space as 
unsafe, or which limit wider mobility.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed women’s mobility within their host cities and the ways in which various 
structures and multiple identities create and extend oppressions (or opportunities) upon refugee 
women in the urban outdoors. By engaging with intersectionality, this chapter has sought to 
circumvent binary interpretations of refugee women as either agents or victims, and presented 
complex, heterogeneous accounts of women’s experiences of mobility and insecurity in their host 
cities. Through these accounts, the ways in which refugee women (and to a certain extent, refugee 
men) inhabit and access different spaces, in graded terms of forbidden and permitted, become 
evident. Public space is not purely the domain of men, nor private space a location of feminine 
seclusion. Rather, women inhabit, use and access public and private spaces in varying and graded 
terms which are shaped by structural mechanisms of patriarchy, social and cultural norms, categories 
of identity, refugee policies and personal experiences. Women hold a range of different subordinate 
and dominant positions and social locations in their host communities. This is dictated by their 
different identities and their relationships interacting with structural mechanisms of patriarchy and 
legal policy (Anthias, 2008). For example, older Syrian women demonstrate a much stronger position 
of power and authority over younger women, dictating their mobility and behaviour in public space, 
despite being in a ‘subordinate’ position within the social hierarchy of their hosts’ communities. 
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This chapter demonstrates how refugee women, occupying positions of societal marginality, 
continually negotiate a hegemonic scrutiny when in public space. This is not only regarding Jordanian 
or Lebanese men, who might typically be perceived as ‘occupying’ or holding power in public space in 
Amman and Beirut. Rather, what emerges is a variety of restrictive structures implemented by a range 
of different groups and individuals who hold varying aspects of power and position. Thus, Syrian 
women’s presence in public space is not only commented on, judged, and therefore, restricted by 
male citizens, but also by Syrian men and women, particularly those who are older or related. These 
individuals shape women’s mobility both through an internalised acceptance of patriarchal norms (for 
example, women’s unchaperoned mobility being perceived as ‘immoral’) and a wider fear of the 
insecurity of Syrian refugees’ position in their host societies.  
In such contexts, where patriarchy and identity intersect and women are subject to public scrutiny, 
patterns of tactical behaviour emerge, which women use in order to blend into their host society. 
Many women describe using similar behaviours and dress that are perceived as decorous and pious in 
order to aid their negotiations of public space. This includes modest clothing, avoiding contact or 
interaction with members of the opposite sex, a quiet demeanour or using chaperones in order to 
navigate public space in an ‘upstanding’ manner. Women are also inclined to stay within their homes 
in the evening as women’s public presence in the night-time is often considered risky or inappropriate 
through a combination of socio-cultural norms and refugee’s status within their host community. 
Consequently, these tactical behaviours often reproduce patriarchal and gendered structures and 
norms. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, even when engaging in societal norms of gendered 
dress and behaviour, incremental aspects of their appearance or accents result in them being 
identified as outsiders. This result in them being targeted by disgruntled or opportunistic others who 
appear to consider them vulnerable and thus an easy focus for threats.   
Other tactical practices include withdrawal, from public space or from personal relationships and 
community integration. This is often shaped by experiences of gossip and harassment. Syrian refugee 
women expressed a sense of judgment and observation within their host communities, from both the 
indigenous host and the displaced refugee community, noting that this often emerged from other 
women. Women talked of being weighted with expectations, and subsequently criticised, regarding 
their dress, behaviour and way of life: from leaving the house in the evening to falling pregnant. These 
habits of gossip and criticism led many women to avoid contact and relationship with others. Women 
who were divorced particularly suffered under these conditions whereby they were socially isolated 
because of the social ‘risk’ they posed to other women in being ‘tempting’ to other women’s 
husbands, particularly in contexts where polygamy is accepted.   
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Women express a strong sense of being gharib (outsiders) in their host communities in the way they 
are treated and their general sense of unease and insecurity. Whilst some women attempt to build 
social networks and integrate into their communities in order to build a stronger sense of community 
and belonging, others reject these opportunities, citing fears of host community behaviour or 
choosing to prioritise family links. This intentional avoidance of the host community was also shaped 
by the presence of wider family relationships. Women expressed a preference for proximity to their 
wider, displaced family, and how as a result they did not ‘need’ to build connections and relationships 
within in their host communities. However, many women express a sense of societal isolation, 
especially those with no social networks, or those that have internationally kept themselves apart. 
Women express a feeling of dissociation from their lives, saying that they are strangers ‘everywhere’ 
including their own homes. Thus, women’s disconnection at the home scale and at the public scale 
are deeply interconnected (Fenster, 2005, p. 229). This disconnection further disrupts and inhibits 
women’s knowledge and sense of belonging to their host cities, as women are reticent to go outdoors. 
This thwarts their capacity to understand the spatial cartography and dynamics of their host cities, 
creating an ongoing sense of insecurity.  
These tactical decisions of withdrawal, and negative perceptions of host community disrupt 
opportunities for relationships and solidarity between marginalised host and refugee communities. 
Whilst some studies have indicated how support, alliances and political manoeuvring can be achieved 
through solidarity at the urban margins (Ataç et al., 2016; Brickell, 2014; Lancione, 2020) this study 
builds on the findings of some of Cornwall’s (2007) work, which found that there are often barriers to 
women’s solidarity and mutual support when women live on the margins. This work finds concerns 
such as suspicion, fear, spatial and temporal vulnerability, social isolation and gossip create barriers 
to the development of these potential networks and opportunities amongst women. As such, because 
of women’s social positioning and personal experiences, there is no guarantee that the sorts of 
networks and solidarities that humanitarian workers and academics presume to develop will 
‘naturally’ do so in such environments. This in itself is unfortunate, as women’s isolation and fear 
clearly affects their mental wellbeing and many express a deep loss from their lack of social links.  
Threats and insults build on impressions of (in)security in the city for refugee women. Women’s daily 
lived experience of being ‘othered’ in their host city, by being objectified, marginalised and abused 
enhances their sense of insecurity within the city. Women lack status and legality and such negative 
encounters further their fears and impressions of the city as unsafe and reflect a particularly gendered 
aspect of marginalisation. The last empirical chapter will examine women’s experiences and 
perceptions of security services and conflict resolution, and the spatial repercussions of this.  
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Chapter Eight: (In)security, conflict resolution and mobility in Amman and 
Beirut  
 
This chapter explores the ways in which Syrian refugee women interact with formal and informal 
security provision in their host cities, the ways in which these interactions are spatialised, and how 
they influence impressions of (in)security within host cities. It is primarily focusing on the research 
question: How do Syrian refugee women engage with structures of formal and informal security and 
conflict resolution provision in their host cities? It examines how both social and legal contexts shape 
refugee interactions and encounters with state and non-state providers of security in the every day, 
and how the relationships and connections between the everyday, embodied, security of the 
individual relate to the wider national and regional concerns of (normative) security.  
Achieving security, in the sense of personal safety and protection, involves relationships with ‘security 
providers’ and with formal and informal coercive power, and access to avenues to mediate or achieve 
redress if conflict arises. The chapter recognises the distinctions between state preoccupations with 
‘security’, concerned with borders and sovereignty, and individual concerns of security as a lived 
experience, that is ‘individual responses to a set of constructed, contested and negotiated threats’ 
(Fawaz & Akar, 2012, p. 107). Using feminist geopolitical and geolegal positions, this chapter considers 
the ways in which macro scale structures, particularly legal and policy structures relating to refugees, 
alongside state capacity (as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’), shape gendered experiences of security in the 
everyday. By focusing on lived experiences of (in)security, the very different political and social 
contexts in Jordan and Lebanon come into play. Whilst Lebanon is broadly understood as a ‘weak 
state’ and has an extensive hybrid security system at work, Jordan is a ‘strong state’ with a centralised 
and organised security apparatus (Hazbun, 2016; B. Salloukh, 1996). This is coupled with differing 
approaches to refugee legality, particularly access to identity papers and documents, explored in 
earlier chapters.  
The ways in which refugees’ intersecting identities and their legal status (or lack thereof) play into 
experiences, access and perceptions of security providers, and the role that this plays in ongoing 
perceptions of public space will also be evaluated. As such, it builds on some of the findings and 
analysis of Chapters Six and Seven. This includes discussion on: the ways in which refugee policies 
interact with social and cultural norms and refugee women’s identities, to shape access and 
experiences of shelter, livelihoods and public space within host communities; the continuities and 
differences in which this is experienced in Amman and Beirut; and the tactical ways in which women 
use their agency in order to respond and negotiate these structures and experiences.   
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It begins by considering how refugee women’s perceptions of state security provision are marred by 
their experiences of conflict in Syria, and how this shapes attitudes towards security provision in their 
host city. Thereafter, it goes on to analyse women’s spatial experiences and encounters with state 
security provision in their host cities and how this is shaped by their identity as ‘refugee women’. 
Having established some of the complexity and gendered ways in which this operates, what follows is 
an examination of the alternative providers of security within Amman and Beirut, with a specific focus 
on political parties. The chapter then examines further community stakeholders that can act as a 
means of security or conflict resolution for refugee women but are, in reality, rarely used or accessible 
to women. Lastly, the chapter explores the ways in which women tactically negotiate issues of 
insecurity within their host communities, employing aspects of their identity alongside social and 
cultural norms in order to enhance their (and their wider family’s) sense of security. This section 
demonstrates some of the agentic ways in which women respond to oppressive and challenging 
conditions in their host cities.  
By using theories of intersectionality this chapter draws out the complexities of women’s experiences 
regarding lived security in their host cities, specifically regarding impressions of, and access to, 
providers of security. Women express a fear and wariness, as well as an appreciation, for different 
state and non-state security providers, who, in different contexts, fluctuate between a source of 
security or insecurity for refugee women.   
Experiences in Syria shaping fears of public space and security institutions  
Experiences of living in, and fleeing, a warzone had a deep and lasting effect on families. As explored 
in Chapter Seven, the Syrian civil war had affected the spatiality of women’s lives. Women were often 
confined to home because of dangers of the conflict, or because of the social demands and 
expectations of different regimes (such as Daesh). Whilst Chapter Seven explored the ways in which 
the conflict had impacted women’s experiences of public space and led to a fear of leaving their homes 
this section highlights how encounters and impressions of state security institutions during the civil 
conflict, permeated refugee’s wider perceptions of police and army in host cities.  
Many women found it challenging to adjust to the presence of security personal within their host 
cities, associating uniforms, military camouflage and weapons as aggressive, hostile and unsafe.  
‘At first I had a fear of anything that resembled the regime in Syria, whether it was a 
policeman, airplane, cops, whatever’ (Zarifa, Hashmi Shamali).   
220 
 
‘I’m scared of the police…I have a complex because of what happened in Syria. I feel very 
scared. My daughters can’t tell the difference between fearing the police in Syria, and fearing 
the police here’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh).   
Many participants highlighted their initial sense of alienation in their host communities as they dealt 
with the trauma of flight and asylum. Yara talked of her strong sense of fear in her neighbourhood 
which she attributed to her experiences in Syria and the psychological condition she had developed 
as a result. She also expressed fear over symbols representing the regime and seeing planes in the sky. 
Ulima and Saad reflected on the proliferation of security checkpoints in Beirut which left them feeling 
uneasy:  
‘[In Syria] there are lots of checkpoints...when the [Syrian Army] saw [my husband] was from 
Aleppo, they started beating him up. So, here, whenever we see checkpoints, we are scared 
of that happening again’ (Ulima, Na’ba).    
Participants joked about some of these memories, including their reactions to police and planes in 
their host countries, and how they had adjusted with time to their new surroundings. These accounts, 
whereby women would share their genuine fear, but undercut it with jokes, is not unlike Palestinian 
refugee participants from Johnson's (2007) study who engaged in ‘deflationary humour’ to deflect 
their anxieties and fears about their situation (p. 610-611).  Nailah explained that she had managed to 
overcome her agoraphobia, and now knew a couple of people in her local neighbourhood whom she 
would visit, whilst Zarifa confidently declared that she didn’t feel fearful when out the house any 
longer and felt far more confident negotiating the city, even independently. However, it was clear that 
experiences in Syria, particularly airstrikes, and interactions with police and army, had left some 
women extremely fearful of leaving their homes, particularly in the early days of their asylum. It also 
demonstrates the ways in which a sense of intimate insecurity can be experienced not only in material 
grounded experiences at the city scale, but in the overhead spaces above the city.  
These experiences left a marked effect on how women perceived state security institutions. Women’s 
impressions of the urban outdoors were shaped by both a fear of physical harm and death, and also a 
fear of state security and the power and authority they might have to detain, arrest or torture.  These 
perceptions of the police or army as representatives of the state, which in Syria posed a strong threat 
to citizens, had permeated into longitudinal perceptions of security providers as being potentially 
unsafe or threatening. This had spatial implications, in that security forces are predominantly present 
and monitoring public spaces. As such, participants expressed an aversion, particularly to the urban 
outdoors, as they associated this an increased likelihood of interacting with representatives of state 
security.   
221 
 
Legality, Space and (in)security in Amman and Beirut  
Chapters Six and Seven have presented some of the ways in which refugee papers and wider legality 
linked to residency and working opportunities shape refugee experiences and (in)securities in their 
host communities. This next section builds on this analysis of legality, residency and work, to consider 
the ways in which refugees and state security services are brought into confrontation through security 
services’ monitoring and issuing of refugee papers, and the ways in which this shapes perceptions of 
space and security services in each context.   
Legality, mobility and security in Beirut  
Due to the ongoing political climate in Beirut (as explored in Chapter Four), public space in the city is 
monitored by a range of both state, and non-state security actors. The most tangible reminder of this 
is through the city’s proliferation of hawajaz. This is a term (literally ‘barriers’) that refers to a 
checkpoint or blockade, which can be either temporary or permanent, and can be operated by 
functionaries of a political party or by local police (Monroe, 2011). Hawajaz are fixated on identity and 
an individual’s right to ‘belong’ or be present in a particular place at a particular time. Several scholars 
have commented on the complexities of negotiating different security providers operating within the 
city, the effect this has on daily life and the production of public space (Fawaz et al., 2012; Monroe, 
2016). Alongside the city’s residents, refugees must also negotiate the presence of these state and 
non-state security providers. However, as most Syrians do not possess the legality to reside in 
Lebanon, checkpoints are a source of fear and act as a means of controlling refugees’ access and 
negotiation of Beirut.  
Where possible, checkpoints were avoided or spatially and verbally negotiated. Women referred to 
the necessity of paying bribes to pass through hawajaz, or appealing to army and policemen's 
compassion for their situation:  
'[I] don’t have the legal papers…I would pay a bribe or a fee or something. Once they caught 
one of my sons at the checkpoints. And I explained their situation and what they are going 
through and then they let him go… [If I see a checkpoint] I feel scared. Maybe they would catch 
my son. And we don't have money to release him, and maybe they deport him back to Syria, 
and I’m very scared about that' (Zulima, Na’ba).   
Even participants that did have legal papers, expressed fear and concern about checkpoints that were 
so fixed on an individual’s identity and legality. Fathima, a wealthier participant who had legal status 
through her husband, spoke of her son’s experiences at checkpoints when he was outside their 
neighbourhood:  
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‘There is a checkpoint close by, but they wouldn't search us… [But, my son] when he was in 
another area, and they were asking him: “Why are you here?” And things like that, about his 
whereabouts. So, the checkpoint in our area would make us feel safe, but further, beyond [our] 
area we would feel a bit uneasy [about checkpoints], a bit uncomfortable’ (Fathima, Mazra’a).  
Many women talked of renegotiating their mobility in the city, changing routes or returning home to 
avoid interacting with these checkpoints, citing concerns that if their papers were illegal that they 
could face imprisonment or deportation. For many, their expired papers at least indicated that 
they had previously possessed a legal residency permit and allowed for some degree of 
negotiation at a checkpoint. For example, one could emphasize one’s poverty, or that that 
the family was in the process of renewing residency or acquiring a kafala. For others who had 
not entered Lebanon legally and had been smuggled into the country, vulnerability and fear 
was even more acute:  
‘People who don’t have legal papers would avoid [the checkpoints and the police] and would 
stay at home. We came into this country legally, but our papers expired. But for people who 
were taghrib [smuggled]….it is always [vulnerable for them]’ (Zada, Na’ba).   
These individuals felt that they didn’t have the ‘right’ to register with UNHCR and intentionally 
engaged in far more determined tactics of anonymity and seclusion in the city. They were typically far 
more financially precarious, and appeared to be from poorer, more working-class backgrounds.   
Some participants held a registration certificate issued by the UNHCR, and many viewed this paper as 
vitally important regarding their status. Janmyr (2017) notes that the main difference between 
refugees who are registered and those who are recorded (under the post-May 2015 policy) is not the 
level of assistance on offer, but fundamentally the certificate itself, which acts as an important vehicle 
of legitimacy that could assist refugees in negotiating hawajaz.      
Women often carried a photocopy of the original UNHCR document on them; even though for many 
this document had ‘expired’ (the original registration certificate was issued for two years). This 
provided some sense of legality, and hence security, within Lebanon: 
‘I would feel secure because I have papers from the UN. If anyone wanted to talk with me, I 
would say I’m registered with them, even though they [the UN] are not really helping me at 
the moment…but it does help. There is a specific number, if anyone [gave you trouble] you 
would call this number’ (Alyas, Na’ba).   
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However, because of the poor access to UNHCR, the lack of material assistance and the rescheduling 
of appointments, others were caustic about the papers, saying they provided little sense of protection 
or legitimacy. This was particularly in reference to assisting refugees if they were stopped at a hawajaz 
or arrested by security:   
‘I only have a paper [recording my family] with the UN... [if I were in trouble] what would that 
do to help?’ (FGD 6, Bourj Hammoud).  
‘[UNHCR] gave me a barcode. This does not make me feel secure. There is no security’ (FGD 
5, Bourj Hammoud).   
A focus group participant explained how her husband had been recently arrested because of his lack 
of legal papers and expressed her frustration regarding kafala policies and permits:  
‘They let him out on the condition he made legal papers, renew his visa, find a kafala, in the 
duration of month. He couldn’t find a job [or kafala], now there is a search warrant in his name’ 
(FGD 6, Bourj Hammoud). 
 
224 
 
 
If refugees were unable to afford a permit, most continued to limit their mobility in the urban 
outdoors, avoiding security providers, and experiencing a heightened sense of insecurity. Although 
there are numerous arrests of those without papers, the Lebanese government has generally avoided 
large scale deportations (although there were some exceptions to this in the early days of the crisis, 
see: Dionigi, 2016). Instead, detention and arrest were intended to induce refugees to ‘legalise’ their 
status and gain a kafala sponsor for work. Thus, authorities used fear as a tool to encourage refugees 
to comply with legislation and policies. However, as detailed above, refugees simply couldn’t afford 
this process, and arrests and detention did little to transform this experience, save to heighten fears 
(Interview with Lebanese NGO, September 2016).    
Women who had built networks within their host communities, commented on the benefits of hearing 
about checkpoints in advance from others in the neighbourhood, which aided their spatial decision 
making. This was particularly the case for young men who were perceived as being more vulnerable 
to arrest:  
‘A Lebanese guy we know, would ring me or my sons to let us know [about checkpoints in the 
area]’ (Wajida, Na’ba).  
 
‘If there was a certain [event] they would tell you notto go out…It is communicated verbally 
through Syrians…[they] would tell you if there is a curfew or [house checks]’ (FGD 8, 
Mazra’a’).     
 
Police not only conducted checkpoints but would also be involved from time to time in house 
checks. However, this was often done alongside dominant political parties, and refugees explained 
that in their experiences, these were generally calm events that were conducted respectfully. 
Gender and class both have a strong role to play in negotiating checkpoints and security providers. 
The intersection of these categories can create a highly insecure environment for an individual. 
Security measures in Beirut are predominantly focused on:  
‘lower class men, seemingly non-Lebanese who, mainly due to media and different political 
actors discourses have been suspected to be the main cause of the deteriorating security 
situation in the country’ (UNDP, 2015, p. 19-20). 
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Men are frequently presumed by state security services and political parties to be affiliated with 
Bashar al Assad’s regime, rather than neutral, and are thus perceived as politically and socially 
dangerous. Lebanon has a long history of hosting migrant Syrian laborers who are employed in blue 
collar work, such as construction and gardening. Syrians are also considered to be more conservative 
then Lebanese. As such, some researchers have found that Lebanese citizens presume that Syrian men 
harass Lebanese women because they are unaccustomed to the personal freedom that these women 
enjoy (Carpi, 2016). All these factors add to a sense that Syrian men are dangerous, poorly educated, 
working class and represent a risky political undercurrent that affects the stability of Lebanon. This 
ensures that Syrian men are deemed ‘suspicious’ when in public space and are often acted on because 
of the ‘potentiality’ of their behavior (Monroe, 2011). This assumption that men were more 
threatening was reiterated by Syrian women themselves:   
‘They are more likely to check [men’s papers] because [men] are more likely to make problems 
and be dangerous’ (FGD 4, Bourj Hammoud).   
Hawajaz are operated by men, typically in security uniforms, and armed. Women often commented 
that they were not considered a threat, but their husbands and sons were, and that police were 
frequently fixated with men’s identities and backgrounds:   
'They wouldn't ask for papers from me or my daughter because I am a female and they 
wouldn't be intrusive or demanding about that. But with my husband, they would [want] to 
see his paperwork' (Shahar, Na’ba).  
‘[I haven’t experienced the checkpoints] but my son goes to prison every 2-3 months because 
he doesn’t have the Lebanese approval to be here’ (Husniya, Na’ba).  
Some participants shared a perspective that men spent more time in public and that women would 
only leave the home to partake in domestic responsibilities such as buying groceries, as explored in 
more detail in Chapter Seven. As a result, refugees felt that security services were not interested in 
being ‘intrusive’ against women’s mobility, as it was perceived as domestic and unthreatening.    
Despite the propensity for men to be stopped, searched and occasionally arrested, a handful of 
women noted that they had seen female refugees arrested and detained alongside men, despite their 
capacity to negotiate checkpoints. These women warned that they were not free from detention, or 
aggressive tactics from police, because of their gender:   
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'On the way [to the NGO] there was a checkpoint... and they took both men and women into 
custody. They don't discriminate [between them] if the papers are illegal' (Yaminah, Na’ba).   
These comments reflect the gendered experience of both public space and refugee experience, 
indicating how women often did not see themselves at risk for deportation, but how they feared the 
arrest and detention of male relatives, many of whom were the primary breadwinner for households 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014). Turner (2016, 2018) has detailed how the rhetoric of 'vulnerability' does 
not cover refugee men, yet, there is clearly a strong focus by the state on men’s legitimacy, presence 
and mobility in public space, whilst women are often framed through a domestic lens, confined to the 
seclusion of home and anxious to return to it. Despite this, women are not entirely immune from the 
gaze of the state and are also vulnerable to arrest and detention.  
Refugees’ predominant interaction with state security services was through the daily negotiation with, 
or presence of, state security personnel on the streets of Beirut. Refugees expressed a strong desire 
to avoid representatives of the state due to their lack of power and status, emphasising that they 
would not approach the state security premises (such as a police station) to resolve a problem or 
report a crime:  
‘I feel fear when I see security. I feel unsafe when I pass a checkpoint…We wouldn’t dare go to 
General Security [if we had a problem] we would get beaten up and shut up….no one helps us’ 
(FGD 8, Mazra’a). 
Women felt unable to use or approach state security representatives to manage actual incidents of 
conflict or crime at the neighbourhood level. Few sought recompense, and those that had approached 
the police for assistance, explained that were often rebuffed or ignored and had to accept whatever 
circumstances they found themselves in:  
’You are a Syrian, you are a foreigner, you would have to give up your rights if a problem 
happened. As a Syrian, you would have to shut up and stay quiet…if there was a big problem 
you would have to move to another area’ (Khalila, Maza’a). 
Bushra, a divorced mother, shared a story of a taxi driver’s attempted assault on her as she left his 
taxi. When she reported the incident to the police, she was dismissed and undermined:   
'[the driver] assaulted me, and I have the number [plate]...of the taxi. And I reported him at 
the police station and nothing happened' (Bushra, Na’ba).  
The police were sceptic, asking how she could have escaped her predicament while noting the license 
plate at the same time, dismissing her and telling her to report it to the taxi firm. Whilst some women 
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hypothesised that they would utilise police if they encountered a serious problem (typically 
considered a physical assault resulting in bodily harm, or an aggressive burglary) those that had been 
subjected to actual fraud, theft and violence all spoke of avoiding conflict and confrontation where 
possible and maintaining 'silence'.  
Zada and her husband worked together in a small tailor shop in the centre of Na’ba. During her 
interview, her husband sat quietly in the background sewing, occasionally responding if asked a 
question. They had several stories regarding theft and exploitation in the neighbourhood. Their small 
tailor shop had taken on a large order for a Lebanese businessman, who never paid for the completed 
order. I asked why they hadn’t followed it up, or gone to the police to report the theft, but they were 
reticent:  
‘We didn’t ask for help. We didn’t want anyone to know. We accepted what happened and 
moved on. We are new people here and we don’t want trouble. We came from a place with 
trouble. All we want is our safety, and for our children to go to school. We have suffered. If a 
man came to the shop and started causing trouble, we would just say: ‘it’s fine’. We avoid 
conflict, we would waive fees for work [and avoid trouble]’ (Zada, Na’ba).  
Zada and her husband also expressed a fear of approaching police or political parties to report 
someone who had defrauded them as they were concerned that such people would return ‘with 
thugs’. This fear of reprisals had kept them extremely nervous of those that they did business with, 
and they insisted now they would only do work for people they trusted and wouldn’t ‘mix with 
Lebanese people’. They avoided revealing details of incidents to their wider community, fearing 
subsequent conflict and exploitation. Their experience echoes that of urban refugees in Malaysia, who 
frequently find that they are subject to victimisation because they are unlikely to approach security 
services or report incidences (Nah, 2018). This couple felt that Syrians had very little recourse to justice 
in the neighbourhood and that no one would represent them. During their interview they shared a 
story of a man they knew who worked in Bourj Hammoud, who was attacked and mugged of nearly 
US$2000 when he was returning home after being paid for a job:  
‘Who would he complain to? Who would help him? Maybe people would say to him: “You’re a 
liar”’ (Zada, Na’ba).     
An escalation of violence, however, was perceived as something that some participants felt would 
require the presences of state security services, particularly if refugees held appropriate 
documentation:   
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‘If it was something on a smaller scale...a small, minor fight, we would prefer to fix things in a 
peaceful, community-ish, kind of way. We wouldn't call the police…so there wouldn't be any 
damage to them and there wouldn’t be any damage to us.  But if the problem is big, if it was 
maybe physical violence, that necessitates the presence of the army or the security forces, we 
would have to go to them’ (Deema, Mazra’a). 
Deema was one of the more secure participants in the study. Her husband had secured a kafeel 
through his full-time job, which meant that the family had managed to renew their residency permit 
legally. They were middle class, living in the most expensive rental property in the study. Although she 
still expressed a lot of nervousness about checkpoints, for the most part, she was more secure in the 
neighbourhood then most and was a member of a Syrian women’s support group. Her legal status, 
class and knowledge of her rights and her belief that she could ask her husband’s boss, or their 
landlord for assistance, if they ran into difficulties, enhanced her sense of security in the 
neighbourhood, and her confidence in approaching the police if they experienced violence. Her social 
networks, wealth, legal status and standing in the community all aided a sense of belonging and 
security. In contrast, those refugees whose lower socio-economic status and marginality meant that 
they could not establish their legitimacy in the city, felt unable to access state security institutions for 
help and assistance, and checkpoints throughout the city enhanced and spatialized their pervading 
sense of unease.  
Although checkpoints, which were strongly focused on identification and status, were a source of 
great concern for the women, police and political parties promoting security within the 
neighbourhoods were often appreciated. With the spill-over of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon 
resulting in heightened periods of tension, security personnel circulated the neighbourhood to 
conduct house to house searches. On these occasions, many participants expressed relief and 
gratitude for the presence of armed police:  
'Of course, when the army19 comes I would feel safe. Because when there is conflict...[they] 
control the situation and I would feel safe. If the army doesn't come, the conflict would perhaps 
escalate and there would be more consequences' (Shula, Na’ba).  
 ‘I sometimes see army and security personnel around the neighbourhood. They make me 
feel secure’ (Jadara, Na’ba).  
 
19 Both the ISF and the LAF wear combat uniform in their day to day policing of the city. Additionally, since 2011 the LAF has also become 
increasingly involved in day to day policing in Lebanon (Tholens, 2017). As a result, participants frequently interchanged the ISF and the 
LAF and referred to them both as ‘the army’ even when asked specifically about police.    
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‘We try to avoid the checkpoints if we can [as they imprison men]. With the presence of the 
army, we all feel safer. We prefer the army to be in control. Rather have that, than the thugs’ 
(Zada, Na’ba).   
‘[Regarding the ISF/LAF ] I feel unsafe …they are stopping and catching our children. But at 
the same time, the army is a sort of safety for the area…so I do feel safe’ (Husniya, Na’ba). 
Some of the participants expressed fears that what had happened in Syria could extend into Lebanon, 
and that refugees would be caught in further conflict. These concerns are shared with most 
stakeholders and citizens in Lebanon. Despite its political and geographical proximity, there have been 
efforts to keep Lebanon out of explicit involvement in the conflict, and to dampen tensions emerging 
between differing political factions and creeds as a result of the conflict and the ongoing refugee crisis 
(Dionigi, 2016; Salem, 2012). Whilst no participant actively expressed a pro-Assad stance, on limited 
occasions, frustration would be expressed that other Syrians had ‘caused’ the Syrian civil war with 
their protests against Bashar al Assad’s government, which had resulted in impoverished 
circumstances for many Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Therefore, the presence of general security on 
the streets, or through house searches, which were frequently described as respectful, appeared to 
be highly appreciated by women. This is similar to Hanafi's (2010) findings in Palestinian refugee 
camps, where despite networks of Palestinian-provided security within refugee camps, there was still 
a desire to have state providers of security (e.g a police station) near settlements, in case incidents 
spiralled out of control. However, the findings above also demonstrate that this desire for a state 
security presence stretches beyond camps, or urban refugee camps, into the poorer neighbourhoods 
of the city.  
These responses reveal an ambivalent, scalar and contextual perspective on urban (in)security in 
relation to security providers. Lyytinen (2015) highlights that security and insecurity are highly related 
and, at times, inseparable issues for urban refugees. Because of shifting identities that are continually 
intersecting with wider structures of state politics, patriarchy and refugee policies, a refugee’s source 
of security can alter to become an element of their insecurity. This can be particularly dependent on 
which of their ascriptive identities take the foreground. For example, when a woman’s gendered 
identity is foregrounded, she is often able to negotiate checkpoints, but when her nationality is 
foregrounded, she is perceived through a wider geopolitical lens of disrupting ‘state security’ and is 
vulnerable to arrest if her papers are lapsed.  
The spaces of the city that these women inhabit also develop their varying sense of (in)security. 
Refugee women reside in marginalised communities, which are typically high density and prone to 
230 
 
violence and crime, living in structures that can be permeable and compromised (Pasquetti, 2015). 
Sources of insecurity within these neighbourhoods are closely related to intimate worries of crime and 
violence. Drug dealers, domestic abuse, home robberies, sexual harassment, assaults, rapes, muggings 
and rumours of kidnapping and disappearances, were all discussed by participants. As such, many 
women felt that a police presence might also address or prevent day to day crime that pervades such 
areas and chips away at their sense of personal safety and community. Women typically express a far 
greater sense of fear related to crime than men, particularly violent and sexual crimes, due to their 
physical inferiority, and cultural and patriarchal norms relating to femininity (El Sadaawi, 2015; R. H. 
Pain, 1997; Valentine, 1989). Thus, it is not surprising that in interviews women expressed an 
appreciation for the moral ‘order’ and stability that security services provide, rather than a sense of 
insecurity. However, hawajaz that are focused on identity documentation and a ‘right to be present’, 
alter security providers into a source of fear. These checkpoints connect refugees to wider geopolitical 
concerns of security, borders and sovereignty, and disrupt refugee’s sense of a right to the city through 
probing interrogations regarding their spatial mobility in the city. Thus, security in this context is a 
shifting landscape of differing threats very much dependent on lived experience, identity and context 
and deeply related to spatial mobility (Akar, 2012).  
Legality, mobility and security in Amman  
The structure of the Jordanian State and its regulatory approach to managing incoming Syrian refugees 
results in contrasting experiences and perceptions of security and public space for Syrian refugee 
women, compared with those living in Beirut. Existing policies, which provided refugees with identity 
documents and status through the Ministry of Interior, meant that women expressed some sense of 
reassurance that they were ‘permitted’ to be in Jordan, and therefore felt that they possessed some 
protection and rights. Refugees would typically have at least one interaction with the police, as all had 
been to a police station to organise their identity documents as part of the Urban Verification Process 
introduced in 2015. This process also offered amnesty for those that didn’t have existing legal 
documents to be in Jordan (Achilli, 2015). Most were unflustered by this encounter with the police, 
and the necessity to attend police headquarters, seeing it as positive and explaining that it was ‘just 
an ID, so there is nothing to be afraid of’. A change of attitude towards state security providers was 
expressed by some women however, who described their initial fear concerning the police due to their 
experiences in Syria, which had slowly changed over the years of their asylum:  
'When we first got here, we were really scared. [When] we got to know the police more, we 
[were] not afraid of them anymore. They [the police] are very decent' (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh). 
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‘When we first got here, we were sort of scared of the police, but when we got to the borders, 
the police treated us really well. We like the police more than we like the people. Because they 
are so humane, and we have never seen anything from them that is not good’ (Nailah, Hashmi 
Shamali).   
Speaking informally with Jordanian police about their attitudes towards Syrian refugees, they 
emphasised that from their perspective, they treated Syrians fairly and considerately and in the same 
way that they would treat Jordanians:  
‘We treat Syrians exactly the same [as we treat Jordanians]. They are our brothers’. 
(Conversation with Police Captain, Hashmi Shamali)   
When asked about whether they would feel confident about speaking with the police or requesting 
their assistance, women’s responses were often in marked contrast to those in Beirut and many were 
bewildered by this question. Most were open to the idea of approaching the police and insisted that 
they possessed legal documentation and therefore held rights in their host country:   
'We didn’t do anything wrong, so why would we be scared?’ (FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).   
'We are legal, and we don't have anything to worry about' (Fariha, Mahatta). 
‘We didn’t do anything [wrong] so why should we feel [that we have to hide]?’ (Hanan, Hashmi 
Shamali). 
‘We would go to the police immediately if there was [a big issue]. Our relatives would do the 
same, it goes without saying’ (Jasura, Hashmi Shamali). 
The complex security apparatus that existed on the streets in Beirut was absent in Amman. Therefore, 
negotiating checkpoints of different security providers and providing identity documents was a far less 
common aspect of day to day life in the city. Whilst I regularly saw a police presence in Amman and it 
was clear that certain spaces of the city (such as hotspots of protest or popular tourist areas) were 
being monitored by a police presence, this presence was rarely heavy or organised. It certainly paled 
in comparison to Beirut’s ultra-heightened sense of security with checkpoints, barbed wire and 
military uniforms on the street.  
However, like participants in Lebanon, women highlighted the gendered experience of the police and 
public space, noting how men were perceived by the police and the state as 'risky' or a 'threat', whilst 
women were perceived through a lens of vulnerability, domesticity and innocence. When 
encountering police in public space, women insisted that they would feel safe and confident:    
232 
 
‘They treat women as if they are holy here, they don't ask for ID's or anything' (FGD 2, 
Ashrafyeh). 
‘The police are really nice, and kind, and they respect women here’ (FGD 1, Ashrafyeh).     
It was clear that many women associated their female identity as key to aiding their relationships and 
interactions with security services. Here patriarchal norms and kinship ties worked in positive ways 
for women, as they expressed a sense that police (who were predominantly male) felt a sense of 
responsibility and duty towards protecting female refugees. This in turn created a twofold sense of 
security and safety in that they were not a ‘target’ for police, and that they were also able to access 
security services if they needed assistance because of societal patriarchal and kinship obligations to 
protect and respect women.    
The identity card provided through the MOI for Syrian refugees was a key component of security for 
refugee women. This allowed women to feel legitimate in Jordanian society and increased their 
confidence whilst navigating public space in the city. The benefits of regular amnesties for refugees 
who had been smuggled over the border or from one of the camps, and did not have Jordanian identity 
documents, was clearly illustrated through Hanan’s account:  
'My husband taghrib [smuggled] me from the camp. But I wasn't able to walk the streets for 
five months because I didn't have an ID...and when my son saw a policeman or an officer....he 
would run to me yelling: 'Mom, Mom, Mom, there's a policeman there!'....[my] son was afraid 
they would take me back to the camp’ (Hanan, Hashmi Shamali).  
Hanan later described visiting a police station during an amnesty for documentation, explaining that 
she was treated gently and humanely by an officer who said:  
‘Why were you afraid [to organise your papers]? We wouldn’t have done anything to you’.  
Appropriate documentation was critical to enhancing refugees’ sense of legitimacy and their ‘right’ to 
seek assistance from state security services. Discussing a house burglary that took place shortly after 
their arrival in Amman, a focus group participant noted:  
'The [theft] happened when we first got here, and we didn't have legal documents. We felt we 
didn't have the right [to go to the police]’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh).      
These two statements highlight the link between state-sanctioned legality and a personal, embodied 
sense of insecurity. Without appropriate legal papers, particularly during the early period of their 
asylum, refugee women engaged in restrictive practices, believing that their presence in the country 
was illegal and they were unable to access security services. By restricting their mobility and avoiding 
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police, they experience increased vulnerability and isolation within their host community. Thus, 
appropriate legal status provides a sense of safety, security and legitimacy within host communities 
and enhances a refugee’s sense of possessing rights.  
Despite predominantly positive perspectives of how Jordanian police interacted with refugee women, 
some participants were still deeply shaped by their prior experiences of war which permeated their 
perspectives of state security services (see opening section). These were then exacerbated by their 
personal experiences with Wafedin raids in their neighbourhoods (see more below).    
‘I’m scared of the police. Because of [what happened to] my son, and also because we have a 
complex about what happened in Syria…I feel very scared’. (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh)   
Additionally, like fears expressed by participants who had experienced violence or theft in Beirut, 
some participants expressed a concern that they couldn’t approach police for fear of community 
reprisals. Reflecting on her son’s assault by some local thugs, Mouna noted that she was too nervous 
to approach the police because her son (and most of the rest of the community) knew who was 
responsible for the attack. She felt unable to take the matter further, as it would result in him being 
targeted and assaulted again. Here, the dynamics of a close, and highly dense neighbourhood, works 
to undermine productive connections with state security services.   
Despite positive attitudes towards the police, participants were still wary about their position in 
society. Some frequently referred to themselves as gharib: ‘strangers’ and outsiders, referencing the 
high incidence of verbal harassment they encountered, as explored in earlier chapters. Women felt 
they had fewer rights if police were required to mediate between Jordanians and Syrians and as such 
needed to be conscious and aware of their position and avoid conflict:  
‘If we got into trouble with a Jordanian…the right would be with them. The son of your country 
is closer to you… but in general [the police] respect [refugees]’ (FGD 1, Ashrafyeh). 
Negative encounters with police had a clear effect on refugees’ attitudes towards security, eroding 
their faith in traditional protective institutions. Very occasionally, participants would mention 
approaching the police but being rebuffed or ignored:   
'My neighbour’s son attacked my son with a knife...when I called the police, they said to me: 
“Call us when a [real] crime happens” [and hung up]’ (Saba, Hashmi Shamali).   
Other women felt the police were inaccessible and wouldn’t assist refugees in problems and conflicts:  
‘The police don't solve our problems. The only person who would solve your [own] problems is 
you’ (Basmaa Ashrafyeh).   
234 
 
These expectations and experiences left refugees concerned and reticent to trust police. However, for 
many women this didn’t affect their public mobility. For example, Saba said she would still feel 
‘completely comfortable walking the streets’, but that she couldn’t ‘trust’ the police to assist her.    
Another state security institution that left refugees deeply uneasy was the Jordanian secret police, the 
Mukhabarat. This agency has a fearful reputation, and frequently Jordanians would joke with me that 
even they feared the Mukhabarat and would avoid interacting with them at all costs. Mukhabarat 
often wear plain clothing and present an ‘everyday’ image, and, especially for an outsider, are not 
easy to spot or avoid. Leesha described being snatched off the street by Mukhabarat officers and 
interrogated for 24 hours, after she had approached a local church that had a reputation for helping 
Syrian refugees with third country resettlement20. Leesha described this interrogation as primarily 
focused on her decision to enter a church, and what appeared to be a fixation with her potential 
conversion to Christianity21 rather than her status as a Syrian refugee. However, she described her 
strong sense of terror when she saw a visual presence of state security in public space and expressed 
many fears about deportation. A focus group participant expressed strong distrust of any state 
security services, as Mukhabarat had smuggled her family from one of the border camps and had later 
extorted them by threatening to return them to the camp if they didn’t provide him with more money 
(FGD 1, Ashrafyeh). She felt there was no one she could seek help from as Mukhabarat are greatly 
feared and have significant power. These experiences left women fearful of state security institutions, 
particularly those that are perceived as secretive and powerful.   
In contrast to refugee women in Beirut, women in Amman predominantly expressed confidence that 
they could approach and use police, which in turn lessened their vulnerability to exploitation. 
However, gendered distinctions begin to emerge when examining refugee encounters with Wafedin 
in their neighbourhoods.  
As outlined in detail in Chapter Six, food vouchers and support provided though UNHCR and the Red 
Cross were rarely sufficient to cover livelihood needs in Jordan. Many women, their male relatives and 
children were seeking employment, or were employed, in infrequent low skilled labour (Stave & 
Hillesund, 2015). As few refugees possessed genuine work permits, the threat of arrest was high as 
the Wafedin frequently ran work permit raids on the 'typical' refugee and migrant hosting 
neighbourhoods in East Amman. Migrant workers as well as refugees were targeted in these searches. 
Participants shared accounts of plainclothes officers arriving in the neighbour and eliciting an 
 
20 Humanitarian organisations working out of local churches to assist refugees with asylum is not uncommon. I came across a 
handful of these organisations whilst in Jordan, who were involved in assisting refugees with their applications for asylum in third 
countries.  
21 Conversion to Christianity is illegal in Jordan. However, churches as institutions, and Christianity as a practised religion, are 
generally tolerated as long as they are not actively proselytising.  
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atmosphere of panic. Refugees would attempt to evade arrest by scaling buildings or jumping out of 
windows, resulting in injury, or feigning that they were shop customers instead of employees:  
‘[The atmosphere changes when the Wafedin arrive]. Everyone is scared, everyone is running 
around. It’s so bad…people don’t know where to go…it’s like a flashback to when we were still 
in Syria. They use the huge police cars that are armoured’ (Rabiah & Zafira, Hashmi Shamali).  
The expression of fear attached to male relatives being 'sent back to Syria' was far more intense in 
Jordan then it was in Lebanon. This fear stemmed from personal experience, as many of the women 
had relatives who had been deported, threatened, imprisoned or moved back to one of the Border 
Camps when caught working without a permit. This was compounded by the regular visual reminders 
of these Wafedin raids in their neighbourhoods. Whilst men in Lebanon were frequently detained and 
arrested, evidence of actual deportations were not found across this research project22. However, 
refugees in Jordan had either had personal or second-hand experience of a family member being 
detained and deported. Participants expressed resentment at the deportations of family members 
that had been working to support their socio-economically compromised families and felt that these 
experiences had created a barrier in their capacity to access state security provision.  
As established above, MOI identity cards had a positive effect on the sense of security and belonging 
within Jordan, by permitting refugees to be ‘present’ within its borders.  However, the inability to gain 
a legal work permit through a kafeel resulted in gendered anxieties and discomfort in public space and 
a deep nervousness regarding security services. Typically, men were engaged in informal work, such 
as construction or painting, which required them to work in the outdoors, and would often wait in 
public spaces (such as under bypasses) to attract informal work opportunities. As such, men engaged 
in visible practices of work without permits, which led to a pervading fear of being caught with the 
resulting repercussions. Women often contrasted their attitudes towards state security institutions 
with their male relatives, saying that the men were ‘terrified’ of being caught, and highly 
uncomfortable in public space when police were present, whilst they felt that they were treated 
respectfully by the state:    
‘My husband is absolutely terrified by [the police], because once he was painting a building, 
and he was chased by [them]…..if he was caught, he would be deported….He is not that 
worried when he is working inside of apartments, because he would just close the door and 
work in peace. But he is worried when he works outside’ (Nailah, Hashmi Shamali).   
 
22 The lack of an aggressive deportation / refoulement policy appears to be in part down to labour market concerns, as Lebanon had a strong 
reliance on Syrian migrant workers pre 2011. See: Janmyr (2017) and Turner (2015) for more on this.  Additionally, Jordan has frequently 
limited movement of refugees because of concerns related to terrorism, or potential to ‘make trouble’ (for example, deportations of 
refugees from Za’atari refugee camp over protests).  
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‘In terms of my husband, and in terms of work and such, he is completely terrified of the police’ 
(Zarifa, Hashmi Shamali).   
‘‘Every time my brother tries to work, he gets caught by the Wafedin. They caught my brothers’ 
multiple times and every time they would be forced to sign the warning saying they wouldn't 
work again…The men can't work, the Wafedin keeps coming to arrest them, and sometimes 
that ends in deportation’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).  
Nailah’s comments, highlighting her husband’s fear, illustrates the risk of working visibly in public 
space without a permit, and how this affects attitudes towards police and a heightened sense of 
insecurity in public space. Turner (2015) notes that young, single refugee men were often denied the 
ability to leave border refugee camps as they are the greatest threat to the labour market in Jordan. 
Thus, they are perceived as having the potential to disrupt the human security of Jordanian citizens’ 
access to work. As such, refugee men working without permits become the target of the security gaze 
and are readily deported. This had a profound influence on perceptions of security services and 
foregrounds the relationship between gender, space and security. In 2016, policy changes to Syrian 
refugees’ rights to work were amended through the Jordan Compact at the London conference 
(Barbalet et al., 2018). The resultant policy changes led to the Jordanian government issuing a set 
amount of non-employer and non-position-specific, simplified (and free) work permits, particularly for 
those who had ongoing informal work in the construction sector. Despite the emergence of these 
permits in the year preceding my interviews, there was still a marked nervousness about them. NGOs 
requested that I emphasised, during interviews, that more flexible work permits were now available. 
Despite my efforts, participants continued to insist that they would need a permanent job, or that 
there was still an expensive payment attached to the permit. This illustrates the challenges of 
communicating policy changes with an urban refugee population, who often seek to enhance their 
anonymity and avoidance of the state. It also demonstrates, that despite arguments to the contrary, 
refugees fear and distrust the Jordanian State enough to dismiss this policy as ‘too good to be true’ 
and claim that is must have caveats and conditions attached. These examples demonstrate the 
Jordanian State’s capacity and how it quickly and effectively penetrates day to day society through 
tools such as the Wafedin or the Mukhabarat. 
The kafala process of work sponsorship also placed Syrians in highly vulnerable positions. They felt 
unable to approach the police as they might displease their kafala and lose their legal status and 
employment. A participant described how her eleven-year-old daughter had been molested by her 
husband’s employer, a man well known to their family. She was furious and extremely concerned for 
her daughter’s safety, however her husband refused to allow her to report the incident to the police 
as it endangered the family's sponsorship and their status. As such, the family had dealt with the 
237 
 
incident through informal mediation23. She disagreed with her husband’s decision not to report this 
to the police, and the family’s continued relationship with the man in question. She expressed a strong 
sense of frustration that this was the approach her husband had chosen for their family, but felt she 
had little option. Thus, with or without kafala, women’s access to appropriate avenues of protection 
and justice may be limited.  
Refugee women, mobility and state security in Amman and Beirut  
Perspectives of security services and (in)security are deeply gendered in Amman and Beirut and 
intersect with macro structures of policy, state structure and issues of identity. In both Beirut and 
Amman, women sense that they receive gendered preferences when encountering or approaching 
security services. In Amman, women consider themselves to be treated respectfully and considerately 
despite their status as outsiders in contrast to (especially informally employed) Syrian men. In Beirut, 
women feel that when their gendered identity is foregrounded over their nationality, they can 
negotiate checkpoints and security personal, appealing to gendered assumptions of women as 
unthreatening domestic caregivers and thus of no interest to the ‘gaze’ of state security.  
Gendered and national identities work particularly to shift social positionalities of power regarding 
women’s experiences and interactions with security services (Anthias, 2008). Whilst women appear 
to have subordinate positions in the way they are perceived as ‘domestic’ and vulnerable, this  
provides them with a more secure position than that of refugee men, in regard to their mobility and 
capacity to navigate security providers or checkpoints. Whereas men are perceived as dangerous and 
are therefore more scrutinised, women can use the intersection of their identity to navigate and 
negotiate these structures. However, when their nationality is foregrounded by security providers, 
particularly in Beirut, women experience a shifting landscape where they are also vulnerable to arrest 
and detainment.  
However, one of the key differences between these two contexts is legal status, which has a clear 
effect on refugees’ own perspectives of their right to be present and their right to access services. 
Women express a deep nervousness about approaching security services in Beirut when they did not 
have an authorised status. These led to a heightened fear when negotiating public space and indeed 
a desire to renegotiate space or to limit one’s mobility. Even though women feel nervous having direct 
contact with state security services, they still express an appreciation for their presence and a sense 
that they bring ‘order’ to the city. By contrast, legality for refugee women in Amman provides them 
 
23 We spoke with this participant following the focus group as we were very concerned about child protection issues. She explained that she 
had not reported the incident to anyone ‘with authority’. We encouraged her to let the Social Worker at the NGO know so at the very least 
the institution could provide support for her daughter and assist her if she wanted to take it further. We then followed up with her a few 
days later when she confirmed she had informed the NGO and they were dealing with the incident.  
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with a right to access security services, and therefore they express a heightened sense of security 
within their host community alongside largely positive attitudes towards police as being accessible 
and compassionate towards them. 
Having analysed refugee women’s experiences of state security and the wider effect this has on their 
day to day lives and perceptions of security within their host communities, the following section 
considers alternative security provision and the role this has on experiences of (in)security in Beirut 
and Amman.  
Political parties as alternative conflict management and security provision  
Political parties in Beirut  
Moving beyond state security institutions, other avenues and representatives emerge as a means of 
enhancing or mediating security issues for refugees in their urban host communities. In Arab culture 
it is common to resolve challenges and conflicts at the community level, where possible, by engaging 
mediators. Involving police, or wider formal security representatives is avoided and community efforts 
at mediation are preferred, particularly in more rural contexts. This is in order to avoid the implications 
of involving police, security services or eventual court cases, which are often considered to be 
damaging or embarrassing for an individual’s reputation (Johnstone, 2015; Özçelik, 2006). Informal, 
community level mediators include political parties, religious representatives, community leaders and 
councils and Mukhtars (community mayors). In refugee communities, especially in refugee camps, 
community leaders and representatives, as accessible mediators, emerge quickly (Sullivan & Tobin, 
2014). These institutions and individuals allow for alternative means of resolving conflict or enhancing 
security for refugees, particularly as refugees lack formal documentation which makes them reticent 
to approach police.  
This section examines further refugee reflections on access to security services and conflict 
management within their host communities, by focusing on stakeholders outside of state security 
institutions. This first sub-section explores the role of political parties in each city, due to their prolific 
presence in Beirut in particular, followed by a brief sub-section which explores other avenues of 
security within each city that were discussed during focus groups and interviews.  
In place of formal state security actors, political parties active and present at the community level, can 
act as mediators and peacemakers, negotiating conflict on behalf of community members. As this next 
section will show, the role of political parties as mediators highlights the differences between Amman 
and Beirut. Because of the weak state structure present in Beirut, and its fragmented and plural 
security framework, political parties have significant power, within and beyond the spatial boundaries 
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of their neighbourhoods. However, in Amman where the strong state is at work, this was notably less 
present. Indeed, civil society was notably impalpable. This next section examines the presence (or lack 
thereof) of political parties in Amman and Beirut, their interactions with refugee women and the ways 
in which this plays into spatial, perceived and actual experiences of (in)security.  
Political parties frequently act as alternative security providers, mediators and conflict resolvers for 
Lebanese citizens. This is typically due to the ways in which political parties are embedded into civil 
society in the country through kinship, tribal and ethnic linkages and their proximity to the everyday 
citizen (Boege et al., 2008). This assistance also extends to some migrants and refugees and allows for 
a grassroots resolution of issues at the neighbourhood level. Lebanese neighbourhoods are often 
awash with political paraphernalia: flags, posters and slogans of the dominant political party are 
typically visible. In Na'ba, the Shi'a party Hezbollah has a strong presence, and is very much ingrained 
in the daily life of the neighbourhood. Refugees’ perspectives of the party and their involvement 
differed. Whilst some extolled the party and felt that they provided protection and accessible conflict 
resolution, others were nervous of the influence the parties had and were unsure of their position. 
Some women credited Hezbollah's assistance with negotiating releases for male relatives who were 
stopped by security checkpoints in the city. Shahar, a young married woman shared:  
'He [my husband] was stopped at an army checkpoint for like 2 -3 hours…Then he talked to 
someone from Hezbollah that he knows, and he fixed it for him' (Shahar, Na’ba).   
When I asked if she knew who to contact if she had trouble at a checkpoint, she explained that it was 
only her husband who had the connection with the political party. Carpi (2016), who conducted 
research in Lebanese localities outside of Beirut, echoed these findings, stating that: ‘Syrian refugees, 
especially males…(seem) capable of accessing security through informal channels’ (p. 19). However, 
several women in this study, notably from female-headed families, highlighted the protection offered 
to women by the party, particularly regarding their personal protection. Participants recalled being 
encouraged to speak with Hezbollah party representatives if conflict or negative encounters in the 
neighbourhood re-occurred (for example frequent catcalling, harassment or propositioning). One 
participant noted that after she had had some difficulty in the neighbourhood Hezbollah had taken 
note of her name and her family situation (notably that she was divorced with three children and 
extremely impoverished). These participants highlighted the intermediary role of political parties in 
conflict resolution at the neighbourhood level, and their ability to secure an element of safety for 
women's mobility in public space:  
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'I would feel safe because of Hezbollah…because of the political parties…they would make me 
feel secure because they would protect women, and they wouldn't do anything to me' 
(Yaminah, Na’ba).  
 ‘[Hezbollah] enforce security, they provide security for both Syrian and Lebanese people 
(Wajida, Na’ba).  
'The political party Hezbollah…support Syrians and they would work as peacemakers 
between the people if there are conflicts' (Shahar, Na’ba).   
Hezbollah operatives in the area noted how Syrian refugees would often prefer to seek assistance 
from their party, situated outside official state structures of security and justice provision, to resolve 
a conflict or problem, stating that:  
'They would prefer to go to [us] rather than to the army or police station because for most of 
them their papers have expired. A lot of the [police] officers, would tell the Syrians just to leave, 
it might take a lot of time to [file a lawsuit] take action, so justice is more swift with the party' 
(Hezbollah Official, Na’ba).   
Whilst Hezbollah’s party line is to welcome and care for Syrian refugees regardless of their political or 
religious background (a majority of displaced Syrians are Sunni Muslims), their longer-term interests 
are still focused on discouraging Syrians’ long term integration into Lebanon as this affects the 
confessional balance of Lebanon (Dionigi, 2016; Thibos, 2014). Hezbollah’s actions are thus focused 
on the short to medium term, with conflict resolution commonly attainable in this timeframe. The 
comment above, by a senior Hezbollah representative in Na’ba, highlights the informal channel of 
conflict resolution that the party offers not only to Lebanese citizens, but to Syrians as well. Most of 
this conflict resolution appeared to be low level mediation between parties. The representative did 
not mention ‘punishing’ individuals for particular crimes and did say that for significant crimes the ISF 
and LAF would always be contacted and the party would not address these issues themselves 
(although they may play a role in detaining an individual). Speaking with a representative from the 
political party Lebanese Forces, they further emphasised that regarding issues of sexual harassment, 
resolution and punishment wouldn’t be judged according to an individual’s ethnicity, but rather by 
the gender of the victim:  
‘We would fight with him [a harasser] …whoever he was we would be very firm with him. We 
wouldn’t look at it as ‘Syrian’ or ‘Lebanese’, no one would support someone who was 
aggressive or inappropriate towards a woman’ (Lebanese Forces Official, Na’ba).  
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Whilst political party representatives spoke cautiously in interviews of tensions that incoming Syrian 
refugees had brought to their communities (predominantly because of the strain on resources), most 
were quick to emphasise to me that they would always assist in mediating and keeping tensions 
between different groups to a minimum and would assist those in need. Close relationships between 
refugees and political parties, and indeed, the use of political parties as mediators, particularly 
between refugees and state security services, enhances these parties’ knowledge and power within 
their neighbourhoods (Boege et al., 2008).  
However, not all participants were appreciative of the presence of political parties. Karam, a husband 
of a participant, was uncomfortable and unsure of how to negotiate them. He had experienced a mild 
confrontation with a Hezbollah representative, which left him intimidated and cemented his view that 
‘Lebanese people aren’t good’. This experience was exacerbated by the short amount of time the 
family had lived in the area and their lack of social networks.  
In Mazra'a the Future Movement, an established Sunni political party from the March 14th alliance, 
insisted that Syrians never approached them for help and assistance and that the Party preferred to 
stay out of 'refugee and government issues' (Future Movement Official, Mazra’a). Over the course of 
the Syrian refugee crisis, this party (alongside others) had changed its perspective towards incoming 
refugees from a humanitarian response to a security threat, particularly regarding Syrian refugees and 
unemployment, crime and a rise in consumption of compromised resources and their longer term 
presence in the country (Dionigi, 2016). A representative of the party expressed that Syrian refugees 
had no time or interest in local Lebanese politics because they had enough problems of their own and 
the Lebanese political landscape was too complicated for outsider involvement.24 This is supported by 
El Helou & Antara's (2018) report on Syrian political involvement in Lebanon, whose respondents 
frequently noted the flaws of the Lebanese political system and the lack of opportunities for Syrians 
to be involved. Thus, the party insisted they had little to do with refugees and certainly didn’t perceive 
their role as a conflict mediator. However, speaking with local NGOs and researchers in Mazra’a, it 
emerged that a network of Future Movement informants operated in the neighbourhood, in order 
that the predominant political party had ongoing knowledge and involvement of what was going on 
at the street level, and often intervened in low level security issues. In likelihood because of my 
positionality as an outsider, and indeed the official’s own position (an extremely prominent position 
in the party in Mazra’a) this detail was not forthcoming even when it was explicitly asked about.   
 
 
24 Syrian refugees are predominantly Sunni and there is generally an anti-Assad attitude amongst most in exile (although many of my 
participants promoted a politically neutral sentiment) (see Diongi, 2016, and Salem, 2012)  
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Women in Bourj Hammoud noted the strategic importance of aligning with political parties active in 
the neighbourhood in order to secure protection for themselves, indicating that involvement in 
political parties requires a payoff of some sort:  
'Political parties would only welcome you if you wanted to be recruited, if you wanted to 
receive protection. [I] know a lot of people who have done that, a lot of people who got 
involved’. (FGD 6, Bourj Hammoud)    
These accounts show contrasting attitudes from and towards political parties including the motivation 
for refugees to be engaged with them. Several other women interviewed had a more taciturn attitude 
to the prevalence of political party presence. As noted above, some insisted that the only means of 
protection for them was to maintain silence in the face of crime and harassment. Others explained 
that they barely noticed political party influence, and would not approach them for assistance, often 
insisting that ‘only God’ would help them if they had difficulties. One Kurdish participant explained 
that she had been approached by a local Kurdish political party who had emphasized their shared 
heritage as a motivator for providing help and assistance, but she was disappointed:      
‘[The Democratic Kurdish Movement] came in and told me: “Your family is Kurdish, so you 
are like us, so we want to help you”, they took our information they saw our family's civil 
record, things like that… we haven't heard from them since….I have tried to contact them, 
they don't answer their phones’(Husniya, Na’ba).   
She explained that whilst her family had been involved with political parties in Syria, there was ‘no 
safety, only danger’, for Syrians involved in political parties in Lebanon. However, she felt it necessary 
to reach out to the party, when circumstances had deteriorated for her family. An NGO contact also 
advised me that many Kurdish Syrians would prefer to avoid political parties, or indeed any group that 
might be able to identify them. She explained that Kurdish men had a double expectation on them to 
either serve (i.e. be conscripted into) the Syrian Armed Forces, or the Kurdish People’s Protection 
Units (YPG) in the Syrian civil war. Therefore, she insisted, they preferred to remain as anonymous as 
possible.   
A majority of the women interviewed were Sunni Muslim, and for them the Shi'a composition of 
political parties such as Hezbollah was intimidating and a source of insecurity (see Salem, 2012, for 
more on this). One focus group noted that:  
'Whenever people from Hezbollah die in combat, the Shi'a people in the area become very 
agitated…the men destroy Syrians stores…but they don't attack women' (FGD 2, Na’ba).   
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This indicated that the highly political nature of the neighbourhoods could be a source of discomfort 
for Syrians. Furthermore, the armed involvement of groups, such as Hezbollah, within the Syrian civil 
war brought issues of security, and memories of war, to the forefront of the everyday.   
Participants from Al Dahiye also expressed some discomfort with the intense presence and posing of 
political parties at the neighbourhood level. Fathima and Deema, two sisters who lived together in the 
area, explained:    
In Lebanon, there is religious and political diversity…every area is affiliated with some specific 
political movements… [our area] has affiliation with Amal political party25. So in the area you 
would have people who are affiliated with them who ride motorcycles all the time and they 
would look like 'bad boys' and they would want to show off their muscles, that they are 
controlling the area, that they have a presence…They would like to [show off their power] to 
both the Lebanese and the Syrians, but the Syrians, because [we] are the weak point, because 
we are both strangers and foreigners, we would feel this threat…ten times more’ (Fathima & 
Deema, Mazra’a)   
Here, Fathima and Deema note that Syrians’ inferior position relating to their status as refugees and 
outsiders enhances their discomfort in the face of aggressive political posturing, particularly whilst 
negotiating the outdoors. These comments also indicate the gendered element of security provision. 
Participants described security providers as male, exhibiting highly masculinised behaviours to assert 
their dominance and strength. In the city I observed that most, if not all, security actors or community 
mediators, were men. I did not see any female state, or non-state, sanctioned security providers: 
however, these do exist (I did observe women in uniform in Jordan, predominantly as traffic police). 
Informal security is provided by men usually stationed in specific areas of the neighbourhood to create 
a security ‘presence’. For example, in Na’ba, political representatives (from several parties) sat outside 
the central Shi’a mosque throughout the day. As such, masculinised security provision intersects with 
cultural and societal norms of public spaces as masculine to create a hegemonic sense of ownership 
and dominance of public space by male citizens (Fenster, 2005). Women feel uneasy in such spaces, 
both due to their gender and their status as outsiders.    
Other participants in less politically active neighbourhoods, spoke of their fear and their lack of 
knowledge of the presence of political parties. Here political parties were active in particular ‘areas’ 
that were preferably avoided: 
 
25 The Amal Movement is a predominantly Shi’a political party which is part of the 8th March Alliance. 
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‘Security is linked to the political parties. [We feel] that certain sides are connected to other 
sides, even on the streets we are scared to say something…The Lebanese have so many political 
parties [and] they are not all on the same page. [If we asked for assistance] would they approve 
of us? Would they help us?’ (FGD 5, Bourj Hammoud).   
Despite their sense of not knowing which political parties represented which groups, women were 
conscious that political parties were linked to security provision and power hierarchies within 
neighbourhoods. This left them feeling insecure and highly conscious of their behaviour on the street 
when political parties and security personal were present. Khalila noted the heavy focus on security 
in Al Dayihe, noting that despite all the political checkpoints, it was perceived as highly insecure:  
’Over here [Mazra’a] we haven’t noticed [any security points]. But in Al Dahiye there are more 
security checkpoints, even though there is no security…so it is nicer and better here. Over there 
they would stop people all the time and be more detailed in what they check’ (Khalila, 
Mazra’a).  
The heavily gendered provision of security can make women feel insecure and concerned about 
navigating public space. For example, Fathima and Deema went on to explain that they felt concerned 
about their daughters walking to the nearby all-girls school because the aforementioned Amal 
representatives, who drove around on motorbikes, frequented the area around the school. As such, 
she and her sister chaperoned her fifteen-year-old daughter to and from school ‘to avoid any trouble’. 
Here there was a sense that young men’s connections to political parties could act to empower them 
in anti-social and threatening ways. The sisters went on to say that Syrians: 
‘Wouldn’t want to have any trouble with those people… with those political parties… we would 
avoid any [encounters with them]’(Fathima & Deema, Mazra’a).    
Emani was similarly uneasy about political parties and their very visible presence in their 
neighbourhood and in public space:  
‘I see [political party representatives] on the street... near the mosque, by particular cars…. I 
feel fear because they are strangers. I don’t know them, and they might…give us difficulty’ 
(Emani, Na’ba).   
Emani explained that whilst she recognised that there was a lot of political paraphernalia (party flags, 
slogans and pictures of martyrs) around the neighbourhood related to various political parties, she 
was unsure about which parties were actually present. This added to her confusion and nervousness 
about the parties operating at the neighbourhood level, and the dynamics of the community in which 
she was living. Other participants expressed a concern over political parties, their authority and the 
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potential for wider criminal activity. Ayesha and her husband noted that ‘pop up’ temporary hawajaz 
and plural security networks created layers of confusion over police and political party legitimacy in 
specific areas and created opportunities for criminal behaviour:  
‘Regular people would demand to see [our papers]. Not ISF or police, just regular people, who 
then try to steal your papers…sometimes [they are] on motorbikes. They will say: “we’re from 
a political party”, and if you demand ID you might be hurt’ (Ayesha, Mazra’a)  
These contributions show the various ways in which political parties in Beirut act as creators of both 
security and insecurity for refugee women. Whilst some emphasise that political parties are accessible 
and ‘peacemakers’ at the community level, acting as a means of conflict resolution and assistance, 
others contend that the wider security apparatus at work, created and perpetrated by political parties, 
makes them feel deeply uncomfortable and spatially insecure. This takes on a particularly gendered 
tone due to the masculinised dominance of political parties. Political parties can act as mediators 
between refugees and the state and can stand as ‘guarantors’ of refugees when they negotiate police 
checkpoints, by vouching for them. However, political party’s own checkpoints permeate a sense of 
unease and can empower young men, in particular, to behave in spatially aggressive and dominating 
ways.      
Political Parties in Amman  
Whilst political parties often stepped into the gap to mediate and resolve neighbourhood level 
disputes in Lebanon, the lack of a fully developed civil society means that this conduit didn't exist for 
Syrian refugees in Jordan. When participants were asked if the neighbourhoods had a sense of 
hierarchy or if political parties were present and active in the neighbourhood and utilised by refugees, 
the women answered in the negative:  
‘There are no political figures here. There are no searches…. But a lot of charities come’ (Sabah, 
Hasmi Shamali).     
Many reflected on how accustomed they had become to house searches, roadblocks and political and 
sectarian sensitivity in Syria, and how they found these issues to be remarkably absent in Jordan. Some 
expressed distaste and an aversion to anything political, attributing this to the conflict in Syria, 
particularly as many had felt that sectarian divisions within the country had been exacerbated since 
the conflict and had dealt a severe blow to community cohesion:  
‘Since the day of Hafez al Assad…we were raised not to talk about politics…or even saying the 
word 'Alawite'. So out of that fear we never talk about politics. Even here we take that habit 
with us and we never interfere with politics or political parties or anything of that sort. It’s 
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something we grew up with…it’s like a taboo, you can't talk about it…All my friends [in Syria] 
were from different beliefs, and different sectors, and nothing ever happened between us 
before the war started. I’m very sad about [the war], because I had friends from all different 
walks of life. But politics, nobody talks about. Or religion, or anything. You can't publicly speak 
about it’. (Nailah, Hashmi-Shamali)  
Nailah explained that this was not a gendered division, but rather, that both men and women were 
discouraged from talking politically. This dislike of a multiplicity of political and religious groups meant 
that she perceived Jordan as neutral and stable, with only ‘Christians and Muslims’. This statement,  
underlining the dislike of discussing political parties, suggests that there could be further involvement, 
but that participants simply do not want to discuss it. Eidmouni (2017) noted that efforts in Lebanon 
to engage Syrian women in ‘political empowerment’ workshops were viewed poorly by women, 
because political participation is frequently linked to opposing the Syrian regime. Many prefer to avoid 
such topics of conversations and programmes that might engage them with political issues. Other 
researchers have noted the reticence of Syrian refugees to discuss or be involved in politics as they 
fear ‘serious conflicts with the law’ if they do so (El Helou & Antara, 2018, p. 7).  
Arguably, in Jordan, the lack of civil society, poor political party presence in the neighbourhoods, and 
work from other researchers in the field suggesting poor political activism, are all indicative that there 
is little political party activity at the neighbourhood level. Political parties do not appear to be 
embedded at the grassroots, neighbourhood level, acting as mediators where migrants or refugees 
feel unsure of accessing police services, or ingraining themselves into the dynamics of neighbourhood 
society.  
Although some civil society organisations hinted that there was political activism happening in the 
neighbourhoods of East Amman amongst refugees, I found it difficult to secure interviews with any 
organisation that would discuss this in depth. I was continually referred onward; my meetings were 
rescheduled, or my emails went unanswered. I couldn’t determine whether this was because of my 
status as an outsider, the subject to be discussed, the participants being unable to find the time, or a 
combination of all three of the aforementioned. I anticipated some involvement or presence of 
political parties, particularly organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in poorer neighbourhoods 
of East Amman. Mali (2013) detailed the involvement of some Syrian refugees in Jordan’s Muslim 
Brotherhood, joining the organisation’s street protests when they arrived in Jordan, bolstering their 
numbers. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned and re-launched in 2016, amidst great 
controversy, and is suffering from ongoing internal divisions (Magid, 2016). As such, during this 
fieldwork the party’s attentions appeared to be fully engrossed with their challenges related to the 
Jordanian government, and their status within the country. Additionally, Davis (2016) has considered 
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the harsh treatment of politicized Sudanese and Somalian refugees in Jordan to be sending a 
clear message:  
‘to all refugees, migrants and citizens that their status in the country is not protected by 
international norms and agreements. The message is to be quiet and accept what is on offer. 
And there are few or no channels for complaints, whether about the (refugee) status itself or 
about inadequate protection and ineffective or imbalanced aid provision’ (Davis, 2016, p. 3). 
Indeed, in 2012 following protests in Za’atari camp, 200 Syrian refugees were deported back to Syria, 
despite international outcry over the protection of refugee rights (Malik, 2014). This, alongside heavy-
handed tactics by the Mukhabarat and a widespread knowledge of deportations and expulsions of 
Syrians, particularly men engaged in work without permits in urban areas, may have a marked effect 
on refugee decisions to remain low key and un-politicised. The government response to these political 
activities is where one sees the strength, or so-called ‘ferocity’, of the Jordanian state in practise 
(Ayubi, 1995; B. Salloukh, 1996). Its centrally-organised security apparatus and intimidating security 
services can act quickly and severely. This shaped men and women’s fear of politics at a local scale 
and reduced their engagement with civil society.  
Many participants were surprised at the questions relating to civil society, mediators, hierarchy and 
political parties. When I explained the context for these questions, namely that women in Lebanon 
had received help and support through political parties with regard to negotiating security, and on 
occasion, wider conflicts in their communities, many participants in Jordan used the opportunity to 
criticize Lebanon's 'support' for the regime in Syria. Participants emphasized how poor conditions 
were for refugees in Lebanon, insisting that Lebanese politics made Lebanon unsafe for Syrians. They 
did not perceive alternative security providers to police to be something positive, and were extremely 
negative about Shi’a political parties (such as Hezbollah) that operated in Lebanon and were also 
involved in the Syrian civil war.   
Mukhtars, Community Leaders and Religious Institutions as alternative conflict 
mediation in Beirut and Amman  
Outside of police and political parties, other organisations and individuals were present within host 
communities and could potentially act as a means of mediating challenges and conflict and thus, 
enhance a wider sense of security for refugee women Beirut and Amman. However, in contrast to the 
opinions and experiences of political parties and police, when asked about alternative providers of 
security, or community mediators or leaders, women in both Beirut and Amman explained that they 
had very little to do with these people. Some questioned if they existed at all. Whilst in Beirut there 
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appeared to be more of a network of these individuals, in Amman very few women referenced 
representatives:  
‘I haven’t come across anything like a [community leader] here’ (Yeseniah, Hashmi Shamali).    
‘Others in the community don’t assist…Community leaders, political parties…No, to each his 
own. Everyone is just busy with their families, or their own situation’ (FGD 2, Ashrafyeh).  
‘We don't want to put our trust or confidence in anyone because of what has happened - we 
have had a bad experience every time we did’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh). 
For example, Mukhtars are elected street level community representatives, often described locally as 
‘community mayors’. They are the lowest rung of municipal governance, and they have a range of 
administrative responsibilities (such as signing birth and death certificates, regularizing papers) but 
also act to safeguard community relations (Lutfiyya, 1966; Stel, 2015). A handful of studies, specifically 
from Beirut, have noted how Mukhtars play a role in community relationships with Syrian refugees, 
often signing their papers or acting to mediate conflict between refugees and the host community 
(Boustani, et al., 2016; Stel, 2015). However, the women that I spoke with in Beirut were dismissive 
about Mukhtars and felt that they only acted in self-interest:   
‘Mukhtars are always showing off [their power and influence]. Mukhtars sign papers, but 
nothing is free, we always have to pay for it. But they wouldn’t help us [in a conflict]. They 
wouldn’t help us’(FGD 8, Mazra’a).     
Participants highlighted that their lack of papers were a further reason that Mukhtars would not be 
able to assist them.  
‘Our papers are not mufawadyn. We can’t talk to a political party or anything, we can’t speak 
to the Mukhtar…Because we are not [authorised] no one can help us’ (FGD 4, Bourj Hammoud).  
Thus, refugees also perceived political parties and Mukhtars to be part of the wider state 
administrative apparatus and therefore unavailable to assist them in their ‘illegal’ status. Women in 
Amman stated that they had had Mukhtars in Syria, but that in Jordan the system was considered old 
fashioned, and what few Mukhtars were around were ‘only for Jordanians’.  
What emerged as more typical avenues of help or support were neighbours or religious institutions. 
Women who attended churches or mosques regularly explained that they might go to these places to 
seek help or advice. Those that did were typically very positive about the ways in which these 
communities had enhanced their sense of belonging and safety:    
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‘I have a small community in the mosque, so I turn to them for help if I get into any trouble… 
Syrians, Palestinians, Jordanians, all of them. All of the things that made life easier for me here 
as a refugee are the people I made friends with in the mosque’ (Nekia, Hashmi Shamali).   
In Beirut, Onekka talked of how the local mosque had assisted in mediating between her, a large 
international NGO that was providing water butts, and her Lebanese neighbours who were displeased 
about her receiving a water butt on her roof. These tensions were not uncommon and were usually 
related to the use of space and property, as well as overriding tensions regarding the prioritising of 
refugee care over host community care. Onekka highlighted the different religious and ethnic 
affiliations at work, but insisted that:  
‘The mosque doesn’t differentiate between Syrian and Lebanese people. So, we could go at 
any point and say we are having this specific conflict, and the [Sheikh of the mosque] would 
help us’.  
Onekka also noted the way in which the mosque and the local Mukhtar worked together to resolve 
her particular conflict with her neighbours:   
‘I went to the NGO, and the NGO went to the Mosque….The mosque is Shi’a, and my 
neighbours are Lebanese Shi’a, and the Mukhtar’s office is close to the Mosque. So between 
the NGO, the Mukhtar and the Mosque, they worked it out’ (Onekka, Na’ba).  
However, experiences varied. Whilst some spoke of strong community support within religious 
institutions and an agreement that they would approach these places for assistance or advice, others 
argued that churches or mosques ‘wouldn’t help’ with ‘issues of difficulty’.   
Whilst participants in both Amman and Beirut recognised the lack of wider community representatives 
and highlighted their general discomfort within their host communities, a number did emphasise the 
role that their neighbours played in advocating on their behalf. As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, 
relationships with the host community are generally strained. However, many participants shared 
accounts of hospitality and generosity provided by the local population. Furthermore, a number noted 
that if they had difficulties or problems within their neighbourhood, or needed advice, they would 
turn to their neighbours for assistance:  
‘We would go to the neighbours first if there were any difficulties or problems…we trust the 
neighbours’ (Derifa, Mahata).   
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‘Most problems, you can’t resolve them on your own, so generally I do ask for help, I ask the 
neighbours. I trust them’ (Nailah, Hashmi Shamali).   
These experiences of neighbours supporting, defending or advising refugees left participants with 
positive impressions of their communities and neighbourhoods. In Beirut, Wajida noted how her 
Lebanese neighbours advocated on her behalf when her sons had gotten into a physical altercation in 
the wider community:  
‘My Lebanese neighbours who are here [indicates next door] came out and said: 'This woman 
is a good woman, she doesn't do anything [wrong]. She's part of us…so stay away’ (Wajida, 
Na’ba)  
This altercation had greatly upset Wajida, and she emphasised that because her neighbours had 
protected her and her sons, she felt safer in the neighbourhood, or at the very least, safer than she 
had when she lived in other areas of Beirut. Thus, whilst some participants felt that relationships with 
their neighbours and the wider community were strained, or even hostile, others recounted the 
support and care they had received from these individuals and felt that these would be amongst the 
first people they would speak with regarding difficulties and conflicts within the neighbourhood.  
Gender, Tactics and Conflict Resolution   
In Chapters Six and Seven, this thesis has highlighted the ways in which flight and asylum have 
contributed to shifting gender roles, not uncommon to other refugee crises. They have also 
highlighted some of the tactical ways in which women have responded to, and negotiated with, 
structures of policy, legality and patriarchy to enhance their sense of security, particularly when in 
public space. This next section examines some of the personal, tactical ways in which women seek to 
resolve tensions, conflict, and on occasion address criminal activity. Whilst Chapter Seven highlighted 
how women tactically enhance their personal safety or anonymity in public space, this section 
examines the tactics that women employed in order to resolve or avoid difficulties and some of the 
gendered societal shifts that have taken place.    
Men’s inability to gain employment, their injuries from the conflict, or their negative experiences with 
authority figures, had compromised their role in the family unit as protector and provider. Sabah’s 
husband had a pre-existing heart condition which was exacerbated by their flight and asylum. They 
had four children and frequently she took the lead in their family life in Jordan because of his illness. 
This included liaising with the police to organise their security papers and resolving difficulties they 
experienced. She recounted an incident where her neighbour’s son pulled a knife on her fourteen-
year-old son:  
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‘I tried to solve the problem on my own…I called the neighbour and said: “Please get your son 
away from my kid”. She [the neighbour] said: 'My brother works in the police, I have the power 
to send you back to the camp.' I said: “Fuck you and your brother” and I hung up on her’.  
She went on to emphasise that even though she was alone, she was strong and determined:  
‘I called the police. I called everybody. Nobody gives a damn. I’m just going to do this on my 
own’ (Sabah, Hashmi Shamali).   
Several women described simply getting on and solving difficulties. Many women recalled advocating 
aggressively on behalf of their children, husbands and parents and their own personal safety. 
Discussing issues of harassment in Beirut, Fadila aggressively muttered:  
 ‘If someone tries to molest me or harass me, I would cut his throat’ (Fadila, Na’ba).  
 
Badia recalled being followed in the street and propositioned:  
‘[He was saying he wanted to get to know me] I was scared, but I acted tough and I said to 
him: “So what if I’m Syrian? [it doesn’t mean you can proposition me]”’ (Badia, Mazra’a). 
252 
 
After they were defrauded by an Egyptian man in their community in Beirut for kafala papers, Alyas 
encountered the man in her neighbourhood by chance and even though unable to elicit any money 
from him, confronted him:  
‘I know he would want to avoid us. But once I saw him in the neighbourhood and I argued with 
him. I said: “How could you do this to us?!” It was very difficult’ (Alyas, Na’ba).  
Sabeen explained that her brother in law had been captured in Syria which had made him extremely 
nervous and distrustful of police. As a result, he wouldn’t organise the family’s IDs, placing them in a 
compromised position. After a prolonged period, his wife went to sort their identification documents 
with the police and organised schooling for their children. Sabeen reflected:   
‘[My sister] took charge and she went [to the police]….When [men] get depressed they get 
everyone around them depressed, but the women’s [attitude] is always: ‘Yes, I want to do that, 
and that, and fix this”…In Syria the men had a strong role because they work and they get 
money for the house and now they don't have that role, so [the women] became stronger over 
their men. I feel bad for them. [Men] were azeez26 [powerful] in Syria, now [they are] the one 
who begs in the street’ (Sabeen, Ashrafyeh).  
A participant explained that two of her brothers had been caught by the Wafedin whilst they were 
working. They were arrested, sent back to one of the border camps and she heard they were going to 
be deported to Syria. At this point, her mother went to the police at the border camp to advocate on 
their behalf:  
‘My mother said: ‘I will do anything, just don't send them back to Syria.’ [She negotiated]… 
eventually they said: “We won’t deport them back, [but] by the end of the day, they need to 
be out the country.” By the end of the day she had them on a plane to Turkey…’  
Her mother was in the focus group, and I asked her gently, how she had managed to resolve the 
problem and pay for the tickets to Turkey, knowing that their finances were compromised. She 
responded:  
‘I am their mother; I would do anything for them. Because Syria means death….900JD I paid, 
not including tickets….to this day I am paying off the debt’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).    
The 900JD (£900) that she paid was to release her sons from the camp and it secured them the ‘right 
to travel’. When I spoke with a legal aid centre in Amman, the organisation made it clear that open 
negotiations frequently occurred between refugees, police and border control and the ability to 
 
26 Azeez is an Arabic term that means strong and powerful, but also has connotations of being in a cherished position, with respect and 
honour  
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prevent deportation frequently came down to begging tactics, wasta and money.  
Other women also shared accounts of fighting ferociously for the release of male relatives, utilising 
what money they possessed, their resolve, tenacity, feminine position, kinship ties, or shared Arab 
heritage to argue the need for their release. During one focus group two different women shared 
accounts of negotiating with police for the release of their sons:   
‘When my son got caught, I went to the police station with him and my disabled daughter. I 
showed them my daughter and said: “Look at [my daughter], how will I provide for her?” I 
started begging him, so he let my son go.’  
 [My son was arrested] and the police wanted to send him back to the camp. I said to them: 
“What are you doing? He is an orphan; he is the only one who can provide for the family.” We 
tried to get any connection they could get to get him out the police station…He provides for 
the family, so if he goes back to Syria, we would have to go back with him. It cost us 45JD [£45] 
to get him out, through a connection’ (FGD 3, Ashrafyeh).  
On occasion, kinship idioms were used in order to engage with the ‘values and institutional 
arrangements associated with patriarchy’ (S. Joseph & Slyomovics, 2001, p. 8). Frequently women 
would use terms such as ‘sister’ or ‘daughter’ to evoke a sense of gendered kinship responsibility from 
police. After some tension at the police station over her documentation, a focus group participant 
found herself at the mercy of a disgruntled officer until her mother stepped in:    
‘[The policeman said to me] “I'm going to write in your ID that you are not legal in the country, 
that you are not a resident.” My mother had to intervene and get the ID for me. [My mother] 
kept saying to him: “You are like my son, she is like your sister, we are in Jordan, we are 
supposed to be like family to each other, we are not supposed to treat each other this way,” 
to get him off my back’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).   
These negotiations, particularly with security providers, show the fluid, and renegotiated landscape 
of legality and security within these contexts, as already highlighted earlier in the chapter. In the same 
way that women (and indeed men) negotiate hawajaz on the streets of Beirut, women also negotiate 
with security representatives that have the capacity to arrest, detain or deport their family members.  
It is unclear whether these issues (such as arrests) would have been resolved without a family 
member’s negotiation. However, it is clear that in Amman refugees felt that they could approach 
police and advocate for family members, even if the family member had been engaged in an activity 
that was deemed ‘illegal’, such as working without a permit. During the negotiations, women often 
invoked kinship ties and patriarchal norms which dictate that men have a responsibility to look after 
the welfare of women.       
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As touched on in previous chapters, some women also highlighted how the disruption in their 
communities had resulted in a sense of freedom from cultural and gendered norms particularly around 
aspects of shame, honour, power and confidence. In Mazra’a one of the focus groups reflected on 
issues of domestic violence and sexual harassment:  
‘As an Eastern society, as Arabs, it’s not very acceptable to talk about such things. If I report 
[sexual and domestic violence] I would be looked upon as an outcast….A woman would be 
patient up to the point of death before speaking out…When we came to Lebanon, I had more 
room and space to speak about such things than in Syria. There is a shift, there is more freedom 
for people to speak about [these things]. There are two sides to thinking about empowerment 
and oppression. In Syria, our living conditions are better, we have our own house, our own 
land, my husband was working. There is free medical assistance. But I wouldn’t be able to 
speak up if my husband beat me. Here, the living conditions are very difficult…but I feel I can 
be more open about my [personal circumstances]’ (FGD 7, Mazra’a).   
Another participant in the same focus group shared a story of how she and her brother had helped a 
‘Lebanese daughter of the neighbourhood’ escape her husband who had beaten her badly and was 
roaming the streets looking for her. Even though this participant emphasised that she rarely left her 
home and suspected that she was endangering her own life, she still felt it important to assist and 
protect this woman. She dressed her in an abaya to disguise her identity and, alongside her brother, 
accompanied her through the streets to get a bus out of the city.   
Whilst some participants engaged in bold, confrontational tactics, as demonstrated earlier in the 
chapter, there was an overwhelming sense from women that the power structures at play meant that 
locals would always be preferred over a Syrian.  This belief that Syrians’ experiences wouldn’t be 
trusted and that there were no ‘peace makers’ in the neighbourhood to speak up for them featured 
frequently in interviews and during focus groups. Many women thus felt it necessary to engage in non-
confrontational tactics of silence, decorum and diplomacy to ensure issues of conflict did not escalate. 
In Beirut, participants often talked about the need to adopt silence and compliance and avoid trouble:   
‘If there were any conflicts, we would try to calm it down…I would tape my mouth [rather than 
say something]’ (FGD 2, Na’ba).    
Women would frequently accompany these statements about downplaying conflict and calming down 
hostile encounters by either physically placing a hand over their mouths or wiping across their closed 
mouths. This is a very corporal response and highlights a physical need to silence oneself in a situation 
where an individual might defend themselves. Some participants spoke about the need to calm their 
husbands down if they had been insulted, and to avoid sharing difficult encounters and incidents so 
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as not to be drawn into an altercation (FGD 2, Na’ba). Zubaida recalled an incident at the community 
playground which escalated into violence and threats between a local Lebanese family and her 
relatives:  
‘[This guy] was shouting: “You son of a bitch, you son of a whore, who are you?” Calling him 
out for a fight. And my husband got irritated and I stood at the door and said: “You can’t go 
out; we don't want any problems or anything”’ (Zubaida, Na’ba).  
 
Thus, whilst some women felt confident of defending or protecting themselves, confronting harassers 
and petty criminals or petitioning police and negotiating with political parties, others suppressed the 
desire to respond in order to keep family members calm and out of trouble. These responses indicate 
some of the differing ways in which women employ diplomacy and highlight their tactics of silence in 
the face of oppression and potential conflict. Women were not alone in keeping incidences from wider 
family or maintaining silence in the face of violence and conflict. A focus group participant was told by 
her neighbour that her son had been assaulted and had a knife pulled on him weeks after it had 
occurred. She took his response as a reflection of how she and other refugees dealt with conflict in 
the community:   
‘Whenever we face a problem, we don't turn to anyone, we face it ourselves. I said to my son: 
“Why didn’t you tell me what happened?” He said: “I don't want to cause any problems”. I was 
so upset’ (FGD 4, Ashrafyeh).  
These comments indicate the ways in which tactics of silence and avoidance are not only the 
repertoire of women, but also the tactics of refugee youth. Thus, these acts of diplomacy can be 
understood as considered tactics of marginalised groups.    
The examples presented in the section above resonate with the research of Muhanna (2013) and 
Johnson (2007), who have both examined agentic tactics of Palestinian refugee women living in 
repressive conditions. Johnson explores how women engage in tactics of qawiyye (strength), 
supporting imprisoned family members and taking on a role of advocate and negotiator of the family’s 
rights. She notes that women are still conscious and respectful of the wider patriarchal system, and 
the position of their husband, even though they view their own role within the family as evolving into 
that of the head of the family. In the same way, Syrian women advocate for their families by engaging 
in kinship idioms and situating themselves, and those they are negotiating with, within a wider 
gendered, kinship structure. Women use their gendered position within a classically patriarchal 
structure as a tactic to negotiate, respectfully and tenaciously, with those in power (typically men), on 
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behalf of family members in order to enhance their protection and security. Additionally, women show 
a keen aggression and survival instinct in negative conditions. However, this is not the only tactic 
within refugee women’s repertoire. Women also choose to engage in silence and calm diplomacy in 
order to keep tensions and conflicts which could quickly escalate, to a minimum. During these 
incidents, women remind men of their wider responsibility to their families, situating them within 
their family unit and within their wider position as refugees in a host community, imploring them to 
take the route of silence rather than ‘saving face’ by escalating insults.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the ways in which Syrian refugee women perceive and experience aspects 
of personal protection and issues of conflict resolution and management in their host communities by 
considering how they interact with state and non-state security provision in Amman and Beirut. These 
experiences shape attitudes and experiences of urban (in)security for refugee women and, as this 
chapter has explored, have spatial repercussions. 
Comparing the two contexts, there are several continuities and differences as to how women perceive 
security services and how they manage conflict and crime within their neighbourhoods. Yet within 
these experiences, there is much ambivalence, complexity and individuality. What emerges is how 
categories of identity interact with wider structural mechanisms and past experiences to shape 
attitudes and perceptions to notions of personal protection and accessibility to security services in 
host communities. In both contexts, the ascribed gendered identities of women often ensured that 
they were perceived as ‘domestic’, ‘harmless’ or in need of protection by state and non-state security 
services. This allowed the women some freedom to interact with security services, from negotiating 
the release of a relative from prison to navigating the monitoring by hawajaz on the street. Thus, their 
ascribed identities as ‘outsiders’ - vulnerable women who needed protection - often assisted their 
wider navigation of security structures, in contrast to refugee men.   
Broadly speaking, women in Amman have positive attitudes towards police and security services, and 
consider them to be accessible and compassionate, particular with women refugees. Women rarely 
use or seek out alternative, non-state providers of security, either because of their relative absence 
within civil society in Jordan, or because they feel they can access support from local police. However, 
some women also express concern because of contact with the Mukhabarat, or with the Wafedin 
which results in them being nervous, reticent, and on occasion, resentful of the police and security 
services in Amman. Thus, attitudes towards security provision are shaped by a number of interacting 
and individual factors and structures.  
257 
 
In contrast, women in Beirut express largely negative and consistently fearful attitudes towards 
interactions with state security services, often indicating their lack of legal status in Lebanon as a 
specific reason for this. Because there is a large network of alternative security provision and conflict 
mediation avenues, some women look to these individuals and organisations for assistance. However, 
this is still marred by a fear that the rights and needs of Lebanese citizens will take precedence of 
those of Syrians. There is also often a sense that alternative providers are indifferent to their plight. 
Furthermore, women also express fear and concern that connections to political parties or other 
power structures embolden men in negative ways which make women more fearful of these groups 
and of navigating public space. However, despite these generally negative opinions and encounters, 
women still express an appreciation for the presence of security services within their neighbourhoods, 
often feeling that they (particularly state security providers) keep tensions in check. Thus, while 
women prefer security services to be present and active in their neighbourhoods, they are unlikely to 
seek out assistance, preferring to avoid rather than seek interaction with them.   
There is parity across these two contexts in the way in which women express a pervading ontological 
insecurity because of their experiences in Syria. Experience of war and conflict, particularly elements 
of warfare such as aerial bombardment, transform spatialized perspectives of insecurity to include a 
vertical and overhead spatial fear that feeds into a wider sense of insecurity for refugees. Women 
often expressed an inability to divorce their fears of security services that emerged during the Syrian 
conflict, from their ongoing day to day experiences with security personnel in their host cities. As such, 
there is an emotional climate of insecurity and fear that feeds into experiences of security and 
spatiality in the city, creating a sense that the urban outdoors is unsafe and that security providers, an 
extension of the state, cannot be trusted (Pasquetti, 2013). This is then exacerbated if refugees do 
experience actual arrests or detentions relating to their legal status. As a result, it makes them less 
inclined to view security services positively and, if there are alternatives available, pushes them 
towards these providers. However, over time, women living in Amman expressed a growing sense of 
belonging, safety and accessibility to police services, which enhanced their sense of security. By 
contrast, women living in Beirut did not appear to overcome fears related to state security, and if 
anything, their experiences of living in Beirut appeared to exacerbate many of their perceptions of 
security services as ‘unsafe’ particularly if focused on the individual.   
Women in both contexts employ a range of tactical responses to their situation in order to negotiate 
the complexities of security structures and refugee policies in their day-to-day interactions in their 
host cities. Thus, ‘security’ is defined and redefined by social agents in their day-to-day interactions 
and encounters (Fawaz & Akar, 2012). Emphasising the experiences of individual refugee women 
demonstrates how security, and security outcomes, are continually renegotiated by refugees through 
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appeals, wasta and kinship idioms. From their marginalised position, and often compromised legal 
status, refugee women engage in a range of tactics to protect their embodied security and indeed 
what is often the wider human security of their families.  These negotiations (and differing outcomes) 
echo the findings from Chapter Six, which demonstrate that refugee policies, although not gendered 
at the macro state-policy scale, are highly gendered at the lived, city scale. It is evident that amongst 
the host community that men are perceived as ‘dangerous’ whilst women are frequently labelled as 
vulnerable, harmless and domesticated. As such they are positioned to advocate on behalf of their 
families, utilising kinship idioms, bribery and persuasion as tactics, contextualising themselves within 
broader patriarchal and kinship networks of male guardianship and hospitality (S. Joseph, 1999).  
This chapter contributes to wider academic debates on institutions of security and their relationship 
to refugees (Campbell, 2006; Nah, 2018; Nyaoro, 2010; Pavenello, 2010). This thesis extends this by 
examining the lived experiences of refugees in relation to a multitude of security personnel 
institutions and specifically draws out the ways in which encounters, and interactions, are spatially 
specific and gendered.        
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion: (in)security and urban refugee women  
 
This thesis is driven by an interest in the relationship between space, security and identity, and a 
principal research question: How do the social, political and legal contexts of host countries interact 
with the identities of Syrian refugee women to produce multiple scales and forms of (in)security and 
how do women respond to these structures? Through a feminist, critical realist approach to structure, 
agency and identity, it has demonstrated how the interaction of structures and identities produce 
layered, scalar and ambivalent experiences of (in)security. This approach encourages both an 
appreciation for the subjectivity and individuality of experience, but also an analysis of the broader 
implications of how ascribed identities are perceived and acted upon by others. The use of feminist 
theories of geolegality and geopolitics conceptualised the interrelated scales of (in)security that 
operate within refugee women’s lives, and the particular role of law in creating spatial exclusions, 
inclusions and (in)securities through boundary drawing. Through this framework, this thesis has drawn 
attention to the spatially and temporally differentiated experiences of (in)security for refugee women 
(J. H. Clark, 2013; Lyytinen, 2015b).  
This thesis has sought to ensure that the individual experiences of refugee women are brought to the 
fore, in order to provide rich and detailed accounts of refugees’ lived experiences of (in)security within 
urban contexts of the Middle East. In considering the ways in which the social and legal constructs of 
host countries shape refugee women’s experiences and perceptions of (in)security, it contributes to 
filling the lacuna of literature on refugee women’s access to, and perceptions of, both formal and 
informal security and the ways in which they address conflict resolution when occupying marginalised 
social positions. It aids in conceptualising the ways in which women use their agency and tactically 
negotiate their position and personal protection within oppressive conditions, and builds upon 
theorisations of gender and space by examining the ways in which refugee women perceive, access 
and negotiate public and private spaces of their host cities.  
The employment of a comparative methodology allowed for an examination of refugee experience 
across two different contexts. This approach aids in strengthening understanding of how different 
structures operate and interact with identities to shape lived experiences of insecurity. Through 
examining two cities, which are situated in national frameworks that display both similarities and 
differences in their state strength and their security frameworks, deeper understanding of how 
structures and identities interact to shape (in)security emerge. This approach also enables an element 
of reflection upon theoretical framing of Jordan and Lebanon as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states 
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respectively, by analysing the ways in which refugee policies are applied and how security structures 
operate regarding refugee communities.  
Foregrounding and emphasising refugee experience and refugee voice was a central tenet of this 
thesis. As such, it placed refugee women’s accounts at the forefront, in order to situate them as 
knowledge holders and experts in their experiences of war, flight and refuge. Personalised and 
individual accounts have much to offer in the way of lived realities, deviances and anomalies in 
experience, which speak beyond data sets and tick boxes. These methodologies are vital when working 
with refugee populations in order to ensure that refugees are not perceived as a homogenous mass 
of ‘border invaders’ that threaten state sovereignty. The use of interviews, focus group discussions 
and solicited diaries, emphasised refugees as individuals with cultural and social histories and 
identities, who can fully contribute to their host societies and require compassionate and considered 
care, protection, rights and empowering solutions. As explored in the Methodology Chapter, these 
methods are not without their limitations or ethical quandaries. However, utilising qualitative 
methods is integral to ensuring that marginalised women have the space to express, explain and 
reflect on their circumstances and to outline their personal desire for how the ‘state of things’ could 
be.  
The three empirical chapters that preceded this Conclusion Chapter have presented accounts of 
women’s experiences of their host communities in Amman and Beirut. Through this comparative lens, 
several issues and themes become salient. The following sections summarise very briefly the answers 
to the research questions posed in the Methodology Chapter and explored in the empirical chapters 
(and necessarily losing much detail), before presenting the emerging and cross-cutting themes, 
findings and implications in more detail.  
Answering the Research Questions  
Through an examination of Syrian refugee women’s security of shelter and livelihoods in Chapter Six, 
the gendered effects of refugee policy experienced in the lived every day become salient. The chapter 
posed the question: In what ways do these (social, political and legal) structures of host countries 
affect Syrian refugee women’s security of shelter and livelihoods within their host cities and how do 
women respond to these? By examining and comparing access to shelter and livelihoods, the negative 
influences of state refugee policies in shaping access to work, and therefore determining the spaces 
where refugees can afford to live, emerge. State refugee policies and laws have clear implications for 
the lived human security concerns of refugees in their everyday lives. Refugee policies that are 
structured to impede the ability to gain access to the labour market, or indeed insist on refugees’ 
paying to secure their ongoing legal status in their host country through the kafala system or through 
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authorisation documents, have a highly detrimental effect on refugee livelihoods and their human 
security. Whilst refugee policy is not gendered at state and policy levels, this chapter demonstrates 
that hostile refugee policies have deeply felt scalar affects that impact on the intimate and embodied 
lives of refugee women, as families experience deep strain from their inability to live ‘decently’. 
Human security concerns of livelihoods, shelter and employment shape wider perceptions of stability, 
welcome and security within host communities and are experienced and felt in socio-spatial ways. 
While this was the case across both cities, there were differences which relate to the nature of the 
state and the details of their policies, which resulted in participants in Jordan expressing a greater 
sense stability and less fear and precarity. However, ongoing restrictions regarding labour and 
employment did influence enduring concerns about security and settlement. Women are clearly 
affected by the structural laws and policies in place but respond in a range of tactical and considered 
ways. For example, women prioritise the needs and wellbeing of their dependants, and these concerns 
often shape their decision-making regarding movement to the city and ongoing self-settlement over 
return to Syria.  
The relationship between (in)security, mobility and spatiality emerges in Chapter Seven, through an 
analysis of women’s access to, and experiences of, predominantly public, but also private, spaces of 
the city. The chapter posed the question: In what ways do these (social, political and legal) structures 
of host countries shape experiences of public space and urban mobility for Syrian refugee women and 
how do women respond to these? This chapter demonstrates how different structural mechanisms 
interact with categories of identity and personal experiences, to shape perceptions of public and 
private spaces within host cities. In particular, the interaction of patriarchy and socio-cultural norms, 
refugee policies and women’s gendered and refugee identities, result in spatial experiences of varied 
and graded ‘permitted’ or ‘prohibited’ areas for refugee women. This chapter demonstrated how 
patriarchal norms, which influence impressions of public spaces as ‘masculine space’, intersect with 
refugee women’s identities, which structure perceptions of them as vulnerable outsiders, to enable 
an ongoing climate of harassment and exploitation in their host cities. A litany of negative experiences, 
including verbal and sexual harassment, resulted in many women expressing a sense of being 
outsiders and strangers within their host cities. Across both contexts, women’s mobility was 
influenced by men and older women’s attitudes of both what was ‘appropriate’ and what was ‘safe’, 
given the intersection of women’s gendered and refugee identities. As a result, women show 
considered reflection regarding their mobility, behaviour and dress whilst outside the privacy of their 
home, often acting tactically through placing importance on their appearance and behaviour in 
appearing conforming and ‘upstanding’. There is a belief that this behaviour and dress, in turn, will 
provide an element of security to women.   
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Broadly speaking, women based in Lebanon described more daily, active, public activities, but also a 
far greater sense of fear and discomfort in public space, particularly in the evening. This was shaped 
by the complex hybrid security network operating in Beirut, the visible securitisation of public space 
and the use of restrictive pseudo-legal curfews. In contrast, women in Amman were far more varied 
in their impressions of public space, with some intimating that they were just as mobile and 
independent as they had been in Syria, if not more so.  
Looking to conflict resolution and issues of personal protection, Chapter Eight considers Syrian 
women’s access to, and perception of, formal and informal security provision in Amman and Beirut. 
The chapter posed the question: How do Syrian refugee women engage with structures of formal and 
informal security and conflict resolution provision in their host cities? Here, issues of identity become 
deeply salient in how security was felt, experienced and accessed by refugee women. Differing state 
structures and security networks, and their effects on refugee’s lived experiences of (in)security, were 
more palpable. Ascribed identities of gender were relevant to spatial negotiations of the city, 
particularly with security providers (both state and non-state). Experiences and attitudes towards 
security provision were ambivalent and complex, both appreciative and resentful. However, 
comparing across the two contexts it was clear that the role of official papers in ascribing a sense of 
legitimacy, and thus security, was prominent.  
Women’s sense that they were ‘legal’ in Jordan had a clear impact in how they broadly felt about 
police as a positive, fair and accessible service. In contrast, women in Beirut expressed a fear and 
concern about almost all interactions with state security services due to their lack of authorised 
papers. Whilst some women did express an appreciation of political parties as an alternative avenue 
of conflict resolution, many also recognised that there were issues of both power and gender at work 
and expressed a preference to avoid involvement with these organisations. Refugee women in 
Amman indicated that Lebanon’s wider involvement in the Syrian conflict as one of the reasons why 
they had avoided seeking refuge in the country, expressing fear that the involvement of political 
parties meant that they could easily be deported or engaged in the conflict by forces that worked 
alongside the Syrian government. These women perceived Jordan as a state of stability, emphasising 
that Amman’s disengagement from wider geopolitical conflicts and sectarian issues within the Levant 
made it an appropriate place to seek refuge. Thus, regional geopolitical issues of war and alliances 
take effect at the city scale, transforming spaces of the city into potential encounters of insecurity and 
fear, or as locations of stability and safety. Through these contributions, refugee impressions of 
Lebanon as a fragile and compromised state, and Jordan as a stable and strong state become clear. 
These reflections provide insight into wider theoretical framings of these states as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ 
from the perspectives and lived experiences of marginal groups.   
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Across all the chapters, refugee women’s tactical agency was analysed and discussed within different 
contexts, from women accessing work opportunities to negotiating with security providers, thus 
contributing to the final research question:  How do Syrian refugee women experience and respond to 
multiple scales of (in)security, and what tactics do they employ in order to negotiate these structures 
of power? Across the empirical chapters, women demonstrated a range of tactics (that is incremental, 
often spontaneous, activities or behaviours), deployed in order to enhance their sense of security 
within their host cities. These are decisions and activities of agency, enacted within typically 
oppressive environments, where women are in a subordinate position and are using what power and 
social positioning they do have, to immediately enhance their sense of personal protection. Many of 
these tactics are behaviours that enhance their own socio-cultural sense of femininity and thus, to a 
certain extent, uphold, and reproduce patriarchal structures and the gendered nature of social space. 
However, several women demonstrated strong powers of negotiation and confrontation with others 
who had authority and power, including security providers. Despite their apparent fear or concerns 
related to their position, women still expressed a responsibility to advocate for themselves, or other 
members of their families.  
Thus, women respond in a multitude of ways to the insecurity of their position, usually based upon 
their social position and through a tactical response. Whilst these actions are not necessarily 
‘empowering’ in themselves, refugee women demonstrated a remarkable and determined effort to 
make the most of their situations. However, oppressive structures also influence women to take non-
active tactical decisions in order to enhance their sense of protection and security (Hamdan-Saliba & 
Fenster, 2012). In particular, choosing to confine themselves to their homes to avoid interactions, led 
to an even greater sense of isolation, boredom and listlessness and an inability to connect, or feel a 
sense of belonging with their host community. Thus, non-active tactics often result in women 
expressing a sense of ‘othering’ within their own lives, where they did not recognise themselves, or 
their futures. Therefore, whilst women are utilising tactical agency, such non-active tactics can have a 
detrimental effect on their lives.   
Cross-cutting themes  
This section considers three cross-cutting themes that emerged from this thesis. As with the 
theoretical framework and empirical chapters, there are linkages and overlap, and as such there are 
some corresponding and relevant findings across themes. However, it is useful to think of these ideas 
separately.   
1: Ambivalent (in)securities, shaped by the interaction of identity with social, legal and political 
structures 
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The first theme is how refugee policies interact with economic conditions and structural patriarchy to 
shape experiences of (in)security in spatial and gendered ways. For refugee women, (in)security is 
formed through intersecting experiences, identities and structures merging and interacting. Issues of 
(in)security are deeply gendered and experienced at varying, overlapping scales, which render security 
relational and variable. These experiences in themselves are fluid and not ‘static’. Rather, the 
continual interaction of different structural forces and categories of identity, create varied and 
fluctuating socio-spatial experiences of (in)security, which are dependent on the interaction of these 
structures with refugees’ ascribed and subjective identities, and the wider social meanings imbued 
upon material spaces of the city.  
The intersection of nationality, gender and often class, creates an acute vulnerability, where women 
are often unable to seek help and assistance and thus negotiate conflicts in negative ways, such as 
keeping silent in the wake of violence, assault, theft and fraud. This intersects with refugee’s 
protection and rights policy infrastructures within their host communities, to create a perfect storm 
of gendered insecurity for refugee women. However, these interactions do not always create 
consistent effects. Experiences of insecurity are always determined within wider geopolitical, regional 
and local frameworks, through the foregrounding of different identities and through temporal aspects 
of night/day; they thus fall along a continuum, whereby the same contexts can produce spaces and 
experiences which are simultaneously (and changeably) ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’. As a result, security 
service personnel are both threatening extensions of the state, and bringers of law and order; political 
parties fluctuate between being alternative and embedded conflict managers and aggressive and 
lawless threats. In using Fawaz and Akar’s (2012) understandings of security as ‘lived’ and using 
feminist geopolitical  approaches to examining experiences in the everyday as a springboard for 
considering scalar experiences of (in)security, this thesis has demonstrated how, for many urban 
refugee women, there appears to be a landscape of changing insecurities, that require daily 
negotiations and fluid tactics (see more below). These insecurities are invariably more severe in Beirut, 
where the fragile and compromised state structure and its resulting hybrid governance and security 
networks, interact with refugee’s women’s identities across highly securitised spaces to create lives 
characterised by unbelonging and insecurity.  
Just as security is not experienced in a static, consistent way, it is not applied by state or security 
providers consistently. By examining experiences at the city scale, through lived and individual 
experience, the apparent dominance of macro structures of state strength, structure and policy, 
become muddy and fluid. Women provided many accounts of how they negotiate their irregular status 
within their host communities, including accounts of obtaining the release of male relatives who work 
without permits in Jordan, and the negotiation of their embodied encounters with hawajaz, despite 
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their ‘unauthorised’ presence without legitimate papers. It is thus also pertinent to note that these 
policies, which are apparently very exacting at the state scale, are fluid and renegotiated at the city 
scale; conversely, national policies, which may protect and enhance the rights of refugees, may not be 
enacted at the city scale.  As such, policies are always limited in the ways in which they offer rights 
and protection for vulnerable groups, particularly in contexts where the state is fragile, fragmented or 
fierce, and thus not fully permeating into all civil life (L. Landau, 2014). This has clear implications for 
policy and the realities of contexts in which policies regarding refugees are created and enacted. The 
fluidity of policies and refugee women’s capacity to negotiate terms of security and status may also 
play into a wider sense of ‘deregulation’ in their host cities, which aids a sense of insecurity. Women’s 
accounts of arbitrary arrests and detentions, experiences with political parties and security services, 
which punctuate day to day life in the city, form an impression of urban spaces and refugee policies 
as fluid, shifting and ‘unregulated’.  
2: The hegemonic gaze, (in)security and the (re)production of space 
Negotiation of public space is also a negotiation of the hegemonic gaze dominant in that space, which 
shapes experiences and perceptions of (in)security, particularly for marginalised groups. Thus, 
spatiality and security are linked and this results in different spaces of the city being reproduced in 
particular ways. While this second theme overlaps with the first theme, detailed above, in examining 
how issues of space and security are linked and scalar, it specifically demonstrates how intersectional 
identities interact with structural mechanisms to shape experiences of space, rather than space being 
binarized into genders.       
Chapter Six explored how refugee policies in Jordan and Lebanon affect refugees’ legality, and rights 
to work, within their host state. This chapter demonstrated that such policies had detrimental impacts 
on refugee’s livelihoods and shaped the spaces of the city that they sought refuge in, typically informal 
neighbourhoods and compromised dwellings. Chapter Seven detailed how Syrian women’s identities 
as ‘outsiders’ and their complex refugee status, intersects with socio-cultural structures of patriarchy, 
which results in a sense of insecurity and othering in public space, exacerbated by a barrage of verbal 
and sexual harassment, including criticism for being pregnant and being a burden on the state. Chapter 
Eight detailed how women’s refugee status interacts with structural mechanisms of formal and 
informal security services in the city, noting how these affect women’s perceptions of public space as 
a location of citizenship and belonging.  
Across each of these chapters, issues of nationality, age, class and gender created varied 
understandings and experiences of space and security. Participants did not perceive public and private 
spaces within gendered binaries (although it was clear that socio-cultural norms of gender and space 
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certainly influenced perceptions), but rather considered access and negotiation of public space to be 
determined by a range of interacting factors and structures, none of which were static. For example, 
older Syrian refugee women expressed a greater sense of freedom and independence in public space, 
intimating that younger Syrian women needed to be chaperoned, or preferably stay indoors, 
particularly in the evening as their gender, nationality and age made them a target for propositioning. 
Syrian women often intimated that the presence of loitering men, or men with power (i.e. security 
services) made them deeply uncomfortable when in public space. However, they also detailed how 
they negotiated these individuals using their gender and nationality, whilst pointing out that Syrian 
men had a more challenging experience within public space as their identities resulted in them being 
labelled as ‘dangerous’. Lebanese women harassed Syrian women in public for being pregnant and 
being a burden on the State, creating a hostile and unwelcoming atmosphere, intimating that public 
space was a zone of citizenship. Wealthier Syrian women, who held authorised papers, expressed a 
far greater sense of security and freedom in public space. As such, individuals are continually 
negotiating a hegemonic gaze in public space, which is determined by social locations and structural 
mechanisms. Their ability to negotiate this hegemonic gaze is determined by their own social location 
as a result of the interaction of their various identities and it affects their own perceptions of how safe 
or secure a space or situation may be.    
Private spaces of the home are also complex locations where there is little privacy and security. 
Chapter Six highlighted the terrible dwelling conditions of many refugee families, who expressed fears 
of their permeable and compromised homes. Within private spaces of the home women detailed 
experiences of domestic violence, which deeply affected their sense of security. Chapter Seven 
highlighted how many women felt compelled to stay indoors out of fear, but as a result, private spaces 
of the home became suffocating and isolating, where they feel increasingly dissociated from an active 
and engaged life, rather than a haven of privacy and safety. Abuse and harassment could also continue 
into these spaces as neighbours yelled abuse through walls and opportunistic others tried to gain entry 
to homes. Women also spoke of shifting balances of power within their families and the privacy of 
their homes, which were directly affected by refugee policies within their host countries. Homes may 
be both havens of quiet and privacy and locations of intense domestic violence and material insecurity. 
Public spaces are both spaces of interaction, empowerment, warmth and welcome, as well as 
locations of verbal and sexual harassment and othering. These reflections demonstrate how space is 
often incorrectly broadly brush stroked into categories of ‘male’ or ‘female’ spaces, whilst overlooking 
other nuances of identity, such as class, nationality and ethnicity and how these interact with wider 
structural mechanisms. Rather, structures and identities interact to create social positions of 
hegemonic authority that interact with the materiality of particular spaces.    
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3: Tactical agency as a response to (in)security and the repercussions of spatial (re)production  
The way in which refugee women engage in tactical agency is important to note for refugee scholars 
and practitioners, as it serves as a reminder of, and a way of theorising, the ways in which refugee’s 
utilise their own agency in oppressive conditions. Through this framing, refugee women can be 
understood as negotiators of structurally oppressive conditions, rather than simply as helpless 
‘victims’. Thus, their personal capacity is being acknowledged, alongside their need of assistance and 
aid.   
The intersection of refugee women’s gender and nationality and the interaction of these with wider 
constraining structures, typically places them in a subordinate, marginalised and insecure position 
within their host cities. In both Amman and Beirut, women engaged in a range of tactical ‘active’ and 
‘non-active’ tools in order to negotiate their host communities and to enhance their sense of personal 
protection and security (Hamdan-Saliba & Fenster, 2012). These tactics can be perceived as both 
subverting or upholding patriarchal norms and have both positive and negative outcomes for women 
refugees. Women’s varied tactical responses and capacities reflect the interaction of differing 
identities and structures which create varied social positions. For example, a middle-class Syrian 
woman with a kafala might feel more secure in negotiating a checkpoint than a working-class Syrian 
man with no legal status. Thus, tactical responses are very much a reflection of the interaction of 
identity and structural mechanisms.  
When encountering hawajaz, or state security providers, women in both contexts used tactics of 
identity, including foregrounding their feminine identities as mothers and caregivers, their position as 
‘subordinate’ refugees or their ethnic identity as Arabs (Muhanna, 2013). Many women engaged in 
language which positioned themselves as submissive and domestic, deploying kinship idioms to 
remind others of their regional kinship ties and relationships, women’s position as a ‘guest’ of a host 
community, and Arab familial hierarchal structures which emphasise male responsibility in acting as 
protector of women. Whilst these tactics may be perceived as upholding patriarchal norms, by 
emphasising their own position as dependent, women demonstrated significant courage, persistence 
and resilience when negotiating with security providers. This emerged particularly when women 
negotiated with security services for the release of family members, or for a compassionate response 
to illegitimate papers.  
Women also engage in tactical diplomacy and silence, frequently choosing to be submissive and silent 
despite their desire to express frustration, anger or injustice. This was specifically engaged in order to 
avoid potential threats of violence, to ensure wider neighbourly cohesion, or indeed to demonstrate 
their submission to those with greater power and resources to them. As such, these behaviours are 
268 
 
not necessarily telling of how women might want to respond but are reflective of how women choose 
to respond in uneven power matrices in order to enhance their embodied security, and on many 
occasions, the wider security of their families.          
These tactics are perceived as necessary, as refugees consider their subordinate societal position as 
not holding the same weight as a citizen’s rights and position. Thus, conflict avoidance is often due to 
a lack of power and position. Women refugees see citizens as holding and wielding power and view 
themselves as deeply politically inferior. For example, even though most women in Amman 
considered the police to be fair and just, in contrast to the view of police in Beirut, they still echoed 
the same concerns of women in Beirut, that the police’s claims of even-handedness would tip in favour 
of a local if there was an issue of conflict. Thus, identity as a ‘refugee’ and outsider played a significant 
role in how women perceived their status and how they chose to tactically respond to various 
environments and situations.  
Non-active (avoidance) tactics often have a highly detrimental impact on refugee women’s mental 
health, sense of belonging and wider engagement with their host cities. Non-active tactics, such as 
spatial confinement, accentuate and reproduce a sense that refugee women are not welcome, are not 
permitted in public space and disrupt their sense of belonging and right to the city. Spatial 
confinement to homes, particularly because of negative and anti-social behaviour, results in a 
deterioration of mental health, where women spend endless days worrying about relatives in Syria, 
family members attempting to work in the host city without legal papers, and their children’s future 
prospects, whilst confined to dwellings which are typically structurally compromised. Thus, whilst 
there may appear to be an element of ‘choice’ in these activities, e.g. deliberate avoidance of leaving 
the house, these decisions leave women feeling ‘foreign’ in their own lives, homes and wider host city. 
This is a concerning and necessary issue to draw attention to, as women described distressing and 
isolated lives which are exacerbated by socio-cultural norms, particularly regarding their presence in 
public space and the policing of their behaviour and interactions with others. This disengagement has 
repercussions for the ways in which space and gender are reproduced in such settings. Women’s 
avoidance of public space because of a sense of insecurity or isolation results in the continued 
reproduction of public space as a location of masculine citizenship as discussed above (Fenster, 2005).  
These cross-cutting themes demonstrate how experiences and perceptions of security and spatiality 
are influenced by the interaction of social positioning and structural mechanisms. Security is 
demonstrated as ambivalent, and understanding space in graded terms of permitted and forbidden 
(Fenster, 1999) alongside an analysis of identity and power structures, enriches understanding of how 
space is (re)produced in the lived every day and how this in turn affects perceptions of (in)security. 
269 
 
Women respond to ambivalent securities and spaces through tactical decisions and behaviours in 
order to enhance their mobility and personal sense of security. This approach to understanding 
identity, space and security can be encapsulated in the term ‘intersectional geo-security’.   
4) Spatial, temporal and relational vulnerability and the limits of solidarity 
Recent studies have drawn attention to the ways in which migrant and refugee solidarity groups have 
worked together to mobilise claims and resources on states and agencies (Ataç et al., 2016). This builds 
on other research conducted with marginal groups which have demonstrated the effectiveness of 
gendered solidarities on the urban margins and explored the wider impact of these groups (Brickell 
2014). However, this research with marginalised, urban refugee women has found that refugee 
women experience, and are shaped by, a range of spatial, temporal and relational vulnerabilities. 
These affect their day to day lives in their host communities and in turn shape and disrupt 
opportunities for solidarity and support in the urban margins.  
Women carry trauma from their experiences and flight from war, which affects their wider 
experiences of spatiality, from negotiating the street to fearing overhead spaces as locations of 
potential violence. Women feel a keen sense of personal vulnerability when negotiating space at night, 
feeling that they are unwelcomed and unsafe because of both their Syrian and female identity. The 
loss, or separation, from kinship connections and family have a clear effect on women’s mental health 
and sense of belonging, home and wider support. This is then compounded by personal experiences 
in host communities where women are often the target of criticism, hostility and harassment, by both 
women and men. This results in women feeling isolated, unsupported and longing to return home. 
Because of the wider Syrian conflict, women feel unable to reach out to Syrians in their community 
who they do not know personally and some intentionally distance themselves from potential networks 
of support. Additionally, in resource depleted urban margins, relationships and connections are 
difficult to forge when incoming refugee populations are perceived as straining already compromised 
systems or given preferential treatment of care and support by humanitarian agencies. This is further 
compromised by the dynamics of day to day life which are influenced by oppressive structures.  
In these contexts, amongst Syrian refugee women and their communities, opportunities for solidarity 
appear to be far rarer. Women are reticent to build links, nervous of other Syrians and wary of their 
host community and their position within it and concerned about involvement in ‘politics’ and what 
this might bring. Having escaped war, many express a desire to remain quiet and aloof and to wait for 
day to day life to improve rather than demanding better care and assistance from their host State.  As 
such, opportunities for community solidarity or potential solidarity groups on the urban margins, both 
those that draw together refugee women or refugee and host communities, is disrupted. Women feel 
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that wider perceptions of their identities which are both broadly (‘strangers’) and specifically (single 
or divorced) applied and understood, all affect the extent to which they can build relationships within 
their host communities and affect their sense of security. This is not to state emphatically that 
opportunities of solidarity or political involvement are not present (for example, solidarity and support 
groups have been developed amongst Syrian, urban refugee women in Turkey –  see UNHCR, 2017a). 
Or, that other women may be engaging in opportunities of political solidarity and social movements, 
but rather that it was not present amongst my participants for the various reasons outlined above.  
In thinking through ways of assisting urban refugees and in considering the potential power of 
solidarity and collective action, these findings demonstrate the importance of expanding 
understandings of vulnerability in such contexts. These findings suggest the value of wider 
understandings of ‘vulnerability’, which is often associated with system or network weaknesses and 
can lead to homogenous categorisations which overlook the individuality of experience (Clark, 2007). 
Understanding vulnerability as an individual’s compromised human security, but also having spatial, 
temporal and relational elements, allows for a wider reflection on how refugee and host communities 
interact and relate to each other, and the extent to which both marginal host communities and 
refugee communities can (and want to) work alongside each other.    
Particularities and Contributions from Research Findings  
This study provides an insight into refugee women’s experiences in Beirut and Amman in 2016-2017 
and highlights the particularities of how refugee policies in each state interact with other social 
structures to shape lived experiences of (in)security in the everyday at that time. Refugee policies and 
wider geopolitical issues are in constant flux and motion, being re-examined and re-established by a 
wide network of stakeholders alongside refugee rights and issues of wider socio-economic 
development in Jordan and Lebanon.  Indeed, there were ongoing changes to state refugee policies 
whilst I was in the field. Therefore, this study provides insight into urban refugee women’s experiences 
at a particular time and in two particular contexts as outlined above.  
There were several reasons why this research was limited in what it could study, and so also in the 
nature of its claims. Firstly, on some occasions I was prevented from spending longer lengths of time 
with participants and secondly, access to participants was sometimes significantly controlled and 
limited by gatekeepers. Furthermore, some topics were considered too controversial or sensitive to 
be pursued and as a result, some questions and follow up questions I desired to ask were not possible. 
Therefore, there are some issues that are relevant to the themes of this thesis but remain unexplored 
in the depth I would have preferred, particularly around hierarchal power and political parties within 
informal and refugee-receiving neighbourhoods of Amman and Beirut.  Despite these limitations, this 
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research does provide insight into the wider influence of structural mechanisms and the ways in which 
these interact with categories of identity to shape socio-spatial experiences of insecurity.  
Whilst qualitative comparative studies are rare in refugee studies, this research project has 
demonstrated how critical realist feminist methodological approaches to comparative case studies 
can provide considered voice and insight into individual’s contextual experience, while drawing 
broader insight on how structures act to create particular circumstances of oppression and 
marginality.  Thus, it has contributed to the scarce comparative literature on urban refugee women in 
the peripheral world. Whilst refugee scholars have indicated the worth in using intersectionality as an 
approach to understanding (specifically women’s) experience of being a refugee (Ayoub, 2017; A. 
Carastathis et al., 2018), much contemporary intersectionality work tends to be post-structural 
(Martinez Dy, 2016). This is problematic as post-structuralism limits opportunities to identify causal 
relationships, and so talk back to and dismantle, oppressive structures; to discuss more widely how 
these structures operate across a multitude of contexts to continually oppress marginal groups; and 
to consider wider generalities, which allow for cross-contextual policy changes (Cooper, 2016; 
Gunnarsson et al., 2016). A critical realist approach to intersectionality that conceives categories of 
identity as both ascribed and subjective, as both real and socially constructed, enables a measured 
insight into the realities of refugee women, who are often judged and treated in accordance to their 
ascriptive, not their subjective, identities. How refugee women are perceived is often critical to their 
treatment and shapes their lived experiences of insecurity. Thus, a critical realist feminist approach 
aids in not only platforming their experiences, but also showing the ways in which structures shape 
the gendered experience of urban refugees.  
This approach enables a wider insight into refugee women’s experience across different contexts, 
particularly those in the peripheral world, in more classically patriarchal societies, or in contexts where 
policies treat refugees as economic migrants rather than displaced refugees. Many of the structures 
that shape refugee women’s lives in Amman and Beirut (such as patriarchy or state refugee policy 
structures) will be present in many refugee receiving countries in the peripheral world. However, as 
demonstrated in this comparative study, there will be differences across contexts where differing 
frameworks (such as state strength) shape quotidian life in varied ways, even in contexts that appear 
to share much culturally and geographically. However, there will also be some broad similarities that 
aid wider theorisation of women’s experiences in different, repressive contexts. Specifically, looking 
to the ways in which refugee women respond to the interaction of oppressive structures, there can 
be an expectation that refugee women will respond tactically, creatively, with agency, to negotiate 
the best possible outcomes for their personal protection and that of their wider family. Indeed, this 
study continually demonstrates that women are rarely passive pawns of structural mechanisms, but 
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considered, tactical agents, negotiating oppressive circumstances, who require solutions that utilise 
this agency, whilst being mindful of socio-cultural norms and wider socio-legal structures. This 
awareness of socio-cultural norms often means that women will unknowingly continue to uphold 
oppressive norms (in order to protect themselves), which results in their ongoing marginalisation and 
repression. Further study, examining and comparing refugee women’s experiences in other contexts, 
would allow for deeper insight into the role of structural mechanisms and identity in shaping an 
everyday sense of security.  
This approach also enables a critical understanding of gendered refugee experience, whereby 
women’s socio-spatial experiences are not purely ‘oppressive’. Refugee identities and wider structural 
mechanisms can act in ways that are positive or emancipatory for women (although, as indicated in 
this thesis, emancipatory or empowering experiences are rarer, especially amongst women who are 
socio-economically compromised). What emerged within this study was a range of differing gendered 
experiences. A comparative study across different genders, using a feminist, critical realist approach, 
would certainly provide a different aspect into the ways in which gendered refugee identities interact 
with social and legal structures to create socio-spatial oppressions or opportunities and would be an 
important avenue for further study.   
This thesis echoes calls from other researchers (Betts & Collier, 2015; Janmyr, 2016, 2017), who have 
emphasised the need for reforms to Jordan and Lebanon’s refugee policies. In addition, it calls 
attention to the particular gendered effects of these policies on everyday lives. Feminist research is 
inherently political and demands change and transformation to the structures that affect the lives of 
the most marginalised. Using recently developed literature on feminist geolegality (Brickell & Cuomo, 
2019), this thesis has demonstrated how refugee policies have deeply felt gendered affects in the 
everyday. It has shown how both formal and informal policies, and formal and informal ‘enforcers’ of 
the law are experienced in gendered ways. This is pertinent to consider and encourages application of 
these theories to other refugee contexts to consider the gendered effects of law and policy.  
Refugee women’s attitudes and perceptions of humanitarian agencies and UNHCR in such settings is 
worth highlighting. More care should be taken in communicating with refugees why UNHCR is unable 
to register or assist them and other avenues of assistance within the city should be highlighted. This 
should include efforts to assist refugees in understanding their host city’s socio-political undercurrents 
and its broad spatial layout and dynamics. More educated, urbanite refugees who understand the 
asylum process appear to be frequently prioritised by agencies, and illiterate and socio-economically 
marginalised refugees are often struggling to have their voices heard, or needs seen to, in such 
contexts. UNHCR should make greater efforts to ensure they are embedded in informal or poorer 
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neighbourhoods where marginalised refugees are living and make stronger efforts to communicate 
the limits of their position and the rights and protections of refugees in such settings. Programmes 
that promote further skill building and confidence (in particular, literacy) amongst women in these 
settings should also be favoured.    
As established in the earlier chapters of this thesis, urban refugees are a population that is still largely 
overlooked in research and knowledge, and in the limited literature, male (often African) experiences 
tend to be focused on and examined. When it comes to women refugees, it is often their experiences 
within camps (such as camp’s spatial layout and women’s vulnerabilities to GBV) that are highlighted.  
This thesis has contributed to some of the gaps in knowledge, highlighting women’s experiences in 
cities of the Middle East, providing insight into the realities and experiences of what it means to be an 
urban refugee woman in such contexts. In particular, this work has demonstrated the importance of 
examining everyday experiences in order to consider some of the nuances and the patterns of 
behaviour and experience that emerge amongst urban refugees. Women in these contexts are clearly 
affected by the oppressive structural conditions in which they find themselves. However, they equally 
emerge as tactical, considered negotiators that both push against, and use, gendered and patriarchal 
norms, in order to achieve the best outcomes for themselves and their families. Whilst all women do 
not respond in the same way to their environments and have unique and differentiated experiences, 
when thinking about ‘the urban refugee woman’ there are a number of themes and issues that are 
salient and worth considering and applying to different contexts.  
For urban refugee women, their position within heterogenous urban settings, as both the location of 
their shelter and their livelihoods, brings different aspects of relationship, spatiality, livelihoods and 
protection to the fore. For example, relational concerns are a significant aspect of both home and host 
life for urban refugee women and have an important spatial dimension. Relationships within the home 
can be affected by gender-based violence, a change in family roles, responsibilities and power 
dynamics and concerns related to dependents. Relationships with the host community significantly 
shape women’s perceptions of welcome, integration and safety. These play across a number of 
different spatial scales: the body, the home, the street, the city. Identity has a strong role in these 
experiences and can result in many women spatially and relationally isolated, by personal choice or 
through wider socio-cultural norms and hierarchal relationships. This, alongside their compromised 
socio-economic status, results in many women experiencing a wider disconnection from and limited 
knowledge of their host city. Women want to be able to participate, integrate and enjoy their host 
cities, but often feel unable to do so. Despite a typical sense of isolation, many women demonstrate 
an acute awareness of the dynamics of their neighbourhood and their place within in, engaging in 
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behaviours and dress that will not draw attention, avoiding places or individuals of potential conflict, 
and ensuring that wider family members disengage from potential disputes. Because of close cultural 
and language ties in this context, women are also keenly aware of how to present themselves and 
how to negotiate with stakeholders that hold more power and position than them, reminding, 
particularly men, of their obligations and responsibilities towards protecting those that are more 
vulnerable.  
War, flight and self-settlement affect family dynamics and gendered roles and responsibilities across 
a number of considerations. Living in crowded and high-density conditions and disruption from kinship 
ties can result in urban refugee women being vulnerable to domestic violence, abandonment or 
polygamous relationships. This study indicates the complexities of refugee women and work in such 
settings. Most women express a desire to and interest in bringing in income, but often feel thwarted 
by their lack of appropriate skills (typically shaped by patriarchal norms in their home society) or by 
potential exploitation and harassment. Many of those that do find opportunities to work find these 
experiences exhausting, mentally and physically, as they try to juggle these responsibilities with caring 
for their families. Thus, whilst there is an expectation that refugee women who settle in urban areas 
may experience ‘empowering’ avenues of employment and self-reliance and new roles within the 
family unit, many find these opportunities straddle a complex web of economic, social, emotional and 
personal security concerns.  
Whilst in the research field, I was continually struck by women’s resilience and determination in the 
face of traumatising experiences of war, heart breaking circumstances and deeply constraining 
structures, alongside an oft-repeated phrase that ‘only God would help us’. As the Syrian conflict 
continues and the world encounters new challenges from coronavirus, it is vital that we do not forget 
the structural circumstances that refugees live with daily, and to consider the ways in these structures 
often make change and opportunity difficult to achieve. These need to be addressed, in order for 
refugee women to have lives of dignity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275 
 
Bibliography  
 
Ababsa, Myriam. (2013). The Amman Ruseifa-Zarqa Built-Up Area: the Heart of the National 
Economy. In Myriam Ababsa (Ed.), The Atlas of Jordan: History, Territories and Society. (pp. 
384–397). Presses de IFPO. 
Ababsa, Myriam. (2017). Women’s rights to the city. Amman in Context. WPS Prague. 
http://www.wpsprague.com/blog/2017/2/24/womens-right-to-the-city-amman-in-context-
myriam-ababsa 
Ababsa, Myriam, & Daher, R. F. (2011). Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en 
Jordanie. In Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en Jordanie. 
https://doi.org/10.4000/books.ifpo.1675 
Ababsa, Myriam, Daher, R. F., & Ababsa, M. (2016). Social Disparities and Public Policies in Amman. 
In Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en Jordanie. 
https://doi.org/10.4000/books.ifpo.1744 
Abdelmonem, M. G. (2012). The Practice of Home in Old Cairo Towards Socio-Spatial Models of 
Sustainable Living. Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, 23(2), 35–50. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41758894 
Abel, R. (1982). Introduction. In R. Abel (Ed.), The Politics of Informal Justice: Volume 2: Comparative 
Studies, Volume 2 (pp. 1–16). Academic Press Inc. . 
Abraham, J. (2010). Veiling and the production of gender and space in a town in north india: A 
critique of the public/private dichotomy. Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 17(2), 191–222. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/097152151001700201 
Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on 
Cultural Relativism and Its Others. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 783–790. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.783 
Abudi, D. (2011). Mothers and daughters in Arab women’s literature: The family frontier. Brill. 
https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.49-0114 
Achilli, L. (2015). Syrian Refugees in Jordan: a Reality Check. Migration Policy Centre at the European 
University Institute, 2(February), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.2870/821248 
Afsaruddin, A. (1999). Introduction: The hermeneutics of gendered space and discourse. In A. 
Afsaruddin (Ed.), Hermeneutics and honor: negotiating female “public” space in Islamic/ate 
societies ( (pp. 1–28). Harvard University Press. 
Agadjanian, V. (1998). Trapped on the margins: social characteristics, economic conditions, and 
reproductive behaviour of internally displaced women in urban Mozambique. Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 11(3), 284–303. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/11.3.284 
Agnew, J. A. (2011). Space and place. In J. Agnew & D. Livingstone (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of 
Geographical Knowledge (pp. 316–330). SAGE. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446201091.n24 
Ahmed, L. (1992). Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. Yale University 
Press. 
Akar, H. B. (2012). Contesting Beirut’s Frontiers. City and Society, 24(2), 150–172. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-744X.2012.01073.x 
Al-Krenawi, A., Graham, J., & Izzeldin, A. (2001). The psychosocial impact of polygamous marriages 
276 
 
on Palestinian women. Women and Health, 34(1), 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1300/J013v34n01_01 
Al-Shdayfat, N. M. (2017). Emotional Abuse among Syrian Refugee Women in Jordan. Global Journal 
of Health Science, 9(3), 237–247. https://doi.org/10.5539/gjhs.v9n3p237 
Al-Tal, R. S., & Ahmad Ghanem, H. H. (2019). Impact of the Syrian crisis on the socio-spatial 
transformation of Eastern Amman, Jordan. Frontiers of Architectural Research, 8(4), 591–603. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foar.2019.06.003 
Al Husseini, J. (2013). Jordan and the Palestinians. In M. Ababsa (Ed.), The Atlas of Jordan (pp. 230–
245). Presses de IFPO. 
Al Jazeera. (2017, February 10). The Boy who Started the Syrian War. Al Jazeera. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2017/02/boy-started-syrian-war-
170208093451538.html 
Al Kilani, S. (2014). A duty and a burden on Jordan. Forced Migration Review, 47, 30–32. 
http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/syria/syria.pdf 
al Makahleh, S. (2017). Jordan Holds Key to Syria. Foreign Policy Association. 
https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2017/08/25/jordan-holds-key-syria/ 
Al Masri, M. (2016). Political Theatre: Football and Contestation in Beirut [Goldsmiths, University of 
London]. http://research.gold.ac.uk/18235/1/ANT_thesis_Al-MasriM_2016.pdf 
Al Oudat,M & Alshboul, A. (2010). “Jordan First”: Tribalism, Nationalism and Legitimacy of Power in 
Jordan. Intellectual Discourse, 18(1), 65–96. 
Al Rabady, R., & Abu-Khafajah, S. (2015). “Send in the clown”: Re-inventing Jordan’s downtowns in 
space and time, case of Amman. Urban Design International, 20(1), 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/udi.2013.27 
Alaszewski, A. (2011). Using Diaries for Social Research. SAGE. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857020215 
Alhajahmad, S & Lockhard, D. (2017). Syrian refugee labour integration policy in Jordan. 
http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publication_SyrianRefugeeLabourJord
an_English.pdf 
Alizadeh, H. (2007). Changes conceptions of women’s public space in the Kurdish city. Cities, 24(6), 
410–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2007.06.002 
Aljafari, M. (2014). Emerging public spaces in the city of Amman, Jordan: An Analysis of Everyday Life 
Practices [Dortmund University]. file:///C:/Users/Howard/Downloads/Dissertation (2).pdf 
Anthias, F. (2008). Thinking through the lens of translocational positionality: an intersectionality 
frame for understanding identity and belonging. Translocations: Migration and Social Change, 
4(1), 5–20. 
Anthias, F. (2012). Transnational Mobilities, Migration Research and Intersectionality: Towards a 
translocational frame. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 2(2), 102. 
https://doi.org/10.2478/v10202-011-0032-y 
Anthias, F. (2013a). Hierarchies of social location, class and intersectionality: Towards a 
translocational frame. International Sociology, 28(1), 121–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580912463155 
277 
 
Anthias, F. (2013b). Intersectional what? Social divisions, intersectionality and levels of analysis. 
Ethnicities, 13(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812463547 
Anubha, S., & Seferis, L. (2014). Syrians contributing to Kurdish economic growth. Forced Migration 
Review, 47, 14–16. 
Aranki, D., & Kalis, O. (2014). Limited legal status for refugees from Syria in Lebanon. Forced 
Migration Review, 47, 17–18. 
Ardalan, N. (1980). The visual language of symbolic form: a preliminary study of mosque 
architecture. In J. G. Katz. (Ed.), In Architecture as Symbol and Self-Identity. Aga Khan Award for 
Architecture,. 
Arjmand, R. (2016). Public urban space, gender and segregation: Women-only urban parks in Iran. In 
Public Urban Space, Gender and Segregation: Women-Only Urban Parks in Iran. Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315603025 
Ataç, I., Rygiel, K., & Stierl, M. (2016). Introduction: The Contentious Politics of Refugee and Migrant 
Protest and Solidarity Movements: Remaking Citizenship from the Margins. Citizenship Studies, 
20(5). https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2016.1182681 
Atzili, B. (2010). State weakness and “vacuum of power” in Lebanon. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 33(8), 757–782. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.494172 
Avishai, O., Gerber, L., & Randles, J. (2013). The Feminist Ethnographer’s Dilemma: Reconciling 
Progressive Research Agendas with Fieldwork Realities. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 
42(4), 394–426. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891241612458955 
Awan, N. (2017). Diasporic agencies: Mapping the city otherwise. In Diasporic Agencies: Mapping the 
City Otherwise. Routeledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315577029 
Ayoub, M. (2017). Gender, Social Class and exile: The case of Syrian women in Cairo. In J. Freedman, 
Z. Kivilcim, & N. Özgür Baklacıoğlu (Eds.), A Gendered approach to the Syrian refugee crisis (pp. 
77–104). Taylor & Francis. 
Ayubi, N. N. (1995). Overstating the Arab State. I.B Tauris Publishers. 
Badran, M. (2009). Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oneworld Publications. 
Badran, Margot. (2011). Islam, Patriarchy, and Feminism in the Middle East. Trends in History, 4(1), 
49–71. https://doi.org/10.1300/j265v04n01_04 
Balcioglu, Z. (2018). Agency, forced migration and social capital. In A. Lopez-Fogues & F. Melis-Cin 
(Eds.), Youth, Gender and the Capabilities Approach to Development (pp. 163–176). Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315306353-10 
Bangstad, S. (2011). Saba Mahmood and Anthropological Feminism After Virtue. Theory, Culture & 
Society, 28(3), 28–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276410396914 
Barakat, H. (1993). The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State. University of California Press. 
Barakat, H. (2005). The Arab Family and the challenge of Social Transformation. In H. Moghissi (Ed.), 
Woman and Islam: Social Conditions, obstacles and prospects (pp. 145–165). Routledge. 
Barbalet V. et al. (2018). The Jordan Compact Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee 
compacts. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12058.pdf 
Barnes-Darcy, J. (2013). Syria: the view from Jordan. European Council on Foreign Relations. 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syria_the_view_from_jordan138 
278 
 
Bartolomei, L., Pittaway, E., & Pittaway, E. E. (2003). Who Am I? Identity and citizenship in Kakuma 
refugee camp in Northern Kenya. Development, 46(3), 87–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/10116370030463014 
Bastia, T. (2014). Intersectionality, migration and development. Progress in Development Studies, 
14(3), 237–248. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464993414521330 
BBC. (2015, August 17). Lebanon: Beirut faces “rubbish health crisis.” BBC News Online . 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33965688 
Bengio, O. (2016). Game changers: Kurdish women in peace and war. Middle East Journal, 70(1), 30–
46. https://doi.org/10.1353/mej.2016.0009 
Benhabib, S. (1993). Feminist theory and Hannah Arendt’s concept of public space. History of the 
Human Sciences, 6(2), 97–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519300600205 
Berger, R. (2015). Now I see it, now I don’t: researcher’s position and reflexivity in qualitative 
research. Qualitative Research, 15(2), 219–234. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794112468475 
Berti, B. (2015). The Syrian refugee crisis: Regional and human security implications. Strategic 
Assessment, 17(4), 41–53. 
Betts, A., & Collier, P. (2015). Help refugees help themselves: Let displaced syrians join the labor 
market. In Foreign Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Bhaskar, R. (2010). Reclaiming reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy. Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203843314 
Block, K., Warr, D., Gibbs, L., & Riggs, E. (2013). Addressing ethical and methodological challenges in 
research with refugee-background young people: Reflections from the field. Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 26(1), 69–87. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fes002 
Boege, V., Brown, A., & Clements, K. (2008). On hybrid political orders and emerging states: State 
formation in the context of “fragility.” In Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management (Issue 8). http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2595/ 
Boswall, K., & Akash, R. Al. (2015). Personal perspectives of protracted displacement. Intervention, 
13(3), 203–215. https://doi.org/10.1097/wtf.0000000000000097 
Boustani, M., Gebara, H., Romanos, G., Strachan, A., & Warren, M. (2016). Beirut, a safe refuge? 
Urban refugees accessing security in a context of plural provision. 
http://www.knowledgeplatforms.nl/knowledge-platform-security-rule-of-law/knowledge-
platform-security-and-rule-of-law-news/beirut-a-safe-refuge-urban-refugees-accessing-
security-in-a-context-of-plural-provision/ 
Boustani, Marwa, Carpi, E., Gebara, H., & Mourad, Y. (2016). Responding to the Syrian Crisis in 
Lebanon Collaboration between Aid Agencies and Local Governance Structures. International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED): London, United Kingdom. (2016). 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Qualitative Research in Psychology Using thematic analysis in 
psychology Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–
101. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uqrp20%5Cnhttp://ww
w.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uqrp20 
Braverman, I., Blomey, N., Delaney, D., & Kedar, A. (2014). Introduction: Expanding spaces of law. In 
I. Braverman, N. Blomey, D. Delaney, & A. Kedar (Eds.), The Expanding Spaces of Law (pp. 1–
29). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804787185.001.0001 
279 
 
Brickell, K. (2014). “The Whole World Is Watching”: Intimate Geopolitics of Forced Eviction and 
Women’s Activism in Cambodia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104(6). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2014.944452 
Brickell, K., & Cuomo, D. (2019). Feminist geolegality. Progress in Human Geography, 43(1), 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132517735706 
Brooks, A. (2012). Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: Building Knowledge and Empowerment 
Through Women’s Lived Experience. In S. Hesse-Biber & P. Leavy (Eds.), Feminist Research 
Practice (pp. 53–82). SAGE. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412984270.n3 
Brun, C., & Fábos, A. (2015). Making homes in limbo? A conceptual framework. Refuge, 31(1), 5–17. 
https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.40138 
Buchanan, I. (2012). Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist. In Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist. 
SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218235 
Buckley-Zistel, S., & Krause, U. (2017). Gender, Violence, Refugees: An Introduction. In S. Buckley-
Zistel & U. Krause (Eds.), Gender, Violence, Refugees (pp. 1–20). Berghahn Books. 
Bürkner, H. J. (2012). Intersectionality: How gender studies might inspire the analysis of social 
inequality among migrants. Population, Space and Place, 18(2), 181–195. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.664 
Buscher, D., & Heller, L. (2010). Desperate Lives: Urban Refugee Women in Malaysia and Egypt. 
Forced Migration Review, 34, 20–21. http://www.fmreview.org/mags1.htm 
Buscher, Dale. (2009). Women, work, and war. In S. Forbes Martin & J. Tirman (Eds.), Women, 
Migration, and Conflict: Breaking a Deadly Cycle (pp. 87–106). Springer. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2825-9_5 
Buscher, Dale. (2012). Making work safe for displaced women. Forced Migration Review, 41, 46. 
https://proxy.library.mcgill.ca/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1265768653?a
ccountid=12339%0Ahttp://mcgill.on.worldcat.org/atoztitles/link?sid=ProQ:&issn=14609819&v
olume=&issue=41&title=Forced+Migration+Review&spage=46&date=2012-12-01&atitle 
Butler, J. (1988). Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory. Theatre Journal, 40(4), 519–531. https://doi.org/10.2307/3207893 
Calame, J., & Charlesworth, E. (2011). Divided cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. 
University of Pennsylvania Press. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.47-3496 
Campbell, E. H. (2006). Urban refugees in nairobi: Problems of protection, mechanisms of survival, 
and possibilities for integration. Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(3), 396–413. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel011 
Campos-Delgado, A. (2018). Counter-mapping migration: irregular migrants’ stories through 
cognitive mapping. Mobilities, 13(4), 488–504. 
Carastathis, A., Kouri-Towe, N., Mahrouse, G., & Whitley, L. (2018). Introduction: Intersectional 
Feminist Interventions in the “Refugee Crisis.” Refuge, 34(1), 3–15. 
Carastathis, Anna. (2014). The concept of intersectionality in feminist theory. Philosophy Compass, 
9(5), 304–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12129 
Carpi, E. et al. (2016). Crisis and Control: (In)formal Hybrid Security in Lebanon. http://cskc.daleel-
madani.org/sites/default/files/resources/crisiscontrol-informalhybridsecuritylebanon-
report.pdf 
280 
 
Carrington, K., Hogg, R., & Sozzo, M. (2016). Southern Criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 
56(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv083 
Carrion, D. (2015). Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Confronting difficult truths. 
https://doi.org/https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/resear
ch/20150921SyrianRefugeesCarrion.pdf 
Carter, B., & New, C. (2004). Making realism work: Realist social theory and empirical research. 
Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203624289 
Cassidy, K., Yuval Davis, N., & Wemyss, G. (2018). Intersectional Border(ings). Political Geography, 
66, 139–141. 
Ceccato, V. (2015). Public Space and the Situational Conditions of Crime and Fear. International 
Criminal Justice Review, 26(2), 69–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/1057567716639099 
Charrad, M. M. (2011a). Central and local patrimonialism: State-building in kin-based societies. 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 636(1), 49–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716211401825 
Charrad, M. M. (2011b). Gender in the Middle East: Islam, State, Agency. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 37(1), 417–437. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102554 
Chatelard, G. et al. (2009). Protection, mobility and livelihood challenges of displaced Iraqis in urban 
settings in Jordan. http://icmc.net//wp-content/uploads/2019/07/091029-icmc-protection-
mobility-livelihood-displaced-iraqis-urban-settings-jordan.pdf 
Chatelard, Géraldine, & Morris, T. (2012). Editorial essay: Iraqi refugees, beyond the Urban refugee 
paradigm. Refuge, 28(1), 3–14. https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.36083 
Chatty, D. (2007). Researching refugee youth in the Middle East: Reflections on the importance of 
comp arative research. Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(2), 265–280. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem005 
Chatty, D. (2012). Introduction: Dispossession and Forced Migration in the Middle East: Community 
Cohesion in Impermanent Landscapes. In D. Chatty (Ed.), Displacement and Dispossession in the 
Modern Middle East (pp. 1–6). https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511844812.001 
Chimni, B. S. (1998). The geopolitics of refugee studies: A view from the south. Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 11(4), 350–374. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/11.4.350-a 
Cho, S., Crenshaw, K. W., & McCall, L. (2013). Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, 
applications, and praxis. Signs, 38(4), 785–810. https://doi.org/10.1086/669608 
Clark, A. (2017). Exploring Women’s Embodied Experiences of ‘The Gaze’ in a Mix-Gendered UK 
Gym. Societies, 8(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc8010002 
Clark, C. R. (2007). Understanding vulnerability: From categories to experiences of young congolese 
people in Uganda. Children and Society, 21(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1099-
0860.2007.00100.x 
Clark, J. A. (2006). Field research methods in the Middle East. PS - Political Science and Politics, 39(3), 
417–423. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096506060707 
Clark, J. H. (2013). “My Life Is Like a Novel”: Embodied Geographies of Security in Southeast Turkey. 
Geopolitics, 18(4), 835–855. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2013.780038 
Clegg, S. (2006). The problem of agency in feminism: A critical realist approach. Gender and 
281 
 
Education, 18(3), 309–324. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540250600667892 
Cole, J. (1994). Gender, tradition and history. In S. Gocek, F. & Balaghi (Ed.), Reconstructing Gender in 
the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, and Power (pp. 23–30). Columbia University Press. 
Collins, P. H. (2015). Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas. Annual Review of Sociology, 41(1), 1–
20. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112142 
Connell, R. (2014). Using southern theory: Decolonizing social thought in theory, research and 
application. Planning Theory, 13(2), 210–223. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095213499216 
Connelly, S. (2002). Public involvement in Local Agenda 21 : the impact of local authority polic. 
University of Sheffield. 
Cooper, B. (2016). Intersectionality. In L. Disch & M. E. Hawkesworth (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Feminist Theory (pp. 385–406). Oxford University Press. 
Cornwall, A. (2007a). Myths to live by? Female solidarity and female autonomy reconsidered. 
Development and Change, 38(1), 149–168. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00407.x 
Cornwall, A. (2007b). Of choice, chance and contingency: “Career strategies” and tactics for survival 
among Yoruba women traders. Social Anthropology, 15(1), 27–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2007.00007.x 
Council of Europe. (2017). Realising the right to family reunification of refugees in Europe. 
https://rm.coe.int/prems-052917-gbr-1700-realising-refugees-160x240-web/1680724ba0 
Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of 
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 139–167. https://doi.org/10.1016/0011-9164(90)80039-E 
Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241–1299. https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039 
Crisp, J. (2000). A state of insecurity: The political economy of violence in Kenya’s refugee camps. 
African Affairs, 99(397), 601–632. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/99.397.601 
Culbertson, S., Oliker, O., Baruch, B., & Blum, I. (2016). Rethinking Coordination of Services to 
Refugees in Urban Areas: Managing the Crisis in Jordan and Lebanon. Rand Corporation. 
https://doi.org/10.7249/rr1485 
Daher, R. F. (2008). Amman: Disguised genealogy and recent urban restructuring and neoliberal 
threats. In Y. Elshestawy (Ed.), The Evolving Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban 
Development. Routeledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203696798 
Danermark, B., Ekström, M., & Karlsson, J. C. (2019). Explaining society: Critical realism in the social 
sciences. Routeledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351017831 
Das, V. (2006). Life and words: Violence and the descent into the ordinary. University of California 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0104-93132010000200015 
Davis, R & Taylor, A. (2013). Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: A Snapshot from Summer 2013. 
https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/rochelledavis/files/Syrian-Refugee-Report-Sept-
2013.pdf 
Davis, R. et al. (2016). Sudanese and Somali Refugees in Jordan: Hierarchies of Aid in Protracted 
Displacement Crises. Middle East Report, 46(279), 1–9. 
https://www.merip.org/mer/mer279/sudanese-somali-refugees-jordan 
282 
 
Davis, K. (2008). Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a 
feminist theory successful. Feminist Theory, 9(1), 67–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700108086364 
Davis, Rochelle, Taylor, A., Todman, W., & Murphy, E. (2016). Sudanese and Somali refugees in 
Jordan. Middle East Report, 46(279), 1–9. 
Day, K. (1999). Embassies and sanctuaries: Women’s experiences of race and fear in public space. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 17(3), 307–328. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/d170307 
De Bel-Air, F. (2013). Composition of the population. In M. Ababsa (Ed.), The Atlas of Jordan (pp. 
246–252). Presses de IFPO. 
de Certeau, M. (1984). Practice of Everyday Life. University of California Press. 
de Koning, A. (2009). Gender, public space and social segregation in Cairo: Of taxi drivers, prostitutes 
and professional women. Antipode, 41(3), 533–556. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8330.2009.00686.x 
De Regt, M. (2010). Refugee, woman and domestic worker: Somali women dealing with 
dependencies in Yemen. African and Black Diaspora, 3(1), 109–121. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17528630903319904 
De Vriese, M. (2006). Refugee Livelihoods: A review of the evidence. In United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Geneva (Issue February). 
Deeb, L. (2006). An Enchanted Modern : Gender and Public Piety in Shi ` i Lebanon. Princeton 
University Press. 
Deeb, L., & Harb, M. (2009). Politics, culture, religion: How Hizbullah is constructing an islamic milieu 
in Lebanon. Review of Middle East Studies, 43(2), 198–206. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S2151348100000653 
Deeb, L., & Harb, M. (2013). Leisurely Islam: Negotiating geography and morality in Shi’ite South 
Beirut. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-3921 
Delaney, D. (2015). Legal geography I: Constitutivities, complexities, and contingencies. Progress in 
Human Geography, 39(1), 96–102. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132514527035 
Delaney, D. (2016). Legal geography II: Discerning injustice. Progress in Human Geography, 40(2), 
267–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132515571725 
Deutsch, F. M. (2007). Undoing gender. Gender and Society, 21(1), 106–127. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243206293577 
Diehl, J. (2012). Lines in the Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card. World Affairs, 175(1), 7–15. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41638987.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:adb2da81190cd0720e68de
4886be1e07 
Dionigi, F. (2016). The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon: State fragility and social resilience. LSE 
Middle East Centre Paper Series, 15, 1–40. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65565/1/Dionigi_Syrian_Refugees in Lebanon_Author_2016.pdf 
Dionigi, F. (2017). Statehood and Refugees: Patterns of Integration and Segregation of Refugee 
Populations in Lebanon from a Comparative Perspective. Middle East Law and Governance, 
9(2), 113–146. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00902001 
283 
 
Dominguez, S., & Menjivar, C. (2014). Beyond individual and visible acts of violence: A framework to 
examine the lives of women in low-income neighborhoods. Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 44(1), 184–195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.01.012 
Downs, R. M., & Stea, D. (2011). Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behaviour: Process and Products. In The 
Map Reader: Theories of Mapping Practice and Cartographic Representation (pp. 312–317). 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470979587.ch41 
Droeber, J. (2005). Dreaming of Change: Young Middle-Class Women and Social Transformation in 
Jordan. Brill. 
Dryden-Peterson, S. (2006). “I find myself as someone who is in the forest”: Urban refugees as 
agents of social change in Kampala, Uganda. Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(3), 381–395. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel010 
Eckert, P., & McConnell-Ginnet, S. (2013). Language and Gender (2nd ed.). Cambridge University 
Press. 
Edwards, R. (1998). A critical examination of the use of interpreters in the qualitative research 
process. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(1), 197–208. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.1998.9976626 
Edwards, R. (2013). Power and trust: An academic researcher’s perspective on working with 
interpreters as gatekeepers. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 16(6), 503–
514. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2013.823276 
Eghdamian, K. K. (2017). Religious identity and experiences of displacement: An examination into the 
discursive representations of syrian refugees and their effects on religious minorities living in 
Jordan. Journal of Refugee Studies, 30(3), 447–467. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few030 
Eidmouni, M. (2017). Political Empowerment Not a Priority for Syrian Refugee Women. Syria Deeply. 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/07/26/political-empowerment-not-a-
priority-for-syrian-refugee-women 
El-Masri, R. et al. (2013). Shifting Sands: Changing gender roles among refugees in Lebanon. 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/rr-shifting-sands-
lebanon-syria-refugees-gender-030913-en_3.pdf 
El Helou, Z., & Antara, L. (2018). Political participation of Refugees: The case of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/political-participation-of-
refugees-the-case-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.pdf 
El Muhtaseb, L. (2013). Jordan’s East Banker-Palestinian schism. 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162779/746892aacedd3e8fcb1ff7370a77fb67.pdf 
El Sadaawi, N. (2015). The Hidden Face of Eve ((E-Copy)). Zed Books. 
Elder-Vass, D. (2010). The causal power of social structures: Emergence, structure and agency. 
Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761720 
Ellerby, K. (2013). (En)gendered Security? The Complexities of Women’s Inclusion in Peace 
Processes. International Interactions, 39(4), 435–460. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.805130 
Enab Baladi. (2017, September 30). Syrians’ Clothing… Following whose religion? Enab Baladi. 
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2017/09/syrians-clothing-following-whose-religion/ 
Errighi, L., Griesse, J. (2016). The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Labour Market Implications in Jordan and 
284 
 
Lebanon. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp029_en.pdf 
Fábos, A., & Kibreab, G. (2007). Urban refugees: Introduction. Refuge, 24(1), 3–10. 
Faour, M. A. (2007). Religion, demography, and politics in Lebanon. Middle Eastern Studies, 43(6), 
909–921. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200701568279 
Faria, C., & Mollett, S. (2016). Critical feminist reflexivity and the politics of whiteness in the ‘field.’ 
Gender, Place and Culture, 23(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2014.958065 
Fawaz, M. (2017). Exceptions and the actually existing practice of planning: Beirut (Lebanon) as case 
study. Urban Studies, 54(8), 1938–1955. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098016640453 
Fawaz, M., & Akar, H. B. (2012). Practicing (In)Security in the City. City and Society, 24(2), 105–109. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-744X.2012.01070.x 
Fawaz, M., Harb, M., & Gharbieh, A. (2012). Living Beirut’s Security Zones: An Investigation of the 
Modalities and Practice of Urban Security. City and Society, 24(2), 173–195. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-744X.2012.01074.x 
Fawcett, L. (2017). States and sovereignty in the Middle East: Myths and realities. International 
Affairs, 93(4), 789–807. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix122 
Fenster, T. (1999). Space for gender: Cultural roles of the forbidden and the permitted. Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space, 17(2), 227–246. https://doi.org/10.1068/d170227 
Fenster, T. (2005). The right to the gendered city: Different formations of belonging in everyday life. 
Journal of Gender Studies, 14(3), 217–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/09589230500264109 
Fenster, T., & Hamdan-Saliba, H. (2013). Gender and feminist geographies in the Middle East. 
Gender, Place and Culture, 20(4), 528–546. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2012.709826 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2014). Gender and Forced Migration. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. 
Long, & N. Signora (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (pp. 
395–408). Oxford University Press. 
Fletcher, A. J. (2017). Applying critical realism in qualitative research: methodology meets method. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 20(2), 181–194. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2016.1144401 
Fluri, J. (2011). Armored peacocks and proxy bodies: gender geopolitics in aid/development spaces 
of Afghanistan. Gender, Place and Culture, 18(4), 519–536. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2011.583343 
Fluri, J. L. (2011). Bodies, bombs and barricades: Geographies of conflict and civilian (in)security. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 36(2), 280–296. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00422.x 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2), 
219–245. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363 
Fox, K. A., Nobles, M. R., & Piquero, A. R. (2009). Gender, crime victimization and fear of crime. 
Security Journal, 22(1), 24–39. https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2008.13 
Frangieh, G. (2016). Relations Between UNHCR and Arab Governments: Memoranda of 
Understanding in Lebanon and Jordan. In The Long-Term Challenges of Forced Migration: 
Perspectives from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. (pp. 37–43). 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2016/09/23/relations-between-unhcr-and-arab-governments-
285 
 
memoranda-of-understanding-in-lebanon-and-jordan/ 
Freccero, J. (2015). Sheltering displaced persons from sexual and gender-based violence. Forced 
Migration Review, 50, 55–58. 
https://proxy.library.mcgill.ca/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1714007942?a
ccountid=12339%0Ahttp://mcgill.on.worldcat.org/atoztitles/link?sid=ProQ:&issn=14609819&v
olume=&issue=50&title=Forced+Migration+Review&spage=55&date=2015-09-01&atitle 
Freedman, J. (2015). Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate: Second Edition. In J. 
Freedman (Ed.), Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate: Second Edition. 
Palgrave MacMillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137456236 
Freedman, Jane. (2010). Mainstreaming gender in refugee protection. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 23(4), 589–607. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2010.523820 
Freedman, Jane. (2017). Women’s experience of forced migration Gender-based forms of insecurity 
and the uses of “vulnerability.” In J. Freedman, Z. Kivilcim, & N. Özgür Baklacıoğlu (Eds.), 
Gendering the Syrian refugee crisis (pp. 125–141). Taylor & Francis. 
Fregonese, S. (2012). Beyond the “weak state”:Hybrid sovereignties in beirut. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, 30(4), 655–674. https://doi.org/10.1068/d11410 
Frisina, A. (2010). Young muslims’ everyday tactics and strategies: Resisting islamophobia, 
negotiating italianness, becoming citizens. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 31(5), 557–572. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2010.513087 
Frochlich, C., & Stevens, M. (2015). Trapped in Refuge. The Syrian Crisis in Jordan Worsens. In Middle 
East Report Online. https://www.merip.org/mero/mero030215 
Geha, C. (2015). Citizens perceptions of security institutions in Lebanon. In International Alert. 
Gholamhosseini, R., Pojani, D., Mateo Babiano, I., Johnson, L., & Minnery, J. (2019). The place of 
public space in the lives of Middle Eastern women migrants in Australia. Journal of Urban 
Design, 24(2), 269–289. https://doi.org/10.1080/13574809.2018.1498293 
Gieseking, J. et al. (2014). “Public” and “Private.” In J. et al Gieseking (Ed.), The People, Place, and 
Space Reader (pp. 181–186). Routeledge. 
Gilpin, L. S. (2006). Postpositivist Realist Theory: Identity and Representation Revisited. Multicultural 
Perspectives, 8(4), 10–16. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327892mcp0804_3 
Goffman, E. (2004). Gender Display. Terrain, 42, 109–128. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-
16079-2_1 
Golkowska, K. (2017). Qatari women navigating gendered space. Social Sciences, 6(4), 1–10. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6040123 
Goodhand, J. (2000). Research in conflict zones: ethics and accountability. Forced Migration Review, 
8, 12–15. 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/129440/ichaptersection_singledocument/339f
8fae-70a7-4365-97b3-f3ab03246e23/en/12-15.pdf 
Gough, K. (2012). Reflections on conducting urban comparison. Urban Geography, 33(6), 866–878. 
https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.33.6.866 
Grabska, K. (2006). Marginalization in urban spaces of the global south: Urban refugees in Cairo. 
Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(3), 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel014 
286 
 
Graham-Brown, S. (2013). The seen, the unseen and the imagined: Public and private lives. In R. 
Lewis & S. Mills (Eds.), Feminist Postcolonial Theory a Reader (pp. 205–519). Routeledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203825235 
Guay, J. (2016). Social cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host Communities in Lebanon 
and Jordan. https://www.wvi.org/sites/default/files/World Vision International DM2020 Social 
Cohesion Report.pdf 
Guest, G., MacQueen, K., & Namey, E. (2014). Applied Thematic Analysis. SAGE. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483384436 
Gunnarsson, L. (2011). A defence of the category “women.” Feminist Theory, 12(1), 23–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700110390604 
Gunnarsson, L., Martinez Dy, A., & van Ingen, M. (2016). Critical Realism, Gender and Feminism: 
Exchanges, Challenges, Synergies. Journal of Critical Realism, 15(5), 433–439. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2016.1211442 
Habib, R. R., Yassin, N., Ghanawi, J., Haddad, P., & Mahfoud, Z. (2011). Double jeopardy: Assessing 
the association between internal displacement, housing quality and chronic illness in a low-
income neighborhood. Journal of Public Health, 19(2), 171–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10389-010-0368-0 
Haddad, S., & Jamali, D. (2003). The politics of refugees’ non integration: the dilemma of Palestinians 
in Lebanon. Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de l’integration et de La 
Migration Internationale, 4(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-003-1017-z 
Hall, S. (1996). The Question of Cultural identity. In S. Hall, D. Held, D. Hubert, & K. Thompson (Eds.), 
Modernity An Introduction to Modern Societies (pp. 595–634). Blackwell Publishers. 
Hamdan-Saliba, H., & Fenster, T. (2012). Tactics and strategies of power: The construction of spaces 
of belonging for Palestinian women in Jaffa-Tel Aviv. Women’s Studies International Forum, 
35(4), 203–213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2012.03.022 
Hanafi, S. (2010). Governing Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Arab East: Governmentalities in 
search of legitimacy. In Policy and Governance in Palestinian Refugee Camps (No. 1). 
Hanania, M. D. (2014). The Impact of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis on the Development of Amman, 
1947–1958. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 41(4), 461–482. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.942978 
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575–599. https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066 
Harb, M. (2010). On religiosity and spatiality: Lessons from Hezbollah in Beirut. In N. Al Sayyad & M. 
Massoumi (Eds.), The Fundamentalist City?: Religiosity and the Remaking of Urban Space (pp. 
125–154). Routeledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203844595 
Harding, S. (2008). Sciences from Below Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities. Duke 
University Press. 
Harding, Sandra. (2004). Introduction:Standpoint Theory as a site of political, philosophic and 
scientific debate. In S. Harding (Ed.), The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and 
Political Controversies. Routeledge. 
Hassan, A. M., Lee, H., & Yoo, U. S. (2016). From medieval Cairo to modern Masdar City: Lessons 
learned through a comparative study. Architectural Science Review, 59(1), 39–52. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00038628.2015.1015947 
287 
 
Hasso, F. S. (2017). Entering and remaking spaces: Young palestinian feminists in Jerusalem. Journal 
of Middle East Women’s Studies, 13(2), 337–345. https://doi.org/10.1215/15525864-3861411 
Hathaway, J. C. (2007). Forced migration studies: Could we agree just to “date”? Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 20(3), 349–369. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem019 
Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis: A critical introduction. Red Globe Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-62911-0 
Haysom & Pavenello, S. (2012). Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement and vulnerability in 
Amman (HPG Working Paper). https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/7605.pdf 
Hazbun, W. (2016). Assembling security in a ‘weak state:’ the contentious politics of plural 
governance in Lebanon since 2005. Third World Quarterly, 37(6), 1053–1070. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1110016 
Heydemann, S. (2018). Beyond fragility: Syria and the challenges of reconstruction in fierce states. In 
Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-fragility-syria-and-the-challenges-of-
reconstruction-in-fierce-states/ 
Hill-Collins, P. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of 
Empowerment. Taylor and Francis. 
Hodgson, F. (2012). Structures of encounterability: Space, place, paths and identities. In Mobilities: 
New Perspectives on Transport and Society (pp. 41–64). Ashgate. 
Hokayem, E. (2017). Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. In Syria’s Uprising and the 
Fracturing of the Levant. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351224024 
Hooks, B. (1984). Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press. 
Hooks, B. (2014). Feminism Is for Everybody. Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315743189 
Hourani, N. B. (2015). People or profit? Two post-conflict reconstructions in Beirut. Human 
Organization, 74(2), 174–184. https://doi.org/10.17730/0018-7259-74.2.174 
HRW. (2014). Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees. Human Rights Watch. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-least-45-local-curfews-imposed-syrian-
refugees 
HRW. (2017). I Have No Idea Why They Sent Us Back: Jordanian Deportations and Expulsions of 
Syrian Refugees. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/02/i-have-no-idea-why-they-sent-us-
back/jordanian-deportations-and-expulsions-syrian 
Huang, C., Ash, N., Gough, K., & Post, L. (2018). Designing refugee compacts: lessons from Jordan. 
Forced Migration Review, 57, 52–54. http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.opac.bilgi.edu.tr/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=128608087&site=
eds-live 
Hubbard, B. (2014, November 29). Tradition Saves Camels’ Spot in Jordan’s Desert Forces. New York 
Times. 
Hugman, R., Bartolomei, L., & Pittaway, E. (2011). Human agency and the meaning of informed 
consent: Reflections on research with refugees. Journal of Refugee Studies, 24(4), 655–671. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fer024 
Hugman, R., Pittaway, E., & Bartolomei, L. (2011). When “do no harm” is not enough: The ethics of 
288 
 
research with refugees and other vulnerable groups. British Journal of Social Work, 41(7), 
1271–1287. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcr013 
Human Rights Watch. (2016). I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person: How Lebanon’s Residency 
Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees. 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/lebanon0116web.pdf 
Hunt, L. (2008). Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Opportunities, Constraints and the Role of 
Agency. Social Policy and Society, 7(3), 281–292. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1474746408004260 
Hyndman, J. (2001). Towards a feminist geopolitics. The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe 
Canadien, 45(2), 210–222. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0064.2001.tb01484.x 
Hyndman, J. (2004). Mind the gap: Bridging feminist and political geography through geopolitics. 
Political Geography, 23(3), 307–322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2003.12.014 
Hyndman, J. (2010). Introduction: The feminist politics of refugee migration. Gender, Place and 
Culture, 17(4), 453–459. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2010.485835 
Hyndman, J. (2012). The geopolitics of migration and mobility. Geopolitics, 17(2), 243–255. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.569321 
Hyndman, J., & Giles, W. (2011). Waiting for what? The feminization of asylum in protracted 
situations. Gender, Place and Culture, 18(3), 361–379. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2011.566347 
IHRC/NRC. (2016). Securing Status: Syrian refugees and the documentation of legal status, identity, 
and family relationships in Jordan. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/52314 
Ilahi, N. (2009). Gendered Contestations: An analysis of Street Harrassment in Cairo and its 
implications for Women’s access to public spaces. Surfacing, 2(1), 56–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00909880701434299 
ILO. (2014). Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile. 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-
beirut/documents/publication/wcms_240134.pdf 
ILO. (2015). Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan: A discussion paper on labour and refugee 
laws and policies. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-
beirut/documents/publication/wcms_357950.pdf 
Indra, D. (1987). Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on 
Refugees, 6(3), 3–4. 
http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/21503/20178 
Jacelon, C. S., & Imperio, K. (2005). Participant diaries as a source of data in research with older 
adults. Qualitative Health Research, 15(7), 991–997. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305278603 
Jacobsen, K. (2005). The Economic Life of Refugees. Kumarian Press Inc. 
Jacobsen, Karen, Ayoub, M., & Johnson, A. (2014). Sudanese Refugees in Cairo: Remittances and 
Livelihoods. Journal of Refugee Studies, 27(1), 146–159. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet029 
Jacobsen, Karen, & Landau, L. B. (2003). The dual imperative in refugee research: some 
methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration. 
Disasters, 27(3), 185–206. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00228 
289 
 
Jacobsen, Karen, & Nichols, R. F. (2011). Developing a Profiling Methodology for Displaced People in 
Urban Areas. Boston, USA: Tufts University, 1–92. 
Jacobsen, R. (1998). Cognitive mapping without sight: four preliminary studies of spatial learning. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 18, 289–305. 
Jagarnathsingh, A. (2016). Formal Informality, Brokering Mechanisms, and Illegality: The Impact of 
the Lebanese State’s Policies on Syrian Refugees Daily Lives. In Civil Society Knowledge Centre. 
http://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/formal_informality-
brokering_mechanisms-illegality-ls2016_0.pdf 
Janmyr, M. (2016). Precarity in exile: The legal status of syrian refugees in Lebanon. Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, 35(4), 58–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdw016 
Janmyr, M. (2017). No country of asylum: “Legitimizing” Lebanon’s rejection of the 1951 refugee 
convention. International Journal of Refugee Law, 29(3), 438–465. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eex026 
Janmyr, M. (2018). UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: Negotiating status and registration in 
Lebanon. International Journal of Human Rights, 22(3), 393–419. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140 
Jessop, B. (2005). Critical Realism and the strategic-relational approach. New Formations: A Journal 
of Culture, Theory and Politics, 56, 40–53. https://doi.org/10.1558/jcr.v10i1.122 
Johansson-Nogués, E. (2013). Gendering the Arab Spring? Rights and (in)security of Tunisian, 
Egyptian and Libyan women. Security Dialogue, 44(5–6). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613499784 
Johnson, P. (2007). Tales of strength and danger: Sahar and the tactics of everyday life in Amari 
refugee camp, Palestine. Signs, 32(3), 597–619. https://doi.org/10.1086/510543 
Johnstone, N. (2015). Tribal dispute resolution and womens access to justice in Jordan. 
http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Tribal Dispute Resolution and 
Women’s Access to Justice in Jordan.pdf 
Jops, P., Lenette, C., & Breckenridge, J. (2016). A context of risk: Uncovering the lived experiences of 
chin refugee women negotiating a livelihood in Delhi. Refuge, 32(3), 84–94. 
Joseph, S. (1996). Gender and Civil Society. In J. Benin, J & Stork (Ed.), Political Islam: Essays from the 
Middle East (pp. 64–70). University of California Press. 
Joseph, S. (1999). Intimate Selving in Arab Families: Gender, Self, and Identity. Syracuse University 
Press. 
Joseph, S., & Slyomovics, S. (2001). Introduction. In S. Joseph & S. Slyomovics (Eds.), Women and 
Power in the Middle East (pp. 1–22). University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Joseph, Suad. (1996). Patriarchy and development in the Arab world. Gender and Development, 4(2), 
14–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/741922010 
Joseph, Suad. (2000). Gendering and Citizenship in the Middle East. In S. Joseph (Ed.), Gender and 
Citizenship in the Middle East (pp. 17–32). Syracuse University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/0195175344.003.0009 
JRP. (2015). Jordan Response Plan 2015 for the Syrian Crisis. JRP; United Nations. 
Kabranian-Melkonian, S. (2015). Ethical Concerns With Refugee Research. Journal of Human 
290 
 
Behavior in the Social Environment, 25(7), 714–722. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2015.1032634 
Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining with patriarchy. Gender & Society, 2(3), 274–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/089124388002003004 
Kandiyoti, D. (2000). The Awkward Relationship: Gender and Nationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 
6(4), 491–494. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2000.00491.x 
Karimi, A. (2019). The Role of Intimate Relationship Status, Sexuality, and Ethnicity in Doing 
Fieldwork among Sexual–Racial Minority Refugees: An Intersectional Methodology*. 
Sociological Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/soin.12316 
Katz, C., & Smith, N. (2003). An interview with Edward Said. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 21(6), 635–651. https://doi.org/10.1068/d2106i 
Kaya, L. P. (2010). The criterion of consistency: Women’s self-presentation at Yarmouk University, 
Jordan. American Ethnologist, 37(3), 526–538. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-
1425.2010.01270.x 
Kazemi, F. (2000). Gender, Islam, and politics. Social Research , 67(2), 453–474. 
Kelberer, V. (2017). Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan. Middle East 
Policy, 24(4), 148–165. 
Kelberer, Victoria. (2017). The Work Permit Initiative for Syrian Refugees in Jordan: implications for 
policy and practice. In Boston Consortium ofr Arab Region Studies (Issue February). 
Kelly, L., & Mitchell, A. (2012). ‘Walking’ in North Belfast with Michel de Certeau. In O. Richmond & 
A. Mitchell (Eds.), Hybrid Forms of Peace (pp. 277–292). Palgrave Macmillian. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230354234_15 
Kerrignan, F. et al. (2009). Informal justice systems charting a course for human rights-based 
engagement. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic 
Governance/Access to Justice and Rule of Law/Informal-Justice-Systems-Charting-a-Course-for-
Human-Rights-Based-Engagement.pdf 
Khawaja, H. (2015). Public Spaces under Threat: Scenes from Amman [ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE DE 
L’UNIVERSITE FRANÇOIS RABELAIS DE TOURS]. http://www.applis.univ-
tours.fr/scd/EPU_DA/2015M2RI_Khawaja_Hadeel.pdf 
Kiama, L., & Likule, D. (2013). Detention in Kenya : risks for refugees and asylum seekers. Forced 
Migration Review, 44(September), 34–36. 
Kibreab, G. (1996). Eritrean and Ethiopian urban refugees in Khartoum: What the eye refuses to see. 
African Studies Review, 39(3), 131–178. https://doi.org/10.2307/524946 
Kiet, A. (2011). Arab Culture and Urban Form. Focus, 8(1), 36–44. 
https://doi.org/10.15368/focus.2011v8n1.4 
Kivilcim, Z. (2016). Legal Violence Against Syrian Female Refugees in Turkey. Feminist Legal Studies, 
24(2), 193–214. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-016-9323-y 
Kofman, E. (2019). Gendered mobilities and vulnerabilities: refugee journeys to and in Europe. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(12), 2185–2199. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1468330 
Koskela, H. (1997). “Bold walk and breakings”: Women’s spatial confidence versus fear of violence. 
291 
 
Gender, Place and Culture, 4(3), 301–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/09663699725369 
Koskela, H. (1999). “Gendered exclusions”: Women’s fear of violence and changing relations to 
space. Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography, 81(2), 111–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0467.00067 
Kostof, S. (1992). The city assembled: the elements of urban from through history. Thames & Hudson 
Ltd. 
Krause, U. (2015). A Continuum of Violence? Linking Sexual and Gender-based Violence during 
Conflict, Flight, and Encampment. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 34(4), 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdv014 
Krayem, H. (1997). The Lebanese civil war and the Taif Agreement. In Paul Salem (Ed.), Conflict 
resolution in the Arab world: Selected essays (pp. 411–435). American University of Beirut. 
http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html 
Lancione, M. (2020). Radical housing: on the politics of dwelling as difference. International Journal 
of Housing Policy, 20(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/19491247.2019.1611121 
Lancione, M., & McFarlane, C. (2016). Life at the urban margins: Sanitation infra-making and the 
potential of experimental comparison. Environment and Planning A, 48(12), 2402–2421. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X16659772 
Landau, L. (2014). Urban Refugees and IDPS. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. 
Sigona (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (pp. 139–150). 
Oxford University Press. 
Landau, L. B. (2010). Loving the alien? Citizenship, law, and the future in South Africa’s demonic 
society. African Affairs, 109(435), 213–230. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq002 
Landau, L., Ramjathan-Keogh, K., & Singh, G. (2005). Xenophobia in South Africa and problems 
related to it (No. 13; Forced Migration Working Paper Series). 
Lazreg, M. (2015). Feminism and difference: The perils of writing as a woman on women in Algeria. 
In Conflicts in Feminism (Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 326–348). 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203699065 
LCRP. (2015). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015 -2016. 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf 
Lee, E. O. J., & Brotman, S. (2011). Identity, refugeeness, belonging: Experiences of sexual minority 
refugees in Canada. Canadian Review of Sociology, 48(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-
618X.2011.01265.x 
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. In The production of space. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/490789 
Lemanski, C. (2012). Everyday human (in)security: Rescaling for the Southern city. Security Dialogue, 
43(1), 61–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611430435 
Lenner, K., & Schmelter, S. (2016). Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Between refuge and 
ongoing deprivation? IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2016, 122–126. 
http://opus.bath.ac.uk/52656/ 
Lenner, K., & Turner, L. (2019). Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian Refugees 
into the Labor Market in Jordan. Middle East Critique, 28(1), 65–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1462601 
292 
 
Lewis, C. (2005). UNHCR’s contribution to the development of international refugee law: Its 
foundations and evolution. International Journal of Refugee Law, 17(1), 67–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eei004 
Liamputtong, P. (2010). Performing qualitative cross-cultural research. In Performing Qualitative 
Cross-Cultural Research. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812705 
Liebermann, S., & Coulson, J. (2004). Participatory mapping for crime prevention in South Africa - 
local solutions to local problems. Environment and Urbanization, 16(2), 125–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/095624780401600204 
Linn, S. (2020). Women refugees, leisure space and the city. Forced Migration Review, 63, 36–38. 
https://www.fmreview.org/cities/linn 
Lokot, M. (2018). Syrian refugees: thinking beyond gender stereotypes. Forced Migration Review, 57, 
33–35. 
Longhurst, R. (2010). Semi Structured Interviews and Focus Groups. In N. Clifford (Ed.), Key Methods 
in Geography (pp. 103–115). SAGE. 
Ludwig, B. (2016). “Wiping the Refugee Dust from My Feet”: Advantages and Burdens of Refugee 
Status and the Refugee Label. International Migration, 54(1), 5–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12111 
Lutfiyya, A. (1966). Baytin: A Jordanian Village. A Study of Social Institutions and social change in a 
folk community. Mouton and Co. 
Lyytinen, E. (2015a). Congolese refugees’ ‘right to the city’ and urban (in)security in Kampala, 
Uganda. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9(4), 593–611. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1116142 
Lyytinen, E. (2015b). Refugees’ conceptualizations of “protection space”: Geographical scales of 
urban protection and host-refugee relations. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 34(2), 45–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdv001 
Lyytinen, E. (2017). Informal places of protection: Congolese refugees’ ‘communities of trust’ in 
Kampala, Uganda*. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(6), 991–1008. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1207506 
Mabin, A. (2014). Grounding southern city theory in time and place. In S. Parnell & S. Oldfield (Eds.), 
The Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South (pp. 541–542). Routeledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203387832 
MacIntyre, R. R. (2007). Jordan. In K. DeRouen & P. Bellamy (Eds.), International security and the 
United States: an encyclopedia (pp. 403–424). Praeger Security International . 
Mackenzie, C., McDowell, C., & Pittaway, E. (2007). Beyond “do no harm”: The challenge of 
constructing ethical relationships in refugee research. Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(2), 299–
319. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem008 
MacKinnon, C. A. (2013). Intersectionality as method: A note. Signs, 38(4), 1019–1030. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/669570 
Mackreath, H. (2014). The role of host communities in north Lebanon. Forced Migration Review, 47, 
19–21. 
Madanipour, A. (2011). Social exclusion and space. In R. LeGates & F. Stout (Eds.), The City Reader 
(5th ed., pp. 186–194). Routledge. 
293 
 
Madanipour, Ali. (2003). Public and private spaces of the city. Routeledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203402856 
Madanipour, Ali. (2009). Whose public space? In Whose Public Space? International Case Studies in 
Urban Design and Development. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203860946 
Madbouly, M. (2009). Revisiting Urban Planning in the Middle East North Africa Region. 
https://unhabitat.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/GRHS.2009.Regional.MENA_.pdf 
Magid, A. (2016). The King and the Islamists. Foreign Affairs. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/jordan/2016-05-03/king-and-islamists 
Mahmood, S. (2005). Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. In Politics of Piety: 
The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/tran.2007.15.1.87 
Maktabi, R. (1999). The Lebanese census of 1932 revisited. Who are the Lebanese? British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, 26(2), 219–241. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530199908705684 
Malik, N. (2013). The Cost of Syrian Refugees. Carnegie Middle East Centre. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/53049 
Malik, N. (2014). Syria’s Spillover Effect on Jordan. Carnegie Middle East Centre. http://carnegie-
mec.org/diwan/54509?lang=en 
Malkki, L. H. (1995). Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things. 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 24(1), 493–523. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.24.1.493 
Mandel, J. L. (2003). Negotiating expectations in the field: Gatekeepers, research fatigue and cultural 
biases. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 24(2), 198–210. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9493.00152 
Manganaro, L. L., & Poland, A. L. (2012). For better or worse? Gender and perceptions of formal and 
informal justice systems in afghanistan. Women and Criminal Justice, 22(1), 2–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08974454.2012.636287 
Mango, T. (2014). The Impact of Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies: A Case Study of 
Beirut’s Solidere and Amman’s Abdali. University of Exeter. 
Marfleet, P. (2007). “Forgotten,” “Hidden”: Predicaments of the urban refugee. Refuge, 24(1), 36–
45. 
Martinez Dy, A. (2016). Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries. Journal of 
Critical Realism, 15(5), 543–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2016.1193677 
Martinez Dy, A., Martin, L., & Marlow, S. (2014). Developing a critical realist positional approach to 
intersectionality. Journal of Critical Realism, 13(5), 447–466. 
https://doi.org/10.1179/1476743014Z.00000000043 
Martínez, J. C. (2017). Jordan’s self-fulfilling prophecy: the production of feeble political parties and 
the perceived perils of democracy. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44(3), 356–372. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1193805 
Massad, J. (2001). Colonial Effects: The making of national identity in Jordan. Columbia University 
Press. 
Massad, J. A. (2007). Desiring Arabs. University of Chicago Press. 
294 
 
https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226509600.001.0001 
Massena, F. (2018). Urban chaos: Downtown Beirut, then and now. The New Arab. 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/5/3/urban-chaos-downtown-beirut-then-
and-now 
Massey, D. (1994). Space, Place and Gender. Polity Press. 
Mazumdar, S., & Mazumdar, S. (2001). Rethinking public and private space: Religion and women in 
Muslim society. Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 18(4), 302–324. 
Mazumdar, S., & Mazumdar, S. (2002). In Mosques and Shrines: Women’s Agency in Public Sacred 
Space. Journal of Ritual Studies, 16(2), 165–179. 
McCall, L. (2005). The complexity of intersectionality. Signs, 30(3), 1771–1800. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/426800 
McCarthy, C. (2010). The Cambridge introduction to Edward said. Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511780769 
McDowell, L. (1999). Gender, Identity and Place: Understanding Feminist Geographies. University of 
Minnesota Press. 
McIlwaine, C. (2013). Urbanization and gender-based violence: Exploring the paradoxes in the global 
South. Environment and Urbanization, 25(1), 65–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247813477359 
Mellon, J. G. (2002). Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and inter-state relations in the Arab world. 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 8(4), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110208428675 
Meriwether, M. L., & Tucker, J. E. (2018). Introduction. In M. L. Meriwether & J. E. Tucker (Eds.), A 
Social History of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East (pp. 1–24). Routeledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429502606 
Mernissi, F. (1975). Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynami in Muslim Society. Schnekman Publishing 
Company Inc. 
Meth, P. (2003). Entries and omissions: Using solicited diaries in geographical research. Area, 35(2), 
195–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4762.00263 
Meth, P. (2004). Using diaries to understand women’s responses to crime and violence. Environment 
and Urbanization, 16(2), 153–164. https://doi.org/10.1177/095624780401600207 
Meth, P., Buthelezi, S., & Rajasekhar, S. (2019). Gendered il/legalities of housing formalisation in 
India and South Africa. Environment and Planning A, 51(5), 1068–1088. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X18792898 
Midgley, T., & Eldebo, J. (2013). Under Pressuire: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host 
communities in Lebanon. https://www.wvi.org/sites/default/files/UNDER PRESSURE report.pdf 
Migdal, J. S. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities 
in the Third World. Princeton University Press. 
Miller, K. E. (2004). Beyond the frontstage: Trust, access, and the relational context in research with 
refugee communities. American Journal of Community Psychology, 33(3–4), 217–227. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:AJCP.0000027007.14063.ad 
Mills, A. (2007). Gender and Mahalle (neighborhood) space in Istanbul. Gender, Place and Culture, 
14(3), 335–354. https://doi.org/10.1080/09663690701324995 
295 
 
Mirzoian, S. A., & Tatevosian, A. T. (1975). [Content of neuroactive amino acids in the hypothalamus 
and liver of rats in experimental stomach ulcer and their changes under the effect of 
cholinolytic drugs]. Zhurnal Eksperimental’noi i Klinicheskoi Meditsiny, 15(5), 6–10. 
http://www.worldcat.org/title/practice-of-everyday-life/oclc/10122084&referer=brief_results 
Mitchell, D. (2003). The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. The Guildford 
Press. 
Moghadam, V. (2003). Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (2nd ed.). 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
Moghadam, V. M. (2005). Gender and social policy: Family law and women’s economic citizenship in 
the Middle East. International Review of Public Administration, 10(1), 23–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2005.10805059 
Moghadam, V., & Sadiqi, F. (2006). Women’s activism and the public sphere: An Introduction and 
Overview. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 2(2), 1–7. 
Mohanty, C. T. (1984). Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. Boundary 
2, 12(3), 333–358. https://doi.org/10.2307/302821 
Mohanty, C. T. (2003). “Under Western Eyes” revisited: Feminist solidarity through anticapitalist 
struggles. Signs, 28(2), 499–535. https://doi.org/10.1086/342914 
Monroe, K. V. (2011). Being mobile in Beirut. City and Society, 23(1), 91–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-744X.2011.01050.x 
Monroe, K. V. (2016). The insecure city: Space, power, and mobility in Beirut. Rutgers University 
Press. 
Monterescu, D., & Ali, Y. (2016). The Impossible Revolution: Why Did the Arab Spring Fail to 
Materialize in Lebanon and Israel/Palestine? In E. Akcali (Ed.), Neoliberal Governmentality and 
the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 167–188). Palgrave Macmillian. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137542991_10 
Morris, T. (2010). Urban Somali refugees in Yemen. Forced Migration Review, 34, 36–38. 
Mortada, H. (2003). Traditional Islamic Principles of Built Environment. Routeledge Curzon. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2003.10.002 
Moser, C. O. N. (2004). Urban violence and insecurity: An introductory roadmap. Environment and 
Urbanization, 16(2), 3–16. https://doi.org/10.1630/0956247042309847 
Moya, P. M. L. (2000). Introduction: Reclaiming Identity. Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the 
Predicament of Postmodernism. 
Moya, P. M. L. (2006). What’s Identity Got to Do With It? Mobilizing Identities in the Multicultural 
Classroom. In L. Martín Alcoff, M. Hames-García, S. Mohanty, & P. Moya (Eds.), Identity Politics 
Reconsidered (pp. 96–117). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983398_7 
Muhanna, A. (2013). Agency and gender in Gaza: Masculinity, femininity and family during the 
second intifada. Routeledge. 
Munoz, G. (2006). Patriarchy and Islam. Quaderns de La Mediterrània, 7, 37–44. 
https://www.iemed.org/publicacions/quaderns/7/037_Martin.pdf 
Mustafa, D., Anwar, N., & Sawas, A. (2019). Gender, global terror, and everyday violence in urban 
Pakistan. Political Geography, 69, 54–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.12.002 
296 
 
Mutahi, P. (2011). Between Formality and Informality: (In)security, crime and gangs in Nairobi 
informal settlements. South African Crime Quarterly, 37, 11–18. 
Nagel, C. (2002). Reconstructing space, re-creating memory: Sectarian politics and urban 
development in post-war Beirut. Political Geography, 21(5), 717–725. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00017-3 
Nah, A. M. (2018). Refugees and space in urban areas in Malaysia. Forced Migration Review, 34, 29–
31. http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/urban-displacement/29-
31.pdf 
Nahar, G. (2012). The Impact of Political Parties on the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections. 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(16), 121–133. 
Nash, J. C. (2008). Re-thinking intersectionality. Feminist Review, 89(1), 1–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/fr.2008.4 
Nasser-Eddin, N. (2017). Gender performativity in diaspora Syrian refugee women in the UK. In J. 
Freedman, Z. Kivilcim, & N. Özgür Baklacıoğlu (Eds.), A Gendered Approach to the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis (pp. 142–154). Taylor and Francis. 
Nelson, C. (1974). Public and private politics: women in the Middle Eastern world. American 
Ethnologist, 1(3), 551–563. https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.1974.1.3.02a00100 
Newcomb, R. (2006). Gendering the City, Gendering the Nation: Contesting Urban Space in Fes, 
Morocco. City and Society, 18(2), 288–311. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/city.2006.18.2.288.Gendering 
Nooraddin, H. (1998). Al-fina’, in-between spaces as an urban design concept: Making public and 
private places along streets in Islamic cities of the Middle East. Urban Design International, 
3(1–2), 65–77. https://doi.org/10.1057/udi.1998.8 
NRC. (2014). The Consequences of Limited Legal Status for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. Part 2. 
https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/the-consequences-of-limited-legal-status-for-
syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.pdf 
Nucho, J. R. (2016). Everyday Sectarianism in Urban Lebanon. Princeton University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691168968.001.0001 
Nyaoro, D. (2010). Policing with prejudice: How policing exacerbates poverty among urban refugees. 
International Journal of Human Rights, 14(1), 126–145. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980902933753 
O’Laughlin, E., & Brubaker, B. (1998). Use of landmarks in cognitive mapping: Gender differences in 
self report versus performance. Personality and Individual Difference, 24(5), 595–601. 
O’Loghlen, A., & McWilliams, C. (2017). The nexus of displacement, asset vulnerability and the Right 
to the City: the case of the refugees and urban poor of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. International 
Journal of Urban Sustainable Development, 9(1), 21–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2016.1254088 
O’Reilly, K. (2012). International Migration and Social Theory. Palgrave, MacMillian. 
O Driscoll, M. (2017). Bangladesh Rohingya crisis - Managing risks in securitisation of refugees. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/224-Managing-risks-in-securitisation-
of-refugees.pdf 
Obi, N & Crisp, J. (2001). Evaluation of the implementation of UNHCR’s policy on refugees in urban 
297 
 
areas. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/3c0f8bd67.pdf 
Onoma, A. K. (2013). Anti Refugee Violence and African Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
Ormstron, R., Spencer, L., Barnard, M., & Snape, D. (2014). The Foundations of Qualitative Research. 
In J. Ritchie & J. Lewis (Eds.), Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students 
and researchers (pp. 1–25). SAGE. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452230108 
Owen, R. (2013). State, power and politics in the making of the modern middle east: Third Edition. In 
State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East: Third Edition. Routeledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203403259 
Oxfam. (2015). Lebanon: Looking ahead in times of crisis. https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-
2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/dp-lebanon-looking-ahead-time-crisis-141215-
en_0.pdf 
Oxfam. (2017). Still looking for safety: voices of refugees from Syria on solutions for the present and 
future. https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620281/bp-still-
looking-for-safety-refugees-syria-200617-en.pdf?sequence=1 
Özaşçılar, M., Narli, N., & Öztürk, O. (2019). Crime Reporting Behavior Among Syrian Immigrants in 
Istanbul. Crime and Delinquency, 65(14), 1997–2018. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128718807157 
Özçelik, S. (2006). Islamic/Middle Eastern conflict resolution for interpersonal and intergroup 
conflicts: Wisata, Sulha and third-party. Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 3(12), 3–18. 
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/539720 
Paasche, T. F., & Sidaway, J. D. (2010). Transecting security and space in Maputo. Environment and 
Planning A, 42(7), 1555–1576. https://doi.org/10.1068/a43122 
Pain, R. (2001). Gender, race, age and fear in the city. Urban Studies, 38(5–6), 899–913. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980120046590 
Pain, R. H. (1997). Social geographies of women’s fear of crime. Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 22(2), 231–244. 
Palmgren, P. a. (2014). Irregular networks: Bangkok refugees in the city and region. Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 27(1), 21–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet004 
Parr, S. (2015). Integrating critical realist and feminist methodologies: ethical and analytical 
dilemmas. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 18(2), 193–207. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2013.868572 
Pascucci, E. (2017). The humanitarian infrastructure and the question of over-research: reflections 
on fieldwork in the refugee crises in the Middle East and North Africa. Area, 49(2), 249–255. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12312 
Pasha, S. (2017). Violence, Insecurity and the (Un)making of Rukban Camp. 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/02/19/violence-insecurity-and-the-unmaking-of-rukban-
camp/ 
Pasquetti, S. (2013). Legal Emotions: An Ethnography of Distrust and Fear in the Arab Districts of an 
Israeli City. Law and Society Review, 47(3), 461–492. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12028 
Pasquetti, S. (2015). Negotiating control: Camps, cities and political life. City, 19(5), 702–713. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2015.1071121 
298 
 
Pavenello, S. et al. (2010). Hidden and Exposed: Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5858.pdf 
Pickering, S. (2011). Women, Borders and, Violence—Current Issues in Asylum, Forced Migration, and 
Trafficking. Springer. 
Pisani, M., Grech, S., & Mostafa, A. (2016). Disability and Forced Migration: Intersections and Critical 
Debates. In Disability in the Global South (Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 285–301). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42488-0_18 
Pittaway, E. (2011). Making Mainstreaming a Reality – Gender and the UNHCR Policy on Refugee 
Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas. A Refugee Perspective. 
https://www.unhcr.org/4b0bb83f9.pdf 
Pittaway, Eileen. (2004). ‘Refugee woman’: a dangerous label: Opening a discussion on the role of 
identity and intersectional oppression in the failure of the international refugee protection 
regime for refugee women. Australian Journal of Human Rights, 10(1), 119–135. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1323238X.2004.11910773 
Pittaway, Eileen, & Bartolomei, L. (2001). Refugees, race, and gender: The multiple discrimination 
against refugee women. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 19(6), 21–32. 
http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/view/21236 
Pittaway, Eileen, Bartolomei, L., & Hugman, R. (2010). “Stop Stealing Our Stories”: The ethics of 
research with vulnerable groups. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2(2), 229–251. 
Potter, R. B., Darmame, K., Barham, N., & Nortcliff, S. (2009). “Ever-growing Amman”, Jordan: Urban 
expansion, social polarisation and contemporary urban planning issues. Habitat International, 
33(1), 81–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2008.05.005 
Qian, J. (2014). Public space in non-western contexts: Practices of publicness and the socio-spatial 
entanglement. Geography Compass, 8(11), 834–847. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12183 
Rabbat, N. (2012). The arab revolution takes back the public space. Critical Inquiry, 39(1), 198–208. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/668055 
Ramazanoglu, C. & Hollland, J. (2002). Feminist Methodology: Challenges and choices. SAGE 
Publications. 
Ranade, S. (2007). The way she moves; Mapping the everyday production of gender-space. Economic 
and Political Weekly, 42(17), 1519–1526. 
REACH. (2014). Syrian refugees in host communities. http://www.reach-initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/lea.macias-18022014-093340-REACH-
BritishEmbassyAmman_Syrian-Refugees-in-Host-Communities_Key-Informant-Interviews-and-
District-Profiling_Jan2014.pdf 
Riach, G., & James, Z. (2016). Strengthening the rule of law on the margins: Experiences from Za’atari 
refugee camp, Jordan. International Journal of Human Rights, 20(4), 549–566. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2015.1128144 
Robinson, G. E. (1998). Defensive democratization in Jordan. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 30(3), 387–410. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074380006623X 
Robinson, J. (2013). Ordinary cities: Between modernity and development. In Ordinary Cities: 
Between Modernity and Development. Routeledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203506554 
Robinson, J. (2016). Comparative Urbanism: New Geographies and Cultures of Theorizing the Urban. 
299 
 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 40(1), 187–199. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12273 
Rosenberg, J. et al. (2016). Mean Streets: Identifying and Responding to Urban Refugees’ Risks of 
Gender-Based Violence. https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/gbv/resources/1272-
mean-streets 
Ryan, C. (2010). “We Are All Jordan”…But Who Is We? Middle East Report Online. 
https://merip.org/2010/07/we-are-all-jordan-but-who-is-we/ 
Ryan, C. R. (2006). The odd couple: Ending the Jordanian-Syrian “cold war.” Middle East Journal, 
60(1), 33–56. https://doi.org/10.3751/60.1.12 
Ryan, C. R. (2012). The armed forces and the Arab uprisings: The case of Jordan. Middle East Law and 
Governance, 4(1), 153–167. https://doi.org/10.1163/187633712X626062 
Ryan, C. R. (2014). Jordanian foreign policy and the Arab spring. Middle East Policy, 21(1), 144–153. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12064 
Sadiqi, F., & Ennaji, M. (2013). Introduction: conteextualising women’s agency in the MENA region. 
In F. Sadiqi & M. Ennaji (Eds.), Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Agents of Change 
(pp. 1–12). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203851579 
Salem, P. (2012). Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis? Carnegie Middle East Centre. 
Saliba, A. (2012). The Security Sector in Lebanon: Jurisdiction and Organization. Carnegie 
Endowerment for International Peace. 
Salloukh, B. (1996). State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical 
Perspective. Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), 18(2), 39–65. 
Salloukh, B. F. (2013). The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East. International 
Spectator, 48(2), 32–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.787830 
Samuels, G. M., & Ross-Sheriff, F. (2008). Identity, oppression, and power: Feminisms and 
intersectionality theory. Affilia - Journal of Women and Social Work, 23(1), 5–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109907310475 
Sanyal, R. (2011). Squatting in camps: Building and insurgency in spaces of refuge. Urban Studies, 
48(5), 877–890. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098010363494 
Sanyal, R. (2012). Refugees and the City: An Urban Discussion. Geography Compass, 6(11), 633–644. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12010 
Sanyal, R. (2014). Urbanizing refuge: Interrogating spaces of displacement. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 38(2), 558–572. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12020 
Sanyal, R. (2017). A no-camp policy: Interrogating informal settlements in Lebanon. Geoforum, 84, 
117–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.06.011 
Save the Children. (2014). Too young to wed: The growing problem of child marriage among Syrian 
girls in Jordan. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/TOO_YOUNG_TO_WED_REPORT_0714
_0.PDF 
Sawalha, A. (2010). Reconstructing Beirut: Memory and space in a postwar Arab city. University of 
Texas Press. 
Sawalha, A. (2014). Gendered space and middle east studies. In International Journal of Middle East 
300 
 
Studies. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743813001359 
Schwedler, J. (2006). The third gender: Western female researchers in the middle east. PS - Political 
Science and Politics, 39(3), 425–428. https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909650606077X 
Schwedler, J. (2012). The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal Jordan. Middle East Critique, 
21(3), 259–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2012.717804 
Schyns, J. F., Hamaideh, A., Hoekstra, A. Y., Mekonnen, M. M., & Schyns, M. (2015). Mitigating the 
risk of extreme water scarcity and dependency: The case of Jordan. Water (Switzerland), 7(10), 
5705–5730. https://doi.org/10.3390/w7105705 
Scott, J. W. (2012). Gender: A useful category of historical analysis. In N. Cott (Ed.), Theory and 
Method in Women’s History (2012th ed., pp. 443–465). De Gruyter. 
https://doi.org/10.7312/scot91266-004 
Secor, A. (2004). “There is an Istanbul that belongs to me”: Citizenship, space, and identity in the 
city. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 94(2), 352–368. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.2004.09402012.x 
Secor, A. J. (2002). The veil and urban space in Istanbul: Women’s dress, mobility and Islamic 
knowledge. Gender, Place and Culture, 9(1), 5–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09663690120115010 
Sehlikoglu, S. (2017). Revisited: Muslim women’s agency and feminist anthropology of the middle 
east. Contemporary Islam, 12(1), 73–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0404-8 
Shalaby, M. (2016). Introduction: Deconstructing womens empowerment in the Middle East and 
North Africa. In M. Shalaby & V. Moghadam (Eds.), Empowering Women after the Arab Spring 
(pp. 1–18). Palgrave MacMillan . https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55747-6 
Shami, S. (1996). Gender, domestic space, and urban upgrading: A case study from Amman. Gender 
and Development, 4(1), 17–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/741921945 
Shantz, B & Collins, D. (2009). Public Spaces, Urban. In International Encyclopedia of Human 
Geography (pp. 517–522). Elsevier. 
Sharp, J. (2007). Geography and gender: Finding feminist political geographies. Progress in Human 
Geography, 31(3), 381–387. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507077091 
Shearing, C. & Johnston, L. (2003). Governing Security: Explorations of Policing and Justice. 
Routledge. 
Shields, S. A. (2008). Gender: An intersectionality perspective. Sex Roles, 59(5–6), 301–311. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9501-8 
Silvey, R. (2004). Power, difference and mobility: Feminist advances in migration studies. Progress in 
Human Geography, 28(4), 490–506. https://doi.org/10.1191/0309132504ph490oa 
Silvey, R. (2006). Geographies of gender and migration: Spatializing social difference. International 
Migration Review, 40(1), 64–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2006.00003.x 
Singerman, D. (1996). Avenues of participation: Family, politics, and networks in urban quarters of 
Cairo. Princeton University Press. 
Singh, S. (2018). Anchoring depth ontology to epistemological strategies of field theory: exploring 
the possibility for developing a core for sociological analysis. Journal of Critical Realism, 17(5), 
429–448. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2018.1540384 
301 
 
Skran, C., & Daughtry, C. N. (2007). The study of refugees before “Refugee Studies.” Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, 26(3), 15–35. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0240 
Smayra, D. (2013). Lebanon’s ’Arab Spring’ : exploring identity, security, and change. 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk/10540/1/10540.pdf? 
Smith, S. (2012). Intimate Geopolitics: Religion, Marriage, and Reproductive Bodies in Leh, Ladakh. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 102(6), 1511–1528. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2012.660391 
Sommers, M. (1995). Representing Refugees: The Role of Elites in Burundi Refugee Society. 
Disasters, 19(1), 19–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.1995.tb00329.x 
Sommers, M. (2001). Fear in Bongoland: Burundi refugees in urban Tanzania. Berghahn Books. 
Spitzer, D., Neufeld, A., Harrison, M., Hughes, K., & Stewart, M. (2003). Caregiving in transnational 
context: “My wings have been cut; where can I fly?” Gender and Society, 17(2), 267–286. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243202250832 
Springer, S. (2009). Violence, democracy, and the neoliberal “Order”: The contestation of public 
space in posttransitional Cambodia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99(1), 
138–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600802223333 
Stanko, E. A. (1995). Women, Crime, and Fear. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 539(1), 46–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716295539001004 
Statz, M., & Pruitt, L. R. (2019). To recognize the tyranny of distance: A spatial reading of Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. Environment and Planning A, 51(5), 1106–1127. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X18757508 
Stave, S., & Hillesund, S. (2015). Impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the Jordanian labour market. 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-
beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf 
Stel, N. (2014). Governance and Government in the Arab Spring Hybridity: Reflections from Lebanon. 
Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, 6(1), 49–69. 
Stel, N. (2015, December 4). Mukhtars in the Middle: Connecting State, Citizens and Refugees. 
Jadaliyya. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32751/Mukhtars-in-the-Middle-Connecting-
State,-Citizens-and-Refugees 
Stevens, M. R. (2016). The collapse of social networks among Syrian refugees in urban Jordan. 
Contemporary Levant, 1(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/20581831.2016.1153358 
Suerbaum, M. (2018). Becoming and “Unbecoming” Refugees: Making sense of Masculinity and 
Refugeness among Syrian refugee men in Egypt. Men and Masculinities, 21(3), 363–382. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X17748170 
Sullivan, D., & Tobin, S. (2014). Security and Resilience Among Syrian Refugees in Zaatari Refugee 
Camp, Jordan. MERIP. https://www.merip.org/mero/mero101414 
Sur, P. (2012). Safety in the urban outdoors: Women negotiating fear of crime in the city of Kolkata. 
Journal of International Women’s Studies, 13(2), 212–226. 
Susser, A. (2011). Jordan 2011: Uneasy Lies the Head. Middle East Brief, 52, 1–10. 
https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/16-Susser-Asher-2011-Uneasy-Lies-the-
Head.pdf 
302 
 
Tamimi, A. (2016). The mayhem in Syria: Where to? In Insight Turkey (Vol. 18, Issue 2, pp. 11–19). 
https://www.insightturkey.com/author/azzam-tamimi/the-mayhem-in-syria-where-to 
Taylor, S. J., Bogdan, R., & DeVault, M. (2015). Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A 
Guidebook and Resource (4th Edition). John Wiley & Sons. 
Temple, B., & Young, A. (2004). Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas. Qualitative 
Research, 4(2), 161–178. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794104044430 
Thibos, C. (2014). One million Syrians in Lebanon: A milestone quickly passed. 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31696/MPC_THIBOS_2014_.pdf?sequence=1&is
Allowed=y 
Tholens, S. (2017). Border management in an era of ‘statebuilding lite’: Security assistance and 
Lebanon’s hybrid sovereignty. International Affairs, 93(4), 865–882. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix069 
Thompson, E. (2003). Public and private in middle eastern women’s history. Journal of Women’s 
History, 15(1), 52–69. https://doi.org/10.1353/jowh.2003.0037 
Thomson, F. (2007). Eliciting emotions in HIV/AIDS research: a diary‐based approach. Area, 39(1), 
74–82. 
Thorleifsson, C. (2016). The limits of hospitality: coping strategies among displaced Syrians in 
Lebanon. Third World Quarterly, 37(6), 1071–1082. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1138843 
Tiltnes, Å. A., & Zhang, H. (2013). Insights into the socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees 
in Jordan. In UNRWA. 
Tobin, S. A. (2012). Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution. Middle East Policy, 
19(1), 96–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00526.x 
Torres, R. M. (2018). A crisis of rights and responsibility: feminist geopolitical perspectives on Latin 
American refugees and migrants. Gender, Place and Culture, 25(1), 13–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2017.1414036 
Tribe, R. (2005). Working with interpreters. In K. Holt-Barret & W. George (Eds.), Race, Culture, 
Psychology, and Law (pp. 163–176). SAGE. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452233536.n11 
Turner, L. (2016). Are Syrian Men Vulnerable Too? Gendering The Syria Refugee Response. Middle 
East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/are-syrian-men-vulnerable-too-gendering-
syria-refugee-response 
Turner, L. (2018). Challenging refugee men: humanitarianism and masculinities in Za’tari refugee 
camp. SOAS. 
Turner, Lewis. (2015). Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the 
Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan. Mediterranean Politics, 20(3), 386–404. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125 
Turner, Lewis. (2019). The Politics of Labeling Refugee Men as “Vulnerable.” Social Politics: 
International Studies in Gender, State & Society. https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxz033 
Tyler, D., & Schmeidl, S. (2014). Urban realities for displaced young women and girls Still at risk : 
forced evictions in urban Afghanistan. Forced Migration Review, 46(May), 37–39. 
UN Women. (2013). Gender-based Violence and Child Protection among Syrian refugees in Jordan, 
303 
 
with a focus on Early Marriage. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/39522 
UN Women. (2014). ‘We just keep silent’ Gender-based violence amongst Syrian refugees in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/We_Just_Keep_Silent_final_English.pd
f 
UN Women. (2018). Unpacking gendered realities in displacement: The status of Syrian refugee 
women in Lebanon. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/72200.pdf 
UN Women. (2019). Addressing gender amongst Syrian refugees in Lebanon. 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/72394 
UNDP. (2015). Enhancing community security and access to justice in host communities and other 
fragile areas in Jordan (2015-2018). 
http://www.jo.undp.org/content/dam/jordan/docs/Governance/Comm Security Project 
Document_FINAL _JUN-2015.pdf 
UNDP, & Lebanon Support. (2015). The conflict context in Beirut: the social question, mobilisations 
cycles, and the city’s securitisation. Lebanon Support. https://doi.org/10.28943/cskc.003.00023 
UNHCR. (1951). UNHCR Convention and Protocol related to the status of Refugee. UNHCR. 
UNHCR. (2004). Country Operations Plan: Lebanon. https://www.unhcr.org/3fd9c6a14.pdf 
UNHCR. (2009). UNHCR policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eep028 
UNHCR. (2015a). Refugees from Syria: Lebanon. 
https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/45764 
UNHCR. (2015b). UNHCR OPERATIONAL UPDATE, Jordan, February 2015. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR Jordan Operational Update 
Feb 2015 FINAL.pdf 
UNHCR. (2017a). GENDER EQUALITY PROMISING PRACTICES: SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND NORTH AFRICA. UNHCR. 
UNHCR. (2017b). Jordan Factsheet. June 2017. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Jordan Fact Sheet June 2017- 
FINAL.pdf 
UNHCR. (2018a). Jordan Factsheet February 2018. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FactSheetJordanFebruary2018-
FINAL_0.pdf 
UNHCR. (2018b). Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan. 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria 
UNHCR 3RP. (2016). Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2016-2017 in Response to the Syria Crisis. 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf 
UNHCR Operation Portal. (2020). UNHCR Operation Portal Refugee Situations. UNHCR. 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36 
UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2016). Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. 
https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp289533.pdf?_ga=2.305
80027.563301547.1596373163-2063710043.1596373163 
304 
 
UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. 
https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2018/01/VASyR-2017.pdf 
Upham, P., & García Pérez, J. (2015). A cognitive mapping approach to understanding public 
objection to energy infrastructure: The case of wind power in Galicia, Spain. Renewable Energy, 
83, 587–596. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2015.05.009 
Valentine, G. (1989). The geography of women’ s fear. Area, 21(4), 385–390. 
Valentine, G. (2007). Theorizing and researching intersectionality: A challenge for feminist 
geography. Professional Geographer, 59(1), 10–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9272.2007.00587.x 
Valentine, G., Sporton, D., & Nielsen, K. B. (2009). Identities and belonging: A study of Somali refugee 
and asylum seekers living in the UK and Denmark. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 27(2), 234–250. https://doi.org/10.1068/d3407 
Vargas, C. M. (1998). Ethical Challenges in Refugee Research:Troublesome Questions, Difficult 
Answers. Refuge - Canada’s Periodical on Refugees (Toronto), 17(3), 35–48. 
Verme, P., Gigliarano, C., Wieser, C., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M. (2015). The Welfare 
of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon. In The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: 
Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0770-1 
Vertesi, J. (2008). Mind the gap: The London underground map and users’ representations of Urban 
space. Social Studies of Science, 38(1), 9–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312707084153 
Vincent, S., & O’Mahoney, J. (2018). Critical Realism and Qualitative Research Methods. In The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Business and Management Research Methods: History and Traditions. 
Von Benda-Beckmann, F. & Von Benda-Beckmann, K. (2014). Spaces that come and go: A legal 
anthropological perspective on the temporalities of space in plural legal orders. In I. 
Braverman, N. Blomey, D. Delaney, & A. Kedar (Eds.), The Expanding Spaces of Law: A timely 
Legal Geography (pp. 30–52). Stanford University Press. 
Wachter, K., Horn, R., Friis, E., Falb, K., Ward, L., Apio, C., Wanjiku, S., & Puffer, E. (2018). Drivers of 
Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in Three Refugee Camps. Violence Against Women, 
24(3), 286–306. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801216689163 
Walby, S., Armstrong, J., & Strid, S. (2012). Intersectionality: Multiple inequalities in social theory. 
Sociology, 46(2), 224–240. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038511416164 
Wall, M., Otis Campbell, M., & Janbek, D. (2017). Syrian refugees and information precarity. New 
Media and Society, 19(2), 240–254. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444815591967 
Ward, P. (2014). Refugee cities: Reflections on the development and impact of UNHCR urban 
refugee policy in the middle east. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33(1), 77–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdt024 
Watkins, J. (2018). Policing and Protection for Syrian Refugees in Jordan. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Police. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77511 
Watson, V. (2009). Seeing from the South: Refocusing urban planning on the globe’s central urban 
issues. Urban Studies, 46(11), 2259–2275. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098009342598 
Weber, M. (2004). The Vocation Lectures (D. Owen & T. Strong (eds.)). Hackett Publishing Company. 
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. Gender & Society, 1(2), 125–151. 
305 
 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243287001002002 
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (2009). Accounting for doing gender. Gender and Society, 23(1), 112–
122. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243208326529 
Whitzman, C. (2007). Stuck at the front door: Gender, fear of crime and the challenge of creating 
safer space. Environment and Planning A, 39(11), 2715–2732. https://doi.org/10.1068/a38449 
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2000). Civil society as social control: State power in Jordan. Comparative Politics, 
33(1), 43–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/422423 
Williams, J., & Massaro, V. (2013). Feminist Geopolitics: Unpacking (In)Security, Animating Social 
Change. Geopolitics, 18(4), 751–758. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2013.816842 
Wojkowska, E. (2006). Doing Justice: How Informal justice systems can contribute. 
http://www.albacharia.ma/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/30535/0280Doing_Justice__H
ow_informal_justice_systems_can_contribute_(2007)7.pdf?sequence=1 
Yadav, S. P. (2010). Segmented Publics and Islamist Women in Yemen: Rethinking Space and 
Activism. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 6(2), 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.2979/mew.2010.6.2.1 
Yassin, N. (2012). Beirut. Cities, 29(1), 64–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2011.02.001 
Yeoh, B. S. A., & Huang, S. (1998). Negotiating public space: Strategies and styles of migrant female 
domestic workers in Singapore. Urban Studies, 35(3), 583–602. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098984925 
Yıldız, A., & Uzgören, E. (2016). Limits to temporary protection: non-camp Syrian refugees in İzmir, 
Turkey. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea, 16(2), 195–211. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1165492 
Yuval-Davis, N. (1997a). Women, citizenship and difference. Feminist Review, 57(1), 4–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/014177897339632 
Yuval-Davis, N. (1997b). Women, citizenship and difference. Feminist Review, 57(1), 4–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/014177897339632 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). The politics of belonging: Intersectional contestations. In The Politics of 
Belonging: Intersectional Contestations. SAGE. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446251041 
Zahar, M. (2005). Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic 
Failure. In P. Rothchild, D & Roeder (Ed.), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil 
Wars (pp. 219–240). Cornell University Press. 
Zetter, R. (2007). More labels, fewer refugees: Remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization. 
Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(2), 172–192. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem011 
Zetter, R., & Ruaudel, H. (2014). Development and protection challenges of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Forced Migration Review, 47, 6–10. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=98648438&site=ehost-
live%5Cnhttp://0-
content.ebscohost.com.libraries.colorado.edu/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=98648438&S
=R&D=aph&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLr40Sep7I4v+bwOLCmr02ep7BSsa+4SrWWxWXS&Conte 
Zwi, A. B., Grove, N. J., Mackenzie, C., Pittaway, E., Zion, D., Silove, D., & Tarantola, D. (2006). Placing 
Ethics in the Centre: Negotiating New Spaces for Ethical Research in Conflict Situations. Global 
Public Health, 1(3), 264–277. 
306 
 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17441690600673866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
307 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 
 
List of Refugee Interviews   
Beirut (September – November 2016) &  Amman (February – April 2017)  
 
 
 
INTERVIEW DATE PSUEDONYM BRIEF BIO LOCATION MALE PRESENT MULTIVOICE RECORDED
Interview 1 23/09/2016 Alyas
Sunni, married mother of 4, from Raqa'a, 
working class
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 2 23/09/2016 Yaminah
Separated mother of 11, Bedouin, from 
near Aleppo. Wouldn't specify religion, 
working class
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 3 23/09/2016 Wajida
Divorced mother of three, young thirties, 
wouldn't specify religon, lower-middle 
class
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 4 24/09/2016 Ulima
Married mother of two, Sunni, young 
twenties, from countryside of Aleppo , 
working class
Home, Na'ba Y-HUSBAND Y Y
Interview 5 24/09/2016 Takiya
Sunni, married mother of 6, late twenties, 
from Dakishe, working class
Home, Na'ba Y -HUSBAND Y Y
Interview 6 26/09/2016 Shula
Sunni, married mother of 3, late twenties, 
from Aleppo, lower middle class
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 7 26/09/2016 Shahar
Married mother of one, Sunni, young 
twenties, from Deir Ez Zour
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 8 26/09/2016 Zulima 
Married mother of three, Sunni, from 
Aleppo, late twenties 
Home, Na'ba N N
Interview 9 27/09/2016 Zada
Married mother of six, Sunni, 40 years old, 
from Raqqa 
Work, Na'ba Y-HUSBAND N N
Interview 10 27/06/2016 Zubaida
Sunni, married mother of 6, 23 years old, 
working class from Raqaa
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 11 28/09/2016 Bushra 
Christian, divorced mother of three. 
Middle Class, mid-thirties, from Damascus  
Café, Na'ba N Y
Interview 12 28/09/2016 Fadila
Sunni, married mother. Elderly, Lower 
Middle Class 
Café, Na'ba N Y
Interview 13 29/09/2016 Husniya 
Kurdish Muslim, married mother of 5, 
Lower middle class, from Aleppo 
Home, Na'ba N N
Interview 14 29/09/2016 Ghada 
Married mother of one, early forties, 
Sunni, lower middle class 
Home, Na'ba N Y
Interview 15 28/09/2016
Jadara, 
Onekka 
Friends. Sunni, married mothers in their 
late twenties with young children. Lower 
middle class, one from Aleppo one from 
Afreen. 
Home, Na'ba Y Y
Interview 16 11/10/2016 Emani 
Married mother of one, early twenties, 
Sunni, from the coutryside of Aleppo 
Home, Na'ba Y Y
Interview 17 06/10/2016 Badia 
Kurdish Muslim, early thirties, married, 
two children, from Quamlishee, working 
class
NGO, Mazra'a Y Y
Interview 18 01/11/2016 Sara
Kurdish Muslim, 19, married mother of 
one, lower middle class, from 
Quamlishee
NGO, Mazra'a N Y
Interview 19 01/11/2016
Fathima & 
Deema
Sisters (live together) Deema, married 
with four children, Sunni. Fathima 
divorced with children, Sunni. Middle 
class with kafala status 
NGO, Mazra'a Y Y
Interview 20 02/11/2016 Ayesha
Married mother of 2, late twenties, Sunni, 
from the countryside of Aleppo
Home, Mazra'a Y-HUSBAND N Y
Interview 21 02/11/2016 Khalila 
Married mother of 3, young thirties, from 
countryside of Aleppo
Home, Mazra'a' Y N Y
Interview 22 02/11/2016 Mahira 
Married, mother of 2 (and pregnant), 
sunni, working class, + from Deir Ez Zour 
Home - Mazra'a Y N Y
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INTERVIEW DATE PSUEDONYM BRIEF BIO LOCATION MALE PRESENT MULTIVOICE RECORDED?
Interview 1 27/02/2017 Mouna
Sunni, married, middle class 
mother of 4, mid-thirties, from 
Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 2 27.02.2017 Nailah
Sunni, married, middle class 
mother of 4, early-thirties, from 
Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 3 28/02/2017 Rabiah
Sunni, married, middle class 
mother of 4, early-thirties, from 
Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 4 28/02/2017 Zarifa
Sunni, married, middle class 
mother of 2,early thirties, from 
Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 5 28/02/2017 Sabah 
Sunni, married, middle class 
mother of 2, 23, from Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 6 06/03/2017 Yesenia 
Sunni, married, working class 
mother of 2,  late twenties, 
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 7 06/03/2017 Nekia
Sunni, lower-middle class, mother 
of 2, step mother of 2, late thirties, 
from Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 8 07/03/2017 Badra
Sunni, lower-middle class, mother 
of 4, late twenties
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 9 07/03/2017 Rania
Sunni, married, lower-middle class 
mother of 4, from Homs
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 10 07/03/2017 Samya
Sunni, married, working class 
mother of 4, late twenties
NGO,  Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 11 08/03/2017 Aleaha
Sunni, married, upper middle class 
mother of 1, from Homs
Home - Mahata Y
Interview 12 09/03/2017 Basmaa & Sama 
Basmaa: Sunni, married, working 
class mother of 4 (elderly) and 
Sama: married, daughter in law 
(late teens), from Damascus 
NGO, Ashrafyeh Y Y
Interview 13 12/03/2017 Derifa
Married mother of two, middle-
class 
Home - Mahata  Husband/FIL Y Y
Interview 14 12/03/2017 Fariha & Qamar
Fariha, married lower-middle class 
mother of 7 from Homs, early 
thirties, Qamar, married middle 
class mother of 5, from Homs
Home - Mahata Y y
Interview 15 13/03/2017 Ieesha
Sunni, lower middle-class, 
separated mother of 3, from Daraa 
NGO, Ashrafyeh Y
Interview 16 13/03/2017 Noodah & Shayma
Noodah: Divorced mother of 6, 
Shayma, divorced mother of 7, 
NGO, Ashrafyeh Y Y
Interview 17 14/03/2017 Hanan
Sunni, married, middle class 
mother of 4, early forties, from 
Homs
NGO, Ashrafyeh Y
Interview 18 14/03/2017 Kalima
Sunni, separated mother of four 
from Damascus, working class, late 
forties 
NGO, Ashrafyeh N
Interview 19 16/03/2017 Ishtar & Sabeen
Mother and daughter, both 
married living in separate homes, 
middle class, from Homs
Home - Hashmi Shamali Y Y
Interview 20 16/03/2017 Tira & Jamal
Two sisters, Tira married mother of 
10, 37 years old, Sunni; Jamal 
married mother of 4, 25 years old, 
both working class, from Homs
Home - Mahata Y Y
Interview 21 19/03/2017 Yara & Mona
Two sisters in early twenties. 
Middle class, unmarried, living 
with large extended family
Home - Mahata/Marka Father Y Y
Interview 22 21/03/2017 Jasura
Sunni, married mother of 5, 32, 
from the countryside of Homs, 
working class 
Home - Hashmi Shamali Husband   Y Y
Interview 23 21/03/2018 Keila 
Sunni, married mother of 4 
(pregnant), 28,from the 
countryside of Homs, working class
Home- Hashmi Shamali Y
Interview 24 21/03/2019 Alma & Rima
Sisters In law. Alma 22, married 
and pregnant, Rima late twenties, 
with children, both Sunni, from 
Homs, lower middle class
Home - Mahata Y Y
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List of Focus Group Discussions 
 
 
List of Diary Participants  
 
 
Recorded/Not 
Recorded 
Focus Group 
Number 
Number of 
Participants
Date CC or NGO Worker Present 
Y FGD 1, Na'ba 5 28/09/2016 Yes - Community Contact
Y FGD 2, Na'ba 5 28/09/2016 Yes - Community Contact
Y FGD 3, Na'ba 5 28/09/2016 Yes - Community Contact
Y
FGD 4, Bourj 
Hammoud
12 25/10/2016
No - post FGD interview, 
social worker
Y
FGD 5, Bourj 
Hammoud
6 26/10/2016
No - post FGD interview, 
social worker
Y
FGD 6, Bourj 
Hammoud
4 29/10/2016
No - post FGD interview, 
social worker
Y
FGD 7, 
Mazra'a
11 06/11/2016 Yes - Social Worker
Y
FGD 8, 
Mazra'a
7 07/11/2016 Yes - Social Worker
Recorded/Not 
Recorded 
Focus Group 
Number 
Number of 
Participants
Date CC or NGO Worker Present 
Y
FGD 1, 
Ashrafyeh
3 01/03/2017 Yes - Social Worker
Y
FGD 2, 
Ashrafyeh
7 01/03/2017 Yes - Social Worker
Y
FGD 3, 
Ashrafyeh
5 02/03/2017 Yes - Social Worker
Y
FGD 4, 
Ashrafyeh
5 02/03/2017 Yes - Social Worker
AMMAN
BEIRUT
NAME LOCATION BRIEF BIO 
Nasim Beirut Sunni, mid- thirties, married mother, not working, from Aleppo
Fatima Beirut
Sunni, late twenties, married mother, not working, children with 
health complications, from Aleppo
Iman Beirut Sunni, late twenties   
Najat Beirut Sunni, early forties, married mother, not working
Amira Beirut Sunni, mid-forties, married mother, from Aleppo 
Fahira Amman Sunni, lower-middle class, mother of 7 from Homs, early thirties
Rahima Amman Sunni, middle class married mother
Hanan Amman Sunni, married, middle class mother of 4, early forties, from Homs
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ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS LEBANON
Participant Location Date 
Community Contact Working in Na'ba 20/09/2016
NGO Representative Working in Bourj Hammoud 25/09/2016
Political Party Representative (Hezbollah) Na'ba 29/09/2016
Political Party Representative (Lebanese Forces) Na'ba 06/10/2016
Political Party Representative  (Future Movement) Mazra'a 26/10/2016
Mukhtar Na'ba 29/09/2016
Mukhtar Mazra'a 10/10/2016
Researcher Working in Mazra'a 26/10/2016
Participant Location Date 
Community Contact Working in Mahata 12/02/2017
NGO Representative Working in Ashrafyeh 21/02/2017
NGO Representative Working in Ashrafyeh 09/03/2017
Justice Centre (JCLA) Amman 30/03/2017
ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS JORDAN
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Refugee Interview outline (semi-structured format)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Name:  
• Age:  
• Marital Status: 
• (Children?) : 
• Is your family here with you in Lebanon/Jordan? 
• Religion:   
• Life in Syria: (Did you work, did you live with extended family?)  
• UNHCR papers (what is your status?)  
  
(NOTE: This is for my own records, I like to have the women's first names so I can speak to them 
properly during the interview, but if they don't want to give them, this is fine. I won't use their 
names or any identifiable aspects in my work.)   
 
My name is Sarah Linn, I am a researcher from the University of Sheffield, UK. This is my translator, X (brief 
introduction of translator). I have been speaking to Syrian refugee women about their experiences of life in 
the city.   
 
I want to ask you some questions about what it is like living in your neighbourhood. How you get around, 
how you resolve problems and how you feel, especially when you are outside of your home. I am doing a 
study to show people in England what is like for a refugee woman who lives in a city in Lebanon/Jordan. 
Thank you very much for your time and for sharing your experiences with me.  
 
Anytime you would like to stop, please just say so. I would like to record this, so I can write up some notes, 
but only I will have access to the tape and afterwards, I will destroy the tape. If you change your mind, just 
say – I will stop recording and we will stop the questions. You don't have to take part in this study, if you 
don't want too. Are you happy to participate in the study and do you have any questions?  
 
We are just going to ask a few questions about you to begin with, your background and how you arrived in 
Lebanon/Jordan. Then I will ask some questions about the neighbourhood and your activities and how you 
might resolve problems and difficulties.  
 
(NOTE: Occasionally I encourage the women to cognitively map their neighbourhood – i.e. as we talk about a 
particular place they use, or don't like, they draw it out on paper as we talk – not all engage with this, so it 
tends to only be something I use depending on the interview)  
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• Where are you from in Syria and when (and how did you arrive in Lebanon/ Jordan?)  
• Were you in a camp? If so, how/why did you leave?  
• Why did you choose to come to Beirut/Amman?  
• Where about are you living now? (if this isn't clear – need to know neighbourhood)   
• How long have you lived in your particular neighbourhood? Are you going to keep living 
here?  
• Do you have family in Jordan/Lebanon? (Are other people from your community living in 
your neighbourhood? Do you know them, are you connected?)  
• What is the neighbourhood like? (Do you know your neighbours? Are there lots of Syrians 
living there? Is it a good neighbourhood? Family? Friends? Have you managed to settle 
in?)  
• What does your daily routine look like?  
• Are there areas where you wouldn't you go in the neighbourhood? Where would you 
avoid? Would it be ok if you were with others, but not by yourself?   
• Are their particular places you don't like? Or have you been told to avoid any places?  
• Has anyone ever made you feel uncomfortable on the street? (Maybe said something to 
you?)   
• How have other women in the community behaved towards you? Are they welcoming, do 
you interact with them? (Both refugee and host community)  
• Have people's attitudes changed over the time you have been here? (Prompts: Were they 
welcoming, but now not so much? If so, does that make you feel a less safe?)  
• Do you feel that you have a sense of belonging to the city and to this neighbourhood?  
 
• What helps you to feel safe when you are out? (Prompts: Clothing, charitable registration 
or involvement, UNHCR papers, Authorization permit, walking with friends/family, going 
to a place you know – nothing, it never occurs to you?) 
• Have you adjusted your appearance since you arrived in Lebanon to make you feel more 
protected? (started wearing the hijab? Wear the hijab indoors because of sharing 
accommodation?)  
•  If you must run an errand, will you take others with you? (For company? For safety?) 
• Do you leave the neighbourhood? If so, for what reasons? (Do you ever visit friends in 
other parts of the city?) 
• Would you use public transport or a taxi (yes, no, why)  
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• Are there certain times that you wouldn't go out? (Prompts: National holidays? Night 
time?)  
• Where do you feel safest? (Prompts: Home? NGO Centre? With others? Safe space?)  
• What helps you feel secure?  
 
I'm going to ask you a few questions about resolving conflict or difficulties in the neighbourhood 
and about different security providers 
 
• If there is a disagreement in the neighbourhood, who normally helps to resolve it? 
(Prompts: police, army, political parties, religious mediator, mukhtar?)  
• If there is a disagreement between Syrians, who normally helps to resolve it? (Syrian 
representative?)  
• Would you ever speak to the police/army? Would you ever ask them to help resolve a 
problem or difficulty? 
• Who would you go to, to assist in resolving a major conflict or problem?  
• How do you feel when you see someone in uniform?  
• Is there a certain group or political party that operates in your neighbourhood?  
• Is there a curfew in your neighbourhood? How did you know about the curfew? How does 
it make you feel?  
• Have you every accessed/used the Mukhtar? (What for, did they assist you?)  
• Are you aware of different signs, flags, patrols, representatives indicating different 
political parties operating in your area?    
• Are you aware/know the different political parties in your neighbourhood? If you had a 
problem with a birth certificate, or if your landlord was giving you trouble, would you 
speak to a member of the political parties to help you sort this? (No? If so, who would you 
go to?)  
• What happens when you pass a checkpoint? Do you avoid them? Do you know of anyone 
who has had difficulty with them?    
 
Thank you's and passing over of contact information. Do they have any questions?   
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Refugee Focus Group Outline (Semi-structured format)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(If possible, in given setting, ask for a bit of brief background from each participant at outset, 
covering these issues and where possible how/where they arrived in Amman/Beirut)  
• Name:  
• Age:  
• Marital Status: 
• (Children?): 
• Religion:   
• Life in Syria: (Did you work, did you live with extended family?)  
• UNHCR papers (what is your status?)  
• When/how did you arrive in Jordan/Lebanon or Amman/Beirut 
• Why did you settle here?  
• General living standards & circumstances (rent, location, condition, experience) 
 
Main Questions  
• Can you tell me a bit about how life has been in your local neighbourhood? (Have people been 
welcoming? Have you settled in? Do you have access to resources?)  
• Are you working? (Did you work previously, what have experiences been like? How is family 
income organised?)  
My name is Sarah Linn, I am a researcher from the University of Sheffield, UK. This is my translator, X (brief 
introduction of translator)   
I want to ask you some questions about what it is like living in your neighbourhood. How you get around, 
how you resolve problems and how you feel, especially when you are outside of your home. I am doing a 
study to show people in England what is like for a refugee woman who lives in a city in Lebanon/Jordan. 
Thank you very much for your time and for sharing your experiences with me.  
If anyone wants the group to stop, please just say so. I would like to record this, so I can write up some notes, 
but only I will have access to the tape and afterwards, I will destroy the tape. If you change your mind, just 
say – I will stop recording and we will stop the questions. You don't have to take part in this study, if you 
don't want too. Are you happy to participate in the study and do you have any questions?  
I am going to ask a few questions about each of you to begin with, your background and how you arrived in 
Lebanon/Jordan. Then I will ask some questions about the neighbourhood and your activities and how you 
might resolve problems and difficulties.  
(NOTE: Occasionally I encourage the women to cognitively map their neighbourhood – i.e. as we talk about a 
particular place they use, or don't like, they draw it out on paper as we talk – not all engage with this, so it 
tends to only be something I use depending on the interview)  
 
316 
 
• Do you leave your local neighbourhood and how do you feel when you leave it? (Do you use 
any leisure spaces? Do you visit NGO’s? Do you use public transport? Have you encountered 
any issues with these?)   
• Can you describe some of your experiences when in public space? Do you feel confident going 
out alone? Do you restrict yourself? (Can use examples of other participants describing 
harassment if needed)  
• If you had any problems or difficulties in the neighbourhood, how would you resolve them? Is 
there someone who might help you? (Police? Neighbours? Family?)  
• Do you have someone that represents or helps your family? (A Mukhtar? A Syrian 
representative for refugees in the community?)  
• Do you see much police or army in the neighbourhood? How do you feel about this?  
• Would you speak to the police/army if you had any problems or difficulties?  
• Do you have a sense of belonging to your local neighbourhood/community/city/host country?  
• Does your life look very different to how it was previously in Syria? (In what ways?)   
• (If appropriate) Do you feel empowered by these changes? 
 
Thank you's and passing over of contact information. Do they have any questions?   
 
 
 
 
 
